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Abstract 
The close connections and interactions between the Taiwan crisis and succession 
politics, and Taiwan policy and informal politics, demonstrated that the PRC politics 
were not fully institutionalised. Military-driven politics played a major role, but 
succession politics constituted the centre of Chinese informal politics. This leadership 
succession problem provided the military with the opportunities to greatly influence 
Beijing's decision-making on events in the Taiwan Strait. The military's influence 
was significant largely because political control was weakened by the struggle for 
succession. This process was facilitated by the importance of informal politics in the 
PRC. In this sense, the PRC provocation of the Taiwan crisis can be largely attributed 
to the military'S leverage in the leadership succession struggle. Although other 
informal political factors contributed to Beijing's Taiwan policy and decisions to 
launch war-games, the struggle for succession was the most important factor acting on 
Taiwan policy and influencing the lead-up to the Taiwan crisis. Thus, the Taiwan 
crisis was due to a series of internal domestic elements of which the succession crisis 
was the key. 
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Note on Romanization 
This study uses a large number of primary Chinese materials. In transliterating the 
names of people and organisations from Chinese into English, it involves a question 
of which form of Chinese romanization system should be adopted. The Hanyu Pinyin 
system, a Mandarin romanization system, has been used in mainland China. The rest 
of the world, including the United Nations, has selected this system as the standard for 
romanizing Chinese. Thereby for the case of mainland China, the study adopts this 
system. However, Taiwan has not officially accepted the system. It continues to use 
the Wade-Giles romanization system. In addition, many Taiwanese including senior 
officials have their own English first names. Thus the Wade-Giles system is used for 
transliteration of the names of people and organisations in Taiwan. In using two 
systems simultaneously, there is a small difference in spelling a specific personal 
name to which attention needs to be paid. For example, for *~~, this study largely 
uses the Wade-Giles system spelling it as Lee Teng-hui. Meanwhile, in quoting from 
documents in both Chinese and English on mainland China, his name is spelled as Li 
Denghui. 
A question about how to transcribe Chinese words into the Roman alphabet has 
been intensively debated in recent years in Taiwan, involving the issue of 
independence/reunification and incurring criticism from Beijing. In view of this, it 
needs to be stated that adoption of the two systems is merely for academic purposes, 
but does not imply any particular political position. 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1. The Purpose of the Study 
1.1-1. The Originality and Importance of the Study 
The PRC, as a rising superpower with an expanding economy and strengthening 
military muscle, carries considerable weight in the global arena. Its views are being 
heard and taken seriously around the world, sometimes arousing concern from the 
international community over its future orientation. Its economic development, 
social transformation and political change will be decisive factors shaping world 
affairs in the new millennium. This gives rise to the question: Will it be merged into 
contemporary international society or develop strained relations with the outside 
world? One of determinants of which direction it will take is that of the Taiwan 
Issue. 
Taiwan is an island of considerable strategic significance. The Taiwan issue 
exerts leverage on the Asia-Pacific geopolitical balance of power while playing an 
important role in shaping the global strategic pattern. It involves the major powers, 
in particular, the sole superpower, the United States. It is the most important and 
sensitive issue affecting PRC-US relations, and a continued point of contention 
between the two. As permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, 
nuclear powers and the world' ~ most populous and powerful nations, respectively 
their Taiwan policies have global consequences. As cross-strait disputes mount, the 
PRC-Taiwan relationship has become more complex and emotional, an important 
potential threat to international security. Furthermore, the PRC's domestic political 
problems have an important bearing on the situation in the Taiwan Strait. In this 
context, this study raises the question: what is the relationship between domestic 
politics and Taiwan policy in the PRC? 
The 1995-96 Taiwan crisis shocked the international community. The associated 
massive military manoeuvres were the PRC's largest operation since the end of the 
1 
2 
1979 PRC-Vietnam Border War. In tum, the US made a strong response in the latter 
part of the crisis, dispatching two aircraft-carrier battle groups near the Taiwan Strait. 
This was the largest American military movement in the Asia-Pacific theatre since 
the end of the Vietnam War. The crisis led to a military stand-off between mainland 
China and the island, as well as the PRC and the US, and had a damaging impact on 
peace and stability in both the region and the world. People worried about a cross-
strait war which might escalate into a PRC-US armed conflict, and even a nuclear 
war. Consequently, some major questions are raised for research: Why did the 
Taiwan issue suddenly erupt into a crisis? Why did the parties concerned get 
themselves into such a dangerous situation? Where were the sources and causes of 
the crisis? Which factors, international or domestic, lead to the outbreak of the 
, 
crisis? 
In terms of the origins of the crisis, the controversial ROC President Lee Teng-
hui's US visit in mid-1995 triggered a strong reaction from Beijing, which conducted 
military exercises including missiles test-fired into waters off Taiwan. Why did the 
PRC respond so strongly? Did Beijing provoke the crisis? If so, why? To answer 
these questions one has to sort out how Taiwan policy is made and establish the key 
factors influencing decision-making on the Taiwan crisis. 
1.1-2. Significance of the Proposed Research and Its Main 
Contributions 
The theme of this study is not new. Although some scholars have put forward the 
view that the PRC leadership succession problem was the root cause of the 1995-96 
Taiwan crisis, few scholarly works have detailed the succession struggle that 
preceded the crisis. 1 By examining the inner link between PRC leadership 
succession and Taiwan policy-making this study will argue that succession politics 
seriously affected Taiwan policy, thereby demonstrating that domestic politics has a 
significant influence upon Beijing's foreign policy. 
I . For a review of different perspectives on the original source and underlying cause of the Taiwan 
crisis and the PRC leadership succession problem, as well as scholars' earlier contributions to the 
topic, see Chapter 1.2-1. The Existing Views and Perspectives on the Topic. 
This study aims to contribute to Chinese political studies in two respects. First, 
the study will provide a comprehensive analysis of decision-making regarding the 
Taiwan crisis and general Taiwan policy-making in the PRC by exploring close 
connections between domestic politics and Taiwan policy conditions. Using a case 
study of the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96, this study will examine the systems and 
mechanisms for the making ofPRC policy toward Taiwan by analysing their 
structure and process as well assessing the impact of the external environment upon 
Taiwan policy-making. In making a thorough examination into why the Taiwan 
crisis broke out, it will seek to locate the fundamental source and underlying causes 
of the crisis. 
3 
Secondly, in applying relevant theories the study will investigate the Taiwan crisis 
and the PRC leadership succession crisis in order to examine the interrelationships 
between Taiwan policy-making, succession politics, foreign policy-making and 
informal politics.2 It is important to establish to what extent inconsistent policies and 
changing behaviour can be explained by way of these interrelationships. At a 
broader level of generalisation, the study will also consider the wider theoretical 
implications, including new developments in researching Chinese informal politics.3 
The study will explore the concept of military-driven politics. It will seek to 
demonstrate that the military is a driving force in informal politics and one of the 
major informal political factors. 
1.2. The Current State of Knowledge and the Key 
Assumptions of the Study 
1.2-1. The Existing Views and Perspectives on the Topic 
2 • For relevant theories, see Chapter 1.3-1. Theoretical Background. 
3 • Regarding the theory of Chinese informal politics, this study mainly refers to the publications in the 
1990s which summarised and developed past research results especially since the 1970s. The China 
Journal organised a special symposium and published a group of articles on informal politics theory 
in its July 1995 issue. This is a primary reference for this study's consideration of the issues of 
informal politics. In addition to this special journal symposium, the other special issue of The China 
Journal and some articles in other journals are referred to. See the Forum on the Nature of Chinese 
Politics Today, The China Journal, NoA5, January 2001, pp.l-142; Lowell Dittmer, "Patterns of Elite 
Strife and Succession in Chinese Politics," The China Quarterly, No.l23, September 1990, ppA05-
430; Avery Goldstein, "Trends in the Study of Political Elites and Institutions in the PRC," The China 
Quarterly, No.139, September 1994, pp.714-730; Joseph Fewsmith, "Institutions, Informal Politics, 
and Political Transition in China," Asian Survey, VoI.XXXVI, No.3, March 1996, pp.230-245. 
Shortly after the 1995-96 Taiwan crisis, members of the academic community 
began researching all the complex factors leading to the armed antagonism in the 
Taiwan Strait. The Security Dialogue published a special section on the crisis in its 
December 1996 issue. In the July 1996 issue, The China Journal carried a group of 
articles on the subject. A year later, a more detailed version of several of them 
reappeared in a volume, under the title "Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan's Future: 
4 
Innovations in Politics and Military Power".4 The volume was based on an 
international workshop in May 1996 organised by the Northeast Asia Program of the 
Australian National University. The Journal of Contemporary China ( JCC) also 
published a special issue in July 1997. After two years, most papers of this issue, 
with the title of "Across the Tdiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-
1996 Crisis", were compiled into a monograph adding three others (two of them 
appeared in the JCC in following years ).5 These two books provide much 
background analysis to events in the Straits during 1995-1996 and assessment of the 
purposes of the PRe war-games, including differing explanations of the origins of 
the crisis. 
"Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? JJ and "Face Off: China, the 
United States, and Taiwan's Democratization", are two further monographs dealing 
with the 1995-96 Taiwan crisis, however, both have differing points offocus.6 The 
former explores the origins of the crisis, placing emphasis on suggesting how to 
respond to the consequences and developing an approach for the management of 
future crises. Although the latter also assesses the repercussions of the crisis and 
makes policy recommendations to avert possible crises in the future, it is more 
specific, seeking out the main source and the major causes of the crisis. In addition, 
4 . Greg Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan's Future: Innovations in Politics and Military 
Power. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian 
Studies, Australian National University, 1997. 
5. Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 
Crisis. New York and London: Routledge, 1999. 
6. Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 1999; John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's 
Democratization. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997. 
"China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue" explores the origins of the 1995-96 Taiwan 
crisis but its views appear to be "in favour ofPRC positions".? 
5 
In the meantime, several military monographs have been published but the 
principal books are "Crisis in the Taiwan Strait" and "The Chinese PLA 's Perception 
of an Invasion ofTaiwan".8 The former is based on a seminar held in Washington, 
D.C. in the fall of 1996 and the latter is a collection essays from June 1995 to 
September 1996. While analysing the historical roots of the crisis, the two 
monographs focus on the military strategies and tactics of the PRC, the US and 
Taiwan together with the military balance and confrontation in the Straits in 1995-96. 
Special attention has been given to PRC defence spending, modernisation and 
organisation, assessment of the PLA weapomy systems, combat capabilities, 
command structure, military doctrine and preconditions for attack on Taiwan. 
In addition, there are a number of books dealing with PRC military and foreign 
relations and cross-strait relations as well as the security issues in the Asia-Pacific 
region and the Taiwan Strait. These books, such as "The Great Wall and the Empty 
Fortress: China's Search for Security", "The Coming Conflict with China", "China's 
Security: The New Roles of the Military" and "Taiwan's Security in the Changing 
International System", touch upon the 1995-96 Taiwan crisis but are less specific as 
regards its origins.9 
Scholars from both sides ofthe Taiwan Strait obviously have different views, and 
criticise the opposite side for provoking the crisis. PRC scholars mainly restate 
Beijing's standpoints on the crisis while Taiwanese scholars' views are also close to 
their government's position despite differences in interpreting the crisis. lo 
7 • See Sheng Lijun, China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2001, and its book review by Robert G. Sutter, The China Journal, No.47, January 2002, 
pp.130-132. 
8. James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs (eds), Crisis in the Taiwan Strait. FT. McNair, Washington, 
D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1997; Peter Kien-hong Yu ( WI :&IJ ~ ) (ed.), The Chinese 
PLA 's Perception 0/ an Invasion o/Taiwan ( '*' if fill jj{ if x1.iit;!; 18 tit .z M f.Il). New York: 
Contemporary U.S.-Asia Research Institute, 1996. 
9 • Andrew 1. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search/or 
Security. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997; Richard Bernstein and Ross H. 
Munro, The Coming Conflict with China. New York: A. A. Knopf, Distributed by Random House, 
1997; Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China's Security: The New Roles o/the Military. 
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1998; Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Taiwan's Security 
in the Changing International System. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997. 
10. Some scholars in the PRC not only follow Beijing's policy toward Taiwan and justify the 
leadership's decisions on the Taiwan crisis, but also make more bellicose remarks than the party and 
In terms of the controversial issues, Andrew J. Nathan summarises three major 
views on the origins of the Taiwan crisis. Suisheng Zhao also analyses multiple 
. perspectives on the major causes of the crisis. ll These widely divergent views and 
perspectives cover politics, economics and military issues. 
A general view suggests that the 1995-96 events in the Taiwan Strait were due to 
a host of coexistent reasons. Interweaving factors were at work and Beijing, Taipei 
and Washington, all shared responsibility for the crisis, despite differing about "the 
degree of blame to be placed on" the three sides. 12 All three's domestic politics 
impacted upon events in the Straits and strained relations. Accordingly, respective 
policies impinged on each other leading to the crisis. On one hand, "Chinese-
American-Taiwanese diplomatic jockeying" was considered to be a causal factor of 
the crisis. As such, the strategic interest conflicts between the PRC and the US, 
stemming from Beijing's ambitions to replace US hegemony in Asia and the 
perception ofthe US as its main strategic enemy, was the root cause of the crisis. 13 
6 
On the other hand, among the triangular relationships between Beijing, Taipei and 
Washington, the mainland-island disputes were principal, playing a maj?r role in 
precipitating the crisis. Clearly, the crisis originated from fundamental political 
differences on either side of the Taiwan Strait. Major changes, mainly 
democratisation and the rise of pro-independence forces in Taiwan politics, then 
government. For example, Chu Shulong, a specialist in PRC-US relations at the government-run 
Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations, clamours for a PRC-US War over Taiwan. 
With unparalleled violent and harsh words, he asserts that the PRC and the US would likely fight for 
the status of Taiwan, "either a hot war or a new cold war". See Chu Shulong, "The Second PRC-US 
War: International Involvement in China's Unification," in Greg Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy and 
Taiwan's Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power. Canberra: Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997, 
pp.228-239. Also see Chu Shulong, "National Unity, Sovereignty and Territorial Integration," The 
China Journal, No.36, July 1996, pp.98-102. 
II. Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 
Crisis. New York and London: Routledge, 1999, pp.viii, 1-18. 
12 • Rex Li, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Future of China-Taiwan Relations," Security Dialogue, 
Vo1.27, NoA, December 1996, ppA50-452; James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs (eds), Crisis in the 
Taiwan Strait. FT. McNair, Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1997, p.2. 
13 • Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China. New York: A. A. Knopf, 
Distributed by Random House, 1997, pp.18-21, 149-165. Also see Peter Van Ness, "Competing 
Hegemons," The China Journal, No.36, July 1996, pp.l25-128. 
impacted on cross-strait relations enhancing both adverse positions. Lee Teng-hui's 
US visit consequently became a central issue in the conflict across the Straits. 14 
7 
In a background analysis of cross-strait relations in the mid-1990s, Suisheng Zhao 
examines the phenomena of coexistence, economic cooperation and political 
hostility. He explains why the increasing economic exchanges did not bring about 
substantial improvement in political relations and why the Beijing-Taipei disputes 
intensified moving toward the armed stalemate again, attributing it to deeply rooted 
mutual hostility and perplexed political contentions. 15 Edward Friedman and Dennis 
Van Vranken Hickey also consider that "mutual misperceptions in Beijing and Taipei 
were one ofthe major causes for the persistence of hostility and the military crisis."16 
Meanwhile, Zhao is of the opinion that a strategic shift in the PRC Taiwan policy 
from peaceful reunification to a forcible merger was an immediate cause of the crisis. 
This shift corresponded to a major change in the cross-strait situation caused by 
Lee's US visit and his perceived intention of collaborating with the US to seek 
Taiwan independence. 17 
Although scholars' views are divergent on the main source and the major causes 
of the crisis, most ofthem emphasise that the PRC war-games provoked the crisis. 
One view suggests that interrelated factors caused the PRC to use force to intimidate 
Taiwan. John W. Garver "attributes China's decision to use military intimidation to 
three complementary factors". First, in order to re-engineer Communist Party 
legitimacy, Beijing attempted to promote a new Chinese nationalism through 
confronting Taipei and Washington over the Straits. Second, through coercing the 
Taiwanese electorate, Beijing wanted to demonstrate its indispensable presence in 
Taiwan politics. Third, Beijing's decision on the military coercion of Taiwan was 
generated by the inconsistent policy of the Clinton administration regarding the 
Taiwan issue. On one hand, Washington's failure in reaffirming its commitment to a 
peaceful resolution ofthe issue, in particular an infirm stance to help defend Taiwan 
14. John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle and 
London: University of Washington Press, 1997, pp.1-5; Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in 
the Taiwan Strait? Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999, pp.ix-x. 
15. Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 
Crisis. New York and London: Routledge, 1999, pp.21-40. 
16. Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 
Crisis. New York and London: Routledge, 1999, pp.13, 258-259. 
evidenced by its mild reaction at the early stage, encouraged Beijing's military 
adventure. On the other hand, Beijing felt compelled to make strong responses to 
stop Washington from tilting further toward Taipei: 18 
However, other scholars analyse the cause of the crisis from mainly the 
perspectives ofPRC domestic politics. They can roughly be subdivided into four 
issues: national security interests, nationalism, national political stability ( as 
impacted by Taiwanese democratisation) and the leadership succession. It is 
noteworthy that almost nobody provides an ideological or economic rationale as an 
explanation of the origins of the crisis. 19 
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Some opinions assume that several factors interacted simultaneously and 
contributed together to Beijing's provocative military actions. For example, the 
interpretations of Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang suggest Beijing's decisions to 
launch military exercises were motivated by Chinese nationalism. They are inclined 
to combine this with the perspectives of national security and interests. Furthermore, 
they believe that the military, for its own institutional interests, played a major role in 
compelling Beijing to provoke the Taiwan crisis. 20 
Andrew J. Nathan's interpretation is very different from the great majority of the 
academic community. He proposes that a serious security concern over the Taiwan 
issue drove Beijing to conduct military exercises. He states that "the fundamental 
national security interests of China are involved" because the status of Taiwan has a 
most important bearing on ensuring PRe security. In an unfavourable neighbouring 
environment, Beijing had developed a sense of insecurity. If the island won 
independence, this could encourage ethnic separatism in the country's vast border 
regions and cripple national defence. In order to preserve national unity and 
sovereignty, Beijing had to take the actions it thought were necessary to check 
17 . Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 
Crisis. New York and London: Routledge, 1999, pp.99-125. 
18 • See John W. Garver, Face Ojf: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle 
and London: University of Washington Press, 1997, and its book review by Gregory W. Noble, The 
China Journal, NoA1, January 1999, pp.228-229. 
19. Some scholars believe that the PRC domestic economic issues were irrelevant to Beijing's 
decision on cross-strait tension. See John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and 
Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997, and its book 
review by Gregory W. Noble, The China Journal, NoA1, January 1999, p.228. 
20. Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China's Security: The New Roles o/the Military. Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1998, pp.271-279. 
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Taipei's advance along the separatist road. Beijing viewed Taipei's pragmatic 
diplomacy in seeking to gain international recognition of Taiwan's sovereign status, 
in particular, Lee's US visit, as a major move in permanently splitting the island from 
the mainland. By reason of the rising Taiwanese independence movement and its 
collaboration with hostile foreign forces, mainly the US, the PRC national interests, 
especially its security were at stake. Therefore Beijing changed its peaceful 
reunification policy to a coercive strategy.21 Henry Kissinger and Stuart Harris share 
Nathan's understanding. 22 However, these explanations of national security and 
interests are not unchallenged, Peter Van Ness, in particular, contests Nathan's 
interpretation. 23 
Other scholars interpret Beijing's motivations for its violent actions in the Straits 
purely in terms of nationalism. In Edward Friedman's opinion, the impetus for 
Beijing's decisions to launch military exercises to threaten Taiwan was to use 
Chinese nationalism in place of China's communist ideology in order to legitimise its 
rulership. Communism had already collapsed as a national ideology. As a result, 
Communist Party legitimacy became increasingly problematic and Communist 
leaders were promoting nationalism as the only unifying ideology in maintaining 
"the antipeople police state". As a symbol of "bullying" and "hegemony" by 
outsiders, the Taiwan issue was regarded as a ready-made theme for rallying the 
Chinese people behind the banner of nationalism. In attacking Taipei for engaging in 
independence activities and invoking hostile foreign forces mainly the "hegemonist 
America" and "militaristic Japan", Lee's US visit was propagandised as the critical 
issue for national unity and sovereignty. Beijing made use of it to whip up 
nationalistic resentment in mobilising domestic support for the Communist regime. 
By playing on their role as the sacred defenders ofthe country's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity in the face of the "Taiwanese separatists and American 
21. Andrew J. Nathan, "China's Goals in the Taiwan Strait," The China Journal, No.36, July 1996, 
pp.87-93. Later, a book by Nathan and Robert S. Ross enhances the perspectives of national security 
and interests with greater consideration of the Taiwan problem, in particular, the issue of Lee's US 
visit, as crucial matters to the PRC. See Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and 
the Empty Fortress: China's Searchfor Security. New York and London: W. W. Norton & 
. Company, 1997, pp.193-225. 
22 • Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China. New York: A. A. Knopf, 
Distributed by Random House, 1997, p.117; Stuart Harris, "The Taiwan Crisis: Some Basic 
Realities," The China Journal, No.36, July 1996, pp.129-134. 
23 • See Peter Van Ness, "Competing Hegemons," The China Journal, No.36, July 1996, p.l26. 
hegemonists", Communist leaders hoped to maintain their grip on power. 
Consequently, militant Chinese nationalism, even Chinese Chauvinism, resulted in 
military provocation in the Straits.24 However, other scholars adduce evidence to 
contest the argument of nationalism. They do not view nationalism as a critical 
political dynamic in adopting belligerence toward Taiwan during 1995-1996.25 
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A debate on the deterrence of Taiwanese independence and/or democratisation is 
a further primary factor in discussing PRC military pressure on the island. Richard 
Bernstein and Ross H. Munro argue that Beijing attempted to remove a threat of 
Taiwanese democratisation while disagreeing that PRC coercion was aimed at 
deterring Taiwanese independence. A democratising Taiwan was considered 
dangerous to monopoly rule of the Communist Party. In order to prevent the 
democratic idea from spreading to people on the Chinese mainland, a frustrated 
Beijing had to repress it through intimidation of Taiwanese voters. 26 However, Chen 
Jian, Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang argue that the PRC military exercises were 
not aimed at the democratisation of Taiwan, but targeted at Taiwanese 
independence.27 
In terms of the leadership succession issue, opinion is divided into two opposite 
schools: succession struggle consequence and institutional outcome. The former 
proposes that the Taiwan crisis was caused by a succession crisis in the PRC 
leadership, but the latter argues that the military exercises were Beijing's systematic 
responses. The central issue is one of personality or organisation. Which role is 
determinant? Was Beijing's military coercion of Taiwan shaped by noninstitutional 
or institutional elements? Did the leadership succession or the leadership system 
playa more important role in making decisions on events in the Straits? 
24. Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 
Crisis. New York and London: Routledge, 1999, pp.243-275. 
25. For example, in a case study of Beijing's Taiwan policy in the mid and late 1990s, Suisheng Zhao 
concludes that "nationalism has not driven China into taking irrational action against Taiwan". See 
Suisheng Zhao, "Chinese Nationalism and Beijing's Taiwan Policy: A China Threat?," Issues & 
Studies, Vol.36, No.1, January/February 2000, pp.76-99. 
26. Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China. New York: A. A. Knopf, 
Distributed by Random House, 1997, pp.l4-17, 79,155, 161-163. 
27. Chen Jian, "Understanding the Logic of Beijing's Taiwan Policy," Security Dialogue, Vol.27, 
NoA, December 1996, ppA59-462; Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China's Security: The New 
Roles a/the Military. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1998, p.276. 
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The school of succession struggle, headed by John F Copper, strongly believes 
that succession politics in Beijing was transformed into the leadership crisis which, 
in turn led'to the Taiwan crisis.28 The Taiwan crisis came at a time when the Beijing 
leadership was undergoing another power transition. As Deng Xiaoping's health 
visibly deteriorated, a final fight over his succession became increasingly tense. 
Taiwan issues, in particular, the problem of Lee's US visit, set off a fiercer struggle 
over the leadership succession. The paramount leaders, in particular, Deng's heir 
apparent, Jiang Zemin, found it extremely difficult to withstand being accused of a 
soft stance on national reunification and PRC-US relations. As a result, Beijing 
adopted belligerence toward Taiwan, risking a military conflict with the US. 
Dennis Van Vranken Hickey also considers that "the thorny succession issue" 
caused "China's leadership crisis" contributing to a tough policy toward Taiwan and 
leading to the cross-strait tensions.29 In addition, Ellis Joffe, Rex Li and Willy Wo-
Lap Lam hold the view that contention over the leadership succession was a primary 
element in Beijing's war-games while laying emphasis on the roles of military-driven 
and factional politics in the succession struggle.30 However, few scholars of the 
school of succession struggle justify their assumption in detail. 
A contrary view is put by Andrew J. Nathan.31 John W. Garver also considers that 
succession politics affected but was not a deciding factor in compelling Beijing to 
make decisions to intimidate Taiwan.32 Sheng Lijun acknowledges that "personal 
political consideration also played a role" because the leadership succession "had not 
28 • John F Copper, "The Origins of Conflict Across the Taiwan Strait: The Problem of Differences in 
Perceptions", in Sui sheng Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 
1995-1996 Crisis. New York and London: Routledge, 1999, pp.41-74. 
29 . Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Taiwan's Security in the Changing International System. Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, p.190. 
30. Ellis Joffe, "How Much Does the PLA Make Foreign Policy?" in David S.G. Goodman and Gerald 
Segal (eds), China Rising. London and New York: Routledge, 1997, pp.53-70; Rex Li, "The Taiwan 
Strait Crisis and the Future of China-Taiwan Relations," Security Dialogue, Vo1.27, No.4, December 
1996, p.4S1; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "The Factional Dynamics in China's Taiwan Policy," The China 
Journal, No.36, July 1996, pp.l16-118. 
31. Andrew 1. Nathan, "China's Goals in the Taiwan Strait," The China Journal, No.36, July 1996, 
p.87. 
32. John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle and 
London: University of Washington Press, 1997, and its book review by Gregory W. Noble, The China 
Journal, No.41, January 1999, p.228. 
been completed", but argues that the divergence of the Taiwan issue, mainly Lee's 
US visit, in Chinese elite politics should not be exaggerated.33 
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The school of institutional outcome is represented by You Ji.34 Although he does 
not dispute the utility of searching for internai political sources of the conflict across 
the Straits, he considers that power struggles in the hierarchy are overemphasised and 
the divergence over Taiwan policy between leaders is exaggerated. He places 
Beijing's decision-making during the Taiwan crisis in the context of strategic 
calculations. He insists that the leadership system performed an important function 
in shaping the PRC military exercises in the Straits because of grave concern over 
territorial sovereignty and national security. There was an apparent unanimity of 
view in Beijing on the strategy regarding Taiwan, reaching a consensus to shift from 
promoting mainly peaceful reunion to increasing military pressure to force Taipei to 
move to reunification rather than independence. Thus Beijing decided to conduct 
military exercises to warn Taipei. 
The school of institutional outcome places emphasis on Beijing's strategic and 
diplomatic considerations. But it overlooks the political reality surrounding Taiwan 
policy decision-making in the PRC during 1995-96. For example, Nathan, Garver 
and Sheng came to their conclusions without an examination of the interplay between 
succession politics and Taiwan policy. 
Because You Ji is representative of the school of institutional outcome, this study 
focuses on analysing his arguments. His discourses are instructive in reviewing 
Beijing's motivations for the attempted coercion of Taipei. However, some 
interpretations within the institutional context are questionable. The crux of the 
argument is that "China's domestic politics of succession" "has theoretically been 
settled",35 suggesting that a major change in Taiwan policy was made under a stable, 
33 • Sheng Lijun, China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2001, pp.156-159. 
34 • See You Ji, "Missile Diplomacy and PRC Domestic Politics," in Greg Austin (ed.), Missile 
Diplomacy and Taiwan's Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power. Canberra: Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National 
University, 1997, pp.29-55; You Ji, "Changing Leadership Consensus: The Domestic Context of War 
Games," in Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-
1996 Crisis. New York and London: Routledge, 1999, pp.77-97. 
35. You Ji, "Changing Leadership Consensus: The Domestic Context of War Games," in Suisheng 
Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis. New York 
and London: Routledge, 1999, p.82. 
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authoritative and systematic leadership. Thus the PRe's actions in the Taiwan Strait 
resulted from strategic considerations in the formulation of policy and decision-
making.36 This argument leaves the question open in five respects. 
First, it calls into question whether Jiang Zemin's status as Deng's heir had been 
consolidated. The perspectives on the vulnerability and instability of Jiang's position 
as successor in the first half of the 1990s had already become prevalent.37 In 
evaluating "Jiang's prospects and his leadership problems" a year and half after 
coming into office, You made a critical assessment of him by reason of "the lack of a 
regularized process within the leadership" and "grave uncertainties" in the succession 
to Deng.38 However, four years later, You had a higher regard for Jiang's staying 
power than those scholars in the Western countries and Taiwan on grounds of "the 
institutional dynamics of succession politics".39 Unfortunately, You's work has less 
to teach us about how and why this transformation from the noninstitutional to the 
institutional occurred. On the contrary, it emphasises that the timing and 
environment were key factors in realising Jiang's right of succession whilst the 
application of factional politics also played an important role. 40 
36 • You Ji, "Changing Leadership Consensus: The Domestic Context of War Games," in Sui sheng 
Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis. New York 
and London: Routledge, 1999, pp.77-97. 
37. For example, Ellis Joffe, an advocator of the succession struggle approach, believes that Jiang "is 
both vulnerable and movable". See Ellis Joffe, "How Much Does the PLA Make Foreign Policy?" in 
David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds), China Rising. London and New York: Routledge, 
1997, p.56. 
38. You Ji, "Jiang Zemin 's Leadership and Chinese Elite Politics after 4 June 1990," Working Paper, 
No.221. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, December 
1990. 
39. For You Ji's opinion on Jiang's stable successor position, see You Ji, "Jiang Zemin: In Quest of 
Post-Deng Supremacy," in Maurice Brosseau, Suzanne Pepper and Tsang Shu-ki (eds), China Review 
1996. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1996, pp.1-27; You Ji, "Changing Leadership 
Consensus: The Domestic Context of War Games," in Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: 
Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis. New York and London: Routledge, 1999, 
pp.83-86. 
·40 . According to You Ji, the Ieey to Jiang's final and real hold on power is that he carefully calculated 
the timing to take over the reins of power from the party elders. With a cautious approach to the 
consolidation of his successor position, his strategic calculations of accommodating the party elders 
were successfully brought about over several years. Only when the revolutionary veterans such as 
Chen Yun passed away and Deng Xiaoping's health was in serious decline in 1995, did Jiang really 
succeed to the supreme power ofDeng. "This highlights that the factor of timing that [ it is ] 
determines the outcome ofa succession process." "The year 1995 proved the importance of the 
environment in which a successor can develop his power base." The demise of most party elders and 
Deng's failing health gave Jiang golden opportunities to fully gain the reins of power. See You Ji, 
"Jiang Zemin: In Quest ofPost-Deng Supremacy," in Maurice Brosseau, Suzanne Pepper and Tsang 
Shu-lei (eds), China Review 1996. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1996, p.3; You Ji, 
"Jiang Zemin's Command of the Military," The China Journal, No.45, January 2001, p.137. In 
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A second key issue is Jiang's relationship with the military and the military's role 
in the Taiwan policy and decision-making. The consolidation of Jiang's successor 
position involves an assessment of his degree of military support. You concludes 
that "the PLA has never challenged Jiang's position as the commander-in-chief'. 
However, he acknowledges that "the post-Deng power transfer has increased the 
influence of the PLA in the country's politics". The military gained "an enlarged say 
over vital leadership decisions" because of its major role in the leadership succession. 
In exchange for their support, Jiang had to satisfy the military through making 
"efforts to safeguard military interests", "enlarging military spending" and 
supporting "the PLA's new grand defence strategy". Meanwhile, "the PLA has 
probably acquired crucial power in directing the course of the PRe's Taiwan policy" 
and "the PLA has always taken a hard approach to Taiwan". This gives rise to the 
question: how could Jiang bring the military under his authority and curb the 
military's aggressive demands on Taiwan? There are more questions that need to be 
further addressed, such as the military's stance toward Jiang's new Taiwan policy 
(the eight-point proposal), lobbying on Taiwan policy and influence on the 
decision-making during the Taiwan crisis.41 
Third, the institutional outcome approach does not adequately explain why 
Beijing changed its responses to Lee's US visit from moderation to belligerence.42 
addition, in fact, You Ji acknowledges that "while factional dynamics persisted at the apex of the 
political pyramid," Jiang applied the factional means in fostering his successor position, combining 
"formal positions" and an "informal network of personal associates". See You Ji, "Jiang Zemin: In 
Quest ofPost-Deng Supremacy," in Maurice Brosseau, Suzanne Pepper and Tsang Shu-ki (eds), 
China Review 1996. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1996, pp.2, 7. 
41 • You Ji, "Missile Diplomacy and PRC Domestic Politics," in Greg Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy 
and Taiwan's Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power. Canberra: Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997, 
pp.43-4S. 
42 • When Lee planned his US trip and the Clinton administration decided to issue a visa to him, 
Jiang's administration exercised restraint. Beijing made representations toward Washington but did 
not adopt a tough diplomatic stance or suspend negotiations with Taipei. Whilst Lee visited the US 
from June 7-12, Beijing still responded politically, only publishing articles in the official media 
criticising Lee. Shortly after Lee's US visit, the PRC Taiwan Affairs Office on June 12 stated that 
although the visit had caused tensions between Beijing and Taipei, the agreements and exchanges 
between the two sides should be maintained and should not be affected. On June 14, ARA TS V ice 
Chairman Tang Shubei declared that the Second Koo-Wang Talks would be held in July in Beijing as 
scheduled. On June 16, Beijing withdrew its ambassador from Washington and suspended the 
scheduled Second Koo-Wang Talks. Although Jiang's administration toned up its responses, these 
reactions were still within reasonable bounds. See Chapter S.l-1. Jiang Zemin's Attempt to Maintain 
His Moderate Taiwan Policy and Mounting Pressures upon Him to Change It. Beijing did not 
announce its intention to conduct military manoeuvres until July IS. See Chu-cheng Ming, "Political 
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Beijing's early restraint reflected the fact that it did not necessarily have to make 
military responses. You Ji recognises that "immediately after Lee's US visit the 
Chinese leadership make a U-turn in its Taiwan policy". He offers plausible 
explanations for this, considering that there was a consensus on a strategic shift 
"from peaceful inducement to threats of force" in Beijing's "reunification policy".43 
However, the question needs to be asked: was such a response, adopting a mild 
stance at first and reacting strongly later, strategically calculated? Did the leadership 
system or the internal political processes play the larger role in making decisions to 
suddenly escalate from diplomatic means to military force? It is necessary to address 
these unanswered questions in order to discover the real cause for this maj or change 
in Beijing's stance toward Lee's US visit from restraint to violation. 
Fourth, the view of institutional outcome alone can not adequately explain the 
structure and process of Taiwan policy-making. As such, several important questions 
need to be further discussed: Did the official organs of Taiwan policy-making 
function properly? Did retired officials outside formal organisations have an 
influence? In the case of Jiang Zemin's new Taiwan policy-making, did he have 
self-interested intentions for power, and did his proteges outside the official Taiwan 
policy organs playa role? Were there informal political factors contributing to the 
interlinked Taiwan and US policies? Most important, did the leadership succession 
or the leadership system playa large role in making decisions on events in the 
Straits? 
Fifth, institutional outcomes should result from the institutionalisation of policy 
decision-making. However, this presupposition of institutionalisation is open to 
question. Was there a well-institutionalised mechanism of Taiwan policy-making? 
Were there conflicts between the institutional and noninstitutional elements in the 
course of Taiwan policy-making? Because the leadership succession in the 
Communist regime is recognised as a major problem,44 the most contestable issue in 
Interactions Across the Taiwan Strait," in Maurice Brosseau, Suzanne Pepper and Tsang Shu-ki (eds), 
China Review 1996. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1996, pp.l90-192. 
43. You Ji, "Changing Leadership Consensus: The Domestic Context of War Games," in Suisheng 
Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis. New York 
and London: Routledge, 1999, pp.77-83. 
44 • For example, Michel Oksenberg believes that "Leninist systems have no institutionalized and 
orderly procedures for selecting the successor to their paramount leader". "This is the Achilles heel 
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the argument of institutional outcome is whether politics and policy decision-making 
under the Communist regime can be institutionalised. A number of Chinese politics 
scholars hold the vi~w that PRC politics was not institutionalised in the mid-1990s. 45 
As You Ji acknowledges: "orderly succession is an unsolved problem for China. The 
only way out is to institutionalize it under the rule of law ...... a long and painful 
path".46 This study will argue that the key issue of non-institutionalised politics is 
that problems in the leadership succession system had not been resolved.47 Thereby 
it has to further the analytical inquiries into whether the war-games were related to a 
succession struggle consequence, or not. 
In searching for the underlying cause for Beijing's decisions to conduct military 
exercises in the Straits and the origins of the Taiwan crisis, these five sets of complex 
and controversial questions remain to be addressed. 
1.2-2. Hypotheses 
There were six possible domestic factors acting on the making of PRC policy 
towards Taiwan in the mid-1990s. These were: national security interests, ideology, 
nationalism, economic issues, national political stability and the leadership 
succession. 
First, it seems reasonable to argue that national security interests could be a cause 
of PRC Taiwan policy actions. Yet, there was no immediate external threat to the 
PRC's security. To be sure, the status of Taiwan had a bearing on China's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and for this reason the pursuit of national interest 
of the system." See Michel Oksenberg, "China's Political System: Challenges of the Twenty-First 
Century," The China Journal, No.45, January 2001, p.29. 
45 . Joseph Fewsmith points out emphatically "the lack of institutionalization at the top of the political 
system". See Joseph Fewsmith, "Institutions, Informal Politics, and Political Transition in China," 
Asian Survey, Vol.XXXVI, No.3, March 1996, p.245. Tang Tsou believes that "in the ( Chinese) 
Communists' project of rebuilding the state and the reconstruction of the whole society, the process of 
institutionalization has never been completed". See Tang Tsou, "Chinese Politics at the Top: 
Factionalism or Informal Politics? Balance-of-Power Politics or a Game to Win All?" The China 
Journal, No.34, July 1995, p.99. 
46. See You Ji, "Jiang Zemin: In Quest ofPost-Deng Supremacy," in Maurice Brosseau, Suzanne 
Pepper and Tsang Shu-ki (eds), China Review 1996. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 
1996, p.24. 
47 • Lowell Dittmer considers that "the question of succession is never permanently settled". See 
Lowell Dittmer, "Chinese Informal Politics," The China Journal, No.34, July 1995, p.20. 
had been one of the long-term strategic tasks ofPRC leaders. However, although 
Taiwan independence was an issue, it was not about to be declared as such. 
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Second, the role of Chinese communist ideology in structuring general policy 
formation had declined to the extent of becoming insignificant in the making of 
Taiwan policy. Beijing's adoption of belligerence toward Taiwan could hardly have 
been motivated by ideological considerations. 
A third factor is that of nationalism. As communist ideology has crumbled, 
Beijing has embraced nationalism as a replacement. However, this might be 
regarded as a reason and means to monopolise power rather than a basis of policy 
decision-making. Nationalism was a tool of the Communist leadership to justify its 
tough policy in external propaganda and domestic mobilisation. Also, Chinese 
nationalism, as a weapon, is of great use for the power struggle between aspiring 
Communist rulers. 
A fourth factor relates to economic issues. The reform of the economic system 
had limited relevance to the formulation of policy toward Taiwan. In terms of 
economic development, Taiwanese investment on the mainland helped sustain GDP 
growth. Although Beijing wished to attract more Taiwanese investment, it placed 
politics above the economy in pursuing its Taiwan policy goals.48 Hence, while in 
Taiwan policy-making, economic ties between the mainland and the island and their 
possible impacts on the domestic economy were taken into account, they were not 
one of the most serious considerations. As regards the national economic situation, it 
was not a tough economic time in the mid-1990s. Beijing was still able to keep the 
economy ongoing in the face of a mountain of problems despite the potential threat 
they posed to political stability. There were no conditions in pressing ahead with the 
economy that would entail the Taiwan issue. 
Since national security interests, ideology, nationalism and economic issues do 
not appear to be major determinants of the general Taiwan policy-making setting or 
the root cause of decision-making on the Taiwan crisis, an exploration of domestic 
48. Raymond I.M. Chang and Pei-chen Chang, "Taiwan's Emerging Economic Relations with the 
PRC," in Denis Fred Simon and Michael Y.M. Kau (eds), Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle. 
Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1992, p.291; An-chia Wu, "Taipei-Peking Relations: The Sovereignty 
Issue," in Bih-jaw Lin and James T. Myers (eds), Contemporary China and the Changing 
International Community. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1994, pp.193-194; 
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politics is required. A discussion of the domestic political origins involves two main 
areas: national political stability and the leadership succession. The key question for 
inquiry is whether political instability constituted the domestic origin of the PRC 
adventurist policy on Taiwan. There were problems of political stability but they did 
not reach a critical point. Although Communist Party legitimacy remained 
problematic and there were hidden troubles in stabilising the country in the looming 
post-Deng Xiaoping era, Beijing, by and large, had maintained a stable political 
situation through a tightening control. Internal tensions such as sporadic protests had 
to be tackled, but there was no imperative necessity for Beijing to divert people's 
attention from the domestic social and political problems to the Taiwan issue. In 
addition, preventing the democratisation of Taiwan from threatening one-party rule 
in the Chinese mainland was hardly likely to be Beijing's main considerations. A 
democratising Taiwan might have an impact in the long term but did not constitute 
an imminent threat to the survival of the Communist dictatorship. 
Since political stability did not drive the policy toward Taiwan and the US, it is 
necessary to look into the leadership succession problem. The mid-1990s was a 
critical juncture for succession politics. De facto ruler, Deng Xiaoping's health had 
been in serious decline. The supreme power was passing to Deng's chosen 
successor, Jiang Zemin. But this political transition process was fraught with 
contradictions and struggles. As Deng's health deteriorated, the succession struggle 
became fiercer. 
Thus, after analysing various possible major factors likely to influence 1995-96 
Taiwan policy-making, this study will assume that the PRC military intimidation of 
Taiwan arose from a power struggle which centred on the leadership succession 
problem. Jiang could not afford to be charged with weak policies toward Taiwan and 
the US due to the vulnerability of his successor's position. As a result, the war 
games in the Taiwan Strait initiated by the PRC became unavoidable. 
Therefore, the main hypothesis is that in the case of the 1995-96 Taiwan crisis, 
internal political considerations in the PRC outweighed strategic and diplomatic 
consideration in the formulation of policy and decision-making. A subsidiary 
Yu-Shan Wu, "Mainland China's Economic Policy Toward Taiwan: Economic Needs or Unification 
Scheme?" Issues & Studies, Vo1.30, No.9, September 1994, pp.29-49. 
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hypothesis is that in the internal political processes surrounding decision-making in 
the case of the 1995-96 Taiwan crisis, informal politics, mainly issues of succession, 
were more important than institutional politics. It will be argued that these internal 
political factors played a larger role in shaping Beijing's Taiwan policy and decision-
making on events in the Taiwan Strait during 1995 and 1996. 
1.3. Methodology 
1.3-1. Theoretical Background 
James N. Rosenau, a leading theorist of international relations, provides the basic 
theory. He identifies "five sets" of explanatory characteristics to determine foreign 
policy decision-making. According to Rosenau, these involve: "the individual, role, 
governmental, societal, and systemic variables" which can be used to explain a 
country's external policy behaviour.49 
The 'individual' variables focus on the decision-makers, who lead foreign affairs 
and formulate guiding principles and policies toward the outside world. Their 
individual characteristics such as "values, talents and prior experiences" shape 
foreign policy. 
The 'role' variables are embodied in the institutional positions held by officials. 
As the professional diplomats, they carry out their duties according to the 
requirements of their positions. 
The' governmental' variables concern the administrative system of foreign policy. 
Under the democratic political system, the functions of the government operating 
foreign policy are placed in the context of "executive-legislative relations". 
'Societal' variables refer to various social forces, mainly interest and pressure 
groups, that have an influence upon foreign policy decision-making. The important 
dimensions, such as social institutions and values, national identity and union and 
economic deVelopment, may act on the countries' external behaviour. 
The 'systemic' variables involve the "external environment". In making foreign 
policy, the decision-makers have to take international conditions and constraints into 
49. James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy ( Revised and Enlarged Edition). 
London: Printer; New York: Nichols, 1980, pp.128-135. 
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account. More importantly, they have to consider major factors such as geopolitics, 
ideology and, in particular, any aggressive intentions of potential enemy states. 
With regard to the respective roles of the five sets and their relationships, Rosenau 
points out: "Attaching causal priorities to the various sets of variables is extremely 
difficult." "There is no need to specify exactly how large a slice of the pie is 
accounted for by each set of variables." 
In view of the different roles of the five sets under varying circumstances, this 
study absorbs the essence of Rosenau's theoretical system. Its structure is designed 
with reference to, but without copying mechanically, the system of the five sets. In 
light of the uniqueness of the PRC situation, emphasis is placed on the individual, 
governmental and systemic variables. Role is merged into governmental because 
basically both variables belong in the same classification. To be sure, they can be 
differentiated one from another in given conditions. However, under the PRC 
political system, both diplomats and the government departments concerned with the 
conduct of foreign affairs are together in the same system and are under the unified 
leadership of the Communist Party. Since the party makes all key decisions through 
its leading apparatus, the State Council-led governmental system does not playa 
decisive role in making foreign and Taiwan policy. 50 
The concept of the societal factor is not applicable to the study of Chinese politics 
in the mid-1990s because it does not accurately explain the PRC social structure and 
political reality. A necessary precondition for explanation in Western political 
science is the function of civil society, but this did not exist in the first half of 1990s 
in the PRC. PRC society has undergone a massive transformation in recent years 
with the rapid economic development. This has brought about the reorganisation of 
social forces, in particular, the formation of new social classes and the emergence of 
a middle class. Nevertheless, this was not the case in the mid-1990s. Even today, 
there is no official description of the status of interest and pressure groups. The 
50. The institutions and officials of the Communist Party are established at allieveis and all units of 
the system of foreign affairs. For example, the leading party group is set up within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs ( MFA ), which is directly led by the Foreign Affairs Central Leading Group under 
the Politburo Standing Committee. Usually, the Foreign Minister is concurrently the Secretary of the 
leading party group in the MFA. Also, the Premier is concurrently the Secretary of the leading party 
group in the State Council. The PRC Taiwan policy-making system works under the leadership of the 
Central Taiwan Work Leading Group. For the working relationship between the Chinese Party and 
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Communist regime does not recognise the existence of nongovernmental 
organisations. Political discourse under the one-party state serves fundamentally 
different political functions than it does under a democratic system. Therefore the 
theoretical exposition can not indiscriminately make use of a general methodology 
that applies to the Western countries. For these reasons, this study will not examine 
the societal variables that do not appear to have had an influence upon the Taiwan 
policy-making of the mid-1990s. 
Of the five variables, four are domestic factors. This underlines the domestic 
determinants of foreign policy. In another volume, Rosenau provides a framework 
for looking at how domestic factors influence international behaviour. He elaborates 
on the rationale that domestic politics determine external policy, referring to it as 
"linkage politics". 51 According to this rationale, external behaviour has its own 
internal origins in each country. Diplomacy is an extension of domestic affairs. The 
formation of foreign policy depends fundamentally on internal rather than on external 
factors. Although the international environment has effects on foreign policy-
making, determinants outside a country are secondary in influencing its actions in 
foreign policy. This rationale provides an instrument to review the domestic sources 
of foreign policy. 
From a perspective of national-international linkages, Rosenau expounds 
additional sources of foreign policy. Domestic explanations locate the determinants 
of foreign policy, but external factors also act on foreign policy-making, despite 
being less important. Simultaneously, domestic policy interacts with external policy 
and domestic politics interacts with foreign relations. This interplay reflects the 
correlation between international and domestic politics. Obviously, there are organic 
links between the two levels of politics. Therefore external influence on foreign 
policy has to be taken into account. The approach of linkage politics facilitates the 
exploration of the interactions between external relations and internal factors, and 
examines foreign policy-making in the context of national-international linkages. 52 
government offices in foreign and Taiwan policy-making, see Chapter Four-The Structure and 
Process of PRC Policy toward Taiwan. 
51. James N. Rosenau (ed.), Domestic Sources o/Foreign Policy. New York: The Free Press; 
London: Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1967. 
52. For the approach oflinkage politics, see James N. Rosenau (ed.), Linkage Politics: Essays on the 
Convergence o/National and International System. New York: The Free Press, 1969. 
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While dealing with the theoretical issues in the study of international crisis, James 
1. Richardson's book and a volume edited by Charles F. Hermann also give their 
discourses on the theory of international crisis-management.53 More specifically, the 
two monographs edited by Daniel Frei provide a systematic frame of reference for 
the subject.54 Thus this study utilises Frei's theoretical framework while referring to 
the approaches and analyses of Richardson and Hermann. 
Decision-making is one of the most important questions in managing international 
crises.55 The literature examines issues such as strategy and tactics, rationality, 
estimation, options, risk and consequences in crisis situations. In international crisis-
management, although institutions and organisations are essential, the personality of 
decision-makers may significantly affect outcomes. These complicated factors help 
to shape the degree of tension, development of events and situational changes. Coral 
Bell's Crises and Policy-Makers is a valuable specialised reference for this study.56 
The interplay between external conflicts and domestic politics is viewed as a 
major aspect in international crisis management. On one hand, the internal political 
situations of the parties involved in crises relate to the causes of crises irrespective of 
whether they are direct or indirect. On the other hand, international crises effect 
domestic politics. In this sense, international crises are a sequence of adv~rse 
interactions between international and national politics beyond the control of either. 
This "inside-to-outside linkage" politics plays a major role in causing confrontation 
between the sides and in dealing with the critical situation outside. Patrick James's 
examination of international crises and linkage politics provides a useful 
53 . James L. Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy: The Great Powers since the Mid-Nineteenth Century. 
Cambridge; New York NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1994; Charles F. Hermann (ed.), 
International Crises: Insights/rom Behavioural Research. New York: The Free Press, 1972. 
54. Daniel Frei (ed.), Managing International Crises. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 
1982; Daniel Frei (ed.), International Crises and Crisis Management: An East-West Symposium. 
Farnborough, England: Saxon House, 1978. 
55 . See The Forum on Crisis Decision Making, in GREIS, Vo1.30, No.1, Spring 1986, pp.5-64; 
Jonathan M. Roberts, DeciSion-Making during International Crises. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988; 
Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Making and 
System Structure in International Crises. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977; 
Charles F. Hermann, Crises in Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis. Indianapolis and New York: 
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1969. Also see Graham T. Allison, Essence a/Decision: 
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971. 
56. Coral Bell, Crises and Policy-Makers. Canberra: Department ofInternational Relations, Research 
School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1982. 
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interpretation in this respect. 57 It is instrumental in exploring the complex questions 
that interweave external events with internal factors in this topic. In the context of 
national-international linkages, the connections and interactions between the internal 
political forces of the participants in crises are impacted upon by the urgent and 
severe nature of conflicts with hostile countries. This can intensify the internal 
disputes on soft-or-hard choices and give rise to sharper political struggles, thereby 
affecting the decision process in response to the outside confrontation. Richardson 
provides the implications of the analysis for understanding and assessment of this 
sort of conflictual interaction, focusing on how domestic politics affects decision-
making, in particular, how decision-makers adopt measures to cope with crises.58 
To sum up, the theory of international crisis management helps in making clear 
key assumptions about the topic of this study, and in clarifying issues raised by the 
hypotheses. This study employs these theories to look into a host of factors in the 
background of the 1995-96 Taiwan crisis and to explore the fundamental reasons for 
the major changes in Beijing's Taiwan and US policies through examining the 
decisional processes. More significantly, it can make use of these theories to discuss 
how and why the PRC leadership responded to Lee Teng-hui's US visit with a 
coercive challenge. 
Besides general theories, this study also adopts three specific theories. 
The first deals with theory on the domestic sources ofPRC foreign policy. Jolm 
R. Faust and Judith F. Kornberg in particular examine the domestic determinants of 
foreign policy.59 Lu Ning deals with domestic political factors in general foreign 
policy formation while focusing on structure and process.60 They all underline the 
domestic dynamics of foreign policy actions. In terms of the interplay between 
foreign policy and domestic politics, external behaviour takes shape in the context of 
internal politics. 
57. Patrick James, "International Crises and Linkage Politics: The Experiences of the United States, 
1953-1994," Political Research Quarterly, Vo1.51, No.3, September 1998, pp.781-812. 
58. James L. Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy: The Great Powers since the Mid-Nineteenth CentUlY. 
Cambridge; New York NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp.306-326. 
59. John R. Faust and Judith F. Kornberg, China in World Politics. Boulder and London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1995. 
60 . Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1997. 
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Gerald Segal proposes that foreign policy and domestic politics are closely linked 
in the PRC, viewing domestic reform politics as one of the determinants in foreign 
policy-making. In conclusion, he points out: "It can be shown that at least some 
aspects of domestic reform have had a clear effect on foreign policy reform. The 
most striking change has been the broader involvement of aspects of Chinese 
domestic politics in foreign policy.,,61 
Lev Deliusin explains how PRC domestic conditions and policy influence its 
foreign policy-making arguing that the leadership in the post-Mao era solves 
domestic problems in the economy, society and politics in a new way, leading to a 
new perspective on the global setting. Decisive domestic factors in the development 
of PRC foreign policy are embodied in both its economic needs and its political 
changes.62 
Robert S. Ross deals with the relationship between the international environment 
and the political system in the making ofPRC foreign policy. Two schools debate 
over whether domestic or international factors are more important in shaping PRC 
foreign policy. After surveying both opinions, Ross points out: "The international 
environment cannot fully explain developments in Chinese foreign policy." "A full 
understanding of Chinese foreign policy requires an examination of the dynamics of 
China's domestic political system." Ross believes that there have been differences 
between the leaders over foreign affairs. Leadership differences and replacements 
can bring about a shift in external focus and orientations. Therefore succession 
politics could significantly affect Beijing's foreign policy-making process.63 
To summarise, in terms ofPRC foreign policy-making, external factors such as 
the international environment and foreign influence are at work, but an external 
motivation is seldom the determining factor in policy formation. Instead, the 
formation ofPRC foreign policy is primarily about internal causes, i.e., domestic 
political factors, more than external factors. Most importantly, leadership succession 
politics plays a significant role and can cause a major change in foreign policy. This 
61 • Gerald Segal (ed.), Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy Reform. London; New York: K. Paul 
International for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990, p.5. 
62. Lev Deliusin, "The Influence of China's Domestic Policy on Its Foreign Policy," in Frank J. 
Macchiarola and Robert B. Oxnam (eds), The China & Challenge: American Policies in East Asia. 
New York: The Academy of Political Science, Proceedings, Vo1.38, No.2, 1991. 
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is because potential successors have a personal need for power or achievement in the 
area of foreign policy. This can produce an unexpected consequence on external 
relations. Under such circumstances, observation of the formulation and evolution of 
PRe foreign policy should place emphasis on the political transition, which is one of 
the principal variables. In light of this rationale, and while not neglecting external 
factors, this study will concentrate on searching after the source of internal causes-
domestic political factors of influence in the making of PRe Taiwan policy. 
The second specific theory relating to the PRe political system and policy making 
is put forward by Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg. They believe that "the 
fragmentation of authority is a core dimension of the Chinese system". They argue 
that there are shortcomings and limitations to other approaches and models ( such as 
responses to policy problems, power struggle and factional rivalry) in explaining the 
Beijing leadership's policy formulation. "None of these explanations incorporates 
structural dimensions of the Chinese bureaucracy into the explanation.,,64 They 
present an alternative systematic framework, proposing a fragmented party-
governmental policy-making structure and a highly complex decisional process of 
bargaining and consensus-building. Further, Lieberthal and David M. Lampton 
establish a "fragmented authoritarianism" model for the PRe political system and 
policy making. They consider that this model indicates that "authority below the 
very peak of the Chinese political system is fragmented and disjointed." However, 
"the system is somewhat but not totally fragmented. The fragmentation has not 
reached the point where its constituent parts have the legitimate autonomy 
characteristics of a pluralist system.,,6S This model summarises the characteristics of 
PRe polity and policy formulation. It is instrumental in understanding and observing 
PRC politics and policy decision-making. 
The third theory relates to Chinese informal politics, and helps to explain the 
policy-making and behaviour of the PRC toward Taiwan. By adopting informal 
political theory and focusing on the Taiwan crisis of 1995-96, this study can examine 
63. Robert S. Ross, "From Lin Biao to Deng Xiaoping: Elite Instability and China's U.S. Policy," The 
China Quarterly, No.l18, June 1989, pp.265-299. 
64. Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oks enberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and 
Process. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988, pp.137, 3. 
65. Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (eds), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making 
in Post-Mao China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, pp.5-12. 
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in depth the relationships between informal politics and Taiwan policy conditions. 
Lowell Dittmer and Tang Tsou give a definition of Chinese informal politics which 
is underlain by the leaders' interpersonal relationships. Dittmer suggests that "the 
central term in our conceptualization of informal politics is relationships". Tsou 
defines informal politics as "politics in which personal relationships with others or a 
set of such relationships constitute an end in itself,.66 There are different points of 
view on the theory of informal politics. According to Dittmer, formal politics and 
informal politics are interrelated and interact on each other.67 Joseph Fewsmith 
appears to agree with the basic category of informal politics by Dittmer. 68 However, 
others go to two extremes. Lucian W. Pye, for example, believes that "the 'informal' 
is very nearly the sum total of Chinese politics".69 Meanwhile, Andrew 1. Nathan 
and Kellee S. Tsai reject the classification of informal politics and formal politics, 
insisting on a factionalism model. 70 The arguments of these two extreme viewpoints 
suggest that, in practice, it is difficult to distinguish informal politics from formal 
politics. 71 In addition, Frederick C. Teiwes states that "abnormal politics" prevailed 
in the Maoist period, but "the post-Maoist period had been seen an evolution toward 
'normal politics' ".72 This study accepts Dittmer's viewpoint suggesting that 
informal politics is part of PRC politics. 
66. Lowell Dittmer, "Chinese Informal Politics," The China Journal, No.34, July 1995, pp.9-15; Tang 
Tsou, "Chinese Politics at the Top: Factionalism or Informal Politics? Balance-of-Power Politics or a 
Game to Win All?" The China Journal, No.34, July 1995, pp.95-102. 
67. Lowell Dittmer, "Chinese Informal Politics," The China Journal, No.34, July 1995, pp.9, 14. For 
more discourses on the relations between formal politics and informal politics, see Tang Tsou, 
"Chinese Politics at the Top: Factionalism or Informal Politics? Balance-of-Power Politics or a Game 
to Win All?" The China Journal, No.34, July 1995, pp.98-108. 
68. Joseph Fewsmith, "Institutions, Informal Politics, and Political Transition in China," Asian Survey, 
Vol.XXXVI, No.3, March 1996, pp.232-233. 
69. Lucian W. Pye, "Factions and the Politics of Guanxi: Paradoxes in Chinese Administrative and 
Political Behaviour," The China Journal, No.34, July 1995, p.39. 
70. Andrew J. Nathan and Kellee S. Tsai, "Factionalism: A New Institutionalist Restatement," The 
China Journal, No.34, July 1995, pp.164-167. 
71 • Frederick C. Teiwes supports Lucian W. Pye's general argument considering that in some periods 
"it was virtually impossible to separate the formal from the informal". This notwithstanding, while 
implicating the informal nature of the political process in the PRC, he does not explicitly agree with 
Pye or Andrew J. Nathan and Kellee S. Tsai. See Frederick C. Teiwes, "The Paradoxical Post-Mao 
Transition: From Obeying the Leader to 'Normal Politics," The China Journal, No.34, July 1995, 
pp.58-59. 
72 . Frederick C. Teiwes, "The Paradoxical Post-Mao Transition: From Obeying the Leader to 'Normal 
Politics," The China Journal, No.34, July 1995, pp.55-94; Frederick C. Teiwes, "Normal Politics with 
Chinese Characteristics," The China Journal, No.45, January 2001, pp.69-82. 
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1.3-2. The Research Methods: Introduction 
It is essential to define the sphere of the PRC policy toward Taiwan because such 
a delineation determines the research orientations of the study. In seeking to draw a 
demarcation line, such questions are raised as: What is the nature of Taiwan policy? 
In which field should it be categorised, domestic or foreign? Of course, there are 
difficulties in a clear-cut definition because of the complexity of the Taiwan issues. 
Beijing and Taipei maintain adverse standpoints. Foreign countries, in particular, 
major powers, take different stances. Scholars hold opposite viewpoints. In terms of 
the international legal status of Taiwan, interpretations vary.73 Furthermore, the 
definition of relations across the Taiwan Strait and the idea of resolution of the 
Taiwan issue are diverse. For example, a number of concepts and solutions have 
been brought forward such as one China; two Chinas; one China, one Taiwan; 
independence of Taiwan; independent Taiwan;74 one country, two governments; one 
nationality, two states; one country, two systems, and so on. 
The complex and controversial nature of the Taiwan issue highlights that it is an 
international problem. In particular, the US was connected with its origin and has an 
influence on its resolution. Taiwan also has its own position in the world arena. 
Although the PRC has claimed Taiwan to be just a province which has no legitimate 
right to develop formal ties with other countries, the island still maintains diplomatic 
relations with about thirty nations. 
From the perspective of Beijing, Taiwan represents an internal affair of the PRC. 
Correspondingly, Taiwan policy is included in the domestic policy arena. However, 
this leaves the question open. The internationalisation of the issue and the PRC 
handling of Taiwan affairs are correlated and interactive, even integrated into the 
PRC conduct of its relations with the major powers and other countries.75 Isolating 
73. For a discussion of the international legal status of Taiwan, see Jean-Marie Henckaerts (ed.), The 
International Status o/Taiwan in the New World Order: Legal and Political Considerations. London: 
Kluwer Law International, 1996, pp.1-32. Also see Chiu Hungdah, "The Principle of One China and 
the Legal Status of Taiwan," (Ji '* ~ , " - J:f:I JJ.: .D1U EjiS'1l% 'ft;.1~ :l:ill ill. ," ) Cheng Ming Monthly 
(fjf P$), No.280, February 2001, pp.69-72. 
74. The meaning of independence of Taiwan is the island's dejure independence and independent 
Taiwan indicates the island's de/acto independence. 
75 . Resolving the Taiwan issue is one of the main functions of the PRC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
It is prescribed that "to carry out in its diplomacy the guidelines and policies of the Center regarding" 
"the resolution of the Taiwan question, and to promote the peaceful reunification of the motherland." 
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the island diplomatically is Beijing's top foreign policy priority. The Taiwan issue is 
the largest dispute between the PRC and the US and has led to frequent and intensive 
negotiations between the two powers.76 Meanwhile, the diplomatic war between 
Beijing and Taipei never ends. Since the early 1990s, Beijing has struggled to defeat 
Taipei's efforts to participate in the United Nations. Moreover, Beijing has never 
extended control over the island since the foundation of the PRC in 1949 and the 
ROC government effectively rules the island. Thereby Beijing cannot treat the island 
simply from a perspective of domestic governance. In fact, the international legal 
status of Taiwan is that of a political entity. According to Beijing's own Taiwan 
policy, it has acquiesced to thefaU accompli.77 
As such, while Beijing insists that the Taiwan question is a domestic issue, in 
practice it regards the Taiwan affair as a matter for foreign affairs administration. 
The PRC organisational system for Taiwan affairs in the 1990s had, in addition to the 
Taiwan Affairs Office under the Party's Central Committee and the State Council, 
supervision from leading officials and institutions in the area of foreign affairs. For 
example, the Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Qian Qishen, was also 
the deputy head of the Central Taiwan Work Leading Group. He was in charge of 
foreign relations and cross-strait relations simultaneously. There was also a 
department concerning the Taiwan issue in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 78 In 
managing cross-strait economic relations, Beijing views Taiwanese business as 
See Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1997, p.189. 
76. According to Michael D. Swaine, "although technically considered part of the domestic policy 
arena," the PRC leading body of Taiwan policy-making involves functions of supervising and 
coordinating the country's relations with the major powers, mainly the US. See Michael D. Swaine, 
The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking. Santa Monica, Ca: Rand 
Corporation, 1996, pp.27-28. 
77 • Since the late 1980s, Beijing has admitted Taiwan's membership of the "international economic 
organisations in the name of 'Chinese Taipei'''. It promises "after Taiwan's reunification with the 
mainland, its social and economic systems will not change". "As a special administrative region, 
Taiwan will exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy legislative and independent judicial power, 
including that of final adjudication. It may also retain its armed forces and administer its party, 
governmental and military systems by itself. The Central Government will not station troops or send 
administrative personnel there." See Jiang Zemin, "Continue to Promote the Reunification of the 
Motherland," (IT r~ ~ , " j; {IE:it!: tEl. 00 $JE - *.!lr S9 % $; mJ ~lli ~ ~ 4- ," ) January 30, 1995, 
in The Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the 
State Council ( 'i=' ;t!,: 'i=' ~ ~ 1~ I 1''1O;J]\ -0 ~ /00 :%- ~ ~ t~ $:%- ;J]\ -0 ~), China's Taiwan 
Issue ( rp /lfI fJ Iff fa] JJf). Beijing: Jiuzhou Press ( fL YJorIIii .:j) ill X& ;f± ), 1998, pp.231-232. 
78 . Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1997, p.21. 
overseas putting it under the administration of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation. According to Beijing's rules, a Taiwanese corporation is 
regarded as a foreign institution. In other ministries, such as the Ministry of 
Transportation, specific Taiwan affairs offices have been established.79 
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Therefore, the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan is in the nature of 
quasi-foreign relations with each other, despite being not de jure separate states. It is 
proposed within this study that Taiwan policy should be delimited as within the 
scope of the foreign policy field. so However, such a definition is merely for 
academic purposes. A judgement of the international legal status of Taiwan is beside 
the point. In this study, Taiwan is viewed as an external factor relative to the internal 
issues of mainland China but is also discerned different from the international 
factors. In effect, Taiwan is the external factor acting on the PRC Taiwan policy-
making within the confines of China. 
1.3-3. The Research Methods: Case Study Approach and Sources 
This study takes the form of a case study. Although there are different opinions 
on the case study approach, Lincoln P. Bloomfield values it highly, suggesting that 
"All in all, the virtues of good case studies for the purpose of better analysis of the 
policy process seem impressive: data is readily available; sets of events can be 
readily distinguished from other sets; some interesting theoretical constructs are 
already in hand to make the learning from case studies of general value. "SI The 
academic case study work on foreign policy-making and crisis decision-making has 
proved useful for explaining major events. According to previous scholars' 
experiences, the case study approach has been successfully applied to research on the 
79. "Taiwanese Investment on the Mainland Is Only Next to Hong Kong," (" ~ <gf *- Mi' is' ¥~ 1.£ iX 
T ~ mr , " ) Taiwan Today News Network (TTNN) ( :f/d 7ll fJj E lfli j'ifJ), Taipei [hereafter TTNN ( :f/d ifl fJj E /ff/i /lfJ) ], December 26, 1998. 
80 . This does not mean that this study agrees with the "two states theory". Fonner Republic of China 
President Lee Teng-hui put forward his 'two states' theory in July 1999 asserting a "special state-to-
state relationship" between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. See "President Lee: Cross-Strait Issues 
Lie in Different Systems Rather Than Unification Or Independence-An Interview With Deutsche 
Welle," ( " * J{], ~ : w-J I¥ IPJ tMI /f 1:£ ~ 3!tt mJ 1:£ jjJlJ Jjt-:t~ iJt 1,f, 00 ~ pi 1t ijj , " ) Central 
Daily News, International Edition (rf1!t!E jli, !lJI/tiU/fi), July 10, 1999, p.3. 
81. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, The Foreign Policy Process: Making TheOlY Relevant. London: Sage 
Publications, 1974, p.42. 
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Taiwan issue and the Taiwan Strait crises. For example, Suisheng Zhao conducts a 
case study of Beijing's Taiwan policy in the mid to late 1990s while exploring the 
causes of the 1995-96 Taiwan crisis with regard to the role of Chinese nationalism. 82 
The Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96 was chosen as a case study for three reasons. 
Firstly, it profoundly affected international relations as well as the domestic politics 
of the parties involved, particularly as regards PRC domestic politics. Secondly, it 
has characteristics different from that of other events during the same period, 
providing conditions for looking into the PRC political transition and foreign policy 
in the first half of the 1990s. Thirdly, the intensified succession struggle, sharpened 
policy contention as well as the frequent and close interplay between external 
behaviour and domestic politics during the crisis which provides an appropriate 
opportunity to dissect both PRC succession politics and foreign policy-making. 
The methods that the study uses range from macrocosm to microcosm, from 
general trends to individual points. It begins with research on the political system 
and general policy making framework, and continues with the structure and process 
of Taiwan policy making, and then examines the various factors that shape the PRC 
policy toward Taiwan. Through analysis of the international, external (Taiwan), 
party-governmental and leadership/individual variables, it will seek to locate the 
deciding factors of Taiwan policy making. It focuses on the analysis and 
ascertainment of the domestic determinants acting on the formation of PRC policy 
toward Taiwan in the mid-1990s. Finally, the study will address the issues of 
succession politics-leadership instability and Beijing's crisis-decision-making on 
events in the Straits. Thus it can be seen that the analysis covers four dimensions: 
the international environment, the national polity, the country's policy organisations 
and institutions and the leadership/decision-makers. Also, the examination is 
undertaken at four levels: general policy formulation, foreign policy-making, Taiwan 
policy-making and its policymakers. 
One difficulty is access to the official archives. In particular, the PRC has not 
disclosed documents detailing its internal policy contentions and decisional process 
leading up to the 1995-96 Taiwan crisis. Under such circumstances, use has to be 
82. See Suisheng Zhao, "Chinese Nationalism and Beijing's Taiwan Policy: A China Threat?," Issues 
& Studies, Vo1.36, No.1, January/February 2000, pp.76-99. 
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made of the existing data and materials pertinent to the topic such as newspapers, 
magazines and other accounts. There is a wide variety of Chinese documents 
available and the study relies where possible on primary Chinese materials. 
Simultaneously, it utilises materials, data and journalistic accounts in English as well 
as other indepth analyses by Western China specialists. 
Although the PRC has opened itself to the outside world, its foreign policy-
making is not generally accessible to outsiders. In particular, leadership succession 
and Taiwan policy-making are two sensitive issues. Sometimes, both issues are 
classified as secret by the authorities. In order to break through PRC black box 
politics and closed foreign policy-making, many scholars in China studies have to 
rely largely on the use of Hong Kong's publications in the Chinese language as 
sources for their research, mainly newspapers and magazines despite concerns 
regarding their credibility.s3 Among Hong Kong media, sister periodicals, Cheng 
Ming Monthly ( 13- pJ#) and The Trend Magazine ( ijI; ;t;), are viewed as the leading 
publications. They have figured prominently in the two last decades with behind-
the-scenes accounts of politics, the military, society and economy in post-Mao China. 
In their authoritative works, a number of respected researchers in the field of Chinese 
study such as John W. Garver, Greg Austin and Allen S. Whiting, quote frequently 
from both monthlies. 84 
1.3-4. The Organisation of the Study 
The main body of this study is basically designed in light of James N. Rosenau's 
theoretical system of variables/determinants of foreign policy-making. 
After this introduction, Chapter Two and Three concentrate on the external 
variables of PRC Taiwan policy-making analysing both the international factors and 
83 • For a brief discussion of the credibility of Hong Kong's media reports on the PRC military, 
foreign policy and Taiwan policy, see John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and 
Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997, p.171. 
84. See John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle 
and London: University of Washington Press, 1997; Greg Austin, China's Ocean Frontier: 
International Law, Military and National Development. st. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen & 
Unwin in association with the Department ofIntemational Relations and the Northeast Asia Program, 
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, 1998; 
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the Taiwan factor. In Chapter Two, international factors principally relating to the 
major Asian-Pacific powers, Russia, Japan and the United States are examined. The 
first two sections focus on the importance of Russia and Japan in the balance of 
power, both globally and in the Asia-Pacific region in terms of the Taiwan issue. 
They deal with these two countries' relations with the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, 
interests in Taiwan, stances on the Taiwan's status and their respective roles in the 
Taiwan crisis. The third section is the focal point of the chapter, demonstrating that 
the US was principal among the major powers influencing the Taiwan issue and 
played a major role in the Taiwan crisis. It examines mutual policies between the 
PRC and the US and the triangular relationship between Beijing, Taipei and 
Washington. From a perspective of the world strategic pattern and with an 
assessment of American vital interests in Taiwan and stance on its status, it tries to 
find out where the crux of the PRC-US dispute over the Taiwan issue lay. It 
investigates the inconsistent policy of the Clinton administration on the Taiwan 
issue, making further explorations into the changed decision on Lee Teng-hui's US 
visit. Washington's measures in handling events in the Straits and its major role in 
the Taiwan crisis are reviewed in order to ascertain whether it could be the main 
source of the crisis. 
Chapter Three provides a brief history of the evolution of Taiwan's status 
highlighting the strategic importance of the island. After surveying the economy and 
military, it places emphasis on an assessment of major changes, mainly 
democratisation in Taiwan politics from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s. An 
analysis of the question of Taiwan independence is focused upon because this 
involves the key issue of whether Beijing's grounds for coercive pressure upon 
Taipei are justified. With an assessment of various political forces, mainly the three 
major parties and the outlines of their cross-strait policies, it observes Taiwan's 
political situation and discusses the balance of the political forces between pro-
unification and pro-independence. Following this is an exploration of the Taiwan 
people's view on national identity and a survey of public opinion polls on the issue 
of unification! independence. The March 1996 presidential election is examined by 
Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy After Deng," The China Quarterly, 
No.142, June 1995, pp.295-316. 
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surveying the four presidential candidates and their main campaign themes, cross-
strait issues and mainland policy. The impact on cross-strait relations by Taiwan's 
rapid transformation in domestic politics and major change in external policy is 
considered. In reviewing Taipei's mainland policy and pragmatic diplomacy, Lee's 
US visit is analysed. In particular, Lee's controversial role in the issue ofunificationl 
independence is discussed. The final section evaluates the conditions for Taiwan 
independence within the island. These two chapters seek to establish that neither the 
international factor nor Taiwan itself were the main sources of the crisis. 
The subsequent three chapters deal with variables of the Party, government and 
the military, and individual Ileadership in the PRe. They underline the importance 
of domestic factors in shaping the Taiwan policy, examining the possibility that the 
leadership succession could be the prime determinant acting on the policy and 
decision-making during the crisis. Chapter Four examines the structure and process 
of Taiwan policy-making. It begins with a survey of the political system and party-
governmental decision-making framework, making clear that the central authorities 
of the Communist Party are the force at its core, leading the country and formulating 
policy. By offering analyses of the organisational system and functions of the 
Taiwan affairs administration and Taiwan policy formulation, it is hoped that how 
the decision-making structure and process worked in this area shall be illuminated. 
In particular, focus shall be placed on what systematic defects may have impacted on 
the process and from where they stemmed. 
Chapter Five deals with the role ofthe military, elaborating its possible 
involvement in, and influence on, top level civilian policymaking. An initial survey 
demonstrates that the military'S particular role in Taiwan policy-making was borne 
out of its privileged status in the political system and general decision-making, and 
position as kingmaker in succession politics. It explores how the military came to act 
as one of the originators of inputs into the Taiwan policy-making process through an 
overview of the PLA high command personnel and functional institutions. In terms 
of the services' roles, it focuses on the PLA Navy's lobbying on Taiwan policy. The 
evidence of the military's vital interests in Taiwan policy is embodied in three 
aspects: preservation of the military's political privilege, military build-up for 
modernisation drives and more budgetary resources for defence. Finally, the 
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military's influence upon Taiwan policy-making is evaluated. The military engaged 
in major lobbying activities in several important dimensions. Furthermore, although 
it was well placed in the formal organisations and regular process of Taiwan policy-
making, it still conducted military-driven politics using informal political means 
illegally to pressure the civilian leadership. 
Chapter Six contains details about the individual/leadership variables. It focuses 
on searching out the source of the need to devise a new policy for an accomplishment 
of Chinese reunification. This involves two major questions on whether Jiang's 
leadership had been consolidated and the nature of the motives behind his 
exploitation of the Taiwan issue. Both questions are addressed in two main sections. 
An initial examination provides an appropriate background on political transition. It 
reviews the collapse of Deng Xiaoping's succession strategy, in particular, the 
removal from office of two previous successors, Bu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. In 
this context, it discusses Jiang's sudden rise to power and unsteady leading position. 
It interprets the causes of why his position as successor was so fragile. In examining 
several individuals holding important positions, it highlights the contenders for 
succession sorting out those of the principal competitors in the long-term and the 
immediate rivals threatening Jiang's position. The second section examines Jiang's 
attempt to exploit the Taiwan issue. By surveying Jiang's potential means of 
establishing credibility and authority, it explains the reasons why he chose Taiwan 
affairs as a hopeful breakthrough point. In searching out what motives actuated Jiang 
to claim credit for the resolution of the Taiwan issue, its broader background is 
explored. Finally, it examines his political motivations in seeking to become an 
authoritative paramount leader and establish his place in Chinese history by 
achieving the return of Taiwan. 
Chapter Seven addresses the policy background of the 1995-96 Taiwan crisis. 
Initially, it provides a background analysis examining the circumstances under which 
Taiwan policy became a focus of the PRC leadership succession struggle. In an 
overview of the previous Taiwan Strait crises and the evolution ofPRC Taiwan 
policy, Beijing's perceptions of the issue and considerations of reunifying Taiwan are 
analysed. This interprets the importance and sensitivity of the Taiwan issue in elite 
politics, helping to understand reasons why Lee's US visit evoked much contention 
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and an eventual PRC move from moderation to belligerence. In addition, it explores 
the reason why elite and succession politics playa major role in the dominance of 
hard-line approaches to Taiwan policy. The second section examines Jiang's new 
policy toward Taiwan. It begins with an analysis of possible major domestic factors 
likely to influence Taiwan policy-making. After reviewing the historical background 
in terms of the cross-strait situation for Jiang's initiatives on Taiwan, the eight-point 
proposal that laid the foundation of his new Taiwan policy is evaluated. Taipei's 
negative responses to this proposal and their implications are also analysed. 
The leadership succession struggle over the Taiwan issue and its ramifications are 
the subject of Chapter Eight. By exploring the interactions between Jiang's 
jeopardised right of succession and the critical situation in the Taiwan Strait, it 
provides an overview of the succession struggle as regards the Taiwan. In discussing 
the failure of Jiang's new Taiwan policy, its consequences for his successor position 
and its impact on his handling of cross-strait relations and the PRC-US relations, it 
looks into the causes of the Taiwan crisis. Subsequent analytical inquiries are made 
into Beijing's decisional process in launching war games before the chapter explores 
how Jiang shifted his stance on Taiwan from moderate to tough under internal 
pressure. Further explorations are made into the reasons why Beijing made such a 
major U-turn in the responses to Lee Teng-hui's US visit from restraint to violation. 
The two sub-sections contain details about the military's role in Beijing's 
decision-making on the Taiwan crisis amid the leadership succession struggle. One 
examines Jiang's relationship with the military, which is assessed focusing on an 
analysis of his intentions to seek to gain the military's support because of his 
unstable leadership. Meanwhile, the other deals with the question of what role the 
military played in making decisions about bringing coercive pressure to bear upon 
Taipei with its leverage on the succession struggle. It demonstrates, in particular, the 
interplay between military-driven politics and succession politics. 
Chapter Nine concludes the thesis, utilising the results from the previous chapters 
to establish whether the PRC leadership succession problem led to the Taiwan crisis. 
The initial section excludes both the international factors and the Taiwan factor as the 
main sources of the Taiwan crisis. It confirms that the Russian factor and the 
Japanese factor did not significantly affect the Taiwan crisis and also verifies the 
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view that the Taiwan crisis did not have its origins in relations with the US, despite 
that country's major role in the crisis. In particular, it underscores Washington's 
initial stance against Lee's US visit and the restraint exercised toward Beijing's 
military exercises at the early stage, illustrating that the US had neither the intention 
to provoke Beijing on the Taiwan issue nor any plan to create tension in the Taiwan 
Strait. In synthesising the previous analyses of Taiwan's political situation, the issue 
of Taiwan independence, Taipei's mainland policy as well as countermoves against 
Beijing's military intimidation, a case is also made that Taiwan was not the main 
source of the crisis. Lee's US visit was controversial, especially angering Beijing, 
but it should not have become a reason for military confrontation in the Straits. 
Faced with problems in cross-strait relations and the PRC-US dispute on the visit, 
there were other policy options open to Beijing. The study underlines Beijing's 
restraint to the visit at the early stage, which reflected the fact that it did not 
necessarily have to make military responses. In return, it argues that this indicated 
that there were other major factors in the origination of the crisis. Thus it suggests 
analysing key issues from a perspective of the domestic factors acting on the PRC 
Taiwan policy and decision-making on events in the Straits in order to explain the 
origins of the crisis. 
The next section further tests the key assumptions to ascertain what were the most 
important domestic determinants. In the summarised analyses, it establishes that five 
factors: national security and interests, ideology, nationalism, the economic issues, 
and domestic political stability, were not crucial in forming Taiwan policy and 
making decisions during the Taiwan crisis. It confirms that the leadership succession 
problem was a prime determinant in the seriousness of this Taiwan crisis, reinforcing 
the crux of the argument. With a series of examinational syntheses, it concludes that 
the succession struggle became the dominant factor in the formation of Taiwan 
policy and in accounting for the Taiwan crisis. The following section remarks upon 
the structure and process of Taiwan policy-making and Taiwan-crisis decision-
making under circumstances of unsteady leadership. It concludes that both 
institutional and noninstitutional elements conflicted, disrupting the formulation 
institutions of Taiwan policy. Due to the lack of a normal political environment and 
regular policy mechanisms, it inevitably produced an adventurist policy behaviour 
that replaced political solutions with military means in response to internal military 
pressures, the cross-strait problems and PRe-us diplomatic disputes. Further, it 
highlights the military's role in the structure and process of Taiwan policy-making 
and its involvement in, and influence on, Beijing's decision-making on the Taiwan 
crisis. It concludes that the leadership succession problem together with the 
military's leverage accounted for the outbreak of the Taiwan crisis. 
The final section summarises the findings in this study. 
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Chapter Two 
The International Involvement in Taiwan 
2.1. The Russian Factor in the Taiwan Issue 
In contrast to the United States and Japan, Russia has no the strong ties with, or 
vital long-term interests in, Taiwan. Indeed, Russia has little influence upon Taiwan 
and plays a minor role in the Taiwan issue. However, of all the foreign influences 
involved in the Taiwan issue, the Russian factor is third in importance because it 
plays an indispensable part as an important counter-weight to the US and Japan. To 
a great extent, the Russian factor in the Taiwan issue stemmed from the international 
balance of power. Russia takes both PRC-Russian relations and the world strategic 
pattern as its starting point in considering Taiwan policy. 
2.1-1. PRe-Russian Relations 
In the early period of the Cold War, the global strategic pattern was that of a 
bipolar world and PRC-Russian relations fell within the gambit of American-Russian 
contention for global dominance. In the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the focus of 
Moscow's strategy in the Asia-Pacific region was to support the Chinese Communist 
forces and include the PRC in an Eurasian Communist bloc. After the Chinese 
Communist forces seized state power and the American backed Nationalist forces 
were defeated and retreated to Taiwan, the PRC and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty 
of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in 1950.85 For the Soviet Union, this 
strengthened its position in the world-wide confrontation with United States. For its 
part, the PRC, gained strong support from the Soviet Union for its opposition to 
"American imperialism". The Soviets provided large quantities of economic and 
military assistance and helped the PRC confront the US in Asia. Moscow played an 
important role in prompting the PRC to go to war against the US in Korea during 
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1950-1953.86 As a result, hostility between the PRC and the US was maintained for 
two decades and Taiwan was placed under American protection for nearly half a 
century. Although Moscow declared that it supported Beijing's position in the 
dispute over the Taiwan issue, the PRC participation in the Korean War was in 
favour of the Soviet strategic interests at the cost of settling the Taiwan issue.87 
In the mid-1950s, the rift between the two communist powers became apparent. 
The Soviet Union sought to control the PRC Navy by proposing a PRC-Sovietjoint 
fleet but Beijing rejected this proposal. Meanwhile, Mao Zedong was planning to 
challenge Khrushchev's leadership in the Communist world. 88 The 1958 Taiwan 
Strait crisis was an important factor leading to the disintegration of the PRC-Russian 
alliance. While the PRC was prepared to create tension in the Taiwan Strait, 
Moscow dissuaded Beijing from this plan so as to avoid direct conflict between the 
two superpowers in the Far East. However, when Moscow saw that the Taiwan crisis 
was drawing to an end and there was no a real danger of becoming involved itself, 
Khrushchev addressed a bellicose letter to President Eisenhower, in which he warned 
that an atomic attack on the PRC would bring a rebuff by the same means. 
However, Beijing was dissatisfied with Moscow's weakness toward the US and 
with the Soviet empty show of strength.89 Furthermore, the PRC leaders rejected 
Moscow's proposal that Beijing should handle the Taiwan as a buffer zone to avoid 
an armed conflict similarly to the Russian model of the Republic of Far East in 1920-
1922. The PRC maintained that the Taiwan issue was an internal Chinese affair in 
which neither the Russians nor the Americans should interfere.90 In the 1960s the 
PRC-Soviet alliance completely split and a number of armed conflicts broke out 
85. Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War-The Making o/Sino-American Confrontation. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994, pp.82-84. 
86. Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War-The Making o/Sino-American Confrontation. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994, pp.l60-161, 196-200. 
87. During late 1949 and mid 1950, Beijing worked out an operational plan to capture Taiwan and the 
PLA made preparations for the Taiwan campaign. However, this plan was aborted because of the 
outbreak of Korean War. Beijing dispatched the PLA main force to participate in the Korean War and 
its attempt to seize Taiwan had to be postponed. See He Di, " 'The Last Campaign to Unify China': 
The CCP's Unmaterialized Plan to Liberate Taiwan, 1949-1950," Chinese Historians, VoI.V, No.1, 
Spring 1992, pp.1-16. 
88. "K.hrushchev Proposed the PRC Should Establish the Republic of Far East in Taiwan," (" iMJ; -= 
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among Chinese and Russian troops along the border. In the 1970s, PRC-Soviet 
relations deteriorated further while the PRC made a substantial strategic alliance with 
the US to contain Soviet global expansionism.91 
Yet, the Soviet Union did not change its basic policy on the Taiwan issue during 
the Cold War. At the 1971 UN General Assembly, the Soviet Union was one of the 
supporters of the resolution giving the PRC the legitimate Chinese seat in the United 
Nations while excluding the ROC. In the 1980s, the Taiwan issue became a useful 
bargaining weight in Washington-Beijing-Moscow triangular relations. The Soviet 
Union spared no effort to estrange PRC-US relations by reaffirming its stand in 
support of the PRC' s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan and attacking US-Taiwan 
close relations which hurt the PRC's vital interests. Moscow's position on the 
Taiwan issue helped Beijing to force Washington to make concessions.92 In the 
PRC-US-Soviet strategic grand triangle, Moscow often played the Taiwan card as a 
lever to balance the PRC and the US, and has continued to do so in the PRC-US-
Russian triangular relations in the post-Cold War era. 
In terms of Russia's considerations of policy toward the PRC, the "good 
neighbour" approach eased tensions along the PRC-Russian borders and reduced the 
burden of the defence budget in order to concentrate resources on economic 
development. Also, Moscow looked at the PRC's impressive economic growth and 
viewed economic and trade cooperation with the PRC as a means by which to boost 
Russia's economy. 
As the PRC's military power grew, increasing the need for more arms, the PRC 
became the most important market for Russian weapons and energy resources. In 
terms of geopolitics, besides cooperation on major international issues, one of the 
90. "Khrushchev Proposed the PRC Should Establish the Republic of Far East in Taiwan," (" iJi. ~ 
~:k 'I§' ~ -j,5l. r:p ~ (E i:! nit iL :@ * ~ ;f!l/E, ") TTNN ( 1:p lfC.1ij E Jff j'!fJ), May 29, 1999. 
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purposes of Russia seeking to further ties with the PRC was to obtain Beijing's 
support for Russia to enter into the Asia-Pacific region. In this regard, the PRC 
could play an important role in supporting Russia's participation in Asian 
international forums. A Russian good-neighbour policy toward the PRC was 
designed to obtain Beijing's help for Russia to join the Asia-Pacific economic 
cooperative organisation and participate in regional economic and political processes. 
Moscow was eager to change the image of the former Soviet Union threatening 
regional countries. It was very keen to join the political and economic 
neighbourhood in Russia's own eastern surrounds. In particular, Russia had 
readjusted its Western-orientated foreign policy since 1993, and had given a priority 
to the Asia-Pacific region. Russia attached great importance to the economic growth 
of the Asia-Pacific region and hoped to create favourable conditions for its own 
economic development. Under this background and within such a design framework, 
Moscow pursued its policy toward the PRC in the post-Cold War era.93 
In 1991 and 1994, Russia and the PRC signed two border accords basically 
resolving long-term border disputes and energetically promoting the improvement 
and development of bilateral relations.94 The two countries had cooperated on major 
international issues since 1992. In 1993, an agreement on military cooperation over 
five years between the PRC and Russia was signed. In 1994, the two nations signed 
a mutual nonaggression pact.95 In January 1994, President Yeltsin proposed a PRC-
Russian constructive partnership oriented towards the 21st century. President Jiang 
Zemin paid his return visit to Russia in September 1994 and agreed to establish such 
a partnership. Furthermore, Moscow proposed to establish a PRC-Russian strategic 
partnership. Initially, it seemed that the PRC leaders were not enthusiastic but 
apparently changed their mind on the eve of the fourth Yeltsin-Jiang presidential 
summit of 1996 and Jiang immediately agreed when Yeltsin repeated the proposal. 
Relations with the United States were difficult for both nations, as Beijing and 
93 • Pi Ying-hsien, "The Dynamics of Sino-Russian Relations," Issues & Studies, Vo!.32, No.1, 
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Moscow believed that Washington was seeking domination of the post-Cold War 
world. This prompted the PRC and Russia to move closer together. PRC-Russian 
strategic cooperation was at its height in mid-1995 and early 1996, at a time when 
Moscow worried about the US-led NATO expansion of its defence scope eastwards 
Russia's western border and Beijing confronted Washington over the Taiwan issue. 
Both nations shared similar views on a range of international issues and had acted 
with each other in light of some common interests in world affairs. When Yeltsin 
visited the PRC in April 1996, the two nations announced the establishment of a 
strategic partnership for the 21st century.96 For Beijing's part, with the Taiwan issue 
in mind, it sought to safeguard itself with its close strategic ties to Moscow. 
2.1-2. Russia's Relations with Taiwan 
The former Soviet Union had severed diplomatic relations with the ROC and 
recognised the PRC in October 1949. From the early 1950s to the late 1980s, 
relations between Taiwan and the Soviet Union were hostile and prohibited mutual 
contacts. However, Moscow and Taipei sounded out the possibility of approaching 
each other in the late 1960s when Beijing and Moscow moved from alliance into 
enmity. 97 Since the early 1970s, the international situation had changed 
considerably. Beijing and Washington ended their hostility and engaged in strategic 
parallelism. Moscow and Taipei attempted to utilise their combined leverage against 
their common enemy-Beijing. Both sides tried to conduct political cooperation and 
even considered that they might militarily help and support each other or form a 
military alliance of some sort against the PRC.98 
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During the period, from the 1970s to the 1980s, Moscow sought to exploit the 
handling of the Taiwan situation in PRC-US relations. It adopted a gesture of tying 
down the PRC on the Taiwan issue. Sometimes, it showed off its military presence 
by despatching warships to sail through the Taiwan Strait, in an attempt to send a 
warning message to Beijing. A Russian journalist, Victor Louis, who was viewed as 
a KGB official, visited Taiwan in 1968. 
In the meantime, Taipei explored the necessity and possibility of resorting to a 
tactical alliance with Moscow. Yet this would have involved a fundamental shift in 
its stand from anti-Communism to cooperation with communist countries. A debate 
about whether Taipei would collaborate with the Soviet Union to balance PRC-US 
relations had been conducted for a long time within the ROC leadership. The ROC 
leaders expressed their opinion that they might improve relations with Moscow to 
cope with Beijing if that was necessary. Some of the ROC political figures, visited 
Moscow and diplomats came into contact with their Soviet counterparts by meeting 
on public occasions and maintaining private contacts. 
However, rapprochement between Taiwan and the Soviet Union was not realised. 
Neither Moscow nor Taipei changed their respective policies toward the opposite 
side. There were two main reasons for this. Firstly, the ROC basic national policy 
was anti-Communist and motivated to resist Russia. The ROC leadership had a 
deep-seated hatred ofthe Soviet Union because Moscow had supported the Chinese 
Communist forces in subverting the Nationalist regime. Secondly, the ROC 
leadership worried that it would provoke the Americans to anger and that it would be 
deserted by Washington. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had not changed its stance 
on Taiwan's status during the Cold War, remaining in support of Beijing's stance on 
cross-strait issues. For its part, Moscow did not wish to complicate its relations with 
Beijing. These factors notwithstanding, the intention to draw closer to one another 
and maintain some secretive contacts, laid a foundation for a thaw in the relations 
between Russia and Taiwan. 
In the late 1980s, Taipei relaxed restrictions on nongovernmental exchanges with 
the Soviet Union. Taiwan and the Soviet Union had came into unofficial contact 
Containment. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994, p.98; Lai-to Lee, The Reunification of China: 
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with each other and Taipei ultimately lifted its ban on direct trade and investment in 
the Soviet Union in 1990.99 
The change in bilateral relations really began after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. In 1992, John Chang, ROC Vice Foreign Minister visited Moscow. 
International media quickly observed that the visit was the first time since the formal 
contacts between both sides had been broken off in 1949 and saw his tour as an ice-
breaking mission. He and his Russian counterpart discussed the exchange of liaison 
missions and signed an agreement on the establishment of representative offices in 
their respective capitals. loo Substantial relations between Russia and Taiwan have 
greatly improved since then. A number of high-ranking officials, legislators, and 
politicians have exchanged visits between Russia and Taiwan, including former 
Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev's visit in 1994. 101 Russo-Taiwanese exchanges 
in the fields of tourism, sports, education and culture had surged. The people-to-
people contacts had also rapidly increased. In 1995, 10,000 Taiwanese businessmen 
and tourists visited Russia while more than 1,000 Russians travelled to Taiwan. l02 
Taipei viewed ties with Russia as an important aspect of its pragmatic diplomacy. 
It sought to develop formal political relations while expanding trade and economic 
ties with Russia. In return, Moscow responded positively to Taipei's desire for the 
development of ties and decided to establish unofficial bilateral relations. 103 In 1992, 
due to Taiwan's increasing influence in the Asian-Pacific region and further contacts 
between Taiwan and Russia, President Boris Yeltsin issued an administrative decree 
to facilitate Russo-Taiwanese relations. 104 The Taipei representative office in 
Moscow was inaugurated in July 1993 and the Russian representative office in Taipei 
99 • Ralph N. Clough, Reaching across the Taiwan Strait: People-to-People Diplomacy. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1993, pp.l12-115. 
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Pinter, 1996, p.93. 
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International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997, p.4l. 
became operational in December 1996. 105 In 1993, the two sides signed a joint 
commercial agreement to open direct airline links. In 1996, the two sides were 
negotiating for an accord of marine navigation. Also, they sought to sign a 
cooperation agreement to boost bilateral trade. 106 Meanwhile, Taiwan tried to 
establish diplomatic relations with some former Soviet republics but failed. 107 
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Russo-Taiwanese economic relations had made further progress since the 
early1990s. Taiwan made an effort to increase its share of the Russian market. 
Russia sought to promote substantial trade exchanges between the two sides. It 
believed that Taiwan and Russia had complementary trade domains and structures. 
Taiwan's exports to Russia were mainly consumer goods. In addition, Russia needed 
high quality information technology, telecommunications and electronics products. 
In terms of these technologies and goods, Taiwan had a relatively strong competitive 
capacity that could export to Russia at reasonable prices. Russia had abundant 
natural resources, especially gas and crude oil. 90 percent of Taiwan's imports from 
Russia were basic necessities for Taiwan's industry such as metals and other raw 
materials. Also, Taiwan was interested in importing petroleum and liquefied gas 
from Russia. 108 Since Taiwan opened direct trade links with Russia in 1990, two-way 
trade greatly increased, from US$ 119 million in 1990 to more than US$ 1.8 billion 
in 1995. 109 In 1996, Russia imported US$ 141.20 million worth of Taiwan-made 
products while Taiwan imported US$ 1.63 billion worth of goods from Russia. 110 
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In the mid-1990s, Taiwan became Russia's fourth largest trading partner in Asia 
following the PRC, Japan and South Korea.l1I However, for the period of 1991-
1995, Russia's dealings with Taiwan equalled less than one-seventh of the trade 
volume of such between the PRC and Russia. 112 If Russia calculated its commercial 
interests, the PRC was therefore obviously a larger trading partner than Taiwan. The 
PRC ranked third in Russia's list of trading partners while Russia was the eighth 
largest partner of the PRC. ll3 More important, Russia undertook a large number of 
weapon transactions with the PRC. 
Moscow was desperate for Taiwanese investment and encouraged Taiwan's 
companies to do so. Russia appeared to be an attractive market for Taiwan, which 
viewed it as a great potential for investment because of its vast market, rich natural 
resources and strong industrial base. Yet, although Taiwanese entrepreneurs were 
interested in investing in some Russian industrial sectors, their investment in Russia 
remains limited. They hesitated to build large projects because of the Russia's 
unstable political situation and poor economic conditions as well as the stagnation of 
bilateral political relations 114 
Generally speaking, the prospects for Russo-Taiwanese trade and economic 
cooperation appeared unpromising. Therefore, Russia had economic interests in 
Taiwan but they were not vital. This made Moscow consider that PRC-Russian 
relations were far more important than Russo-Taiwanese relations. 
Politically, there was no close contact between Moscow and Taipei, despite some 
engagement in low-profile cooperation such as preventing and combating crime. 115 
There was political support for Taiwan in Russia despite the pro-PRC administration 
that pursued PRC-Russian strategic cooperation and the legislative body which was 
dominated by the communists. Many people in Russian political circles, including 
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some prominent politicians, had visited Taiwan and advocated further bilateral 
relations. The Liberal Democratic Party ( LDP ) led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who 
was famous for his nationalism, beat the drum for Taiwan. The LDP's 
parliamentarian, Alex Mitrofanov, chairman of the Committee of Geopolitics of the 
State Duma, formed a group of pro-Taiwan parliamentarians making preparations for 
a bill dealing with Russia's relations with Taiwan in 1996. 116 However, their 
initiative failed to win majority support in the Russian parliament. II? 
It stands to reason that since both Russia and Taiwan were now Western-style 
democratic systems and capitalist economies, they ought to have good bilateral 
political relations. However, the political relationship between Russia and Taiwan 
was limited by PRC-Russian strategic cooperation. Indeed, at a time when the PRC 
and Russia were maintaining closer ties, a breakthrough in Taiwanese-Russian 
formal political relations was not easily accomplished. In Russia's considerations of 
foreign policy, the weight of Russo-Taiwanese relations was limited while the 
leverage ofPRC-Russian relations was considerable. 
2.1-3. Russia's Stance on the Taiwan Issue 
Russia's stance on the Taiwan issue was determined by its acceptance of the 'One 
China' policy. Guided by this basic policy, it recognised the PRC as the only 
legitimate government of China and maintained that Taiwan is an inseparable 
province of Chinese territory. Russia had repeatedly declared that it would stick to 
the 'One China' policy. When President Yeltsin issued the administrative decree to 
shape Russo-Taiwanese ties in 1992, he instructed that Russia would not establish 
inter-governmental relations with Taiwan and Russia would develop substantial ties 
only on the basis of the principle of 'One China'. 118 Beijing gained further support 
from Moscow for its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan in 1996.119 Russia's 
116 . "The Republic of China Must Base Itself on the International Society," ( " r:p $ ~ ~ ;16, ~~ JL 
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119. "Joint Statement by the People's Republic of China and the Russia Federation," Beijing Review, 
May 13-19, 1996, p.6. 
unofficial links with Taiwan were by and large in economic cooperation, and the 
trade, technological and cultural sectors. 
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Militarily and politically, Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait issue were important in 
Moscow's view of the strategic pattern of the Asia-Pacific region, but not 
fundamental or critical to Russian interests. In 1996, the pro-Taiwan Russian 
parliamentarians advocated that from a geo-political perspective of gaining a 
favourable regional balance of power, Russia should playa role in the dispute over 
Taiwan's status and not allow the PRC andthe US to dominate the Taiwan Strait. 120 
However, this advice was not taken as there was no imperative need for Russia to be 
involved in the dispute over Taiwan. 
To a great extent, Moscow's support for Beijing over the Taiwan issue was driven 
by concern over its own domestic political stability and ethnic issues. Both Moscow 
and Beijing were burdened with complex ethnic problems at home. The Russian 
Federation was troubled by ethnic independence claims. The PRC leadership also 
faced internal instability, including secession tendencies in Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner 
Mongolia besides the Taiwan independence movement. In terms of national stability 
and unity, the PRC and Russia converged in their fundamental and long-term 
interests. Beijing and Moscow had agreed to non-interference in each other's 
internal affairs and mutual support in opposition to interference from the Western 
countries, mainly the US. Moscow actively supported Beijing's stand on Taiwan in 
exchange for the PRC's acceptance of Russia's policy toward Chechnya. Beijing 
supported Russia's perseverance in maintaining its national sovereignty, unity and 
territorial integrity, and maintained that the Chechnya issue was an internal affair of 
Russia. 121 
Although the PRC and Russia cooperated strategically and had a close military 
relationship, there was no necessity for Moscow to support Beijing in forcefully 
seeking to reunify Taiwan with mainland China. It was significant to refer to the 
former Soviet Union's stance in this matter because, in terms of policy toward 
Taiwan, Russia basically carried on from that of the former Soviet Union. Even 
120 • "The Republic of China Must Base Itself on the International Society," ( " r:p $ ~ G0 ;J6' §~ JL. 
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during the period of the PRe-Soviet alliance in the 1950s, Moscow did not openly 
back the idea of Beijing settling the Taiwan issue by military means. In the early 
1950s, Stalin did not back a PRe invasion of Taiwan despite publicly supporting 
Beijing's policy of reunifying with Taiwan.J22 In the late 1950s, one of the 
preconditions for Moscow providing nuclear aid was that Beijing had to give an 
assurance that it would not take independent military action over Taiwan.123 In 1959, 
Khrushchev advised the PRe leaders to drop the idea of militarily liberating Taiwan 
and work out a peaceful solution to the problem.124 The Russian leaders continued to 
follow this line of policy on Taiwan. They would support a peaceful resolution 
rather than a forcible settlement of the Taiwan issue.125 
The PRe-Russian strategic partnership was more of a political alignment than a 
military alliance. It served Russia's strategic objectives as a useful check to US 
global dominance and a leverage to balance the Japan-US alliance. Having neither 
vital economic interests nor immediate security interests in Taiwan, Moscow wanted 
to avoid being dragged into an armed conflict over Taiwan on Beijing's behalf. It 
did not wish to damage Russo-Western relations because of an involvement in 
disputes over Taiwan. During the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, Moscow explicitly 
gave its diplomatic support for Beijing's stand on Taiwan. 126 However, there was no 
evidence to suggest that the Russian armed forces would back the PLA's massive 
manoeuvres off Taiwan. 127 
2.1-4. Evaluation of the Russian Factor in the Taiwan Issue 
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Maintaining close and friendly PRC-Russian relations was significant for both 
Beijing and Moscow's domestic concerns, foreign relations and world strategy. This 
diplomatic and strategic consideration largely accounted for the establishment of the 
PRC-Russian strategic partnership. The partnership had resulted in a change in the 
geo-strategic geometry, reshaping the regional and global balance of power. The 
major powers had to readjust their mutual relations and respective foreign policies in 
t 
light of such a new strategic situation. The PRC-Russian strategic partnership had 
posed a challenge to the American hegemony reminding Washington that it could not 
dominate world affairs and boosting both major powers' bargaining position vis-a-vis 
the United States. Also, it was a warning to the US-Japan military alliance that 
Washington and Tokyo could not enlarge their security system into an eastern 
NATO. In keeping with this strategic convergence, Russia would diplomatically 
support the PRC over the Taiwan issue and oppose any expanded military role of the 
Japan-US security alliance in the Asia-Pacific region. In return, Beijing would back 
Moscow in opposition to NATO's expansion and growing Western encroachment on 
the Russian sphere of influence. 
Having no direct stake in Taiwan, Russia had no wish for a major role in the 
question of Taiwan's status. Russia's policy toward Taiwan was based on both PRC-
Russian relations and the world strategic pattern. It had basically been reflected in 
the pursuit of Russia's own national interests, being principally out of concern for 
Russia's own domestic problems. Also, Russia's support for the PRC policy towards 
Taiwan was aimed at strategic cooperation with the PRC in the international arena 
for its possible resurgence as a world great power. Russia's position would be taken 
into account in shaping the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait and the Asia-
Pacific region in spite of its declining national strength and relatively decreased voice 
on the Taiwan issue. Russia's influence on Taiwan and the region could be exploited 
by Beijing to balance respective geo-political forces involved in Taiwan's status. 
In any case, the PRC-Russian strategic partnership was very different from the 
PRC-Soviet alliance in the 1950s. The former was more in the nature of a military 
alliance but the latter was largely for strategic cooperation on the international issues. 
Although Beijing had considered the need for closer military ties with Russia to 
strengthen its position on Taiwan, Moscow was reluctant to let such ties target 
Taiwan. For these reasons Russia was not viewed as having a great influence upon 
the 1995-96 Taiwan crisis. 
2.2. The Japanese Factor in the Taiwan Issue 
Historically a suzerain state, Japan is connected Taiwan in many respects. 
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Geographically proximal and a major global and regional power, Japan has strategic 
and security concerns over Taiwan. Economically and politically, it also has close 
ties with Taiwan. Thus, Japan has an influence upon Taiwan and plays an important 
role in the island's status. 
2.2-1. PRe-Japanese Relations128 
In modem history, Japan and China were long-standing mutual enemies due to the 
wars of Japanese aggression against China. In 1895, China was defeated and the 
Chinese Qing government was forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki, ceding 
Taiwan to Japan. After Japan lost World War II and withdrew from Taiwan, China 
recovered it in August 1945. 
Following the Communists' victory over the Nationalists in the Chinese civil war 
in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek escaped from the mainland and transplanted his 
government to Taipei. Chiang's Nationalist government continued to insist, with US 
support, that it was the legitimate government of all of China. In the meantime, 
Japan moved from being an enemy to being an ally of the United States. For 
common interests, Tokyo and Taipei united together and joined the US-led Western 
anti-Communist alliance to deter Soviet and PRC communist expansion. When the 
PRC joined the Soviet-led Communist bloc, Japan and the US concluded a security 
treaty in 1951 and Taiwan and the US signed a mutual defence treaty in 1954. 
Hence, both Japan and Taiwan were members of a US-led close network of military 
128. For an overview ofPRC-Japanese relations, see Marie SOderberg (ed.), Chinese-Japanese 
Relations in the 21st Century: Complementarity and Conflict. London; New York: Routledge, 2002; 
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security treaties. During the early Cold War period strong rivalry developed between 
Japan and the PRe. The PRC-Soviet Alliance of 1950 was openly directed against 
Japan. 129 The latent conflict between the PRC and Japan nearly broke out during the 
Korea War of 1950-1953 because Japan provided strong and effective logistic 
support to the American troops. 130 Taiwan's status also helped to maintain tensions 
between Beijing and Tokyo. The Japanese government recognised the ROC 
government as the sole legal government of China and concluded a peace treaty, 
terminating the state ofthe Chinese-Japanese war of 1937-1945, with the ROC rather 
than the PRC. 131 Furthermore, Japan followed the US in containing the PRC and 
supporting the ROC in the confrontation between Beijing and Taipei. 
Technically, the PRC and Japan remained in a state of war. Both the US troops 
stationed in Japan and the US-Japan military alliance perceived by Beijing to be the 
main source of threat to the PRC's national security. In particular, Beijing viewed 
Japan's formal diplomatic relations and close contacts with Taiwan as Tokyo's plot 
to create an independent Taiwan and split China. However, the two nations 
continued to maintain and develop trade ties. 
For Beijing's part, it attempted to influence Japan's China policy through 
economic exchanges. It believed that Japanese businessmen cared for nothing but 
profit, and that they would lobby the Japanese government to pursue a policy in 
favour of the PRC. For example, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai demanded that Japan 
should provide neither aid nor investment to Taiwan.132 Thus a non-governmental 
agreement on trade and fishing was reached and economic and technological 
exchanges were conducted between the two countries. Thereby Japan benefited from 
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a favourable trade balance with the PRC while Beijing sought to attain its political 
objectives by economic means. 133 
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Beijing tried its best to win Tokyo's diplomatic recognition in the competition for 
national legitimation between the ROC and the PRC. Besides economic bait, Beijing 
exerted political pressure on Japan. 134 Since 1958, Zhou had put forward the three 
principles for the normalisation ofPRC-Japanese relations and demanded Japanese 
acceptance. These three principles were that (1) Japan should recognise the PRC 
Government as the sole legal government of China; and (2) Taiwan as an inalienable 
part of the territory of the PRC; (3) Japan should renounce the "Japan-Taiwan 
treaty", which recognised the ROC as the legitimate government of China, as illegal 
and invalid and should abrogate it. 135 
Japan basically accepted these three principles despite having reservations. 
Thereby it normalised relations with the PRC in 1972. Japanese Prime Minister 
Kakuei Tanaka paid a visit to the PRC and then on the 29 September the Sino-
Japanese Joint Statement was signed, in which the two nations proclaimed that the 
state of war was ended and diplomatic relations were established. 136 
PRC-US reconciliation brought about by concern regarding the Soviet threat gave 
an impetus to the normalisation ofPRC-Japan relations. Japan largely followed 
American foreign policy after the Second World War. During the Cold War, Japan 
was a firm ally of the US, helping to contain the Soviet Union. From 1945-1971, 
Japan sided with the US in PRC-US hostility. It was not until President Nixon's visit 
to the PRC in 1972 that Japan began to realise the necessity for normalisation of 
bilateral relations with the PRC. Beijing was also eager to terminate the abnormal 
state of affairs which had hitherto existed between Japan and the PRC. Faced with 
the growing threat of the Soviet Union and the evolving international situation of the 
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early 1970s, Beijing intended to defend its own security and enhance its status in 
shaping the balance of power in the Asia-pacific region. In order to collaborate with 
Japan in opposition to the Soviet Union and diplomatically compete with Taiwan, the 
PRC chose not to claim the payment of reparations from Japan when diplomatic 
relations were established. 137 
In August 1978, the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed and 
came into effect in October of that year. It included an "anti-hegemony" clause 
aimed at the Soviet Union. 138 At first Japan rejected this because it was worried that 
it might be dragged into a conflict with the Soviets. However, Beijing insisted upon 
the clause, intending to draw Tokyo into a common anti-Soviet nexus of relations 
and Japan ultimately accepted, after Chinese insistence and American persuasion. 
The "anti-hegemony" clause was an implicit understanding that the two nations 
would oppose Soviet hegemonism in the Asia-Pacific region, acting in co-ordination 
with American strategy. In fact the PRC, Japan and the US made an alliance to deter 
the Soviet Union. Because containing the Soviet invasion and expansion became a 
matter of prime importance, the PRC and Japan temporarily shelved most of their 
bilateral disputes. 
The two countries maintained good relations in the 1980s, despite some problems. 
After the Communist regime's military crackdown on democracy demonstrators in 
Tiananmen Square on 4 June 1989, Japan partly took part in the Western countries' 
sanctions against the PRC, but continued its substantial commercial relations with 
the PRe. It lifted its partial sanctions and restored Japanese government loans to the 
PRC in 1990.139 
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The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union also had an impact on 
PRC-Japan relations. The disappearance of the common enemy removed the security 
concern of the Soviet threat, a key facet of Chinese-Japanese relations. Thus, 
fundamental differences and major disputes were again exposed. The competition 
for Asian domination between the two major powers emerged again with accusations 
over armaments expansion. In bilateral relations, in addition to trade imbalances, 
there were three major issues. First was the unresolved issue of Japanese aggression 
against China from 1937 to 1945. The Japanese government stated only that it 
"deeply reproaches itself',140 but the PRC government insisted on its demand that a 
formal apology be made. Second was the territorial disputes over the Diaoyu/ 
Senkaku Islands. 141 Third was the Taiwan issue. In particular, it became more 
controversial and sensitive as Taiwan's domestic political situation changed and 
ROC President Lee Teng-hui's pro-Japanese attitude was increasingly revealed. 
From the early 1990s, the frictions between the two nations over Taiwan increased. 
However, the PRC and Japan had to cooperate because of mutual need and 
respective interests. 142 Political dialogue and diplomatic consultations between the 
two nations have been established on a regular basis while holding talks on the issue 
of security. 143 The leaders of the two countries had exchanged visits, including CPC 
General Secretary Jiang Zemin's visit to Japan in 1992, Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji's 
visit to Japan in 1994; Emperor Akihito's visit to the PRC in 1992, Prime Minister 
Morihiro Hosokawa's visit to the PRC in 1994 and Prime Minister Tomiichi 
Murayama's visit to the PRC in 1995.144 In particular, the two economies were 
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complementary to each other. Both benefited from economic cooperation and 
exchanges and economic relations developed significantly. In the mid-1990s, the 
PRC was the Japan's second largest investment recipient and trading partner, and 
Japan was the PRC's largest trading partner and the second largest investor. 145 
2.2-2. Japan's Relations with, and Interests in, Taiwan146 
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Historically, Taiwan was a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945. This inclined 
some Taiwanese to take a pro-Japan stance. Many elder Taiwanese elite graduated 
from Japanese-language schools during the Japanese occupation, studied in Japanese 
universities and worked in Japanese companies in the 1930s and 1940s and therefore 
had a favourable opinion ofthe Japanese. 147 In particular, ROC President Lee Teng-
hui was well known for his pro-Japanese attitude. This allowed Japan a degree of 
influence on Taiwan. 
After Japan switched its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1972, it 
maintained unofficial relations and continued its friendly and substantial ties with 
Taiwan. The two sides established representative offices in their respective capitals. 
They conducted close cooperation and had frequent economic, trade and cultural 
exchanges. 
In the mid-1990s, the people-to-people exchanges and business links were very 
close and frequent. Annually, about 1.5 million visitors travelled between Japan and 
Taiwan. 148 Taiwanese visitors make up one of the largest groups of foreigner to visit 
Japan every year. 149 
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Taiwan and Japan had a close economic relationship. In the mid-1990s, Japan 
was Taiwan's second-largest trade partner and Taiwan was Japan's fourth-largest. lso 
"Japan's exports to Taiwan in 1996 were worth US$ 42 .. 4 billion, while imports 
from Taiwan were valued at US$ 29.7 billion."lsl Japan was also Taiwan's largest 
foreign investor. 1s2 Accumulated Japanese investment in Taiwan between 1972 and 
1996 amounted to US$ 7.4 billion, while Japan's investment in South Korea, whose 
population was twice Taiwan's, totalled only US$ 5.9 billion during the same 
period.1s3 
Keeping key sealanes through the Taiwan Strait free and safe for international 
navigation is crucial for Japan. As a leader in world trade and an island nation, Japan 
is dependent on its links to the outside world. International sealanes, in particular 
those which pass by Taiwan and go through the Taiwan Strait, are Japan's lifeblood. 
The issue of free passage in the sealanes through the Taiwan Strait therefore has a 
most important bearing on Japan. 
Taiwan is just 75 miles from the nearest Japanese island. If armed conflict 
happened in the Taiwan Strait, or if the PRC took control of Taiwan, there would be 
a potential threat to Japanese sealanes, lines of communication and economic well-
being. Because a friendly Taiwan can ensure the Japanese sea routes remain 
unimpeded, Taiwan's security is seen as important to Japan. 
There are further reasons why Taiwan has strategic significance for Japan. 
Obviously, in view ofthe competition between the PRC and Japan, a divided China 
is favourable to Japan because a reunified and powerful China could block any future 
Japanese road to Asian-Pacific hegemony. The PRC and Japan each sought a 
favourable balance of power in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific region. In such a 
strategic competition, Japan could make advantage of Taiwan to balance the PRC. 
These long-term and vital interests in Taiwan suggest that Japan hoped for an 
important role in addressing the question of Taiwan's status. However, because of its 
capacity as a former suzerain state, Japan had to handle the Taiwan issue cautiously, 
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as it was a very sensitive issue in PRC-Japan relations. Beijing was on its guard 
against Tokyo's possibly remaining ambitions for Taiwan. 154 Since 1994, Japan-
Taiwan relations had given rise to much controversy between the PRC and Japan. 
The US was also concerned over Japan's intentions toward Taiwan. Since Japan 
surrendered its occupation of Taiwan in 1945, the US had prevented any Japanese 
hopes of reconquest. For example, when he visited the PRC in 1972, President 
Richard Nixon assured the Chinese leaders that the US would prevent Japan from 
seeking to retake Taiwan when the American military force withdrew. 155 Therefore, 
adopting a cautious approach in tackling the Taiwan issue, Tokyo did its best to 
remove Beijing's suspicion while considering Washington's attitude. 
Lee Teng-hui had expressed his pro-Japanese opinion since 1994. He attended a 
Japanese-language school and completed his studies at Kyoto Imperial University in 
Japan. He spoke much better Japanese than he did Mandarin Chinese or Taiwanese, 
holding great feelings of warmth to, and gaining support from, Japanese. His public 
pro-Japanese expression stirred up a protest par~de in Taiwan and the overseas 
Chinese community. 156 In particular, his pro-Japanese statements brought about stern 
rebukes from Beijing and deep suspicion of his intention in promoting emotional ties 
between Japan and Taiwan. 15? Although Tokyo appeared to favour a Japan-educated 
head of state in Taiwan and probably had a high regard for Lee's pro-Japanese 
stance, it did not dare to publicly appreciate or encourage it. 
Since Lee came into office, Taipei had sought to upgrade relations with Japan. In 
February, 1993 ROC Foreign Minister Fredrick Chien paid a private visit to Japan. 
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This was the first time an incumbent ROC foreign minister had visited Japan since 
Japan switched diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC in 1972. However, 
no high-level Japanese officials met with Chien. Tokyo reiterated that Japan would 
maintain unofficial relations with Taiwan. 158 In addition, Taipei made an attempt to 
lobby the Japanese parliament to pass a bill that could be patterned after America's 
Taiwan Relations Act and lay a legal framework to facilitate Japanese-Taiwanese 
contacts. Yet, its attempt failed. There was political support for Taiwan in Japan, 
such as that from a group of pro-Taiwan parliamentarians. However, it was "fragile", 
and was "based on individuals rather than an institutionalised system". The domestic 
political situation compelled the Japanese government to act with care in dealing 
with Japan-Taiwan relations. Meanwhile, major political change in Taiwan had not 
significantly affected Japan-Taiwan relations and Tokyo did not explicitly express its 
support for Taipei's "diplomatic goals".159 
However, Lee persevered in attempting to realise his wish to visit Japan. In 
finding a pretext for a Japan trip, he focused on seeking an invitation to attend the 
Asian Games in Hiroshima in October 1994 and an Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Osaka in November 1995. In Summer 1994, the 
President of the Olympic Council of Asia ( OCA) extended an invitation to Lee to 
attend the opening ceremony of the Asian Games as an honoured guest. The 
invitation drew protests from Beijing, which threatened that the PRC would 
withdraw from the athletic event and adopt other retaliatory measures if Tokyo 
allowed Lee to enter Japan. The Japanese government decided to not grant Lee a 
visa and the OCA president withdrew his invitation. Lee was forced to cancel his 
plan to attend the ceremony.160 
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Since sports diplomacy failed, Lee schemed to make a Japan trip by participating 
in an unofficial summit of leaders from APEC forum countries. Beijing threatened to 
boycott the summit and warned Tokyo of possible untoward consequences if Lee was 
invited to attend. 161 Again, Tokyo was forced to accept Beijing's requirement. When 
he visited the PRC in May 1995, Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama 
assured the PRC leaders that the arrangement for Taiwan's participation in the third 
APEC summit would be same as those of the previous two summits in Seattle and in 
BogOr. 162 This meant that, as before, Taiwan would only be allowed to send a senior 
economics minister to represent Lee to the summit. After being granted a visa to 
visit the US in May, Lee was encouraged and demonstrated determination to go to 
Osaka in November. Until the eve of the summit, Lee did not give up his attempt to 
attend. 163 Nevertheless, at a time when Lee's US visit caused tensions in PRC-US 
relations and cross-strait relations, Tokyo was even less unlikely to issue Lee a visa. 
Obviously, an approval of Lee's visit would seriously strain ties between Japan and 
the PRC. Lee then sought a trip to Japan on an other pretext. He attempted to enter 
Japan at the invitation of his Japanese alma mater, Kyoto University. Beijing 
strongly urged Tokyo not to allow Lee to visit the university, warning that it would 
harm PRC-Japan relations. Tokyo had to keep its national door shut tight against 
him. 164 This demonstrated that Japan made an effort to prevent any deterioration in 
the relations between the PRC and Japan and avoid any worsening of the situation in 
the Taiwan Strait. 
2.2-3. Japan's Stance on the Taiwan Issue 
Japan's basic stance on the Taiwan issue was stated in ajoint communique with 
the PRC issued in 1972 when relations were normalised. The Japanese government 
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recognised the PRC government "as the sole legal government of China", and "fully 
understands and respects" the PRC stand that "Taiwan is an inalienable part of the 
territory" of the PRC. 165 As soon as the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement was 
published, the "Japan-Taiwan treaty" was declared to be terminated by Japanese 
Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira .166 This indicated that Japan adhered to its stand 
of complying with the Potsdam Proclamation that waived its sovereignty over 
Taiwan and reaffirmed it had returned Taiwan to China, but did not recognise 
Taiwan as an integral part of the PRC. Its non-acceptance of the PRC's sovereign 
claim to Taiwan implied that Japan actually retained a degree of uncertainty about 
jurisdiction over Taiwan. Also, this demonstrated that Japan adhered to a 'one-
China' policy, but it differed from the PRC's version of the 'One-China' principle. 167 
Japanese reservations were a basis for handling relations with Taiwan, but became 
a source of friction between the two countries over the Taiwan issue. Since the early 
1990s, Beijing had pressured Tokyo to sign a second Sino-Japanese joint 
communique or publish a statement to clarify further its position on Taiwan. 
However, Tokyo insisted that Japan's position on the status of Taiwan had been 
outlined in the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Statement and was reluctant to publish a 
new statement.168 Tokyo simply repeated its past statements on the Taiwan issue and 
did not promise further explanation despite being urged to do so by Beijing. It 
restated that there is only one China and it would keep its relations with Taiwan 
strictly on a non-official level. For example, on November 14 1994, Prime Minister 
Tomiichi Murayama said that Japan would continue to abide by its stance on the 
Taiwan issue as contained in the Sino-Japan Joint Statement. Japan would hold to a 
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'one China' policy and would not support the idea of "two Chinas".169 Without 
undertaking more commitments on the question of Taiwan in response to Beijing's 
demands, this was still within the expression of Japan's stance on Taiwan as 
contained in the 1972 joint statement. 
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With respect to the issue of Taiwan independence, the Japanese government's 
position was that it would not support such a claim. On the status of Taiwan, Tokyo 
maintained "the continuation of the status quo". It advocated that the cross-Taiwan 
Strait disputes should be settled peacefully through dialogue. It did not want to be 
involved in an armed conflict with the PRC over the Taiwan issue. 170 
2.2-4. Japan's Responses to Events in the Taiwan Strait during 
1995-96171 
When tensions arose from cross-strait relations and the PRC staged war games in 
late 1995, Tokyo called on Beijing to calm matters. Tokyo considered that the 
PRC's missile tests between the 8th and 15th of March 1996 affected Japanese civil 
air traffic, sea navigation and the fishing industry. On March 6, Ryozo Kato, director 
general of the Japanese Foreign Ministry'S Asian Affairs Bureau, summoned 
Counsellor Zheng Xianglin of the PRC Embassy, expressing concern over the PRe's 
planned test-firing of missiles. Kato said that "Tokyo is worried that 'something 
unexpected' may happen as the missile tests will be conducted near Japanese 
territory and waters, or some 60 km from Yonaguni island". Kato told Zheng that 
the Japanese government called on the PRC government to exercise restraint, and 
169 • Wu Xuewen, Lin Liande and Xu Zhixian, Chinese-Japanese Relations: 1945-1994 ( *$:)( . 
t*:l!:q,~ ·1~Z7t ' * E }C/~ 1945-1994). Beijing: The Press of Current Events ( atiHl:lJ1R:t± ), 
1995, pp.445-446. 
170 • Kokubun Ryosei, "Japan-China Relations After the Cold War: Switching from the' 1972 
Framework' ," Japan Echo, Vol.28, No.2, April 2001, pp.13-14; Marie Soderberg (ed.), Chinese-
Japanese Relations in the 21st Century: Complementarity and Conflict. London; New York: 
Routledge, 2002, pp.48, 95. 
171 • For Japan's diplomatic responses to PRC military exercises during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 
1995-96, see Greg Austin, "Taiwan and PRC Military Power in Japan's Domestic Politics," in Greg 
Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan's Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power. 
Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 
Australian National University, 1997, pp.94-104; Marie Soderberg (ed.), Chinese-Japanese Relations 
in the 21st Century: Complementarity and Conflict. London; New York: Routledge, 2002, pp.97 -98. 
63 
hoped tensions across the Taiwan Strait would be resolved through peaceful 
means. 172 
On March 8, Tokyo continued urging Beijing to exercise restraint. Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama said that "Tokyo would like to give Beijing due warning 
because the missile exercises were conducted near Japanese territory." Prime 
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto expressed his anxiety saying that the situation was 
moving "in an unfortunate direction". Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda said that the 
Japanese government might "take further measures after seeing how the missile tests 
affect civil aviation, sea transport and fishing.,,173 On March 11, Vice Foreign 
Minister Sadayuki Hayashi stated that Tokyo understood Washington's decision to 
send the two aircraft carriers to waters near Taiwan. "We consider that the U.S. 
move reflects its strong interest in peace and stability in the region".174 
In the meantime, the Japanese Embassy in Beijing conveyed the Japanese 
government's grave concerns about the Taiwan crisis to the PRC government while 
making representations to the PRC Foreign Ministry about the military exercises of 
Chinese armed forces near Taiwan. Also, Tokyo exerted pressure on Beijing by 
suggesting that it might reconsider its continuing economic aid to the PRC. 175 
Simultaneously, Tokyo called on Taipei to exercise restraint and not to "escalate 
tensions between it and the PRC", while appealing to Beijing and Taipei to resume 
dialogue and peacefully resolve their disputes.176 This demonstrated that Tokyo tried 
to keep a balance in tackling the problem of cross-strait military confrontation. 
Generally speaking, "the Japanese government maintained its cautious approach 
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throughout March 1996". By trying to "stay aloof", Tokyo sought to avoid 
provoking Beijing. 177 
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Militarily, the Japanese government prepared to take measures to deal with the 
Taiwan crisis. Prime Minister Hashimoto gave instructions to the Defence Agency 
for a study of any new developments in the situation in the Taiwan Strait and the 
impact of the crisis upon Japan. The Defence Agency paid close attention to the 
situation and researched contingency arrangements, secretly mapping out a plan to 
meet any possible exigency. The plan assumed that the PLA Air Force might launch 
an attack on the American Air Force base on Ryukyu Island as well as on Japanese 
Air Force bases. In response Japan's airforce would be deployed to defend their 
airspace. The Japanese Air Force dispatched its EP3 aircraft to fly over the East 
China Sea and collect intelligence. 
However, by and large, the plan proposed that the Japanese Self Defence Forces 
would provide logistical support for US military operations in the event of an armed 
conflict over Taiwan between the PRC and the US. The plan required the 
preparation of military facilities and supplies, in particular refuelling services for 
American warships and medical treatment for US soldiers. Also, the plan required 
the collection of intelligence in preparation for support of the American military 
force. 178 
However, in making contingency arrangements for a possible PRC military threat, 
the question of whether such arrangements would be lawful arose. Although Tokyo 
believed that this plan was based on the US-Japan mutual defence and security treaty, 
which stipulated that the Japanese forces had an obligation to provide logistical 
support to US troops, there was no clear and definite stipulations on the Taiwan 
issue. 179 The treaty ambiguously stated that Japan would provide support for US 
forces in the event of a regional conflict. On one hand, the PRC military manoeuvres 
clearly targeted Taiwan. They affected Japanese national security but did not pose a 
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direct military threat to Japan. On the other hand, Japan had not committed itself to 
assist the US to fulfil American commitments to Taiwan' security, despite Japan's 
military alliance with the US. 
In April 1996, US President Bill Clinton visited Japan and held talks with 
Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto on security issues in the Asia-Pacific region, in 
particular the Taiwan Strait, and mutual defence cooperation. The two nations 
decided to expand the geographical scope of their security treaty system to the 
Taiwan Strait. 
This notwithstanding, both the Japanese government and the American 
administration have neither confirmed nor denied that Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait 
has been included in the defensive scope of the US-Japan alliance. In particular, 
Tokyo has maintained a degree of geographical ambiguity in addressing the question 
of the defence area. Japan never acknowledged whether the new guidelines had 
covered the area of Taiwan, but only explained in general terms the "areas 
surrounding Japan". This demonstrated that it did its best to avoid angering Beijing 
by not referring to the possibility of military conflict with the PRC. Japan was still 
reluctant to expand its role in supporting the US in a possible PRC-US armed 
conflict over Taiwan. What it hoped was that handling emergencies in the Taiwan 
Strait it would ensure its own security, in particular its economic security and key 
trade routes. Tokyo's motives for promoting increased military cooperation with 
Washington stemmed largely from Japanese fears about Beijing's attempts to 
forcibly settle the Taiwan issue and the manner in which that could involve Japan in 
the conflagration of war. In practice, the PRC war games in the Taiwan Strait 
prompted Japan to broaden its security alliance with the US. IBO 
One has to view the dual nature of the US-Japan security treaty as applied to 
Taiwan. From an American perspective, the US-Japan alliance was a cap on the 
bottle oflatent Japanese militarism containing Japanese ambitions for Taiwan. 
For example, when he visited the PRC in 1972, President Richard Nixon assured the 
Chinese leaders that US military bases in Japan would serve to cope with the Soviet 
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invasion and expansionism and the US-Japan close defence relationship could 
restrain Japan from following a course of militarism. In particular, Nixon assured the 
Chinese that the US would prevent the Japanese forces from stationing in Taiwan 
when the American forces withdrew. 181 Therefore, the US always had the initiative 
in the Taiwan strategy of the US-Japan alliance and could not let Japan act 
autonomously on the issue. Although Tokyo worried about Beijing's military 
adventurism toward Taiwan, it was unable to playa leading role in tackling this 
problem, and followed Washington's line and US leadership.182 
2.2-5. Evaluation of the Japanese Factor in the Taiwan Issue 
The largest Japanese concern regarding the Taiwan question was that of how to 
ensure its own security. In particular, it had a stake in peace and stability in the 
Taiwan Strait which directly related to its economic security. Ensuring security of 
the sealanes was the most immediate and strongest interest of Japan. However, this 
does not necessarily equate to the idea of Taiwan becoming a protectorate of Japan. 
In Japan's national security strategy, Taiwan was important but not crucial. Japan 
would not support Taiwan independence. It strove to avert a war with the PRC over 
Taiwan. Japan's policy on the Taiwan issue was largely economic in motivation. 
While seeking to benefit from its good economic ties with Taiwan, Japan had greater 
interest in developing economic relations with the PRC. 
Japan's basic policy on the Taiwan issue was the same as the US, i.e. preservation 
ofthe status quo. Maintaining the status quo of Taiwan served Japan's long-term 
and vital strategic interests. So long as the PRC military did not launch an attack or 
impose a naval blockade on Taiwan, Tokyo would not respond strongly. Tokyo 
avoided stirring up Beijing's wrath over Taiwan while seeking to develop substantial 
and close relations with Taiwan. However, on the issue of Lee Teng-hui's attempt to 
visit Japan, it was caught in a bind between angering Beijing and improving ties with 
Taipei. In handling this issue, Tokyo made an effort to prevent any deterioration in 
181 • James Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon 
to Clinton. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999, ppA3-44. 
182. Marie Soderberg (ed.), Chinese-Japanese Relations in the 21st Century: Complementarity and 
Conflict. London; New York: Routledge, 2002, ppAO-41, 98. 
67 
the relations with the PRC and avoid worsening the situation in the Taiwan Strait. 
Because of the complexity and sensitivity of the Taiwan issue, Tokyo had to be very 
cautious about its relations with Taiwan. However, Tokyo would not meet all of 
Beijing's demands on the Taiwan issue. It adhered to a 'one-China' policy, but it 
differed from Beijing's version of the 'One-China' principle. 
Although Beijing suspected Tokyo of retaining ambitions for Taiwan, there was 
little chance of Japan restoring its past colonial rule over Taiwan and Tokyo had 
done its best to remove Beijing's suspicion. More importantly, Washington's 
prevention blocked any possibility of Japan's reconquest of Taiwan. 
Japan could playa major role, but could not independently determine the status of 
Taiwan. Japan had set its relations with the US as the keystone of its foreign policy 
and conducted its diplomacy within the framework of the Japan-US alliance after 
World War II. 
There are different views on the effects of Lee Teng-hui's pro-Japanese stance, 
and his intention to influence Japan's policy toward Taiwan, on relations between 
Japan and Taiwan. In addition to his pro-Japanese sentiment, he made efforts to 
lobby the Japanese leaders to upgrade Japan-Taiwan relations and to draw Tokyo 
into favouring Taipei in cross-strait disputes. Yet, Greg Austin considers that there is 
little to suggest that Tokyo had leaned to Taiwan in handling the triangular 
relationships between Beijing, Tokyo and Taipei on the basis of Lee's pro-Japanese 
stance. 183 However, another source reveals that Lee's lobbying on the Japanese 
leaders appeared to have had some effect. Lee had used secret funds to lobby the 
Japanese leaders since 1994, trying to facilitate his relations with them in an apparent 
attempt to seek Japan's backing for Taiwan and political support for himself. When 
the Taiwan crisis reached a critical moment in March 1996, Lee sought help from 
Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto through a Taiwanese businessman who had good 
connections in Tokyo, requesting Japan send a secret envoy to the US and urge 
Washington to send a naval force to protect Taiwan. Finally, it was because of 
Tokyo's insistence that Washington decided to send two carrier battle groups into the 
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region. 184 This source remains to be verified. If it is confirmed, did Lee's lobbying 
activities produce the result? In this case, it raises two issues. One is that it throws 
light on Lee's motives for his re-election in seeking political support from Japan. 
Without powerful US military support in stopping Beijing's intimidation of voters in 
Taiwan, Lee would lose the presidential election. 185 Because he had offended the 
Clinton administration in forcibly breaking through its original disapproval of his US 
visit, he had to ask Hashimoto for help in requesting the US to intervene militarily. 
The other is that Tokyo had no intention of playing a crucial role in deterring 
Beijing's military adventurism toward Taiwan. It was Lee's lobbying that prompted 
Tokyo to ask Washington for intervention. Further, it demonstrated that Washington 
had no intention of deliberately provoking or escalating the Taiwan crisis. 
2.3. The American Factor in the Taiwan Issue 
Of all the foreign influences involved in the Taiwan issue, the American factor is 
the most important. As such, it is the primary external factor of influence in PRC 
Taiwan policy-making. 
2.3-1. PRe-US Relations and Disputes over Taiwan 
During late 1949 and early 1950, following the communist takeover on the 
mainland and the retreat of the Nationalists to Taiwan, the Chinese Communist 
regime and the Truman administration suspected and opposed each other, but the 
PRC and the US avoided direct military confrontation. 186 When the PRC sought to 
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liberate Taiwan, the US did not intend to intervene militarily on behalf of the 
Nationalists. On 5 January 1950, President Harry Truman issued a statement on 
America's stance toward Taiwan's status. He reiterated that the US would abide by 
the relevant provisions in the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam 
Proclamation that declared Taiwan's return to China. In emphasising that the US had 
no territorial ambition for Taiwan, he said that the US would not seek "privileges, or 
to establish military bases on Formosa at this time". In particular, he expressed the 
American position that it would stay aloof from military conflict across the Taiwan 
Strait and that the US would not support the Nationalist forces. 187 In addition, on 12 
January 1950, in addressing the issues of US security in the Western Pacific, 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson drew a US defence line nOlih from the Aleutian 
Islands through Japan, the Ryukyu Islands and south to the Philippines, without 
including Taiwan. 188 
However, when the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the US changed its 
position on Taiwan and was dragged into propping up the Nationalist government in 
Taiwan. On June 27, 1950, President Truman declared that he had "ordered the 
Seventh Fleet" to sail into the Taiwan Strait and station there "to prevent any attack 
on" Taiwan by the Chinese "Communist forces". Under such circumstances, 
Taiwan's status "must await the restoration of security in the Pacific". The day after 
Truman's declaration, PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai published a statement 
strongly condemning "the American imperialists for aggression against China". He 
stated the PRC government's stance, that" Taiwan is part of China will remain 
unchanged forever" and that the determination of the Chinese people would "liberate 
Taiwan". 189 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the PRC and the US confronted each other 
regularly despite on-and-off ambassadorial-level talks. The dispute over the Taiwan 
issue was a focus in the sharp conflict between the two countries, which developed 
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into three Taiwan Strait crises. 19o The US strategically contained the PRe while 
imposing an economic blockade and seeking political change. The PRe pursued a 
strong anti-America policy in dimensions of ideology, politics, diplomacy and the 
military. 
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However, as the international situation had significantly changed since the early 
1970s, both Washington and Beijing faced serious problems in domestic matters and 
foreign affairs. The US was increasingly bogged down in the nearly decade-long 
Vietnam War. This prompted a large-scale anti-war movement bringing heavy 
pressure upon the American government. The grave economic crisis of the early 
1970s d,owngraded America's leading position in the international economic and 
financial system. 191 Although the US still was the most powerful country in the 
world, its international dominance was obviously declining. More seriously, US 
hegemony had been challenged by the Soviet Union, which vied with the US 
strategically, geographically, ideologically and economically on a global level. The 
powerful Soviet forces had become the greatest military threat to America. Despite 
remaining a superpower, the US national strength was not enough to deal with the 
rising Soviet threat. Washington needed to play the old game of balance of power 
that had influenced the modern European international relations in order to make the 
international strategic pattern favourable to the US. In President Richard Nixon's 
view, the framework of global relationships would be transformed because a new 
structure of five great power centres was emerging in the world, initially mainly in 
the economic dimension. This shift in power was resulting in a relocation of 
international relations and was a challenge to the US. In particular, the PRe would 
play an important role in the future international system. Thus, the US should 
accommodate the PRe and bring it into the international polity on its terms. 192 This 
implied that the US would collaborate with the PRe to deal with increasing Soviet 
aggreSSIOn. 
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In the meantime, the PRC was beset with difficulties at home and abroad. It was 
caught in political upheaval and economic collapse because of the Great Cultural 
Revolution. Worse still, the Soviet Union posed a serious threat to the PRC and 
Chinese and Russian forces came into conflict on the PRC-Soviet borders. However, 
the military was deeply and widely involved in the political struggles, thereby 
weakening the country's national defence forces. Beijing believed it difficult to 
defeat a possible Soviet invasion or nuclear attack and had to conduct diplomatic 
manoeuvring to help safeguard itself. It tried to negate self-isolation and sought a 
position in a new strategic world pattern to ensure its security. Therefore, 
Washington was viewed as a potential collaborator in Beijing. In Beijing's eyes, 
through normalising PRC-US relations, Washington could become an acceptable 
partner and form a possible strategic cooperative relationship to lessen the Russian 
menace. 193 
Therefore, common concern about the Soviet threat led Beijing and Washington 
to no longer regard one another as implacable enemies. Washington sought to 
reconcile PRC-US relations and take advantage ofPRC-Soviet antagonism to isolate 
the Soviet Union. By creating strategic parallelism with the PRC, the US would be 
able to deter the Soviet global expansion and eventually undermine the Soviet 
empire. 194 Beijing's concerns about an attack by the Soviet Union compelled it to 
seek rapprochement with the US in the best interests of its security. A collaborative 
PRC-US relationship would force Moscow to think twice in planning an invasion of 
the PRC. 
Washington's secondary consideration in improving relations with the PRC was 
that it believed that Beijing had an influence on Hanoi and thus it sought Beijing's 
help in ending the Vietnam War. President Nixon even was "willing to make a 
concession on Taiwan" in exchange for the PRC leaders' assistance to reach a peace 
treaty in order to honourably withdraw US troops from Vietnam. Beijing intended to 
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"win important concessions from" Washington "concerning Taiwan". Also, it 
expected to remove America's military forces from its doors and lessen the US 
military presence in East Asia through facilitating an end to the Vietnam War. It 
wished to promote a negotiated settlement between America and Vietnam. 195 
It was under such circumstances that PRC-US reconciliation came about. 
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National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger made a secret visit to Beijing in July 
1971, laying the groundwork for a US presidential visit to what was a long-standing 
enemy state. President Nixon paid a visit to the PRC in February 1972. During the 
visit, he met with Chairman Mao Zedong and held talks with Premier Zhou Enlai on 
bilateral relations and international affairs. In his talks with Zhou, Nixon basically 
accepted Beijing's position on Taiwan, setting out a 'one China' policy.196 Nixon 
required the PRC to make "a commitment" to "peaceful resolution of the Taiwan 
issue". Zhou "said that the Chinese leadership was committed to 'strive for peaceful 
liberation' ", but refused to renounce the use offorce.197 
Nixon's week-long visit brought an end to the two decades ofPRC-US 
antagonism. As a result of the landmark visit, a PRC-US joint communique, known 
as the Shanghai Communique, was issued in Shanghai on February 28. 198 The 
communique included an anti-hegemony statement implicitly directed against Soviet 
aggression and expansion. This was the most important agreement that the two sides 
reached and marked the beginning of the PRC-US strategic parallelism. However, 
both sides maintained their own stands on other major international issues. The two 
sides agreed to facilitate trade and economic relations while promoting "people-to-
people contacts and exchanges". They declared that their diplomatic 
communications and consultations, as well as contacts through other channels, would 
continue. In particular, the expression of a desire to further the normalisation of 
relations between the US and the PRC indicated that the two countries would 
establish official ties and move towards closer relations. 
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On the Taiwan issue, the PRC reiterated its basic long-term position while 
pointing out emphatically that it was "the crucial question obstructing the 
normalization" of the PRC-US relationship. The US acknowledged that there is only 
one China and that Taiwan is part of China. This has formed the basis for the US 
'one-China' policy ever since. In response to the PRC's statement that "all US forces 
and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan", the US affirmed 
eventual completion of total military withdrawal from Taiwan so long as "tension in 
the area diminishes". Regarding the PRC's claim that the Taiwan issue was an 
internal Chinese affair in which foreign interference was unlawful, the US reaffirmed 
its interest in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue by the Chinese people. In 
particular, the US mentioned neither its previous position that the status of Taiwan 
was undetermined nor its security commitment to Taiwan that was stipulated in the 
1954 US-ROC mutual defence treaty. This demonstrated that Washington made 
some concessions on Taiwan to the PRC. Furthermore, it was viewed as 
representing "de facto recognition" of the PRC, and was seen as detrimental to the 
ROC and affecting the Taiwan independence movement. 199 
After Nixon's PRC visit, Kissinger frequently suggested that Premier Zhou and 
other PRC leaders visit the US, but Beijing declined his invitations. Beijing insisted 
that only after America's severance of diplomatic relations with the ROC and its 
recognition of the PRC government as the sole legal government representing China 
could PRC leaders visit the US. Kissinger also suggested that the two countries 
should "establish liaison offices in each other's capitals". Initially Beijing refused to 
accept his suggestion. Apparently, it was concerned its acceptance could mean 
endorsement of a variation of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". However, 
Beijing immediately agreed when Kissinger repeated the suggestion in June 1972. In 
order to promote the normalisation of relations with the US and the strategic 
cooperation necessary to deal with the Soviet military threat, Beijing compromised 
on the establishment of the liaison offices, despite the US maintenance of formal 
diplomatic relations with the ROC. In May 1973, the PRC and the US set up the 
liaison offices in their respective capitals. Both offices were de facto embassies and 
199. Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents And China: An Investigative History. New York: 
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both directors were de facto ambassadors and professional diplomats. Beijing had 
persevered in insisting upon recognition of the PRC Government as the sole 
legitimate government of China and obliging other countries to sever diplomatic 
relations with the ROC in negotiating the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
a foreign country. Only with this precondition could missions be established in 
Beijing and other countries' capitals. In view of this, Beijing's acquiescence to the 
coexistence of the PRC de facto embassy and the ROC formal embassy in 
Washington demonstrated that Beijing made a major concession on Taiwan to 
Washington. 2oo This fact illustrated that Beijing could be very flexible in handling 
the Taiwan issue, despite its commitment to uphold the 'One China' principle and 
oppose to the creation of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". 
Nixon promised US diplomatic recognition of the PRC in his second term and the 
PRC leaders made an effort to move toward the normalisation of relations with the 
US. Yet, their respective domestic problems, mainly Nixon's resignation because of 
the Watergate scandal and the struggle for succession to Mao Zedong, resulting in 
little progress being made on the normalisation of relations between the two 
countries. In December 1975, President Gerald Ford visited the PRC but did not 
reach any substantial agreement with the PRC leaders on the major issues of bilateral 
relations. With electoral politics on his mind, he postponed the normalisation of 
relations with the PRC.201 
The PRC and the US signed an agreement to establish diplomatic relations on 15 
December, 1978, and formally established them on 1 January, 1979. In the 
agreement, another anti-hegemony statement was included in addition to the 
Shanghai communique, which again implicitly targeted the Soviet Union and 
demonstrated the main impetus to the normalisation ofPRC-US relationship. The 
US announced that it recognised the PRC government "as the sole legal government 
of China" while acknowledging "the Chinese position that there is but one China and 
Taiwan is a part of China". It would "maintain cultural, commercial and other 
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unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan".202 In the meantime, the Carter 
administration published a statement declaring that the US would switch diplomatic 
recognition to the PRC from the ROC and terminate the US-ROC mutual defence 
treaty. Also, the US would withdraw "its remaining military personnel from Taiwan 
within four months".203 
During the negotiation on the normalisation, the two sides compromised on the 
two major issues. Washington tried to establish linkage between US diplomatic 
recognition of the PRC and Beijing's commitment to peaceful resolution of the 
Taiwan issue. However, Beijing rejected this, and both sides later made concessions. 
Washington would express its expectation of a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan 
issue, and Beijing would not challenge that position. 
The issue of American arms sales to Taiwan was the other point of controversy. 
Washington maintained that it would continue to sell defensive arms to Taiwan after 
the normalisation ofthe PRC-US relationship but Beijing was resolutely opposed to 
this. Later, however, the PRC compromised with the US. The two sides agreed to 
set the arms-sales issue aside and signed the communique on the normalisation of 
their relations despite Beijing reserving "the right to raise this issue in the future". 
For Beijing, the most important factor leading to compromise was that it intended to 
enhance PRC-US strategic cooperation to cope with the Soviet military menace. 204 
This again demonstrated that for the PRC there was much room for compromise in 
handling the Taiwan issue, despite declaring that it would take an uncompromising 
stand on matters of principle. 
During the late 1970s and 1980s, the PRC and the US strategically cooperated in 
their approaches towards the Soviet Union. The leaders of the two countries 
exchanged visits, including Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping's US visit in 1979, 
President Ronald Reagan's PRC visit in 1984, and President George Bush's PRC 
visit in early 1989. Economic ties had greatly developed over this period, with trade 
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and finance blossoming while America significantly invested in the PRC. The two 
countries also undertook limited military cooperation and exchanges.205 
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In order to break the anti-Soviet strategic alliance, Moscow tried to exploit the 
disputes over Taiwan to drive a wedge between the PRC and the US. In particular, 
when the PRC-US disputes over the American arms sales to Taiwan intensified in 
early 1982, Soviet leader Brezhnev reaffirmed the Soviet stance of recognising the 
PRC's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan and declared that Moscow was opposed to 
the "concept of two Chinas". Furthermore, he called for an improvement of PRC-
Soviet relations.206 For Beijing's part, it had shifted the focal point of its view from 
ideology to the economy and had sought to reunify Taiwan since late 1978. In order 
to reach its primary goals of developing the economy and realising modernisation 
while completing national reunification, it needed to create a favourable international 
environment. Since the early 1980s, it had pursued an independent and peaceful 
foreign policy in which there were two basic principles. One was to keep a distance 
from the US. The other was to improve PRC-Soviet relations in light of the 
perception of a diminished Soviet military threat. Beijing believed that strategic 
circumstances favoured it and it could use triangular diplomacy to balance the US on 
the Taiwan issue much as Washington had played the PRC against the Soviet Union. 
Thus Beijing demanded that Washington stop selling arms to Taiwan. Confronted 
with the Soviet Union's aggressive global offensives and its intention of drawing the 
PRC to its side, Washington worried about the rapprochement between the Soviet 
Union and the PRC and had to compromise with the PRC on the issue of US arms 
sales to Taiwan.207 
205 • When the US and the PRC joined forces in opposition to the Soviet Union in early 1970s, the two 
countries began cooperating in military intelligence. See William Burr (ed.), Kissinger Transcripts: 
The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow-A National Security Archive Documents Reader. 
New Press, 1999, pp.170-173, 203-206; James Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious 
Relationship with China,fi'om Nixon to Clinton. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999, pp.63-65. For 
PRC-US military cooperation and its limitations in the 1980s, see Martin L. Laster, The Taiwan Issue 
in Sino-US Strategic Relations. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984, pp.80-86; Martin L. 
Laster, Policy in Evolution: The u.s. Role in China's Reunification. Boulder & London: Westview 
Press, 1989, pp.155-157. 
206 • "A Comment on Brezhnev's Tashkent Speech," Beijing Review, April 5, 1982, p.ll. 
207 • For Chinese-American-Russian diplomatic jockeying during the PRC-US disputes over the 
American arms sales to Taiwan in 1982, see Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents And China: 
An Investigative History. New York: PublicAffairs, 1999, pp.322-329. 
77 
However, in the negotiations on the arms-sales issue Washington demanded that 
Beijing promise to use peaceful means, rather than military force, to resolve the 
Taiwan issue. But Beijing again refused to renounce the use of armed force in 
pursuing the reunification of the island and mainland. It claimed that Taiwan 
represented an internal Chinese affair and argued that it was under no obligation to 
undertake any commitment to the US. After bargaining, the two sides compromised 
and reached an agreement, known as the August 17 1982 Communique, calling for a 
gradual phasing out of arms sales to Taiwan.208 The PRC "reiterated that the question 
of Taiwan is China's internal affair". The US reiterated that it would not pursue "a 
policy of 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan'''. The PRC reaffirmed its "policy 
to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question", and the US understood and 
appreciated this policy. Under these principles, the US promised to progressively 
reduce its arms sales to Taiwan while limiting them "either in qualitative or in 
quantitative terms". In return for this, the PRC did not insist on its original demand 
that the US must set a time limit to stop the sale of all weapons and military 
equipment to Taiwan?09 
After signing the August 17 Communique, the two countries maintained good 
relations and new problems over Taiwan did not occur.2JO However, the Tiananmen 
Square massacre of 1989 ended what many American specialists and journalists 
viewed as a golden era in relations between the two strategic partners. The US 
undertook sanctions against the PRC, while also suspending military contacts. 
Beijing accused Washington of stirring up 1989 pro-democracy demonstrations in an 
attempt to disrupt social stability and change the political system in the PRe. This 
notwithstanding, through sending a secret envoy, National Security Adviser Brent 
Scowcroft, to Beijing, President Bush tried to improve relations with the PRC and 
maintain strategic cooperation. However, because the sanctions still stood and 
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domestic political elements in the two countries were affected, Bush's effort had little 
effect at that time.2l1 
Iil the early 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War 
dissolved the PRC-US strategic partnership. The PRC-US relationship was 
originally fragile because of the economic, cultural and political differences between 
the two sides. Strategic cooperation was initiated in the 1970s and developed in the 
1980s on the basis of a mutual fear of the Soviet military menace. When their 
common enemy disappeared, old feuds and suspicions between the PRC and the US 
inevitably arose. PRC-US relations entered into an uncertain period as increased 
bilateral problems and enlarged divergences over the major international issues 
became apparent. The PRC stepped up defence modernisation and enhanced its 
military force while increasing its economic power. This made it a potential strategic 
competitor for America's world hegemony in the future. However, the US did not 
view the PRC as the only hostile global power that might replace the former Soviet 
Union. In a review of America's national security strategy in the post-Cold War 
period by the Bush administration, the PRC was not targeted at as an enemy. 
Chu Shulong, a leading PRC specialist in PRC-US relations alleges that the US 
"found the challenger" toward its supremacy "to be none other but the PRC" shortly 
after "the Bush administration issued a 'grand post-Cold War strategy' " "in spring 
1992". However, Chu does not offer any evidence to support his allegation. On the 
contrary, his reference indicates that "in the first year of the post-Cold War, the 
challenge powers might have been Japan or Germany". In addition, he asserts that "a 
year later" "the US government issued the 'East Asia and Pacific Strategy Report' " 
"in early 1995", "US actions clearly indicate that the targets of this post-Cold War 
regional security strategy were North Korea and the PRC.,,212 
Meanwhile, some ofPRC elite dismissed this kind of view as groundless. 213 The 
fact was that the review represented a shift in emphasis away from Russia to maj or 
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regional security problems, indicating that Washington's strategic concern 
concentrated on the Persian Gulf and the Korean Peninsula. The US was prepared to 
simultaneously fight two possible large regional wars against Iraq and North Korea. 
The Clinton administration continued this "two major wars" approach.214 
In late 1992, the problem of US arms sales to Taiwan re-emerged. In the 
presidential campaigns, China issues became one of the main campaign themes. 
Bush's China policy was intensively attacked by Bill Clinton, the Democratic 
presidential candidate. In particular, Clinton accused Bush of ingratiating himself 
with Beijing's dictators. More unfavourably, Bush was criticised within his own 
Republican Party for his China policy. He had to campaign hard to defend his policy 
toward the PRC and Taiwan. However, the Texas manufacturer ofF-16 fighter jets 
declared that 5800 workers would be laid off by reason of Bush's refusal to allow the 
sale of F -16s to Taiwan. The Texas vote was critical for Bush's re-election and he 
reversed his decision and declared that he would approve the sale of F -16s to Taiwan. 
This violated America's commitment to the PRC on the issue of arms sales to 
Taiwan that it had undertaken in the August 17 1982 Communique, although the 
Bush administration argued that its decision on the F-16 fighters deal with Taiwan 
was necessary in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. However, 
Beijing reacted mildly to Bush's announcement, adopting few essential measures 
despite lodging a protest. This response was in sharp contrast with Beijing's strong 
diplomatic retaliation against France's sale of 60 Mirage jet fighters to Taiwan. It 
seemed that Beijing understood Bush's political difficulties after communicating 
with him over the F -16s sale issue and seeking to clarify his position. Beijing 
counted upon Bush providing a "significant political payback" if he retained the 
presidency. However, this proved to be a miscalculation.215 
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In his campaign for President, Clinton had vowed that he would 
uncompromisingly struggle with the "butchers of Beijing". However, soon after 
coming into office in early 1993, he adopted a realistic attitude in handling the issues 
ofPRC-US relations. He sought to avoid a political confrontation between the US 
and the PRC. During the campaign he had declared that he would create a linkage 
between human rights and trade regarding continuation of Most Favoured Nation 
( MFN ) trading status to the PRC. However, after the election he made it known he 
intended to preserve the multibillion dollar trade between the two countries with an 
extension of the PRC's MFN status. Every year of his presidency he asked Congress 
to maintain the PRC's normal trade relations' status with the US.2I6 
Most importantly, the Clinton administration pursued an engagement policy 
toward the PRC from late 1993.217 This policy advocated "comprehensive" 
engagement with the PRC. Although the PRC was perceived as a potential future 
adversary of the US, the fundamental point of the Clinton administration's China 
policy was engagement rather than containment. It was formulated to view the PRC 
as becoming democratic and more free-market oriented through promoting peaceful 
evolution and the PRC-US relationship as mainly cooperative and able to manage 
possible friction between the two countries. The purpose of Clinton's engagement 
policy was to promote the PRC to integrate into the international political system 
while encouraging it to also merge into the world economy. Through this 
engagement policy Washington intended to encourage Beijing to be more responsible 
as a major power and less inclined to resort to force to settle external disputes. In 
particular, Washington encouraged Beijing to play an active and constructive role in 
maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.218 
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To sum up, Washington intended to establish a US-lead new world order in the 
post-Cold War era with the western-style democracies and free economies. As the 
surviving communist power, the PRC wanted to preserve its authoritarian state whiTe 
seeking to increase its national strength and influence. Although the two countries 
had contrary ends in mind, the US positively promoted comprehensive and 
constructive engagement with the PRC. 
In the mid-1990s, there were a host of problems in PRC-US relations such as 
arms control issues, nuclear proliferation, and missile exports, controversies over 
human rights, the negotiation over the PRC entrance into the WTO, the issue of 
protecting intellectual property, disputes over the extension of the PRC's Most-
Favoured-Nation status and trade imbalances. However, due to long-standing 
contentions and conflicting security interests, the status of Taiwan remained the two 
nations' most serious difference. 
2.3-2. America's Relations with, and Interests in, Taiwan219 
The US relationship with the KMT government on Taiwan was long standing and 
the two were interrelated in innumerable ways. In the 1930s and 1940s, American 
administrations had maintained good and close relations with the Chinese National 
government. However, after the Communists drove the ruling Nationalists out of the 
Chinese mainland and onto Taiwan in the civil war in 1949, the United States did not 
seek to defend Taiwan. One reason was that Washington believed that the 
Nationalist government was corrupt and incompetent and decided that it would not 
continue its support. A further reason was that the American government intended to 
prevent the PRC from making an alliance with the Soviet Union.220 However, the 
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outbreak of the Korean War prompted Washington to reverse its decision and 
announce that it would back the KMT government on Taiwan. This notwithstanding, 
when Truman declared on June 27, 1950 that the US would place Taiwan under its 
protection, he said that he had called the Nationalist government on Taiwan to "cease 
all air and sea operations against the mainland". 221 The US held to this position, and 
never supported the KMT government in its intentions to retake the mainland by 
military force. 
However, during the early period of the Cold War, America provided considerable 
economic and military aid to the Nationalist forces on Taiwan. Taiwan was brought 
into the US network of military security treaties as part of the US-led anti-
Communist camp.222 Taiwan contributed to the American strategy of containing the' 
PRC and the Soviet Union. But in the 1970s and 1980s, Washington forged a 
strategic relationship with Beijing so as to deal with Moscow. For this purpose, the 
US established diplomatic relations with the PRC in January 1979 and broke off 
official ties with Taiwan. 
After the normalisation ofPRC-US relations, Beijing declared that it would make 
every effort to achieve reunification by peaceful means, but refused to renounce the 
use of military force in resolving the Taiwan issue. Washington was concerned 
about Taiwan's security when the US-ROC mutual defence treaty was due to be 
terminated in 1980. As such, it sought to readjust US laws, in order to continue the 
American security commitment. The "1979 Taiwan Relations Act" during the Carter 
administration set up the framework for strong unofficial ties and US military 
support for Taiwan. 
In the 1980s, the US maintained close and substantial relations with Taiwan 
although strictly these were non-inter-governmental. Taiwan remained an ally of the 
US and assisted the American world strategy. The collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the end of the Cold War undercut the strategic basis for the PRC-US alliance, and 
PRC-US relations became uncertain as the hidden contradictions between the two 
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countries were revealed. In a shift in the global balance of power, Washington again 
attached importance to Taiwan's strategic position and the island's role balancing the 
PRC. US Trade Representative Carla Hills visited Taiwan in 1992. This was the 
first time an American Cabinet-level official had paid a visit to Taiwan since 1979 
when the US severed diplomatic relations with the ROC. 223 The decision by the 
Bush administration to sell the 150 F -16 fighter jets already referred to was the other 
major move in developing relations with Taiwan. 
The Clinton administration continued America's extensive, strong and friendly 
unofficial relations with Taiwan. Furthermore, during mid-1993 and mid-1994, the 
Clinton administration conducted a "Taiwan Policy Review". In light of the 
guidelines of the review, the US upgraded its ties with Taiwan. It allowed mutual 
high level official visits and contacts in the form of stopovers, meetings and 
unofficial visits. Thereby, US-Taiwan sub-Cabinet-Ievel meetings took place in 
Washington DC in June 1995. Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena visited 
Taiwan in 1994. This was viewed as a breakthrough, with exchanges of Cabinet 
members between Washington and Taipei originally banned.224 Nevertheless, the 
Clinton administration pursued a 'one China' policy and reaffirmed that Taiwan is a 
part of China.225 
Until the mid-1990s, the US had substantial and vital interests in Taiwan in 
political, economic and strategic fields.226 Politically, during the Cold War Taiwan, 
as a loyal and close ally, significantly supporting the US. In particular, in the 1950s 
and 1960s, Taiwan played an important role in helping the US to strategically deter, 
politically isolate, militarily encircle and economically blockade the PRC. 
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Since beginning its democratisation process in the late 1980s, Taiwan had shared 
common values with the US. The democratisation of Taiwan had become a major 
factor in maintaining an amicable relationship between the US and Taiwan. 
Taiwan's democracy and freedom contrasted with Beijing's repressive communist 
system. There had been broad-based consensus of support for Taiwan in US public 
opinion. Many Americans advocated that Taiwan should be protected from being 
forcibly ruled by the PRC. 
In particular, the US sought the peaceful evolution of the PRC, and the 
democratisation of Taiwan could play an important role in promoting such political 
change on mainland China. 
Economically, the US had important interests in Taiwan. US-Taiwan economic 
relations had greatly developed. The amount of bilateral trade reached US$ 48.3 
billion "compared to U.S.-PRC trade ofUS$ 57.3 billion" in 1995. Although the 
PRC ranked sixth in America's list of trading partners, Taiwan was America's eighth 
largest partner.227 In the mid-1990s, Taiwan was a major overseas buyer of US 
products. It was the third largest market for US medical products, the fifth largest 
overseas purchaser of US automobiles and also the fifth largest market for US 
agricultural exports.228 US exports to Taiwan outstripped those to the far larger PRC 
and Taiwan's purchase of American products was 1.6 times greater than that of vast 
mainland China between 1987-1997.229 The US and Taiwan had significantly 
invested in each other. In particular, American business interest in Taiwan had 
increased considerably with Taipei's economic policy and Taiwan's excellent 
economic performance providing many business opportunities for Americans. More 
importantly, Taiwan had purchased large quantities of munitions from the US over 
the past forty-five years. 
Strategically, Taiwan was important to America.230 The de facto American 
military alliance with Taiwan helped the US to deal with security issues and maintain 
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a military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. In Washington's view, the PRC had 
the potential to affect the US security posture in the region and Taiwan was an 
important partner in the US-led regional multilateral security system. In promoting 
the US security arrangements and seeking to prevent the PRC from expanding its 
military reach, Taiwan was capable of playing an important role. 
The US viewed the island as an unsinkable "aircraft carrier" on the western 
Pacific Ocean. In 1950 the US established military bases in Taiwan and used them 
until 1978. During the Vietnam and Korean Wars, these American military facilities 
strongly and effectively supported the US troops in their operations. In the post-Cold 
War era, Taiwan was still a fortified point that could facilitate American military 
deployment and movement in East Asia. 
In terms of the US immediate national security interests in the western Pacific 
region, it had a considerable stake in Taiwan. This related directly to control over 
sealane communications on which America's trade with the countries in Southeast 
and Northeast Asia, in particular its ally, Japan's economic lifelines depended. As an 
ally of the US, Taiwan could ensure the international right of the US and other 
countries' passage through the Taiwan Strait and surrounding waters. In a word, the 
security situation in the Taiwan Strait was closely linked with the peace and stability 
of the Asia-Pacific region, over which the US was highly concerned. 
2.3-3. America's Stance on the Taiwan Issue231 
Six documents constitute an organic part of the basic US policy on the Taiwan 
issue. These were the PRC-US joint communiques, signed in 1972, 1978 and 1982 
respectively, which placed the Taiwan issue within the context of broader US 
relations with all of the PRC. A further three were the US domestic legislation and 
administrative documents: the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the six assurances 
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toward Taiwan of 1982 and the 1994 Taiwan policy review. They enlarged the 
framework of US-Taiwan relations and shaped the course of America's policy 
toward Taiwan. 
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The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was the foundation of US policy toward 
Taiwan.232 The act laid down that the US was commi~ed to provide arms for 
Taiwan's defence and prevent the PRC from invading the island, while maintaining 
extensive, close and amicable economic, cultural, and other relations with the people 
of Taiwan. The main purpose of this legislation was to legally guarantee Taiwan's 
security. In fact, the main provisions of the TRA replaced the 1954 US-ROC Mutual 
Defence Treaty that the US had undertaken as a security commitment to Taiwan. 
The TRA legitimated the American position as the largest, strongest and most 
important guardian of Taiwan's security despite lacking formal diplomatic relations. 
After agreement was reached with the PRC on the issue of arms sales to Taiwan 
in the August 17 1982 Communique, the US issued six assurances to Taiwan. The 
assurances aimed at reaffirming America's consistent stance on the question of its 
security commitment to Taiwan. They demonstrated that Washington sought to 
maintain the military balance in the Taiwan Strait in order to ensure Taiwan's 
defence. In particular, they indicated that the US would continue to stay away from 
the mainland-island disputes and conflicts, and would not "exert pressure on the 
ROC to enter into negotiations with" the PRC.233 
The 1994 Taiwan policy review was the Clinton administration's first 
comprehensive articulation of its policy toward Taiwan.234 It sought to further US 
unofficial relations with Taiwan by strengthening economic ties and cooperation in 
other fields. Some high-level government officials were permitted to exchange visits 
between Taiwan and the US. The change of the name of Taiwan's representative 
office in the US to the Taipei representative office was sanctioned. Office calls by 
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the representatives of Taiwan in the US to the US departments and agencies were 
allowed. Taiwan's top leaders, including the ROC president, were permitted to pass 
through the US in transit, but would not be issued permits to visit the US. America 
supported Taiwan's admission into non-state-based world bodies, mainly the 
international economic organisations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). However, it would not support Taiwan in seeking membership of 
international organisations composed solely of sovereign countries. In particular, it 
would not support Taiwan's application to join the United Nations. In terms of the 
issue of Taiwan security, the review raised US concerns about the PRC threat to 
forcibly reunify Taiwan with mainland China. Arms sales to Taiwan for defensive 
purposes, without qualitative or quantitative restrictions, were approved. It appeared 
there were two important alterations in the review. One was the permission for the 
exchange of visits by cabinet-level officials, but President Bush had already sent US 
Trade Representative Carla Hills to visit Taiwan in 1992. The other was that 
America's arms sales to Taiwan were unrestricted in both qualitative and quantitative 
terms. However, in 1992 the decision by the Bush administration to sell 150 F-16 
fighter jets, in fact, had exceeded the explicit limits on quality and quantity in the 
August 17 1982 Communique. Because the Clinton administration did not go 
beyond the Bush administration's policy toward Taiwan, the review represented few 
real, substantive changes in America's stance on Taiwan.235 
The American stance on the Taiwan issue was a 'one China' policy, in which 
there were the three adherences and the three noes. The US adhered to the security 
commitment to Taiwan; the maintenance of the military balance in the Taiwan Strait; 
and the arms sales to Taiwan based on Taiwan's self-defence needs. 
In fulfilling its commitment to ensure the island's security, Washington would not 
accept the use of force against Taiwan by the PRC. For the US, any coercion, 
including threat, blockade, attack or invasion, would be unacceptable. It insisted that 
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differences across the Taiwan Strait should be resolved peacefully, emphasising that 
any cross-strait arrangements would have to be reached on a mutually acceptable 
basis. It had sent messages to both Taiwan and the PRe since the early1990s 
stressing that a dialogue would be conducive to the peace and stability of both sides 
of the Straits and the rest of the region. 
The primary goal of the US was to avert military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. 
The US could not afford to let the situation in the Straits degenerate to that point, as 
it would have grave consequences for America's stature in the Asia-Pacific region. It 
therefore viewed peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as important to US national 
security interests. 
In order to prevent cross-strait military conflict, the US had to maintain the 
military balance in the Taiwan Strait. The fundamental guarantee for the 
maintenance of the status quo of Taiwan was to continue providing arms. Taiwan 
was heavily dependent on the US for its supply of advanced weapons and military 
equipment and the continuance of US arms sales to Taiwan was seen the key to 
frustrating any attempt by Beijing to forcibly settle the Taiwan issue. 
Washington had maintained a degree of strategic ambiguity in terms of the 
question of providing defence for Taiwan. In the event of an unprovoked attack from 
the PRe, the US had not committed itself to defending the island since it sought to 
normalise relations with the PRe in the early 1970s. Senior American officials had 
talked about the question of defending Taiwan under the policy of strategic 
ambiguity. Basically, they stated that the US would view any resolution of the 
Taiwan issue by force with the greatest possible concern. This was still within the 
wordage that the Taiwan Relations Act had used.236 Protecting Taiwanese 
secessionism, however, was outside the scope of US defence aid, and the US would 
not fight for Taiwan independence. 
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When Clinton visited the PRC in mid 1998, he published a statement of the 
"Three Noes" in Shanghai.237 They were that there would be no US support for an 
independent Taiwan; no US support for "two Chinas", or "one China, one Taiwan"; 
no US support for Taiwan's membership in institutions highly symbolic of 
sovereignty. Although Taipei and pro-Taiwan political forces in the US were 
angered by Clinton's statement, senior US officials argued that it was no departure 
from established policy.238 Indeed, while it was the first time a sitting president had 
enunciated it, but Clinton only repeated long-standing policy. When he secretly 
visited Beijing and held talks with Zhou Enlai in July 1971, ReillY Kissinger said 
that "we are not advocating a 'two Chinas' solution or a 'one China, one Taiwan' 
solution".239 In his historic PRC visit and talks with Zhou in February 1972, 
President Nixon gave assurances that "Taiwan was part of China" and "the United 
States would not support the independence of Taiwan". 240 Although Nixon and 
Kissinger did not use the wordage of the three noes, they became the established 
policy despite never being published until the Clinton administration. The Ford 
administration adhered to the Nixon administration's China policy. During the 
Carter, Reagan and Bush administrations, there were no serious disputes between the 
US and the PRC over Taiwan except for the brief tension over the issue of arms sales 
to Taiwan. After the dispute regarding Lee Teng-hui's US visit in mid-1995, Clinton 
sent a letter to Jiang Zemin in August 1995. Although "the three noes" were 
"packaged together" for the first time in the letter, they had consistently been carried 
out over the past two decades. 241 
Although the three noes suggested that the US did not support Taiwan's secession 
from China, they did not mean that the US had stood by the PRC in disputes over the 
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status of Taiwan. While the US had promised to adhere to a 'one-China' policy, that 
policy differed from the PRC's stand on 'one-China'. The US recognised Taiwan as 
part of China, but did not recognise Taiwan as an integral part of the PRC by reason 
of the disputed international legal status of the island. In addressing the issue of the 
PRC's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, the US used the wordage of 
acknowledgement rather than recognition. 242 According to Chiu Hungdah, a 
renowned specialist on the international legal status of Taiwan, this indicated that 
"the United States has never recognized the PRC's sovereign claim to Taiwan". In 
view of status quo of Taiwan, many American senior officials and scholars of 
international law considered that the PRC government has never extended control 
over Taiwan since its foundation in 1949 and the ROC government effectively rules 
the island.243 
Beijing blamed the US government for fomenting the split between the two sides 
of the Taiwan Strait and for objecting to the reunification of China.244 However, this 
was not the American government's position and behaviour. The fact was that US 
administrations had no objection to China's reunification. When he was in office as 
the US president between 1988 and 1992, Bush once asked Taiwan's president Lee 
Teng-hui why the Taiwan issue could not be resolved by following the Hong Kong 
mode. Lee put forward many reasons, saying the problem could not be resolved that 
way on the ground that the "one country, two systems" formula was unacceptable to 
Taiwan. Some experts on the Taiwan issue believe that Bush's attempt showed that 
the US had once considered supporting Beijing in its efforts to resolve the Taiwan 
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issue through "one country, two systems".245 In a letter to Jiang Zemin in September 
1993, Clinton mentioned an American "commitment to a 'unified China' ".246 
One has to acknowledge that the US had benefited from the continued separation 
of the two Chinese states. The US made a profit from its arms sales to Taiwan and 
the Taiwan issue also gave Washington a margin ofleverage over Beijing. The US 
sought to maintain its leverage in the balance of power on both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait and bargain with the PRC. However, America had a stake in the Taiwan 
question that involved US national security interests. Strategically and politically, it 
was highly concerned about how the reunification issue of China would be resolved. 
So long as the PRC remained an authoritarian state which perceived as a potential 
hostile power, the US would not support the Chinese mainland in its efforts to 
reunifY with the island. To be sure, the US would not necessarily benefit from 
realisation of Chinese reunification. However, it would move to facilitate the process 
of reunification if mainland China became a democratic state because, after all, a 
reunified, stable and peaceful China with a modern polity would be in the American 
interest.247 For example, the US supported the reunification of Germany under the 
democratic system and capitalist economy despite not wishing to see a potentially 
powerful adversary of the US created. 
The US position remained one of neither getting involved in the substance of any 
dialogue between Taiwan and the mainland nor prescribing a solution to the cross-
strait political disputes. It took no position on what should be the final status of 
Taiwan, because it was a matter for negotiations between the two sides of the Taiwan 
Strait. Washington would not consider mediating between Taiwan and the PRC and 
did not think it would be appropriate, or even possible, for any outside mediator to be 
involved in negotiations to resolve the differences between Beijing and Taipei. In 
245. George Bush senior revealed this when attending the 12th World Productivity Congress in Hong 
Kong in November 2001. For more detained information and experts' remarks, see "The US Tried to 
Advise Taiwan to Accept 'One Country, Two Systems' to Resolve the Mainland-Island Dispute," 
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November 10, 2001. 
246. Martin 1. Lasater, The Changing a/the Guard: President Clinton and the Security a/Taiwan. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995, pp.150-151. 
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short, the US maintained that the Taiwan issue should be peacefully resolved by the 
Chinese themselves. 
2.3-4. The US Role in Events in the Taiwan Strait during 1995-96248 
From the beginning, the Clinton administration objected to Lee Teng-hui's 
projected visit to the US. When, amid Lee's lobbying of Congress, Beijing 
expressed its concern over the issue of Lee's US visit, Washington gave an assurance 
that Lee would not be issued a permit to visit the US. In April 1995, Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher met Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qishen and 
reassured him that Lee would not be granted a visa. Meanwhile, Christopher tried to 
convey to Qian his uncertainty about the substance of any final decision on the issue 
of Lee's US visit. He told Qian that he had met with serious problems in seeking to 
persuade congressmen to agree with him that a Lee visit should not be allowed. 
Although it appeared that Qian "did not pick up on the subtle implications of 
Christopher's message", the PRC ambassador to Washington, Li Daoyu made it clear 
that "he had seen that the growing congressional pressure might force the 
administration to reverse itself'. 249 
As the lobbyists intensified their campaign to persuade Congress to allow Lee to 
travel to the US, signs showed that Congress would provide strong support for such a 
visit. 250 On 2 May 1995, the House of Representatives voted 396 to 0, approving a 
resolution to allow Lee to visit the US in a private capacity. One week later, the 
Senate voted 97 to 1, adopting a bill almost the same as the House's resolution in 
favour of granting Lee a visa. The Clinton administration made "last-minute efforts" 
248. For evaluation of the US role in the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, see Chiu Hungdah, "Recent 
Cross-Strait Relations and the United States," Issues & Studies, Vo1.32, No.12, December 1996, pp.l-
13; Cheng-yi Lin, "The U.S. Factor in the 1958 and 1996 Taiwan Strait Crises," Issues & Studies, 
Vo1.32, No.12, December 1996, pp.14-32; David S. Chou, "Cross-Strait Relations and U.S. Roles in 
the Taiwan Strait Crisis," Issues & Studies, Vo1.32, No.lO, October 1996, pp.1-25. 
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1999, pp.322-325. 
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"to line up support for" the government's policy toward Taiwan, but failed. 251 Under 
powerful political pressure, the Clinton administration was forced to reverse its 
original stance on the Lee visit.252 
After the voting, it had been impossible for Clinton to deny the resolution. When 
the resolution was hotly debated in the House of Representatives, "several members 
indicated that they would support legislation should the administration ignore the 
resolution".253 A showdown between the White House and Capitol Hill could 
develop over a legislative bill that Taiwan supporters would force Clinton to sign 
into law. Therefore, the US constitutional system compelled Clinton to issue Lee a 
visa. Significantly, Beijing had an understanding of the US political system and 
knew full well that the Clinton administration's reversal of its earlier decision 
resulted from the successful conduct of public relations with the US Congress by 
Taipei. Jiang Zemin, admitting that "we certainly haven't done enough lobbying of 
the U.S. Congress", pointedly invited congressmen to visit the PRC.254 
In order to reduce the impact upon PRC-US relations of its inconsistent decisions 
on the issue of Lee's US visit, the Clinton administration made an effort "to 
minimise the damage". It informed Taiwan officials that Lee's trip "was to be a 
strictly private affair" and it did not permit him to conduct political activities. It 
banned senior officials from meeting Lee and did not allow him to "travel to Cornell 
by way of New York City".255 This demonstrated that the decision to grant Lee a 
visa was not indicative of any major change or alteration in the Clinton 
administration's position on Taiwan's status and basic US policy toward the PRC. 
251 • John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle and 
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Initially, Beijing modestly responded to the issue of Lee's US visit, but suddenly 
shifted to a belligerent response. Shortly after the Clinton administration announced 
permission for Lee to visit the US, Beijing exercised restraint, confining itself to 
mainly diplomatic protestations and no sign of using coercive methods. On 22 May, 
Qian Qishen summoned US Ambassador Stapleton Roy and lodged a strong protest 
to the American government. On the same day, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
published a statement strongly protesting the US government's decision?56 In the 
following days, Beijing cancelled a number of visits by PRC officials to the US, 
including the ongoing visit by State Councillor Li Guixian and the Commander of 
the PLA Air Force Yu Zhenwu, as well as a planned visit by Minister of Defence Chi 
Haotian. Several retaliatory measures were taken, mainly the postponement of expert 
consultation between the two nations on "the Missile Technology Control Regime" 
and nuclear energy cooperation, and the planned visits, scheduled respectively for 
June and July, by the two senior State Department officials in charge of the affairs of 
arms control.257 All of these measures are understandable. On June 16, the PRC 
government announced the recall of Ambassador Li Daoyu. Although this move was 
taken under strong pressure from the military/58 it remained reasonable. It 
demonstrated that Beijing still exercised restraint in attempting to find a diplomatic 
resolution to its dispute with Washington over America's inconsistent decisions on 
Lee's visa. Nevertheless, on July 18 Beijing abruptly announced that the PLA would 
conduct manoeuvres in the Taiwan Strait.259 
Beijing's shift from employing diplomatic and political pressure to utilising 
military force to settle a diplomatic incident is questionable. Although Beijing made 
representations through diplomatic channels simultaneously, it insisted that 
Washington no longer cling obstinately to a mistaken position and that it make a 
pledge not to issue permits to Lee and other top Taiwan leaders for further US 
256. "Lee's US Entry Visa Protested," Beijing Review, June 12-18, 1995, p.7; "China Issues Strong 
Protest to US," Beijing Review, June 12-18, 1995, pp.l8-19. 
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visits. 260 Beijing's overreactions even gave rise to controversy inside the PRC elite, 
including officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and researchers of the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.261 The MFA did not advocate aggravating 
tension over Lee's US visit while the Taiwan Affairs Office objected to any 
retaliatory measures beyond those deemed strictly necessary. However, their 
moderate voices were overridden by the powerful military?62 In particular, the China 
Institute for International Economic Relations, an important think-tank on foreign 
policy in which there were influential government officials and retired senior 
diplomats, implicitly criticised the Chinese leadership. It argued that it was 
unnecessary to demand the US government acknowledge its mistake, as this was 
unlikely to happen. It maintained that disputes between the PRC and the US should 
be settled by means of diplomacy. In reminding the leadership to be prudent in 
seeking a coercive settlement, it proposed that the PRC should not resort to force 
unless the US made an attempt to change the status quo of the PRC territory and 
Taiwan brazenly declared independence. Furthermore, it suggested a moderate and 
flexible Taiwan policy that would treat Taipei on an equal footing as the opposite 
party of the Chinese civil war and conduct negotiation on peaceful reunification on a 
reciprocal basis.263 
Facing Beijing's accusations, Washington expressed the view that it respected and 
understood the PRC' s principles and position on the issue of Lee's US visit, but 
argued that it had not violated the essence of the three PRC-US joint 
communiques. 264 Whilst refusing to make a formal commitment, Washington 
consented to impose a strict restriction on future visits to the US by Taiwan leaders. 
In particular, it promised that Taiwan's top leaders, including Lee, would not be 
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permitted to visit the US in 1996?65 In spite of Beijing's insistence on its demands, 
Washington adopted moves to try to ease the strained PRC-US relations. It offered 
to dispatch Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Peter Tarnoff, to Beijing for 
talks so that it could explain the political difficulties that led to the grant of Lee's 
visa, but Beijing rejected this until August. Also, Washington did its best to restrict 
Lee's visit to a strictly private capacity in order to minimise the impact upon PRC-
US relations.266 
Clinton personally made efforts to mend fences. On June 8, he met Ambassador 
Li Daoyu at the White House. He pointed out emphatically that the permission for 
Lee's visit did not represent any major change in America's basic China policy while 
stressing the unofficial nature of Lee's visit. He gave assurances that the US 
followed the 'one China' policy and opposed "a 'two Chinas' or 'one-China, one 
Taiwan' policy".267 On August 1, Clinton sent a letter to Jiang Zemin, secretly 
making the "three noes" commitment. Simultaneously, he tried to satisfy Jiang's 
long-held desire for a US visit, expressing that he would welcome Jiang to 
Washington. 268 
Beijing reciprocated Washington's goodwill gestures. In August, Harry Wu, a 
Chinese American human rights activist, who had been sentenced to 15 years in 
prison on espionage charges, was expelled from the country but not jailed. This 
cleared the way for First Lady Hillary Clinton's trip to Beijing where she participated 
in the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in September. Two US air force 
officers were detained on charges of spying, but were expelled within twenty-four 
hours.269 
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In early August, Beijing softened its tough stance and agreed to hold a high-
ranking meeting between the two countries. On August 1, Qian Qishen met Warren 
Christopher in BruneL270 Qian urged the US to deliver its promises made in the three 
PRC-US joint communiques. He said that the PRC paid due attention to the recent 
remarks by the US on the Taiwan issue and hoped that it would honour its 
commitments with "concrete action". Christopher reaffirmed the US stand on the 
Taiwan issue and "said the US government will deal with Taiwan on the basis of the 
'one China policy'''. He stated that the US was opposed to Taiwan independence 
and Taiwan's admission into the UN. In particular, in assuring Qian that the US 
would carry out the three communiques, he took a step forward. He said that the US 
"respects China's stand that there is only one China in the world, with Taiwan as a 
part of China". In the 1978 PRC-US Joint Communique on the establishment of 
diplomatic relations, the US "acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one 
China and Taiwan is a part of China". 271 For the first time, the US used the wordage 
of "respect". This indicated that the US made a concession to the PRC, in an 
apparent attempt to accommodate Beijing. Qian and Christopher agreed to further 
high-level talks to ease the tension in relations between the two countries. Later, 
Beijing sent its ambassador back to the US and accepted Clinton's nomination of a 
new ambassador to the PRC. The two countries also restored high-level military 
contacts.272 
A shift and softening in Beijing's stance toward Washington evidently 
demonstrated that the PRC did not necessarily have to make a military response. 273 
Faced with problems of cross-strait relations and the PRC-US dispute over Lee's US 
visit, there were other policy options open to Beijing. Although the visit was 
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Although Beijing appeared to seek a diplomatic solution, it conducted its second 
round of military exercises, mainly the test-firing of missiles off the northern coast of 
Taiwan between 15 and 25 August. In November, in southern Fujian province the 
PLA conducted ground, sea, and air manoeuvres aimed at training for an island 
assault, in order to intimidate Taiwan.274 
However, Clinton still sought to improve PRC-US relations. He met Jiang in 
New York on October 24 when they attended ceremonies marking the United 
Nations' fiftieth anniversary. He again reiterated that the US was committed to the 
principles enshrined in the three communiques, while reaffirming US commitment to 
'one-China'. In particular, he restated the US "three noes" sub-policy on Taiwan, 
despite not formally using such words. He assured Jiang that his administration's 
China policy was focussed on engagement rather than containment, stating that "a 
powerful, stable and prosperous China echoes American interests".275 
After the Jiang-Clinton meeting, the tension ofPRC-US relations appeared to 
ease. However, Beijing stepped up its military pressure upon Taiwan. Following the 
PRC staged war games in late July 1995, including two rounds of missile tests off 
Taiwan, the Clinton administration exercised restraint despite expressing concern. 
When the PRC conducted the first round of missile tests near Taiwan waters, the 
Clinton administration did not lodge a protest with the Jiang administration.276 
Through diplomatic means, Beijing was urged to ease cross-strait tension but there 
was no military response for six months.277 Indeed, the initial reaction of the Clinton 
administration to the PRC war-games was surprisingly mild. For this reason, some 
scholars, such as John W. Garver, believe that Washington's infirm stance and initial 
reaction encouraged Beijing's military adventure. In particular, Garver holds that the 
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Jiang-Clinton meeting "seems to have been an important influence on China's 
decisions to proceed with the exercises,,278 
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The Chinese "warned that if the United States intervened to defend Taiwan 
against China, America's action could lead to war".279 In October 1995, Xiong 
Guangkai, then director of the PLA intelligence department, even threatened to 
incinerate Los Angeles with nuclear destruction if America should come to the aid of 
Taiwan. However, Washington tried its best to avoid involvement in cross-strait 
military confrontation or intervention in the PRC war games, despite implicitly 
warning Beijing. On December 19, the US aircraft carrier Nimitz and its three escort 
vessels and two support ships passed through the Taiwan Strait, supposedly to dodge 
bad weather. This was the first time a US contingent had entered the Straits since all 
US forces and military installations withdrew from Taiwan in 1979. While 
delivering a warning message, Washington continued admonishing Beijing to not 
escalate the crisis through diplomatic channels. In early 1996 when the PRC Vice 
Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing visited Washington, Under Secretary of State Tarnoff 
"told him that the United States had a clear interest in protecting peace across the 
Taiwan Strait".280 
Nevertheless, the PRC dramatically escalated its rhetoric, announcing that it 
would hold a third round of missile testing off the coast of Taiwan between the 8th 
and 15th of March. 281 As it was eight months since Lee's US visit, and Taiwan's 
presidential elections were to be held on March 23, the menace of a new round of 
missile testing was obviously an attempt to intimidate the island and influence its 
election. Faced by Beijing's increasing belligerence, Washington had to make a 
military response.282 If it did not react, it would be seen as having made an empty 
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promise in committing itself to help defend Taiwan. More profound, it would 
damage its credibility by not fulfilling its security commitments to its allies in Asia. 
Also, US domestic political pressure, in particular pressure from Congress for a 
tough reaction, forced the White House to respond militarily. 
However, before making a decision to deter Beijing by flexing military muscle, 
the Clinton administration made last-minute efforts to persuade Beijing to cease its 
most provocative military exercises since July 1995. On March 7 1996, American 
National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and 
Secretary of Defense, William 1. Perry held talks with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister 
Liu Huaqiu. They warned Beijing not to misinterpret the situation and requested that 
the PRC stop any military manoeuvre posing a threat to Taiwan. Simultaneously, the 
US side suggested that the Taiwan crisis should be peacefully resolved through a 
resumption of cross-strait dialogue and further PRC-US consultations. However, the 
American efforts failed. The PRC continued its missile tests off Taiwan's southern 
and northern coastlines on March 8, followed on March 9 by an announcement of a 
live ammunition exercise in the Taiwan Strait scheduled for March 12. More 
provocative, the PRC revealed plans for larger-scale manoeuvres, combining 
operations of the army, navy and air force north-west of Taiwan for the week of 
March 18-25.283 These militaristic actions heightened the tension in the Taiwan 
Strait. 
On March 9, the Clinton administration decided to strengthen its response by 
sending a task force composed of two aircraft carriers. The Nimitz was ordered to 
sail toward the waters off Taiwan to join the Independence, which was already 
stationed in the region.284 Senior American officials talked tough, calling on Beijing 
to refrain from menacing military exercises against Taiwan. Meanwhile, the Clinton 
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administration still spared no diplomatic efforts to ease tensions between the PRC 
and the US and prevent the Taiwan crisis from escalating. Authorised by Clinton, 
Christopher delivered a parallel set of messages to Beijing and Taipei that 
Washington "would continue to maintain a 'One China' policy"?85 On March 11, 
Sandy Berger, the deputy national security adviser, and Tarnoffheld secret talks with 
Ding Mou-shih, the ROC secretary general of the National Security Council in New 
York. Berger and Tarnoff called on Taipei to avoid provocative actions. They 
required Taipei to understand American expectations emphasising that "U.S. military 
support" did not indicate support for "Taiwan's independence,,286 
Although the Clinton administration reacted by deploying the largest US 
naval force to the region since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, the two aircraft-
carrier battle groups stationed 110 miles off Taiwan's shores only monitored the PLA 
military exercises staying outside the Taiwan Strait.287 In adopting a cautious 
approach to tackling the crisis, Washington made every effort to avert direct military 
confrontation or armed conflict, despite mounting tension over Taiwan. The US 
policy of force blended with diplomacy caused Beijing to consider ceasing its 
intimidation of the island. The PRC military exercises intended to run until March 
25, but ended five days ahead of schedule. In response, the two aircraft-carrier battle 
groups ste~ed away a few weeks later. 288 
2.3-5. Evaluation of the American Factor in the Taiwan Issue 
The US involvement in Taiwan was a problem being out of its history in the 
region. Washington had no intention of interfering in the Chinese civil war or the 
status of Taiwan in late 1949 and early 1950, although it was firmly opposed to 
communism. A sudden change in the international climate, because of the outbreak 
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of the Korean war, dragged the US into the cross-strait antagonism. The origin of the 
PRC-US disputes over the Taiwan issue was relevant to the political differences 
between the two countries. However, by and large, it stemmed from the 
confrontation between the US-led western world and the Soviet-led communist 
camp. Therefore, the Taiwan issue was arguably one of the most imp'ortant problems 
resulting from the Cold War. 
Beijing aclmowledged that "in 1949 and 1950" "the US Government officially 
confirmed" Taiwan's return to China according to the Cairo Declaration and the 
Potsdam Proclamation, "and publicly stated that the Taiwan question was China's 
internal affair and that the US Government had no intention to interfere in it".289 
Although Beijing blamed Washington for going "back on its own words", it admitted 
that "it was only because of the outbreak of the Korean War" that the US changed its 
original position on Taiwan.29o 
The US played a critical role in the Taiwan Strait crises, but, it also opened the 
doors for dialogue with the PRC to prevent further conflict. At the high point of the 
Cold War when the two countries engaged in sharp military confrontation over 
Taiwan, the US made efforts to avert war with the PRC, despite making contingency 
arrangements for such an event. During the peak of the 1996 Taiwan crisis, although 
America deployed a powerful naval force, it did its best to avoid military conflict.291 
Most importantly, the US had no territorial ambition for Taiwan. The Taiwan 
policy records of the American administrations from the 1950s to 1980s show that 
they did not object to an ultimate reunion of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. In 
particular, President Bush and Clinton in the early 1990s expressed their favourable 
289. "Speech by Chiao Kuan-hua, Chairman of Delegation of People's Republic of China," Peking 
Review, November 19, 1971, p.6. 
290. "Speech by Chiao Kuan-hua, Chairman of Delegation of People's Republic of China," Peking 
Review, November 19, 1971, p.6. Also see Taiwan Affairs Office & Information Office, State 
Council, People's Republic of China, "The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China," ( §J :%- IliG 
6' 1~ $ :%- 1], 0 ~ / 00 :%- IliG f,if JIg 1], 0 ~ , " i:l1~ IlTI ;!MI l=j 9:t 00 s"J ~ - , " ), in The Taiwan 
Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council ( 9:t 
~ 9:t .;k; i:l1~ I fF 1], 0 ~ /00 :%- IliG i:l1~ $ :%-1], 0 ~), China's Taiwan Issue ( l' f!fI it?'f1! 
/h] JJj). Beijing: Jiuzhou Press ( 1L i1H 00 .::j:5 ill JlR f±), 1998, pp.247-249. 
291 . Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999, p.99; Sheng Lijun, China's Dilemma: The 
Taiwan Issue. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 200 I, p.74. In addition, according to 
David S. Chou, "U.S. intervention has defused the crisis; however, it is unlikely that Washington 
would send combat troops to defend Taiwan." See David S. Chou, "Cross-Strait Relations and U.S. 
Roles in the Taiwan Strait Crisis," Issues & Studies, Vo1.32, No.10, October 1996, pp.l, 24. 
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attitudes toward a final resolution of the issue of China's reunification. However, on 
the question of under what a sort of political system China would be reunified, the 
US obviously had problems with a reunion under the Communist regime. 
Although the Chinese communist ideology had declined and the transition from a 
planned to a market economy had been undertaken, the old authoritarian state 
remained. In particular, the problems of Beijing's elite and succession politics had 
an impact upon cross-strait relations and PRC-US relations. This raised the fears for 
the American and Taiwanese over the possibility of reunification under the one-party 
dictatorship. More unfavourably, the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 damaged 
the PRC image. As a result, this dampened the enthusiasm of residents, including the 
mainlanders on the island, for reunification and deepened the American doubts about 
whether it should support Beijing in the reunification process.292 In this sense, a final 
resolution of the issue of China's reunification hinges on democratisation in the PRe. 
Should Beijing proceed with political reform, that favourable conditions for 
democratic reunification may be created. This would help to remove American 
concerns about a larger Chinese communist state and the obstacles to reunifying 
China. 
This study does not intend to challenge the viewpoint that there was a PRC-US 
strategic competition in which the US took advantage of Taiwan. Rather, the matter 
of first importance for the US was that the PRC should peacefully evolve to become 
a responsible player and live by international rules and norms, just like other large 
democratised nations.293 All major powers compete with each other. However, the 
US found it hard to compete with the PRC on the basis of international norms. In 
particular, Washington found it hard to predict Beijing's foreign policy. The PRC's 
capricious and irrational external behaviour, in US eyes, largely resulted from its 
292. See Brian Murray, "Tiananmen: The View from Taipei," Asian Survey, VoI.XXX, No.4, April 
1990, pp.348-359. In trying to ease Taiwanese and American fears of Chinese reunification under the 
Communist regime in the aftermath of the Tiananmen massacre, Beijing had to repeatedly declare that 
its policy toward Taiwan would not change, while seeking to justifY its bloody suppression of 
democratic movement. See "Policy on Taiwan Unchanged," Beijing Review, July 10-16, 1989, p.8; 
"Jiang Reiterates Policy on Reunification," Beijing Review, March 26-April 1, 1990, p.7. 
293 . Some "PRC government officials" and "military officers" "hold that US government officials are 
basically opposed to the rising power of the PRC under Beijing's communist system". See Robert G. 
Sutter, "The Taiwan Crisis of 1995-96 and US Domestic Politics," in Greg Austin (ed.), Missile 
Diplomacy and Taiwan's Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power. Canberra: Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National 
University, 1997, p.61. 
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Communist political system. The unpredictability of Beijing's foreign policy made 
the PRC a possible source of military conflict in East Asia?94 
After becoming a democratic state, the PRC would be more likely to accept 
universal values and play within the common rules of international relations. 
Undeniably, after the democratisation of the PRC there would still be strategic 
competition between the US and the PRC, as US-Russian strategic competition 
developed after the democratisation of Russia. However, that would be a different 
nature of competition. In particular, the US would compete with a rational and 
peaceful China without fearing its irrational foreign behaviour, international 
belligerency or the possibility of Chinese Communist expansion. 
Within such a broad international vision, the US defined Taiwan's role in PRC-
US relations. Since the late 1980s, the common democratic systems and free-market 
economies had become a key link in maintaining close US-Taiwan relations despite 
unofficial ties. The US had political, economic and strategic interests in the island. 
These vital interests shaped US policy toward Taiwan and dictated that the US playa 
major role in the question of Taiwan's status. 
Both Beijing and Taipei intended to draw Washington to their side. Taiwan saw 
the US as its political and diplomatic supporter and security guarantor. For the PRC, 
resolving the Taiwan issue without American support and cooperation would not be 
possible. 
Therefore, in terms of variables in the international system relating to the Taiwan 
issue, the American factor held the key to the status of the island. 
294 . Some PRC elite consider that the US did not view the PRC as an enemy in its the post-Cold War 
military strategy, but "the development and expansion of a socialist China always is a potential threat 
in the eyes of the American ruling clique". In particular, the ideological factor of deterring and finally 
defeating Communism remained playing a major role in US China policy. See The Group of Subject 
of Study under the China Institute for International Economic Relations ( !:f 00 00 ~$~:£?1fjt* ~ 4? 
i5l1: ii! ~Jl ), China's Foreign Economic Relations toward the 21st Century-An Analysis of Situation 
and the Policy Proposals (/EM ~+-t!ffi3tJgrp&X1jf!£lJfjC/~-Jlf!J97;"IJj..!:jffitJflkif{)· August 
1995, pp.14-15. 
Chapter Three 
The Status of Taiwan 
3.1. Taiwan's Strategic Importance and Strength 
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The Taiwan issue is of great importance, as it relates to security in both the Asia-
Pacific region and the world. There are three main potential trouble spots in the 
region: the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula, of which 
the Taiwan issue is generally acknowledged as the most likely to cause dangerous 
armed conflict. It also has a most important bearing on PRC national reunification 
and defence and has been internationalised for half a century, drawing it to the 
attention ofthe world's major powers. Thus, Taiwan's status has global 
consequences affecting international relations. 
From the perspectives of geopolitics and military strategy, Taiwan is an important 
island, potentially worth fighting for by those involved. It is located in Eastern Asia 
off the southeast of the Chinese mainland, opposite Fujian Province bordering the 
East China Sea, Philippine Sea, South China Sea, and Taiwan Strait, north of the 
Philippines. Taiwan is flanked by the Pacific Ocean to the east, holding an important 
place in the Western Pacific. Its position is a factor in control over the sealane 
communications on which many countries' economic lifelines depend, in particular, 
Japan. Meanwhile, the PRC has also become increasingly dependent on ocean 
shipping. As its economy has expanded rapidly, its sea transportation has developed 
tremendously since the 1980s. In the late 1980s it had about 1000 merchant vessels 
( eighth most in the world ), navigating to more than 150 countries and regions.295 
Most notably, since 1993, the PRC has become a net oil importer.296 Thus Taiwan's 
strategic importance in ensuring sea passage security has become increasingly 
295. Jianhai Bi, "China's Marine Rights and Interests," ( :Ep Jt ¥Hi: ' " fijit :m ffiI 8'9 ¥Hi: ¥F 1£ :@. , " ) 
The (PLA) Naval Journal (fI¥.$ ~;i!J), March 1988, pp.22-24. 
296. The following figures shows crude imports between 1993 and 1996. It impOlted 15.67 million 
tons in 1993; 12.35 million tons in 1994; 17.09 million tons in 1995; 22.62 million tons in 1996. See 
Qing Zhu, "Communist China's Crude Imports and Foreign Relations," ( W fr ' " rp ft ill lJ ;q {!±l 
Ej X1:9r '*- ~ , ") Cheng Ming Monthly( fjf Il$), No.270, April 2000, pp.25-28; Reuters, "China 
1999 Crude Imports at Record 36.6 Million Tons," Inside China, January 21, 2000. 
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essential to the PRC. For the PRC to effectively defend its coastline, ensure itself 
free from any obstruction to getting in and out of the Pacific and to become a 
maritime power in the Western Pacific, it is strategically important to control 
Taiwan. In the PRC evaluation, this strategic significance had been taken more 
seriously in the early 1990s than before. In broader dimensions, in pursuing an 
ambitious naval strategy, Taiwan is a key to any PRC attempt to position itself along 
the sealanes from the Arabian Sea to the Spratlys and control traffic between the 
Indian and Pacific oceans. 
More importantly, Taiwan's special geographic location has an indispensable 
significance in contending for Northeast and Southeast Asia's dominance. The 
island can be regarded as a strategic base from which to launch a military attack on 
the Asian continent. Thus the PRC military considers the immensity of the stake in 
the status of the island.297 If Taiwan was taken by foreign force away from China, or 
if Taiwan declared its independence, it would pose a serious threat to China's 
security. Therefore, Taiwan, as a point of considerable strategic significance, is 
highly valuable for China. 
In terms of international standing and position of strength, Taiwan, with a rich 
economy and a relatively strong army, was viewed as a medium-sized regional power 
in the mid-1990s. Although it was excluded from the world community, having been 
denied membership of the United Nations and other important international 
organisations for which statehood was a requirement, it was larger than many 
member states of the United Nations in area, population, economy and military.298 
Taiwan's membership of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum and the 
Asian Development Bank highlighted its position of economic strength. 
Taiwan enjoyed a booming economy, developing into one of the world's leading 
economies. In performing an "economic miracle", it had developed into one of 
Asia's 'tiger economies'. Real growth in GNP had averaged about 9.15% a year 
297. For the PLA view of the military value of the island, see You Ji, "Changing Leadership 
Consensus: The Domestic Context of War Games," in Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: 
Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis. New York and London: Routledge, 1999, 
pp.88-89. 
298 • The island's territory is 14,000 square miles and it had a population of 21.24 million in late 1995 
including the Pescadores, Matsu and Quemoy. See John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or 
Province? Boulder, Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1996, pp.1-7. 
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during the two decades, from 1970 to 1990.299 The average annual economic growth 
rate was 6.5 percent in the first half of the 1990s.300 The island became the world's 
14th largest economy in the mid-1990s.301 Taiwan's 1996 GDP accounted for 1 
percent of the world's GDP. This illustrated the high productivity of the Taiwanese 
people, given that the island's population accounted for 0.4 percent of the world 
popUlation, and its landmass for 0.03 percent of the world's total. By comparison, 
the PRe 1996 per-capita GDP only reached US$ 662, ranking it 77th in the world.302 
Taiwan's foreign exchange reserves peaked at US$ 104 billion in June 1995, 
becoming one of the world's top foreign exchange reserves.303 Although Taiwan did 
not have a seat in the World Trade Organisation and was excluded from both the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, it was a major power in global 
trade and investment. It was the world's 15th largest trading partner and the 7th 
largest overseas investor.304 The island's remarkable economic achievements and its 
weight in the world economy helped to increase its international stature. Also, by 
virtue of its world-class economic power, Taiwan had an in economic advantage in 
cross-strait relations. This enhanced the island's powerful bargaining leverage in 
dealing with its relations with mainland China. However, for the PRC, such a great 
economic disparity between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait became a barrier to 
reunification. 
In military terms, Taiwan was a medium-sized power in the region, with a large 
military establishment. The island had 376,000 troops, equipped with 38 warships 
(principally surface combatants ),4 submarines and 430 combat aircraft.305 Before 
1991, the goal of Taiwan's strategy was to have a military which, beyond defending 
299 • Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Taiwan's Security in the Changing International System. Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, p.1 00. 
300. Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 1999, p.25. 
301 . Chen Chien-jen, "ROC Looks to Future with Vision," The Free China Journal, April 10, 1998. 
302. Elizabeth Hsu, "Taiwan's 1996 Per-Capita GDP Ranks 25th in the World," CNA, September 15, 
1998. 
303 . Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 1999, p.6. 
304 . K.C. Huang and Sofia Wu, "Open, Peaceful Cross-Strait Engagements Are in US Interests," CNA, 
December 31, 1998. 
305. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1995/96. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, pp.192-193. In comparison, the PRC had 2,930,000 troops, which were 
equipped with 50 warships ( principally surface combatants ), 52 submarines and 4,970 combat 
aircraft, ibid., pp.176-179. 
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the island, would also be capable of invading and recovering the Chinese mainland 
that had been lost to the Communists. Thereafter the combat mission of the armed 
forces had been changed to defend the island rather than to take back mainland China 
by force, as the Taiwan authorities declared that they no longer sought to represent 
the whole of China, nor they would fight for the mainland with the PRC. Taiwan's 
military strategy focused on defence against, and effective deterrence of, a PLA 
attack. Taiwan was in the midst of a reorganisation and restructuring of its army. It 
was building a new generation of military forces based on the principles of smaller 
numbers, higher quality, and high operational capability. The goal was to build a 
high-technology military capable of deterring the PRC and conforming to the new 
strategic situation. In the process of military modernisation, Taiwan, had since the 
early 1990s, made large-scale purchases while also developing indigenous weapons. 
Taiwan was one of the world's biggest importers of weapons, spending US$ 1.5 
billion on arms in 1996.306 
In terms of the military balance, the PRC enjoyed superiority over Taiwan in most 
categories. Taiwan was vastly outnumbered but it had gained an advantage of 
quality over the PRC in some respects. The PRC had the largest army in the world. 
It had a larger naval force than Taiwan.307 In addition to a large number of warships 
of Chinese manufacture, the PLA Navy had purchased Russia Kilo-class submarines. 
Meanwhile, the Taiwanese Navy had acquired French-made La Fayette-class and 
American-made frigates. 308 This made it a middle-naval power. 
In respect of the balance of air forces, the PLA Air Force had its own strong point 
with Sukhoi-27 combat aircraft purchased from Russia.309 However, Taiwan had a 
306. Alexander Nicoll, "Taiwan's Purchases Fuel Arms Trade Growth," The Financial Times, October 
23, 1998. 
307 • For the force of the PLA Navy, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military 
Balance: 1995/96. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp.177-178. 
308 • Taiwan ordered 6 LaFayette-class missile frigates from France in 1992 and most of them were 
delivered in 1996. Also, it acquired 6 Knox-class missile frigates from the United States between 
1992 and 1996. In addition, Taiwan ordered 7 American-made Perry-class frigates, which were 
delivered between 1993 and 1998. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Militw)! 
Balance: 1999/2000. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp.178-179. 
309 • The PLA Air Force had imported 26 SU-27 fighters from the Russians in the early 1990s and was 
expected to acquire more. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 
1995/96. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p.178. 
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more modern air force with US-made F-16 and French Mirage 2000-5 jet fighters. 3JO 
It sought to acquire air command of the Straits. This made it the second most 
powerful Asian airforce after that of Japan. 
Surveying total military capabilities, the PLA appeared to be capable of 
blockading the island, but it lacked the military capability to launch and sustain an 
amphibious assault against Taiwan. However, the PRC enjoyed a monopoly on 
certain weapon systems, such as strategic nuclear forces and ballistic missiles. In 
particular, the PLA had deployed a large number of short-and middle-range ballistic 
missiles that were aimed at Taiwan. This missile deployment was the most 
threatening aspect of the PLA build-up. 
In the mid 1990s although the situation in the Straits was at detente, military 
build-up by both Taiwan and mainland China had never slackened.3!! The result had 
been an intense arms race as the PRC purchased weapons from Russia and the island 
sought to counter by buying arms from the US. If such an arms race continued, the 
military balance of power in the Straits would probably favour the PRC in the long 
run because of its growing national strength. Under the circumstances, although 
Taiwan was actively developing and improving its military strength, it knew it must 
rely on the United States for security. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the US 
would stand against any effort to retake Taiwan by force. Taipei was heavily 
dependent on Washington for its arms, as the US was its largest supplier. The US 
remained the largest, strongest and most important guardian of Taiwan's military 
security. Therefore, Taipei made efforts to preserve its own security by US-Taiwan 
military relations. For Washington's part, it viewed Taiwan as an important force in 
balancing the PRC increasing economic strength, rising military power and 
expanding international political influence. Thus it was concerned about Taiwan's 
security and helped the island enhance defence while maintaining the military 
balance in the Straits. 
310. Taiwan ordered 150 F-16s and 60 Mirage 2000s in 1992. They were delivered in succession until 
1999. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 199912000. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999, pp.I78, 175. 
311. For an overview of the arms race between Taiwan and the PRC, see Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, 
Taiwan's Security in the Changing International System. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1997, pp.77-91, 153-169. 
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Taiwan's history indicates that the island has attracted international attention and 
been a focal point of conflict throughout modern history.312 In particular, from the 
late 1940s and early 1950s on, Taiwan had become the focus of the world's attention 
in the context of the Cold War's early years. Following the Communist take-over of 
the mainland in 1949 when the PRC was founded, Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang 
Kai-shek transplanted his government to Taipei, regarded by the Nationalists as a 
provisional national capital. Chiang's Nationalist government continued to insist it 
was the legitimate government of all of China, formally known as the Republic of 
China, but usually called "Taiwan". Chiang's Nationalist government intended to 
return to the mainland of China by armed force. It cooperated with the United States 
to help curb the Communist expansion led by the Soviet Union and joined by the 
PRe. Such a state of tension was maintained for more than twenty years. In cross-
strait relations, Taipei experienced two Taiwan Strait crises in 1954-1955 and 1958 
during the high tide of the Cold War. Capture by the PRC was avoided because of 
US protection. However, in 1971 President Richard Nixon's visit to the PRC 
effectively ended Chiang's hope of recovery of the lost mainland by force. In 1971, 
Taiwan lost its seats in both the UN and the Security Council, where it was replaced 
by the PRC. Many countries, including the Western European powers, changed their 
diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing and Taiwan became increasingly 
isolated diplomatically. 
After Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975, vice president, Yen Chia-kan succeeded as 
president. Real power and control over Taiwan's government remained with Chiang 
Kai-shek's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who was formally elected president in 1978 and 
again in 1984. In 1979, the US became the last major power to switch its recognition 
to Beijing. Since then, only a handful of countries have maintained formal 
diplomatic relations with Taipei. Both Taipei and Beijing insisted that a country may 
recognise only one Chinese government. Although Taiwan was frustrated by these 
312. For a survey of Taiwan history, see John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? Boulder, 
Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1996, pp.21-33. Also see Taiwan Affairs Office & 
Information Office, State Council, People's Republic of China, "The Taiwan Question and 
Reunification of China," ( ~ :9} ~ J§t t~ *:9} VJ\ 0][ I ~ :9} ~ ~ I~ VJ\ -0][, " i1 t~I'6J ~ Ej 
r:p ~ s"J ~ -, ") August 1993, in The Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and The 
Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council ( r:p :#,: r:p .;;k; J§t 1~ I 11' VJ\ 0 ][ I ~ 3} ~ i11~ * :%-
VJ\ 0][), China's Taiwan Issue ( tp!lll it If Iii] JJj). Beijing: Jiuzhou Press (n 1+1'1 00 45 ill JlR 
H), 1998, pp.245-248. 
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setbacks, the government led by Chiang Ching-Kuo had never given up its objective 
of returning from the island to the mainland. 
Taiwan had different positions and roles in the international system during the 
Cold War and post-Cold War era. Between 1949 and 1970, it played an important 
role in the US global strategy of containing communism. However, Between 1971-
1991, as the US and the PRC improved relations because of a common interest in 
containing the Soviet Union, the importance of Taiwan's position in the world arena 
decreased. However, although Taiwan's strategic importance in the pattern of 
international relations was affected by the unfavourable diplomatic environment it 
remained substantively unchanged in terms of basic long-term significance. 
The genesis of the Taiwan issue was connected with the origins of the Cold War. 
The substance of the Cold War from a Western perspective was anti-Communism. 
When the Soviet communist empire rapidly expanded, the Chinese Communist 
forces rose sharply and became second leader of the international communist bloc. 
In particular, it played a leading role in Asian communism. The PRC had been 
hostile to the United States while supporting so-called national liberation movements 
and promoting the spread of Communism in Asia. The PRC aided, financially and 
militarily, armed rebellions in the Southeast Asian countries against the former 
colonial powers or client governments of the Western alliance, thus expanding its 
sphere of influence. 
To combat the communist influence in Asia, a broad and close network of 
military security treaties among the US and regional countries was established for the 
pursuit of the common interest of containing the PRC and the Soviet Union. Taiwan, 
as the mortal enemy of the PRC, was an essential link in such a network, becoming a 
staunch ally of the US. The US-ROC mutual defence treaty was signed in 1954. The 
US built military bases and stationed air force and navy units in Taiwan and the 
Taiwan Strait. Taiwan became an important part of the US East Asia security 
alliance structure and an outpost ofthe American containment strategy. During 
periods of the 1950s and 1960s, Taiwan contributed its share to the struggle against 
Communism. In return, the Cold War spurred the US to support Taiwan's fiercely 
anti-Communist government, which billed itself as "Free China." The US gave 
considerable amounts of economic and military assistance to Taiwan. The extent of 
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military cooperation between Washington and Taipei was of benefit to both sides. 
The American military assistance and defensive commitment to Taiwan had 
effectively protected the island from PRC invasion. Most significant, in the two 
Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s, the US firmly safeguarded Taiwan and its offshore 
islands. The American naval force provided logistical support and escort for 
Taiwan's troops in repUlsing PRC attacks when the PLA bombarded and blockaded 
the islands of Jinmen. 
However, as part of the evolution of the international situation in the early 1970s, 
the US reshaped its foreign policy, affecting the role of Taiwan. Faced with the 
increasing expansionism and threats of the Soviet Union, the US and the PRC came 
together to cope with their common enemy. As such, the PRC emerged as a wildcard 
in the major power game, with the US stressing the important role ofthe PRC in the 
balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, even the globe, so as to contain the rise 
of the Soviet Union and make up for the perceived American deficiency in national 
strength. By contrast, Taiwan's role in the American strategy of superpower rivalry 
was downgraded. This notwithstanding, Taiwan persevered in following the US in 
the fight against Communism in spite of the PRC-Soviet split. Although Taipei for a 
time appeared to tacitly approach Moscow in an attempt to balance the PRC-US 
rapprochement, it still made its contributions to the resistance of the Soviet 
expansion in the Western Pacific.3!3 
The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War changed the 
international political situation, re-Iocating the position and role of Taiwan in the 
world strategic pattern. With the PRC no longer vital as a strategic partner for the 
US in the post-Cold War era, fundamental and long-standing political and ideological 
differences were exposed and a number of new problems emerged in PRC-US 
relations. Washington intended to establish a new world order that would enlarge the 
democratic world by transforming those totalitarian regimes, in partiCUlar the 
communist regimes, into democratic systems. In the friction between the sole global 
superpower and the surviving communist power, Taiwan considerations played a 
major role in US China policy. Meanwhile, Beijing wanted to continue its grip on 
J 13 • For the relationship between the US and the ROC during the late 1940s and the late 1970s, see 
John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in 
Asia. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997. 
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political power and ensure the PRC major power status in the post-Cold War era. In 
doing so, Beijing wished to expand the country's strength internationally through 
early merging with Taiwan. Under such circumstances, the Taiwan issue became a 
focus of the competition between the PRC and the US from the early 1990s. 
Therefore, the international political significance of Taiwan's status was 
reestablished. 
3.2. Taiwan's Political Situation and the Political Forces of 
Unification vis-a-vis Independence 
3.2-1. Democratisation and the Pro-Unification and Pro-
Independence Camps 
Chiang Ching-kuo made major economic and political changes to Taiwan. In his 
earlier terms of office, the economic "miracle" was accomplished while ruling 
Taiwan with dictatorial powers. About two years before dying, he sought to ilIDovate 
politics to change the authoritative governance. Although he had not slackened in his 
efforts to recover mainland China, this had become increasingly impossible. Under 
the circumstances, the legitimacy ofthe Nationalist regime, constituted by the 
mainlanders and their descendants, became problematic. They dominated the 
government through the election rules that kept them in power despite making up 
only about 15 percent of the population. As a result, they controlled top party and 
government jobs for years. There were few major political leaders in the KMT 
( Kuomintang) and government who were native Taiwanese. This became an 
unfavourable factor affecting the island's unity and stability. In making an attempt to 
consolidate the political foundation of the Nationalist regime and improve the 
government's image, a programme of using indigenous officials was carried out. A 
great number of native Taiwanese were promoted to higher office. More 
significantly, Chiang took major policy initiatives with a realistic assessment of both 
the international situation and domestic factors. First, in adjusting his "three-no" 
policies, no contact, no negotiation and no compromise, he revised policy toward the 
mainland. Taiwanese residents were permitted to visit their relatives on the Chinese 
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mainland. Thereby he eased cross-strait tension and ushered in a new period for 
exchanges. Secondly, he opened up Taiwanese society. The most fundamental 
measure was that martial law was lifted. The governillent legalised opposition 
political parties while permitting press freedom. Political restructuring on the island 
led to abandoning the system of dictatorship. Thus Chiang Ching-kuo opened a new 
epoch for the democratisation of Taiwan while beginning a policy of 
"Taiwanisation".314 
After Chiang Ching-kuo's death in 1988, Lee Teng-hui, a Taiwanese native, took 
the office of president while assuming the ruling KMT chairmanship for the first 
time. Lee carried on Chiang's program of political liberal is at ion and conducted 
further "Taiwanisation", promoting a relatively peaceful transition from dictatorship 
to democracy. He officially lifted the 43 year (from 1949 to 1991 ) state of 
emergency. More remarkable, he significantly reformed the political system, 
developing Taiwan into a fully fledged democracy.315 His political reconstruction 
concentrated on three aspects: a constitutional amendment, major reform of the 
legislative body and direct presidential elections. Lee's role in promoting political 
reform and democratisation had been controversial. On one hand, he had earned the 
nickname "Mr Democracy" for leading Taiwan's evolution from authoritarianism to 
democracy through a "velvet revolution". On the other hand, he had been criticised 
for allowing the influence of factionalism and business groups in politics to flourish. 
Many party members also decried his authoritarian style within the KMT because he 
ruled his party like an authoritarian, silencing or forcing out most of his opponents.316 
To a great extent, Lee's promotion ofthe democratisation of Taiwan was to calculate 
to maintain his power. As the island's first native-born leader, he had the political 
advantage of localism and was able to utilise his political resource as native 
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Taiwanese were a majority in Taiwan. Through mobilising popular support for 
himself and manipulating the election with 'money politics' he could be elected 
easily for successive terms. Indeed, in the democratisation process, the KMT had 
diminished its power because of the end of one-party dictatorship, but Lee's 
leadership had consolidated and he held immeasurable personal power. Despite 
these mixed appraisals of his contributions to the island's democratisation, he played 
a leading role in democratising Taiwan. 
Political reform brought about a significant change in the polity. Undeniably, 
stepping toward democratisation, had sobering aspects, such as the negative style of 
politics and the imperfect rules of the democratic game, especially as regards 'money 
politics'. Although the healthy development of a democratic system remained to be 
undertaken, democracy had taken hold in Taiwan. Constitutional politics, majority 
rule, responsible politics, and, in particular, party politics had been established. Free 
general elections were embraced, becoming the essential part of Taiwan's democratic 
system. In the mid-l 990s, Taiwan's political pattern was structured by three parties: 
the KMT, or the Nationalist Party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP ) and the 
Chinese New Party ( CNP). Taiwan's political climate was affected by 
developments and activities associated with these three political parties. A shifting 
political spectrum was reshaping Taiwan while reorganising the political power 
structure. As democratic freedoms, a mature pluralistic society and multiparty 
elections flourished, the pro-independence forces appeared to be rising. These new 
developments in Taiwan's politics injected an uncertainty into cross-strait relations, 
but did not significantly affect the general situation. 
Reform redrew the island's political map, reorganising the political forces and 
mainly restructuring the pro-unification and pro-independence camps. Yet, there was 
not a fundamental change in the balance of political forces between pro-unification 
and pro-independence although the pro-unification forces retained the advantage in 
Taiwan's political landscape. The ruling KMT was centrist and right-leaning. It had 
monopolised politics in Taiwan for nearly five decades. Although it was slightly 
weakened by a split ( a rightist faction of the party separated and established a 
Chinese New Party), it was still formidable. The KMT continued to pursue its 
established policy of unification with a democratic China. The right-wing CNP was 
116 
the second-largest in the Opposition, having an important influence. It also strongly 
supported reunification with mainland China. The DPP, the largest opposition party, 
was the left-wing party. Although its strength had increased since the late 1980s and 
the early 1990s, the fear that most residents in the island felt toward its independence 
platform largely restrained its political expansion. This political pattern 
demonstrated that in Taiwan's internal conflicts between the pro-unification and pro-
independence camps, the pro-separation forces were still in an unfavourable 
situation. 
3.2-2. The KMT and Its Position on Unificatioli 
The KMT was still powerful in 1995. Immeasurable power remained in the hands 
of the Nationalists who were in charge of the presidency while holding a legislative 
majority. Although the KMT was challenged by the DPP and the CNP, it did not 
face a threat to its more than four decades of rule in Taiwan. It seemed that there was 
uncertainty ahead, but the KMT was still the biggest influence on Taiwan's political 
situation. This demonstrated that during 1995 and 1996 other political forces, in 
particular the pro-independence force, had little chance to replace the KMT in power. 
In the first half of the 1990s, the relationship between the ruling party and the 
government remained the authoritative model. The KMT directly led the island's 
administration despite democratisation. After the major issues were discussed and 
decided by the party's central standing committee meetings, the cabinet rubber-
stamped and implemented the decisions. In particular, the party still controlled 
government personnel, money and legal powers. They indicated that there would not 
be a dramatic change in the state system and national identity. 
The balance of political forces within the party did place restrictions on Lee Teng-
hui, who found it extremely difficult to change the party's orientations. He took 
steps to further "Taiwanise" the party, but the mainlander members had opposed 
Lee's greater "Taiwanisation". In particular, Lee's actions in democratising the 
island but not democratising the party and promoting advantages to native-born 
Taiwanese in order to consolidate his power were revealed. The party's leadership 
consisted largely of Taiwan natives. Yet, Lee was not able to completely control the 
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party because he lacked the authority that Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Chiang 
Ching-kuo, enjoyed despite dominating most party's departments through the 
support from the native Taiwanese members. In the face of opposition from old-line 
Nationalists, Lee had to make compromises with them. He appeared to try to turn 
the KMT's ideological axis, but its traditional core ideology of the Three People's 
Principles, as outlined by founding father Sun Yat-sen, comprising the political ideas 
of nationalism, democracy and people's livelihood, had not significantly changed 
because of the mainlanders' adherence. As the power struggle became fierce, Lee 
was accused of allowing political factions and business interests to gain increasing 
influence in the island's politics. Finally, the contradictions between Lee and the 
opposition erupted in late 1995 when the two heavyweights, Lin Yang-kang and 
Chen Li-an, competed with Lee for the Nationalist presidential candidature.3!7 
In terms of the issue of national unification, the KMT had consistently maintained 
in principle that it sought unification with mainland China. The Nationalists 
advocated eventual unification, but claimed that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait 
should be unified under the Three Principles of the People. In particular, the KMT 
required the democratisation of mainland China as a prerequisite for unification. In 
this context, the party made and carried out its cross-strait policy.318 There were 
. 
some elements sympathising with Taiwan independence or demanding to keep 
mainland China at arm's length in the KMT. For example, a faction within the party 
favoured native Taiwanese over those of mainland Chinese descent. However, the 
pro-unification mainstream predominated over this native-faction. 
3.2-3. The CNP and Its Pro-Unification Stance 
The Chinese New Party (CNP) was a former KMT faction that broke away from 
the ruling party in 1993.319 It was composed of mostly mainland-born citizens and 
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their descendants who moved to Taiwan in 1949. Although it was a relatively minor 
party compared to the KMT and the DPP, it had played an important role in 
opposition politics. Some of Taiwan's most important political figures were 
members of the CNP while holding public office. In the 1995 legislative election, 
the CNP received an unexpectedly impressive 13 percent of the vote, winning 21 
seats in the 164-seat legislature, becoming the second largest opposition party. In 
basic terms, it was the party of the average city resident. Specifically, its core 
members were well-educated professionals such as government functionaries, 
teachers and military officers. This attracted young middle-class urban voters. 320 
Thus it enjoyed a higher support rate in the major cities, especially in metropolitan 
Taipei, where it had greater support than the KMT. In the December 1994 Taipei 
mayoral race, Chao Shao-kong, the CNP candidate, ran a close second receiving 
more votes than the KMT candidate, then Taipei Mayor Huang Ta-chou, although 
the DPP's Chen Shui-bian was the eventual winner.321 The CNP's victory in the 
legislative election and the subsequent increase in its influence on the island helped 
to weaken the KMT's control of the parliament and administration while balancing 
the DPP. However, an arduous task facing the CNP that of was how to establish 
broad political support. It had to reshape its domestic policy to meet the demands of 
voters from diverse demographic groups, especially aiming at constituencies at the 
grass-roots level, as well as towns, villages and boroughs. In raising its position in 
the domestic political arena, a greater effort needed to be made to gain support from 
native Taiwanese.322 This notwithstanding, as the third major party, the CNP was an 
important political force having an influence in setting the direction of policy. 
The CNP advocated a return to the KMT's traditional core ideology, "three 
principles of the people", aiming at the whole China. The New Party leaders 
advertised that the real soul of the KMT resided in the CNP. Policy differences 
between the CNP and the KMT resulted from an ideology and power struggle 
between the CNP founders, a group of disgruntled KMT members and Lee Teng-hui. 
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Before establishing the CNP in 1993, they blamed Lee for exploiting the state 
presidency and KMT chairmanship to pursue his personal political benefit while 
criticising his policy for going against the party's orthodoxy and being in 
contradiction of the interests of the KMT. Their persistent criticism deeply offended 
Lee and they were repressed within the KMT. As a result, this dissident branch 
broke away from the ruling party to protest against Lee's undemocratic practices and 
questionable policies, forming the CNP. Thus the CNP was firmly opposed to Lee. 
Almost all its major policy standpoints targeted Lee. For example, it denounced 
corrupt money politics and was concerned that Lee was responsible for cronyism in 
the Nationalists' ranks and increasing corruption and vote-buying by purchasing 
popularity with campaign bribery. Thus the CNP fought against "black-and-gold 
politics" demanding just elections and clean government. Given that the roots of 
most members were in mainland China, the CNP also criticised Lee for his over-
"Taiwanisation" of the island. In particular, the CNP continuously and sharply 
attacked Lee's pro-Japan sentiments. It always campaigned on the twin theme that it 
was anti-Lee and anti-independence. In boycotting some policies of Lee, the CNP 
had worked hard to prevent Lee from going too far along with his line on 
"Taiwanisation". Its strong anti-Lee sentiments largely reduced Lee's room to 
manoeuvre. Lee was compelled to have scruples about pushing extreme localisation. 
This demonstrated the CNP's ability to exert pressure in handling the issues of 
national identity and cross-strait relations. 
The CNP was totally opposed to the idea of an independent Taiwanese sovereign 
country. In maintaining no independence for Taiwan, it sought to urge Taiwanese to 
consider that Beijing would use force against Taiwan if the island declared de jure 
independence and, thus, an independent Taiwan would not be the way forward for 
the island. This resulted in a weakening of pro-independence forces. In particular, 
the CNP's anti-independence stance gained the support of two influential groups-
the military and business. As Taiwan shifted toward democracy, the troops had 
become politically neutral. However, Taiwan's military had traditionally opposed 
independence while adhering to the proclaimed goal of unification with the 
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mainland. A lot of military officers and their families supported the CNP and 
strongly opposed Taiwan independence. They indicated an unwillingness to fight for 
a Taiwanese republic because they did not think it a just war worth of heroic 
sacrifice. Many Taiwanese who had close commercial ties with mainland China, in 
particular investors on the mainland, also positively supported the CNP in thwarting 
the Taiwanese-statehood fundamentalists' attempts for independence. They had 
significantly invested on the Chinese mainland and feared that separatists would 
move the island toward independence which could trigger a war across the Straits 
and could damage their cross-strait business. They favoured the CNP because it tried 
to improve cross-strait relations and help resolve the problems they faced in doing 
business with the mainland. The CNP's association with these two influential groups 
played a crucial role in preventing the pro-independence forces from seeking 
Taiwanese statehood. In addition, the CNP shared positions with the ruling KMT on 
unification with mainland China. Therefore, in fact, there was an alliance between 
these two unification-leaning parties against the DPP, restraining the political 
strength of separatist forces in Taiwan. 
In an ardent national unification mould, the CNP championed reunion of the two 
sides of the Straits. Its basic mainland policy was to promote peaceful national 
unification under the principle of a single China. It advocated cross-strait 
negotiations over political issues, including unification. It proposed to conduct direct 
dialogue between Beijing and Taipei on how the two sides of the Straits could reach 
reconciliation and seek a resolution that would be acceptable to both. With a strong 
commitment to the island's reunion with mainland China, it hoped to establish a 
long-term mechanism for negotiations, with the view to achieving eventual 
unification. This would help to increase mutual understanding between Taiwan and 
mainland China and facilitate unification processes. Critical of Lee for delaying 
unification talks, the CNP thought that he was inclined to "splittism" in deeds despite 
supporting reunification in words. The CNP was the most active in calling for 
intensified economic and cultural exchanges with the Chinese mainland. It supported 
enhanced cross-strait economic relations by advocating the immediate opening of 
trade, navigation and postal communications. Standing by a shared Chinese culture, 
it made an effort to promote peaceful interaction and positive interchange between 
121 
people on both sides of the Straits. The CNP was known for its close contacts with 
mainland China. Its leaders and lawmakers had made many trips to mainland China 
and had been granted access to some of Beijing's top leaders, exchanging views on 
the cross-strait issues. It criticised the government's restrictive policy toward 
investment on the Chinese mainland while claiming Taipei had overlooked numerous 
difficulties faced by Taiwanese businessmen operating on the mainland. It sought to 
align the party with their interests and positively serve them requiring both Beijing 
and Taipei to take more substantial measures to protect Taiwanese investors doing 
business on the mainland. 
Although the CNP was the most vocal in championing unification with the 
mainland, it maintained that unification should not be completed under the 
Communist regime. The acceptance of "one country, two systems" was not part of 
the party's platform, despite being supported by a small group of members. The 
CNP believed that the future of the Chinese nation should be a democratic China. As 
such, it considered that the biggest barrier to cross-strait unification was the one-
party dictatorship in mainland China. While backing closer engagement with the 
mainland, the CNP sought to take a more aggressive stance toward mainland policy, 
expecting to help bring about changes in mainland China through active contacts and 
exchanges. Meanwhile, faced with the DPP's allegation that the CNP wanted to sell 
out the island to China's communist rulers, the CNP stressed the well-being of 
Taiwan's 21 million people in addressing the issues of unification and cross-strait 
ties. The CNP advocated that the vital interests of the Taiwan people should be 
preserved in the unification process, in an apparent attempt to win more voters and 
maintain the party's influence in the domestic political arena.323 
3.2-4. The DPP and Its Increasingly Ambiguous Independence 
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Platform 
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP ), originated from a banned, 
underground organisation and was formed illegally in 1986, prior to the 1987 repeal 
of martial law. The democracy and independence movement on the island had risen, 
fighting for the native-born Taiwanese against the Nationalists' authoritarian rule. 
Pro-democracy and pro-independence activists gathered their strength and broke 
through the government's prohibition against forming such a left-leaning party. 
While making its contributions to democratisation, the DPP became an important 
political force in Taiwan. In the 1993 local government mayoral and commissioners' 
elections, the DPP scored 41 percent ofthe vote. However, its support rate did not 
grow substantially beyond this. Compared with the 1992 parliamentary elections, it 
got a disappointing 33 percent of the vote in 1995, an increase of only two 
percentage points.324 This indicated that although the DPP was ecstatic at the ending 
of more than four decades of KMT rule, it would still prove an arduous struggle for 
the party to become the largest in the legislature and capture the presidency. 
There were a number of factors restraining the DPP. Firstly, it was handicapped 
by its own limited foundation. The party was led and supported exclusively by 
native-born Taiwanese, while being opposed by the mainlanders. It had backing 
from grassroots supporters but was largely limited to rural south Taiwan. Although 
the DPP's candidate for Taipei mayor, Chen Shui-bian won in 1994, his voter was 
less than 50%. In fact, this victory came about largely as a result of a bitter and 
disruptive competition between the KMT and the CNP candidates.325 Secondly, the 
DPP was short of political resources such money and exposure in state-controlled 
media. A shortage ofDPP managerial experience, in particular an inexperienced 
party in administering the economy, had become an obstacle to its capture of 
governance of the island. Compared with the KMT's strong economic credentials, 
courtesy of a superior financial and economic team, the DPP had no talent in dealing 
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with the economy. Most Taiwanese concerned about the DPP's ability to manage the 
economy preferred to continue seeing the island's rapid but sustained economic 
growth under the KMT government, despite being unhappy with the KMT's other 
behaviour. Thus, it was extremely difficult to imagine that the DPP could mount a 
credible challenge to the KMT in the mid-1990s. 326 
The DPP had long held that Taiwan should be permanently independent of China. 
However, its pro-independence political programme not only had little chance of 
realisation but also had the potential to spark off a war across the Straits. The 
programme frightened most voters in Taiwan, concerned major powers and regional 
countries, and increasingly became a political burden to the party. The DPP adopted 
a platform in the late 1980s and early 1990s calling for formal independence from 
China. This policy was called "the establishment of a Republic of Taiwan" and had 
two main points. One was, in accordance with the reality of Taiwan sovereignty, to 
found an independent state and draw up a new constitution. The other was that, 
under the principle of self-determination as enshrined in the UN Charter, Taiwan's 
21 million residents should be able to determine their own fate. Thus, the party's 
charter called for a referendum by Taiwanese people to decide on the island's future 
status, including its claim for rewriting the Constitution and founding a republic of 
Taiwan.327 Yet, the party's "Taiwan independence" platform caused deep concerns 
domestically and externally. The island had become an affluent society since the 
1970s and the majority of Taiwan's people disliked taking risks that could disrupt 
their stable, prosperous existences. Most of the populace in Taiwan feared and 
opposed a war for independence. A tiny minority of residents stood up for the DPP 
independence platform. The DPP was expanding and most Taiwan independence 
fundamentalists returned from abroad over the early 1990s appearing to enhance the 
pro-independence political forces. However, although the DPP was largely 
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composed of elements supporting or sympathising with separatism, not all members 
supported independence for Taiwan. Activists with aspirations for formal Taiwan 
independence, in particular, die-hard advocates of Taiwanese statehood were small in 
number. What many party members and DPP supporters really wanted was self-
government for Taiwan. Some supporters felt they were ethnically Chinese and 
accepted some form of union with mainland China, they, just, wished to oust the 
KMT from office because they were displeased with its domestic policies and 
sluggish pace of reforms especially opposing its corruption, and anticipated a DPP 
government would bring long-needed reforms. 
The pro-independence clause in the party's platform cost the party too much, 
forming a bottleneck blocking up further DPP development and greater influence. In 
particular, it had frightened many residents and came up against resistance at home 
bringing about stagnation in the development of the party's supporter base. A 
majority of voters decided the DPP's party platform for Taiwanese statehood was too 
risky. In elections, they were scared of the consequences of a declaration of 
independence. Worried that if the DPP came to power it would carry out its platform 
which could incur danger of military conflict, more voters fled to the ruling KMT 
and the CNP. Obviously, the platform had hurt the DPP, proving fatal and the most 
basic reason for the party's failure at the polls.328 After repeated failures at the polls, 
party members were forced to seek to modify the party's independence platform in 
order to alleviate public worry over their call for independence. 329 
Mounting pressure from the international community upon the DPP was another 
area of concern. The DPP had been viewed by many countries as a party that 
promulgated independence for Taiwan while giving little thought to its possible 
consequences. This was of particular concern to Southeast Asian nations. The 
mainland-island dispute over Taiwan's status was considered the biggest security risk 
in East Asia. If the DPP took the helm of the government, this might create tension 
with mainland China, threatening the stability of the Asia Pacific. Taiwan 
independence did not enjoy support abroad. In particular, it did not gain support 
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from the United States. In the event of a PRC attack brought on by a Taiwanese 
declaration of statehood, few foreign countries would be likely to intervene. Under 
strong external pressure, in particular from the US, not to cause any trouble, party 
moderates were aware of the DPP's difficult situation.330 For the party, it had 
become increasingly important to adjust its long-held position on Taiwan 
independence to convince foreign governments that the DPP was a responsible party 
rather than a troublemaker. 
The DPP had been torn by internal struggles since its establishment in 1986. 
There were five factions: the Formosa Faction, the Justice Alliance, the Welfare State 
Alliance, the New Tide Faction and the World United Formosans for Independence. 
Centred on whether it should retain the independence platform and how to become a 
governing party, factional struggle within the party intensified after 1995. Party 
moderates expressed their willingness to relax on formal independence while 
fundamentalists were resolved to carry the independence cause through to the end. 
The New Tide Faction proposed the independence platform and was the most 
persistent of it. However, the pragmatist factions held a different view. In their 
opinion, although the DPP had been appealing to the electorate to help make it the 
governing party, apprehension over its independence platform initially limited its 
appeal. They tried to soften their former independence stance, seeking a new way to 
break through the apparent limits of the party's influence in order to be given a 
chance to run the island. They believed that by taking a more moderate line, greater 
opportunities would come the party's way. 
In 1995, then DPP chairman Shih Ming-teh, who had long advocated 
independence for Taiwan, stated that should the DPP take power, no declaration of 
independence would be necessary and it would not declare independence.331 After 
the 1995 legislative elections, Shih put forward his policy for "Grand Reconciliation, 
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Grand Coalition Government". He tried to break through the ideological deadlock on 
the party's cross-strait policy and reconcile the differences between the political 
parties. <He urged the DPP to establish some common ground with other parties. In 
particular, he visited the rival CNP headquarters, encouraging tactical cooperation. 
He proposed that cross-party alliances and a grand coalition government between the 
ruling party and the opposition parties should be established. He wished to gradually 
realise the DPP's goal of seeking to rule the island through participation in 
government. In facilitating such a genuine political reconciliation and a multiparty 
united government, the DPP would have to soften its independence stance. The 
airing of such a proposal highlighted an internal policy debate over whether the party 
should revise its official platform. Many members threw their support behind Shih. 
However, Shih's proposal sparked a backlash from radical advocates of Taiwan 
independence, headed by Peng Ming-min. They strongly opposed Shih's 
reconciliation policy, with its soft stance on Taiwan independence. In the subsequent 
campaign for the presidency, disputes between these two rival factions over the 
party's mainland policy had become more intense. This caused a party split. Before 
the March 1996 presidential election, some smaller factions broke away.332 Although 
a significant shift away from the independence claim remained to be seen, the DPP 
had grown increasingly ambiguous on the sovereignty issue in a bid to expand its 
voter base and promote a rational impression internationally. 333 
When Lee Teng-hui visited the US in June 1995, the PRC official media believed 
that the visit was for re-election purposes, because the DPP posed "a formidable 
threat to his claim for re-election".334 However, shortly after the visit, Lee and his 
rival, Peng Ming-min, DPP presidential candidate, were labelled twin separatists who 
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independence platform should be changed became fiercer as pragmatists dominated hard-liners. 
Some disgruntled party members left the DPP and formed their own parties. In particular, fervent 
independence advocates split off to found the Taiwan Independence Party. These disaffected left-
wingers from the DPP believed that the DPP had lost its goals of seeking an independent Republic of 
Taiwan. Even Peng organised some groups establishing a "Nation-building Union" in demonstrating 
their disappointment with the DPP's increasing inclination to hollow tokenism of its independence 
platform. See Staff Reporter, "The DPP Faced a Splitting Plight," ( * fiJ 121!f ' " is' ¥'Ig ~ :itt 1t 1m 
[IS 5t it ~ :tl, ") Outlook Weekly ( 7 11!), May 27, 1996, pp.36-37; Linda Chao and Ramon H. 
Myers, The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan. Baltimore, 
Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998, p.280. 
333. Shelly Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Votingfor Democracy. London; New York: Routledge, 1999, 
p.l60. 
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helped each other to be elected simultaneously.335 Furthermore, the PRe official 
media alleged that Lee had been in collaboration with the DPP in pursuing Taiwan 
independence.336 A examination of the relationship between the DPP and the KMT 
demonstrated that Beijing had insufficient grounds to make such an allegation. The 
fact was that, during the campaign of contesting the presidency, Lee attacked the 
DPP while Peng accused the Lee government of misadministration, in particular of 
following the wrong policy on cross-strait relations, even making a personal attack 
on Lee.337 Lee had more political enemies than private friends in the DPP. A 
number ofDPP leaders considered Lee anti-democratic because he had unchecked 
power and ruled the KMT and the island with an authoritarian style.338 Lee took 
advantage of the DPP in defeating his political rivals and consolidating his 
leadership, but he was never ready to share power with it. Being KMT chairman, 
Lee had to focus about the interests of the ruling party. Some DPP leaders proposed 
establishing a political alliance and forming a coalition government with the KMT. 
However, secure in governance, the KMT rejected this proposal, despite seeking the 
cooperation of the DPP on some policy issues and parliamentary motions.339 It was 
hard to eliminate the ferocious political clashes between the KMT and the DPP 
because hostility between these two major political parties was deep-rooted. There 
were policy differences between the two parties and their political stands were 
opposite. In terms of policy standpoints, the DPP was committed to introducing 
334. Li Jiaquan, "Lee's US visit Defies Agreement," Beijing Review, June 26-July 2, 1995, p.19. 
335 • The PRC official media alleged that Lee helped Peng in electioneering through building up 
momentum for Peng with his domination of media and by mobilising voters to support Pengo In the 
meantime, Peng helped Lee to run for the presidency. See Zhao Da, "A Champion for Taiwan 
independence, Peng Mingmian, Was an Intimate Friend ofLi Denghui's," ( j~ :i2s: , " , 'I§' ~.!Il ' 5J\. 7"-
1fj l¥.J4iJt j! $ j': *~ S"J ~ ~ ::t X , " ) Outlook Weekly ( T JIj), September 4, 1995, pp.16-17. 
336. Ling Yunhe, "Li Denghui's Footprints on the Road of Taiwan Independence," (~ E ~, " $ j': 
~ tE 'I§' ~.!Il ::tlftt.L S"J ..IE ~,") Outlook Weekly ( T JIj), August 7,1995, pp.9-10. 
337. Virginia Sheng, "Lee Says March 23 Victor Must Pursue a Peace Pact," The Free China Journal, 
March 1, 1996; Virginia Sheng, "Parties, Candidates Start Presidential Callisthenics," "The Free 
China Journal, December 22, 1995; Virginia Sheng, "Presidential Rivals in TV Forum Present 
Platforms to the Public," The Free China Journal, March 1, 1996; Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, 
The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan. Baltimore, Md.: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998, pp.283, 286. 
338. For example, Frank Hsieh, DPP vice presidential candidate and Yeh Chu-Ian, the DPP 
presidential campaign's manager, called Lee "anti-democratic". See Virginia Sheng, "Lee Says 
March 23 Victor Must Pursue a Peace Pact," The Free China Journal, March 1, 1996. 
339. During the presidential campaign, Lee rejected the DPP's "call for a 'grand coalition' Cabinet". 
See Virginia Sheng, "Lee Says March 23 Victor Must Pursue a Peace Pact," The Free China Journal, 
March 1, 1996. Also see Staff Reporter, "The DPP Faced a Splitting Plight," (-* tV ·~c ~ , " 'I§' 1~ 
~:itt 1t 1Iff 11fu:5t it EEl :f:t, ") Outlook Weekly ( T JIj), May 27,1996, pp.36-37. 
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overdue and thorough democratic reforms, especially opposing the KMT's abuse of 
power. The DPP advocated a clean election, crusading against illicit money in 
politics. It alleged corruption by the KMT, accusing the Nationalists of playing 
"black-and-gold politics". It also tended to be pro-environment and pro-labour. 
Many of its policies, such as reforms of the legislature, direct presidential elections 
and application for United Nations membership were eventually adopted by the 
KMT. 340 Yet, the Nationalists had never converged with the Democratic 
Progressives on cross-strait policy. On the unification/independence issue, the two 
parties were opposed, and there were few possibilities for compromise and 
cooperation. During 1995 and 1996, it was obvious that there was no close political 
connection between Lee and the DPP. It appeared that both shared some ideological 
similarities on Taiwan's identity and Taiwan first because Lee was Taiwan-born and 
the DPP was comprised of native Taiwanese. However, he differed from the DPP on 
one key point: he did not call for a sovereign independent Republic of Taiwan. 
Indeed, Lee led the establishment of a national unification council and presided over 
the formulation of guidelines for national unification, but the DPP demanded 
dissolution of this council and abolition of these guidelines. 341 Although he had been 
criticised for sharing the pro-independence agenda and seeking to join forces with the 
DPP to promote Taiwan independence in the late 1990s and the early days of the 21 st 
century, this was not the case in 1995-96. 
The largest policy differences between the three parties were on the issue of 
national identity, independence or reunification. Meanwhile, the main trend in 
Taiwan politics was to move toward the centre because of the constituencies' 
political inclination to oppose extreme left and right deviations. The ruling 
Nationalists were right-leaning but were trying to close to centrist. Although the 
DPP was the left-wing party, it also appeared to be moving toward a more centre-left 
position. Meanwhile, the right-wing CNP was seeking to readjust its political 
orientations. All Taiwan's political parties were seeking to move toward the centre 
340. Shelly Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Votingfor Democracy. London; New York: Routledge, 1999, 
pp.152-153. 
341 . Yu Ke, "Will It Be Overcast Or Fine Over the Taiwan Strait After March?" ( ~ tilT ' " -= }:j J1 J§' 
~ IlfI :If ~ " ? " ) The Perspective ( m :It t&), No.3 10, April 1996, pp.18-20; The Democratic 
Progressive Party, The Policy White Paper: Planks ( ~±*zv3t ' fJj/(fIl$i1l45 < ifil@!iII». Taipei: 
The Fine Words Printing Ltd. (1ft y:. rp ,ffi~ 1f ~ -0 m ), 1993, pp.231-236. 
in order to obtain a broader base of support.342 With radicalism unwelcome, a 
dramatic change in the polity and national identity became unlikely. 
3.3. Taipei's Pragmatic Diplomacy and Mainland Policy 
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Taipei's foreign policy and mainland policy complemented each other.343 Both 
stressed that "Taiwan and the mainland were both parts of China" and the Beijing 
regime "was not equivalent to China". Thereby, dialogue between the two sides of 
the Taiwan Strait should be undertaken on the basis of equality. Beijing had been 
endeavouring to block Taipei's international living space, in an attempt to degrade 
the ROC's status to that of a mere provincial government of the PRC. Taipei had to 
fight on two fronts. It maintained that both sides of the Straits should coexist as two 
legal entities in the international arena and that the ROC as a sovereign state had the 
right to develop its external relations. In breaking through Beijing's diplomatic 
embargo against the ROC, pragmatic diplomacy had proved of some effect and 
strengthened Taipei's hand in talks with Beijing.344 Meanwhile, a more flexible but 
non-capitulationist mainland policy showed Taipei's sincerity and determination to 
achieve unification and won international sympathy. It helped to counterattack 
Beijing's suppression of Taipei's diplomatic activities and frustrate Beijing's scheme 
to force Taipei to surrender. Taipei hoped that the combination of both foreign and 
mainland policy would compel Beijing to understand, and finally recognise, the 
political reality in Taiwan and of cross-strait relations. Thus, while conducting 
pragmatic diplomacy to raise its international status, the mainland policy aimed at 
strengthening Taipei's bargaining position in negotiating cross-strait issues with 
Beijing. 
342. Cal Clark, "Taiwan in the 1990s: Moving Ahead or Back to the Future?" in William A. Joseph 
(ed.), China Briefing: The Contradictions o/Change. Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997, 
pp.210-215. 
343 • Taipei declared that it always promoted a pragmatic foreign policy and mainland policy that did 
not conflict with each other. The ROC government would promote one policy, but not at the expense 
of the other. For more information about the relationship between foreign policy and mainland 
policy, see The Mainland Affairs Council, The Executive Yuan, Republic of China (17 IIiiI: Il1G "* ~ili ~ 
fA i?), Relations Across The Taiwan Straits ( tt j/ff jJJj /¥ -* /-% iJt If}j 15). Taipei: The Mainland 
Affairs Council ( 1-1 IIiiI: Il1G * ~ili ~ lJ3. i? ), 1994; "Setting Priorities," Free China Review, Vo1.46, 
No.3, March 1996, pp.30-33. 
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3.3-1. Pragmatic Diplomacy345 
In the Chiang Ching-kuo era, the ROC government refused to maintain embassies 
in the capitals of those countries which recognised the PRC. It insisted all countries 
wishing to have diplomatic relations with the ROC sever those with the PRC. 
Nevertheless, the Lee Teng-hui administration changed this inflexible foreign policy 
and sought to retrieve its diplomatic integration by keeping semi-official or unofficial 
relations with nations which had established diplomatic relations with the PRC. 
With flexible measures to expand contacts with other countries, it tried to break 
through the international isolation. 
Taipei's pragmatic diplomacy was shaped by domestic politics and the external 
environment. In examining the interactions between domestic politics and foreign 
relations, one can identify Taipei's primary concerns. Principally, Taipei aimed at 
achieving both foreign and mainland policy goals. It hoped to gain global approval 
for the democratisation of Taiwan and internationally legitimise its new polity, 
thereby helping to compel Beijing to understand, and finally, recognise the political 
reality in Taiwan.346 Taipei viewed expansion of its external relations as 
strengthening its bargaining chips with Beijing. In refuting Beijing's accusation, 
Taipei maintained that its pragmatic diplomacy did not infringe the 'One-China' 
principle. 347 
In broader dimensions, pragmatic diplomacy was focused on three goals. 
Diplomatically, Taipei struggled to break through the isolation that Beijing imposed. 
Politically, it sought to ensure the island's security. Economically, it hoped to 
further develop ties with foreign countries. 
344. Christopher Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in 
International Society. London; New York: Routledge, 1997, p.55. 
345. For Taipei's policy of pragmatic diplomacy and official remarks upon its implementation and 
effects, see The Government Information Office, The Executive Yuan, Republic of China ( 1'7 II& Il1G 
iFJT 1'iU fill ), Quiet Revolution ( T fI!! 11 tftt)· Taipei: The Government Information Office ( 1'7 II& Il1G 
fJT 1'iU fill ), 1995, pp.245-320. 
346. Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Taiwan's Security in the Changing International System. Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, pp. 103- lOS. 
347 . John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle and 
London: University of Washington Press, 1997, pp.27-30; Shelly Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Voting 
for Democracy. London; New York: Routledge, 1999, p.16S-169. 
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Firstly, Taipei intended to extricate itself from a difficult international position. 
The end of the Cold War changed the international system but Taiwan's foreign 
relations isolation remained. Beijing had had an advantage over Taipei in diplomacy. 
Because of the continued imposition of the diplomatic blockade by Beijing, Taipei 
had been in dire diplomatic straits. It had been excluded from the main international 
organisations, becoming increasingly isolated in the international arena. The major 
powers, and most medium-sized countries, diplomatically recognised Beijing rather 
than Taipei. Only about 30 small countries maintained their embassies in Taipei. 348 
Taiwan appeared to have become an international orphan, but its position could not 
be ignored. It strove to become a major actor in the international political system, 
particularly by seeking to playa role in regional security and stability. However, 
Taiwan remained unable to playa role in the official diplomatic network. This kind 
of non-membership of the world community made the island uneasy. Diplomatic 
difficulties even affected Taiwanese travellers, who had problems visiting most 
countries on an ROC passport. Sometimes the ROC passport holders received 
umeasonable treatment, even being insulted at the hands of customs officials, which 
stripped ROC nationals of identity and dignity.349 In order to change the 
unfavourable diplomatic situation and preserve its own vital interests, while seeking 
international respect and recognition for its citizens as individuals, Taiwan found it 
essential to adopt a system of diplomatic offensives. 
The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union had not improved 
Taiwan's sense of security. The biggest threat to Taiwan had been coming from the 
PRC rather than the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the basic 
settlement of the PRC-Russian border disputes had led to detente between the PRe 
and Russia, and even the development of friendly relations. The Russian threat to the 
PRC had been significantly decreased and the PRC no longer needed to worry about 
threats on that front. As such, the PRC could make room for resolution of the 
Taiwan issue. Furthermore, the PRC national economy had made remarkable strides 
348 . Taipei's diplomatic allies often changed because of the diplomatic war between Beijing and 
Taipei. Generally speaking, the number of Taipei's diplomatic allies had been kept at about 30 during 
the late-l 980s and mid-1990s. See Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Taiwan's Security in the Changing 
International System. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, pp.116-117. 
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after carrying out the economic reforms, allowing the PRC to develop into an 
economic giant and a regional major military power. In particular, Beijing was still 
pursuing its military modernisation program and the PLA was enhancing its capacity 
to blockade or attack Taiwan. The military balance in the Taiwan Strait could tilt in 
mainland China's favour in the next decade. Although Beijing declared that it would 
pursue a peaceful reunification policy, it refused repeatedly to renounce the use of 
force against Taiwan. Thus the thaw of the post-Cold War with an improvement of 
the security environment for the majority of countries in the world, had not brought 
an end to the major security concerns of Taiwan.35o 
As the Clinton administration's military drawdown in East Asia and its 
commitment to Taiwan's defence became more ambiguous, Taipei was uncertain if 
America's credibility in the region remained linked to the island's security. In the 
course of pragmatic diplomacy, Taipei therefore wished to gain a guarantee of its 
security from Washington. While relying on its own defensive strength and striving 
to strengthen military ties with the Untied States, Taipei also sought to cope with 
Beijing's military threats through the regional collective security system.351 It 
advocated the establishment of a multilateral security framework to make its 
contribution to the balance of power, peace and stability in the region, and to benefit 
from it.352 
349 • For the difficulties that Taiwanese encountered in travelling abroad before the development of 
pragmatic diplomacy, see "Tourism: Current Passport Is OK," (" 1M. q=r ilf. : :EJil q=r 1? p.~ ftf m ' " ) 
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In economic terms, Taiwan faced the challenge of expanding its market abroad 
and advancing the domestic economy.353 As a world-class economic power, one of 
the major sources of investment, trade, technological innovation and transfer, Taiwan 
was connected to countless interests all over the world. As such, it needed to 
advance foreign economic relations and accelerate the island's integration into 
economic globalisation to maximise its advantages and sustain domestic economic 
growth. In particular, it planned to become a major Asia-Pacific Regional 
Operations Center.354 However, because ofits exclusion from the world's economic 
and financial bodies, Taipei found it extremely difficult to participate in 
consultations, negotiations and decision-making on international economic affairs. 
Meanwhile, it had encountered tremendous obstacles in protecting and supporting 
Taiwanese businessmen abroad due to the lack of diplomatic relations or close ties 
with most nations. 
Under such circumstances, Taipei reshaped its foreign policy positively, 
conducting pragmatic diplomacy.355 It spared no efforts to break the diplomatic 
isolation Beijing had sought to impose on Taiwan. Because Taiwan was denied 
membership in institutions highly symbolic of sovereignty, most notably the United 
Nations, its quest for international recognition focused on eventually joining the UN, 
in an attempt to break through an encirclement for admission into other international 
bodies. Taipei had manoeuvred for participation in the UN since 1993. Through its 
diplomatic allies, it presented its petition for a seat in the UN every year despite 
being frustrated by Beijing. It even offered a US$ 1 billion donation to the UN if it 
was admitted. 
353. Hung-mao Tien, "Taiwan in 1995: Electoral Politics and Cross-Strait Relations," Asian Survey, 
Vol. XXXVI, No.1, January 1996, p.35; Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Taiwan's Security in the 
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Chang and Hung-chao Tai, "The Informal Diplomacy of the Republic of China, with a Case Study of 
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While trying to restore or retain official or semi-official ties with countries that 
recognised the PRC, Taipei sought to develop a means for the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with more countries by expending large amounts of money. Its 
position of economic strength gave Taiwan a leverage in fighting a diplomatic war 
with Beijing. Taipei did its best to flex this muscle in consolidating relations with its 
foreign allies and seeking new diplomatic partners, despite being accused of 
conducting dollar diplomacy by Beijing.356 In the diplomatic battle of the wallet, 
Beijing also bought the support of many countries in its counterattack against Taipei. 
Meanwhile, Beijing used its vast market potential to pull the carpet out from under 
Taipei's feet. A number of smaller nations frequently switched their allegiance 
between Beijing and Taipei for generous financial aid. In such diplomatic warfare 
Taiwan ultimately struggled, its limitations on developing foreign relations, still 
evident. 
3.3-2. The Issue of Lee Teng-hui's US Visit 
The background for Lee Teng-hui's trip to America was very complicated. It 
involved both the ROC government's diplomatic consideration and Lee's personal 
political intentions. American public relations companies and US politics also 
played a part. However, Lee's US visit came out primarily as a result of his personal 
lobbying effort, which tainted the visit by virtue of his utilisation of 'money politics'. 
The top leaders' trip abroad had also been a focus of the ROC government's 
pragmatic diplomacy. Concerned that its bid for a seat in the United Nations had 
been unsuccessful and that the scope of its diplomatic relations was not widening, it 
intensified head-of-state diplomacy, expecting to make progress in upgrading the 
ROC's international profile. The ROC leaders' visits to foreign countries aimed at 
promoting quasi-official ties with nations without diplomatic relations to the ROC, 
while also solidifying its foreign allies. During the 1994 New Year and Chinese 
Spring Festival, Lee and Premier Lien Chan vacationed in five Southeast Asian 
countries. In April 1995, Lee took his "vacations" in the United Arab Emirates and 
356. Wang Sheng, "What Is Li Denghui's Intention to Do Pragmatic Diplomacy Vigorously," ( I 3t ' 
" * ~ ~ *-:j-~:%- ~ 3r 5t:¥t iiX 1ilJ 7g , ") Outlook Weekly ( T fJl), June 26, 1995, pp.41-42. 
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Jordan. In 1993-1995, Lien visited Malaysia, Singapore, Mexico and the Czech 
Republic. 357 This vacation diplomacy developed substantive ties with a number of 
countries without diplomatic relations with the ROC, but, it was unlikely to result in 
an exchange of ambassadors or the establishment of embassies. Furthermore, these 
nations were small and medium-sized and did not playa major role in international 
politics. ROC leaders, in particular Lee, famous for his pro-Japanese sentiment, 
made an attempt to visit Japan on some pretext or other. When he was not given a 
visa to enter Japan, the focus of leadership diplomacy was shifted to the US, despite 
the apparent difficulty of the undertaking. More important, the American connection 
was vital to an island so orphaned internationally. Thus ROC leaders were 
determined to cultivate US ties and set foot on American soil. 
Although Lee enjoyed a 'Mr. Democracy' label, he rose through the ROC 
political hierarchy in an authoritarian manner. His presidency was conferred by 
Chiang Ching-kuo and his second presidency was elected indirectly involving a mere 
formality of voting. Meanwhile, faced with strong opposition both within and 
outside his party, the consolidation of power remained his priority. In order to 
resolve the legitimate problems and keep a grip on power, he wished to become the 
first president of the ROC by means of democracy. Furthermore, he wanted to leave 
a legacy as a champion of democracy, bolstering his own position in the island's 
history. Thus he endorsed the holding of a direct presidential election. Yet, he was 
uncertain whether he could win in the first direct presidential election in March 1996, 
despite anticipating the vote of native Taiwanese. Under such circumstances, his 
efforts to enhance the island's status in the international community would appeal to 
the constituency, strengthening his hand at home. In particular, his leadership 
diplomacy could develop the image of an international leader, an important element 
in making his personal political landmark while establishing his legacy. A trip to the 
US would make him the first ROC president to set foot on America's soil and present 
him on the world stage. James Mann considers that Lee's planned America trip was 
357 . Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 1999, p.75; David W. Chang and Hung-chao Tai, "The Informal Diplomacy of the 
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"in order to be sure of winning" in the presidential election.358 A leading Chinese 
expert on Taiwan, Li Jiaquan, holds the same view as Mann. Li believes that Lee 
wished, by his US visit, to meet "challenges from both within and outside his party" 
and gain "the backing of the US government to seek 'breakthroughs' in foreign 
relations and thus increase his political clout" in order to win the presidential 
election.359 Therefore, Lee's calculation for the American trip was primarily 
politically motivated. He wanted to ensure his own "democratic" victory. 
Lee tried to travel to the US under the pretext of a stopover but failed. In May 
1994, he passed through Honolulu on his way to Central America and South Africa. 
He sought to spend the night to meet local Chinese community, speak at the East-
West Center and play golf, but was not permitted by the State Department. He was 
informed that the State Department would not issue him a visa for his entry into the 
city. Even Lee's special plane was initially refused refuelling in Honolulu. 
Although the State Department allowed a refuelling stop afterwards, Lee's scope of 
activities was limited to the airport lounge. This was a manifestation of the Clinton 
administration's unfavourable stand on the issue of Lee's US visit. Lee had to stay 
on board and complained to the international press that he had received humiliating 
treatment. This prompted him to plan future American journey, in an attempt to find 
a sound pretext and manage to nullify the State Department prohibition.360 
The key to removing a ban on Lee's US visit was to employ money power. Lee, 
who had been blamed of conducting "black-and-gold politics" at home, showed the 
tremendous force of his money diplomacy. The KMT, with its affluence born of 
both legitimate and questionable origins, owned a colossal business empire which 
operated a wide range oflucrative enterprises. This made it one of the richest 
political parties in the world, having assets estimated at US$ 3 billion. Lee 
controlled the party's finance and assigned his henchman, Liu Tai-ying to manage 
the party's business empire and political funds. Only Liu had such responsibility. 
358 • James Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curio liS Relationship with China, from Nixon 
to Clinton. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999, pp.315-317. 
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Other party leaders, for example, KMT vice chairman Hau Pei-tsun, were excluded 
from the party's business and financial affairs. Liu's official title was "Chairman of 
Business Affairs Committee" of the KMT. In particular, Liu assigned funds to boost 
Lee's support internationally for the coming presidential election. 
Liu established the Taiwan Research Institute, headed by himself. Outwardly, it 
was a private think tank for academic purposes. But, in fact, it acknowledged that it 
was financially supported by the government. Its basic functions were to help Lee 
develop ties with major powers' politicians. In particular, it regarded realisation of 
Lee's American journey as its chief goal. In mid-1994, Liu hired Washington 
lobbyists Cassidy and Associates and signed a US$ 4.5 million contract over three 
years for them to lobby on Taiwan's behalf. The contract aimed at lobbying for 
Lee's US visit.361 US$ 4.5 million was paid half by Liu's KMT-owned companies. 
The other half came from Lee's secret political funds. The National Security Bureau 
under Lee's administration set up a secret account. Although the fund financed the 
island's money diplomacy, it largely supported Lee's personal political activities 
involving special diplomatic missions.362 
Liu and the Cassidy firm lobbied hard under various pretexts in order to obtain a 
US visa for Lee, but were initially unsuccessful. When they were almost in despair, 
they found a possible gap that could secure Lee a visa. Both Liu and Lee attended 
Cornell University in the late 1960s. Liu conceived an idea to let Cornell University 
play host to Lee, who could be extended an invitation to participate in an alumni 
reunion event. Seemingly, this was a ground that could not be rejected. In order to 
smooth the way for Lee's US trip, in name, a Taiwanese group called "Friends of Lee 
Teng-hui" made an US$ 2.5 million contribution to Cornell University for the 
establishment of a professorship in world affairs. Actually, this bill was paid by 
360. Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents And China: An Investigative History. New York: 
PublicAffairs, 1999, pA14; James Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship 
with China,from Nixon to Clinton. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999, pp.315-321. 
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Liu's KMT-owned companies. In return, Cornell University promised to secure Lee 
a visa to visit his alma mater. However, the Clinton administration refused approval 
for months. In early 1995, Liu and the Cassidy firm shifted their lobbying target 
from the White House to Capitol Hill. The lobbyists intensified their campaign to 
persuade Congress to allow Lee to travel to the US. Finally, after Congress voted to 
approve a visa, the Clinton Administration was forced to agree to a private visit to 
the US, but did not permit him to conduct political activities during his trip.363 
Lee's US visit was labelled a private trip to attend a class reunion at his alma 
mater while receiving an honorary doctorate from Cornell University. Underlining 
the personal nature of the trip, ROC Foreign Minister Fredrick Chien did not 
accompany Lee although he did have an entourage of several senior officials.364 
Under the conditions of the State Department, Lee had to give an undertaking that 
during his visit to the US he would not engage in political activities. Generally 
speaking, he tried to adopt a low profile during his visit. 365 He even cancelled a 
formal press conference scheduled on the campus, an important item on the visiting 
arrangements, supposedly because of the pressure of the State Department. 366 In his 
speech delivered at Cornell University, he highlighted the ROC's democratic 
achievements and sovereign status. He pledged to commit himself to promoting 
democratic reform in Taiwan and continuing pragmatic diplomacy.367 Although he 
appeared not to provoke Beijing, some PRC leaders, in particular senior military 
officers, viewed the speech as a provocative move to push Taiwan toward 
independence.368 Actually, their opposition was to the trip itself, on the ground of 
363 . James Mann, About Face: A Hist01Y of America's Curious Relationship with China, ji'Oll1 Nixon 
to Clinton. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999, pp.320-322; Michael Weisskopf and Keith B. 
Richburg, "Taiwan, in Courting U.S. Officials, Reflects Yearning for Recognition," The Washington 
Post, November 12 1996. 
364 • Christie Su, "In Historic Trip, Lee Arrives in US for Talk at Cornell," The Free China Journal, 
June 9, 1995. 
365 . According to ROC Foreign Minister Jason Hu, "Lee's visit was private and low-profile", Lee 
"met with no federal officials during his visit, while his meetings with governors and city mayors 
were made in a private capacity". See Lin Wen-fen, "ROC President's 1995 US Visit Not Intended to 
Cause Conflict: FM," CNA, June 22, 1998. 
366. Nigel Holloway, "Low Profile," The Far Eastern Economic Review, June 22,1995, p.15. 
367. "Text of Lee's Cornell Address," The Free China Journal, June 16, 1995. 
368 . Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, pp.251-252. According to Sheng Lijun, initially Beijing made a moderate 
response to Lee's US visit, with "only a routine protest to Taiwan". However, it was Lee's Cornell 
address that provoked Beijing to anger, responding "with sharp criticism" and moving to" 'punish' 
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which they criticised Jiang Zemin for his soft line on Taiwan, despite the speech also 
giving rise to controversy in Taiwan and the US. 
Lee's trip to America was very controversial. His political enemies attacked the 
huge cost oflobbying as an example of how Lee used the KMT's financial resources 
and influence for his own ends.369 When tensions arose in the Taiwan Strait, they 
accused Lee's leadership diplomacy, especially his US visit, of causing the trouble. 370 
In particular, Lee's politically-motivated US trip was violently attacked by other 
candidates during the presidential election.371 In the meantime, it seemed that Lee 
scored a diplomatic triumph, but his meddling in US politics affected US-Taiwan 
relations. Although he was successful in lobbying Congress, he offended officials of 
the National Security Council and the State Department. As a result of being 
pressured by Congress, they were displeased at Lee's aggressive 10bbying.372 
Consequently, when the PRC conducted the first round of missile tests near Taiwan 
waters, the Clinton administration did not lodge a protest with the Jiang 
administration. Some American officials thought that the US "should 'let Lee tal<:e 
his licks for buying Congress' on the visa vote".373 
Lee's US visit should be regarded as mere electoral manoeuvring combined with 
money politics. Beijing's view of the visit as a move to pursue Taiwan independence 
appeared to be exaggerated. His acts threw additional light on his intentions. These 
revealed that his real intention was to use Cornell University as a forum for his 
presidential election campaign, just as Jiang Zemin sought a US visit for leadership 
consolidation when he carne into office.374 An alleged exporter of corruption abroad, 
he significantly invested in US politics and earned profit of political capital at horne. 
In any case, it did not signify a major change in the US government's China policy. 
Taiwan". See Sheng Lijun, China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue. Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2001, pp.26-27. 
369. Michael Weisskopf and Keith B. Richburg, "Taiwan, in Courting U.S. Officials, Reflects 
Yearning for Recognition," The Washington Post, November 12, 1996. 
370. Hung-mao Tien, "Taiwan in 1995: Electoral Politics and Cross-Strait Relations," Asian Survey, 
Vol. XXXVI, No.1, January 1996, p.36. 
371 . For criticism of Lee's US visit by two independent candidates, Lin Yang-kang Chen Li-an during 
the presidential election, see Chapter 3.4-2. The Presidential Election and Candidates' Positions on 
Unification/Independence. 
372 • Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 1999, pp.7-8. 
373 • Barton Gellman, "U.S. and China Nearly Came To Blows in 1996-Tension Over Taiwan 
Prompted Repair of Ties," The Washington Post, June 21, 1998. 
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Beijing knew full well that Lee's US visit resulted from Taipei's chequebook public 
relations and the employment of American 10bbyists.375 The PRC government's 
Taiwan Affairs Office accused Lee of spending a lot of money in paving the way for 
his US visit and official media attacked Taipei for having set up the visit through 
bribery.376 More contestable, Beijing knew clearly that the major reason for the visit 
was more the campaign for Lee's re-election than a statement seeking to widen the 
ROC international living space.377 Presumably this explains Beijing's initially 
modest response to Lee's US visit. However, Beijing suddenly shifted to 
belligerence shortly after. 
3.3-3. Mainland Policy 
While reshaping foreign policy, the Lee Teng-hui administration established new 
institutions for national unification and readjusted its mainland policy. 
There were few institutional establishments for unifying Taiwan with the 
mainland in the Chiang Ching-kuo era despite the consistent and firm pursuit of 
Chinese unification. By comparison the Lee administration approached the 
unification issue in a more structured, institutionalised manner. 378 In the opinion of 
374 • See Chapter 6.2-1. Jiang Zemin' s Attempt to Consolidate His Leadership. 
375. Beijing had employed "influence peddlers" since 1985. However, "from September 1993 to 
March 1995, Taiwan organisations gave 25 times more money than China did to U.S. lobbyists". See 
"The Lobby Factor-Taipei Spends Big to Win Friends and Influence People," Asiaweek, June 23, 
1995, p.29. Liu's successful lobbying for the granting of a visa to Lee demonstrated that Beijing's 
lobbying activities in American politics were very weak and ineffective. Jiang Zemin admitted this. 
See" 'The Problem Is Political Will'-Jiang Zemin on Bill Clinton, Taiwan, His Leadership and 
Deng Xiaoping," u.s. News & World Report, October 23, 1995, p.n. "A few months later", Beijing 
set up a special body to "match Taiwan's influence in Washington". It financed projects to lobby the 
US government to improve ties with the PRC. In particular, it appropriated US$ 2.5 million to 
"influence members of Congress". See Jock Friedly, "Cassidy's Taiwan Lobbying Spurred Beijing 
Action," The Hill, May 21, 1997 p.l. 
376 • The Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the 
State Council ( rp ~ rp -!k: i:3' t~ I it JJ' 0 ][ / 00 %- ~ i:3' y~ • %- JJ' 0 ][ ), China's Taiwan 
Issue ( l' [if! it tlf /h] jjjf). Beijing: Jiuzhou Press (.tL V+I 00 ~ ill J1R f±), 1998, p.l90. According 
to an estimation of the bribery by Wang Sheng, a researcher with the Institute of Taiwan Studies 
under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Taipei spent US$ 10 million in lobbying for Lee's US 
visit. See Wang Sheng, "What Is Li Denghui's Intention to Do Pragmatic Diplomacy Vigorously," 
( .=£ 7t ' " =$ ~ ~ "* m %- ~ ~r ~ :"f, fiX iiiJ -'jg , " ) Outlook Weekly ( T Jil), June 26, 1995, p.41. 
371 • Li Jiaquan, "Lee's US visit Defies Agreement," Beijing Review, June 26-July 2, 1995, p.19. 
378. For the organisational structure of the ROC government for formulating unification policy and 
administering cross-strait affairs and the functions of various bodies, see The Government 
Information Office, The Executive Yuan, Republic of China ( 17 ililc ~ i¥Jr IIU fijj ), Quiet Revolution 
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some scholars such as John F. Copper, Lee made more efforts developing better 
cross-strait ties than previous Taiwan leaders.379 In 1990, the National Unification 
Council was founded. It was the highest organ to make unification policy and the 
ROC President assumed its chairmanship. It held an annual meeting bringing 
together public figures from various circles to discuss issues in promoting the 
unification process, present proposals and make announcements to the public. Its 
establishment manifested the Lee administration's commitment to China's 
unification while preventing Taiwan from declaring independence.38o In January 
1991, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) was set up. It was a Cabinet-level body 
that guided cross-strait relations. It was responsible for mapping out and 
implementing mainland policy and charged with coordinating government agencies 
dealing with the mainland. A month later, the Straits Exchange Foundation ( SEF) 
was formed, which worked under the MAC. SEF conducted direct negotiations with 
its mainland counterpart, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits 
( ARA TS). The two semi-official bodies cooperated to handle cross-strait affairs 
and exchanged opinions. The establishment of the ROC governmental organisations 
in charge of formulating and carrying out unification policy facilitated Taiwan's 
relations with the mainland and helped forge cross-strait rapprochement. This 
appeared to create some conditions for reunion between the two sides of the Taiwan 
Strait, albeit in the remote future. 
During the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, a state of China 
civil war had been maintained. The two Chiangs stuck to the idea that the recovery 
of the Chinese mainland would be achieved militarily and viewed Taiwan as a 
temporary base where armed forces could regroup for a counterattack on the 
communists. However, the cessation of military conflict in the Taiwan Strait in the 
late 1970s and the remarkable progress in personnel, economic and other exchanges 
across the Straits since the late 1980s, significantly changed the cross-strait situation. 
As such, Taipei's mainland policy required reformulation. In early 1991, the 
(T fiji iii tilt)· Taipei: The Government Information Office (1'1 jf~ IlJ'G WT I~ f,ff; ), 1995, pp.205-207; 
Hsin-hsing Wu, Bridging the Strait: Taiwan, China, and the Prospects for Reunification. Hong 
Kong; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp.114-116. 
379 . John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? Boulder, Colorado and Oxford: Westview 
Press, 1996, p.46. 
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Guidelines for National Unification were promulgated. In May, Lee announced the 
end of the Period of National Mobilisation for Suppression of the Communist 
Rebellion, technically ending four decades of the Chinese civil war. These 
documents and measures equated to an ROC abandonment of old view of the 
"communist bandits". It maintained that cross-strait disputes should be resolved 
through negotiation on an equal footing rather than by resort to force. In particular, 
Taipei rejected the use force in the process of national unification. This 
demonstrated that the Lee administration was ready to cultivate a peaceful cross-
strait atmosphere to create favourable conditions for unification in the future. It also 
illustrated their desire for Beijing to reciprocate this goodwill and their desire for 
reconciliation, so that the unification process could be promoted. However, Beijing 
has maintained its threat of military force against Taiwan, as a possible means of 
unification. 381 In his Six Points response to Jiang's Eight-Points, Lee again called 
both sides to renounce the use offorce in unification. 382 
Politically, the Lee administration posed less threat to the Chinese Communist 
government than had the two Chiangs' regimes. These two former presidents were 
resolved to recapture the rulership of China, devoting themselves to subversion of the 
political power of Beijing. Lee was less aggressive than the two Chiangs, and did 
not seek to overthrow the Communist regime. Unlike the two Chiangs, Lee, as the 
first Taiwan-born president, had little interest in playing an active role in promoting 
political change on the mainland. Lee called for mainland China's democratisation 
while expressing the belief that the achievements of political reform and democracy 
in Taiwan should be of encouragement to 1.3 billion Chinese people. Yet, he took 
few actions to support democratic movements on the mainland. Under such 
circumstances, a democratising Taiwan concerned Beijing, but did not overly upset it 
because of the passive approach undertaken by Taipei. The March 1996 presidential 
election in Taiwan, the first-ever direct election of state leaders in Chinese history, 
had an impact upon the Communist one-party dictatorship but Beijing had managed 
380. Hsin-hsing Wu, Bridging the Strait: Taiwan, China, and the Prospects/or Reunification. Hong 
Kong; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p.116. 
381 • The Government Inform'!tion Office, The Executive Yuan, Republic of China ( 11- II& /Bj; ffJi IIg 
Ji?J ), Quiet Revolution ( T f!j if tf!r). Taipei: The Government Information Office ( 11- II& IlJt ffJi II[] 
Ji?J ), 1995, pp.197-213; Hsin-hsing Wu, Bridging the Strait: Taiwan, China, and the Prospects/or 
Reunification. Hong Kong; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp.124-125. 
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to restrict it. As the PRC leadership had quickened the pace of seeking to resolve the 
Taiwan issue since the 1980s, Taipei had been in a defensive position.383 Although 
Taipei sought eventual unification, its mainland policy focused on thwarting 
Beijing's united front strategy, which, in the eyes of Nationalists, symptomatic of 
traditional communist wiles. Taipei strove to prevent the ROC being annexed by the 
Chinese Communist regime with its economic means, political tactics and the 
utilisation of military threat.384 
The Lee administration had taken a pragmatic stance on relations with the 
mainland in relocating the political status of the ROC government and its 
administrative jurisdiction.385 Lee's mainland policy acknowledged political reality 
in its flexibility. The two Chiangs never accepted the communist government in 
Beijing as the legitimate ruler of the Chinese nation, claiming the ROC to be the sole 
legitimate government of all of China in exile. Lee favoured the idea of "one China, 
two governments", born out of their political and geographical separation. Without 
tackling the problem of legal status, on paper, the ROC government retained its claim 
to sovereign rights over mainland China while accepting the reality that China was 
divided and each side could represent only the area under its own jurisdiction. The 
Guidelines for National Unification defined the cross-strait relationship as one of 
"one China, two equal political entities". In view of both "political entities with de 
facto authority", the Lee administration acknowledged that the jurisdiction of the 
ROC did not include the mainland proper and its ruling sphere was only Taiwan and 
the surrounding islands. It did not dispute the fact that the PRC controlled mainland 
China. However, its description of China as a divided nation with two separate 
382. "Steps to Normalize Bilateral Relations," Free China Review, Vo1.45, No.7, July 1996, pp.43-47. 
383 • Even Wang Zaixi ( .:E 1:£ ;:ffl- ), then a senior fellow at the China Institute for International 
Strategic Studies, currently a deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs Office who has the rank of major 
general, held such a view. In criticising Taipei for refusal to hold talks on peaceful reunification, 
Wang said that Lee was not enterprising but wanted to muddle along his tiny independent kingdom on 
Taiwan. See Staff Reporter, "Scholars on the Taiwan Studies Refute a Fallacy of Taiwan 
Independence," ( * fU i21!f ' " 15 ?~ rPJ :1MI 1i1f 1l 'J!f.1!f l}2 , 15 3$ , i~ it , " ) Outlook Weekly ( T 
1J1), September 11,1995, p.14. 
384 • Hsin-hsing Wu, Bridging the Strait: Taiwan, China, and the Prospects for Reunification. Hong 
Kong; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp.97-115. 
385 • For the ROC government's conception of cross-strait relations and policy on the issue of national 
unification, see The Mainland Affairs Council, The Executive Yuan, Republic of China ( 17 il& j)}j; "* 
~m ~ IJt 4} ), Relations Across The Taiwan Straits ( ft filM /¥ 3t /5f iJt Ij/j 1f). Taipei: The 
Mainland Affairs Council ( 17 1I3c j)}j; "* ~m ~ IJt 4} ), 1994; "Guidelines for National Unification, 
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governments was rejected by Beijing. Taipei called on Beijing to recognise the 
existence of the ROC on Taiwan, maintaining only mutual respect would lay the way 
to a mutually beneficial improvement in relations and, ultimately, to unification. 
Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo had sought to unify China according to 
the Three People's Principles, nationalism, democracy and the people's welfare. 
Lee's unification policy carried on these three principles and made them more 
specific in practice. It opposed Taiwan independence and adhered to the "one China" 
policy.386 The Guidelines for National Unification were the basis of the Lee 
administration's cross-strait policy. They stipulated peaceful and democratic 
unification of China, but viewed unification as a long-term goal, which should be 
achieved gradually in three phases. This indicated that only when Beijing shed its 
communist mantle and embraced freedom and democracy, could Taiwan unify with 
the mainland. However, Beijing insisted on the opposite, providing a formula of 
"one country, two systems". The mainland would stick to the communist system 
while Taiwan would retain its capitalist system. However, Taipei raised doubts and 
difficult questions about the validity and workability of the formula. It viewed it as a 
united front scheme aimed at making the ROC "surrender completely" to Beijing. 
Thus, Taipei rejected the Beijing-proposed unification terms while reiterating its 
refusal to accept mainland China's communist rule in any form. The domestic 
political situation in the Chinese mainland further affected Taiwanese views on 
unification. For example, the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre shocked Taiwanese 
and impacted upon their attitude to unification. Also, the international trends toward 
the victory of democracy and the failure of communism further limited 
communism's appeal to Taiwanese. Moreover, it was Taiwan's preference that the 
economic gap between the two sides of the Straits should be bridged before 
unification. Should Beijing raise the living standards of the Chinese people near to 
those of Taiwan, conditions would be ripe for unification. 
adopted by the National Unification Council on February 23, 1991, and by the Executive Yuan 
Council on March 14, 1991," Free China Review, Vo1.41, No.9, September 1991, p.44. 
386 • The Lee administration declared that "the ROC government is firm in its advocacy of' one 
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'one China'. See The Mainland Affairs Council, The Executive Yuan, Republic of China ( fr IJi!z: Il1G 
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The Lee administration, therefore, refused to embrace immediate unification but 
adopted a positive attitude toward the development of cross-strait economic relations 
and took moves to encourage bilateral commercial exchanges.387 It had allowed 
indirect business ties with mainland China since the late 1980s. Indirect trade was 
encouraged and Taiwan had a huge surplus. Investment in the mainland was also 
allowed. As businessmen flocked to the opposite side of the Straits to invest, 
thousands of Taiwanese businesses were established on the mainland. Meanwhile, 
Taipei took precautionary measures to avoid overheated investment that could lead to 
the island's economic dependency on mainland China, but did not curb mainland-
bound investments. As a preventive measure, Taipei advocated the southward ( go to 
Southeast Asia) investment policy so as to divert investment to some other areas.388 
Taipei believed that national security considerations should come before all-round 
economic integration with the Chinese mainland. Thus, it refused the immediate 
establishment of three direct links, trade, mail and transport services across the 
Straits, before ending the state ofhostility.389 However, it was prepared to enter 
discussions with Beijing regarding the opening of the three direct links between the 
island and the mainland, while also making preparations for the gradual development 
of direct shipping across the Straits.390 During the late 1980s and the mid-1990s, 
although cross-strait political relations were frosty, trade and investment ties had 
387 • For the Lee administration's adoption of a policy of encouraging closer cross-strait economic ties 
in the early 1990s, see Christopher Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and 
Status in International Society. London; New York: Routledge, 1997, pp.III-113. In his Six Points 
that made his formal response to Jiang's Eight-Points, Lee expressed his willingness to "enhance trade 
and economic relations to develop a mutually beneficial and complementary relationship". He even 
declared that "Taiwan should make the mainland its economic hinterland" and that Taipei was ready 
to offer its experience and technology to help the mainland develop the economy. See "Steps to 
Normalize Bilateral Relations," Free China Review, Vo1.45, No.7, March 1996, pA5. 
388 . It was after the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, during which Beijing militarily intimidated Taiwan 
with a series of missile tests, that the Lee administration re-evaluated mainland policy and imposed 
restrictions on Taiwanese investment in the mainland as part of his "no haste, be patient" policy. See 
Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 1999, pp.55-58. 
389. For Taipei's security considerations in developing cross-strait economic relations, see The 
Mainland Affairs Council, The Executive Yuan, Republic of China ( 1-1 il& IlJ'C * ~m ~ JJJ. ~ ), 
Relations Across The Taiwan Straits ( it f/!j jllj J¥ )( /f( iJt Ij/j 15). Taipei: The Mainland Affairs 
Council (1-1 jgl( IlJ'C * ~m ~ JJJ. ~ ), 1994; J.D. Kenneth Boutin, "Cross-Strait Trade and Investment: 
Economic and Security Implications for the Republic of China," Issues & Studies, Vol.33, No.12, 
December 1997, pp.70-93. 
390. "Steps to Normalize Bilateral Relations," Free China Review, Vo1.45, No.7, March 1996, pp.45-
46; Chu-cheng Ming, "Political Interactions Across the Taiwan Strait," in Maurice Brosseau, Suzanne 
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become increasingly close and a deeper and wider market integration had been 
expected. Taipei played its part in promoting cross-strait economic relations despite 
its insistence on gradual, steady expansion of cross-strait exchanges. 
In the early 1990s, while not opposed to discussions on political issues, Taipei 
was more active in promoting business and other non-political ties between the two 
sides than Beijing. The Straits Exchange Foundation ( SEF ) had been formed in 
February 1991. However, after ten tentative months and two visits by SEF Vice 
Chairman Chen Charng-ven, Beijing set up the Association for Relations Across the 
Taiwan Straits ( ARA TS ) as a reciprocal mainland body. The SEF and ARA TS 
conducted quasi-official contacts and sought cooperation to handle cross-strait affairs 
while discussing relevant bilateral issues. From April 1991 to May 1995, the two 
semi-official bodies exchanged visits and held talks. They reached a number of 
agreements on routine affairs, in particular urgent matters such as illegal 
immigration, airline hijackings and fishing disputes. More significant, in Singapore 
in April 1993, the two chairmen of ARATS and SEF, Wang Daohan and Koo Chen-
fu, held an ice-breaking meeting, ending forty-four years without contact in the wake 
of the 1949 civil war. Through three-days of talks, they signed four agreements on 
technical issues such as the authentication of documents and handling of mail, 
providing a basis for future talks and systematic interaction between the island and 
the mainland. In accordance with Koo' s proposal, in May 1995 the SEF and the 
ARATS began preparing for the Second Koo-Wang Talks, which were originally 
planned to take place in Beijing in July. However, in mid-June Beijing abruptly 
shifted its responses to Lee Teng-hui's US visit from moderation to belligerence, 
unilaterally suspending the scheduled talks. 391 
Pepper and Tsang Shu-ki (eds), China Review 1996. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 
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There were two focal points in meetings between the SEF and the ARATS. One 
was their different views on the negotiation's priorities. The SEF insisted on placing 
emphasis on discussions of normalisation of cross-strait relations and problems 
arising from cross-strait exchanges. They believed that when the negotiations on 
technical issues produced results, conditions for future political talks would arise. 
Thus, they proposed technical issues such as expanded private cross-strait exchanges 
should be a priority. However, ARATS gave the top priority to discuss how to end 
separation, maintaining the need to enter into direct and immediate political 
negotiation on reunification first. They insisted on dropping the technical talks in 
favour of opening a political negotiation. The SEF was not opposed to conducting 
political talks, but asked Beijing to recognise Taipei as an equal political entity first 
and hold reunification negotiations on a government-to-government basis. In view of 
the impossibility of settling long-standing political disputes in the foreseeable future, 
it seemed that Taipei's claims were reasonable and practical. Indeed, the two sides 
needed to concentrate on consultations for the resolution of technical issues at this 
stage and deal with the reunification issue in the future. However, Beijing was 
reluctant to accept Taipei's propositions and was eager to make progress on 
reunifying Taiwan. 
The other focus was the concept of one China. In November 1992, a consensus 
on the one China issue was reached between the SEF and ARATS. Both sides 
agreed that there is only one China despite differences over its political definition. 
The consensus confirmed adherence to the 'One-China' principle, which sought to 
set aside the sovereignty dispute for the time being while allowing the two sides to 
maintain different claims on the meaning of 'One China'. It appeared to defuse the 
core dispute over the political relationship between the island and the mainland, and 
was conducive to promoting mutual understanding while allowing for the 
preservation of differences. Thus, it helped to facilitate cross-strait ties and the 
pursuit of common grounds for eventual reunification. However, the consensus was 
an informal, oral agreement. It did not arrange further consultation for a written 
version of their mutual acceptance of the' One China' concept. These issues were 
left unresolved, bearing the seed of divergent understandings of the consensus that 
could cause the political friction over the substance of 'One China'. Since reaching 
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the consensus, Taipei and Beijing had different versions of exactly what consensus 
was reached and what 'One China' meant. It even gave rise to disputes over the 
existence of the consensus and the meaning of the term 'One China' within Beijing's 
political circles and among Taiwan's major political parties. In light of SEF 
Chairman Koo Chen-fu's statement, the SEF "reached a verbal consensus with" 
ARA TS on "one China with each side being entitled to its respective 
interpretation.,,392 According to Beijing's version, ARATS and the SEF "reached the 
common understanding" "that each of the two organisations should express verbally 
that "both sides of the Taiwan Straits adhere to the One-China Principle".393 As 
cross-strait disputes mount, interpretations of the consensus have become more 
controversial and complicated in recent years. 
Taipei's behaviour in cross-strait tension during 1995 and 1996 demonstrated that 
its mainland policy was relatively rational. A confrontation between the mainland 
and the island was not Lee Teng-hui's true intention. He did not anticipate that his 
US visit would precipitate cross-straits tensions. 394 After the visit incurred an 
unexpectedly intense reaction from Beijing, he took care to be less provocative. 
With a large-scale campaign, Beijing's official media launched persistent 
392 • "Full Text of Statement of SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu," CNA, July 30, 1999. However, 
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Beijing: Jiuzhou Press (11 V+IIII 45 ill JffR *±), 1998, pp.159-160. 
393 • In addition, Beijing's documents displayed ARA TS officials as stating that "the two sides of the 
strait both uphold the one-China principle, and are striving for national unification. But working 
discussions between the two sides of the strait will not touch upon the political meaning of one 
China." See The Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office 
of the State Council ( * ~ * :5k: i:l rl!l1 I 1'1" 1J' -0 ][ / m! :%- ~ is rl!l1¥:%- 1J' -0][), China's 
Taiwan Issue ( tp /If/ it II! /0 H)· Beijing: Jiuzhou Press ( 11 V'I'! III 45 ill JffR *± ), 1998, pp.159-
160. 
394 • See a brief analysis by Ralph N. Clough in his book, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan 
Strait? Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999, p.7. According to ROC Foreign Minister 
Jason Hu, Lee's US visit "was not intended to cause any conflict between the two sides of the Taiwan 
Strait". "Hu said that Taiwan had not expected the Beijing authorities to react in such a radical 
manner to Lee's visit, but he stressed that Taiwan had not intended to cause trouble. Instead, he 
claimed, it was Beijing that created cross-strait tension by suspending regular cross-strait talks and 
conducting controversial war games near Taiwan in the run-up to the presidential election." See Lin 
Wen-fen, "ROC President's 1995 US Visit Not Intended to Cause Conflict: FM," CNA, June 22, 
1998. 
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threatening, verbal assaults, and even personal attacks against Lee. 395 Yet, he did not 
respond in kind. On the contrary, he denied Beijing's allegations that his US visit 
was for the ultimate goal of Taiwan independence and urged Beijing to replace 
confrontation with negotiation.396 Furthermore, he offered an olive branch of sorts to 
Beijing, stating he remained committed to improving cross-strait relations for 
eventual unification.397 Although Lee had a habit of speaking frankly but 
indiscreetly, he sought to use more moderate language in criticising Beijing's 
military threat. 398 
When he finished his US visit and returned to Taipei, he reaffirmed his 
. commitment to China's democratic unification despite reiterating "his demands for 
respect and dignity for Taiwan".399 Nevertheless, Beijing adopted a policy of 
belligerence toward Taiwan, from late July 1995, staging a series of threatening 
military exercises and missile test-firings off Taiwan's coastline. However, in 
September 1995, Lee declared that "the ROC government insists on adhering to the 
principles and stages established under the Guidelines of National Unification to 
pursue unification". MAC Chairman Vincent Siew reiterated the ROC government's 
"firm position against Taiwan independence" and accused Beijing of distortion.40o 
Siewand SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu appealed to Beijing to resume the cross-strait 
395. "Media Reprove Lee's Splittism," Beijing Review, June 26-July 2, 1995, p.5; John W. Garver, 
Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle and London: University 
of Washington Press, 1997, 102. 
396. Susan Yu, "Lee Seeks to Ease Straits Tension," The Free China Journal, July 28, 1995. 
397. Julian Baum, "Strait Gambit: China Awaits Reaction to Its Halting of Missile Tests," The Far 
Eastern Economic Review, August 10, 1995, pp.20-21. 
398. This thesis' author interviewed a Taiwanese businessman, Mr. Wang Wenjie ( ::E Y. ~ ) in 
Christchurch on Lee's speaking style. Lee had a nickname: IBM, i.e., International Big Mouth. 
When he was in office, he often left the text of a speech prepared for him beforehand by his 
secretaries, instead speaking his own ideas. In the 1990s, a jingle was widely circulated among 
Taiwanese businesspeople in mainland China. It said that "we are afraid of nothing but are fearful 
that President Lee launches an explosive talk". This indicated that they worried that Lee's frank but 
indiscreet talks could have an impact upon cross-strait ties, affecting their business. When the 1994 
Qiandao Lake incident happened, Lee emotionally burst out. He denounced mainland Chinese 
authorities as "bandits" for their handling of the incident. See Chapter 7.2-2. The Historical 
Background of Jiang Zemin's Taiwan Initiative. 
399. Julian Baum, "Domino Theory: Taipei Hopes Lee's US visit Sets a Precedent," The Far Eastern 
Economic Review, June 22, 1995, p.l7. 
400 • The Mainland Affairs Council, the Executive Yuan, Republic of China, "Major Events Across the 
Taiwan Straits (January 1912 to December 1999 )," on the World Wide Web at 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/chrono!ogy/scemap.htIn. 
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dialogues and reaffirmed Taipei's stance in pursuing a peaceful and unified China.401 
In an effort to ease cross-strait tension, Lee even "called for" the two sides "to 
resolve their differences by taking up the principles", of Jiang's Eight-Points and 
Lee's Six-points. He appealed that "the two sides must work pragmatically with new 
perspectives to promote harmony and a climate in favour of the reunification of 
China".402 In his 1996 New Year message, Lee rearticulated these main points, 
emphasising that "China must be reunited".403 Despite on-going tension between the 
island and the mainland, he sought to mend fences with Beijing. Again, he offered to 
open talks with Jiang Zemin, no longer insisting on doing so on an international 
occasion. This was viewed as being more flexible than his previous stand on a cross-
strait summit.404 
Amid the PLA' s three rounds of exercises from July 1995 to March 1996 in 
waters near Taiwan, Taipei declined to yield but exercised restraint. In fact, Lee did 
not order the defence departments to prepare for military operations to strike back at 
the PLA military manoeuvres or counterattack mainland China in the face of 
Beijing's military intimidation. On the contrary, he tried to avoid military conflict. 
He sought to react calmly and cautiously to Beijing's military threats, in particular, a 
series of sabre-rattling moves that Beijing took to intimidate Taiwan. Although he 
gave orders for an increase in military readiness, this was in preparation for any 
contingency. Taiwan's armed forces conducted several drills but they were aimed at 
strengthening military training to defend the island. Their actions mainly signalled 
high alert to monitor the PLA live-fire military exercises and preparation to resist the 
PLA possible attack. This restraint helped prevent the two sides of the Taiwan Strait 
from further military confrontation, reducing the risk of crisis escalation.405 During 
401 • Christie Su, "SEF Chairman Hopeful Despite Peking's Delay of Talks," The Free China Journal, 
June 23, 1995; Christie Su, "ROC Reasserts Policies on one-China,US Relations," The Free China 
Journal, July 21,1995. 
402 . Susan Yu, "Lee Strives to Ease Straits Tension," The Free China Journal, September 8, 1995. 
For Jiang's Eight-Points and Lee's Six-points, see Chapter 7.2-3. Jiang Zemin's Eight-Point Proposal 
for Reunification with Taiwan and Reactions to It. 
403 • Christie Su, "Leaders in Taiwan and Mainland See Hope for Improvement in Ties," The Free 
China Journal, January 6, 1996. 
404. Christie Su, "Report Resets Attention on ROC-Mainland Talk," The Free China Journal, 
September 8, 1995. 
405. Gary Klintworth, "Lessons Learned," in Greg Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan's 
Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997, p.2S3. 
151 
the presidential election period of late1995 to March 1996, Lee expressed his desire 
to end cross-strait hostilities and "pursue a peace accord with Communist China".406 
To sum up, during the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, Taipei cautiously responded 
Beijing's military threats. In particular, it sought to avoid provoking Beijing. In 
contrast to Beijing's relentless bellicosity, Taipei repeatedly made gestures of 
goodwill, reaffirming its commitment to China's unification and urging an early 
resumption of cross-strait talks in an effort to maintain peace and stability in the 
Taiwan Strait. This suggests that Taipei was not responsible for the outbreak and the 
course of the Taiwan crisis despite the appearance that Lee's US visit was that 
trigger. 
3.4. The Issue of Taiwan Independence and the Presidential 
Election 
3.4-1. The Issue of National Identity and Public Opinion on 
U nification/Independence 
It is necessary to analyse issues of ethnicity and Taiwanese identification while 
discussing the question of mainstream public opinion.407 An ethnic division on 
national identity had become an issue in Taiwan's politics and society since the early 
1990s. The issue of national identity focused on ethnicity, but also involved 
political, social and cultural identity. The central question was the status of Taiwan: 
Was the island an independent state or would it unify with the mainland? A debate 
on national identity had been intense and had showed every sign of continuing for a 
long time.408 This indicated that Taiwan's status was unlikely to be dramatically 
406 • Virginia Sheng, "Lee Says March 23 Victor Must Pursue a Peace Pact," The Free China Journal, 
March 1, 1996. 
407. For an overview of the ethnicity issue on national identity in Taiwan in the early and mid 1990s, 
see Alan M. Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization. Anllonk, N.Y.: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1994; Chen Wen-chun, "National Identity and Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan: A Study 
of the Problem of Democratization in a Divided Country," Issues & Studies, Vol.33, No.4, April 
1997, pp.1-44; Shelley Rigger, "Competing Conceptions of Taiwan's Identity: The Irresolvable 
Conflict in Cross-Strait Relations," in Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland 
China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis. New York and London: Routledge, 1999, pp.229-240. 
408. I-chou Liu, "Generational Discrepancies in Public Attitude on Taiwan's Unification Issue," Issues 
& Studies, Vo1.32, No.9, September 1996, p.1OS. 
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changed in the foreseeable future. The complicated and controversial issue of 
national identity divided the island's citizemy. The mainlanders, whose families 
moved to Taiwan during the Chinese Communist take-over of the mainland in 1949, 
thought of themselves as Chinese. Indigenous people, whose families emigrated 
from mainland China generations ago and had weak, if any, links to the mainland, 
saw themselves as primarily Taiwanese. The mainlanders believed that the island 
and the mainland should reunify in the future while many native Taiwanese did not 
favour unification and stressed Taiwan's separate identity. In the meantime, an 
ethnic divide surrounding China and the divergence of views on the issue of 
"unification and independence" was exacerbated by regional differentiation. Rural 
south Taiwan was traditionally a pro-independence base while the pro-unification 
forces held fast in their stronghold of industrial and commercial north Taiwan. 
Obviously, the richer northern Taiwanese dominated the relatively undeveloped 
southern Taiwanese faction in the economic and political fields. This regional 
distribution of supporters for unification! independence demonstrated that the idea of 
Taiwan independence lacked a reliable foundation. 
Some politicians tried to exploit the ethnicity issue, sowing discord between 
mainlanders and native Taiwanese. However, at a time when the Lee administration 
managed to reduce potentially explosive ethnic tensions, the ethnicity issue did not 
become the principal issue in the mid-1990s.409 It is worth paying attention to the 
fact that three-quarters ofthe population was indigenous Taiwanese, but 
independence supporters were only a small minority, ranging from just over than 
10% to about 15%. The number of Taiwanese people supporting independence 
showed little sign of significant growth in the foreseeable future.41o This in turn 
showed that without the approval of popular will, the idea of Taiwan independence 
lacked legitimacy. Although the debate on national identity was, by and large, 
carried out along ethnic lines between mainlanders and Taiwanese, close to half of 
Taiwan's residents considered themselves to be both Chinese and Taiwanese in 
409 • Robert Irick, "Lee's Pragmatism at Work in Mainland Relations Talk," The Free China Journal, 
April 21, 1995; Christopher Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status 
in International Society. London; New York: Routledge, 1997, p.lOO. 
410 . I-chou Liu, "Generational Discrepancies in Public Attitude on Taiwan's Unification Issue," Issues 
& Studies, Vo1.32, No.9, September 1996, p.106. 
153 
1996.411 A lot of native Taiwanese called the island home but did not cast away their 
Chinese heritage. An important phenomenon was that "a united China" was still 
regarded as "the core value" for 25% of Taiwan residents during 1994-1995 despite 
only 15% being of mainland descent. 412 This showed that a quarter of the population 
backing reunification with the mainland was a major factor in restraining Taiwan 
independence. 
In the mid-1990s, in regularly gauging the public mood on the unification-
separation dichotomy, public opinion polls had shown an overwhelming majority of 
Taiwanese people were happy with the stability of the status quo.413 A 1994-1995 
poll presented a picture of a big middle and two small ends. It displayed that most 
people preferred neither unification nor independence. Those who supported 
immediate unification and immediate independence were in the minority. During 
1994 and 1995, the number of independence supporters varied between more than 
10% and about 15%. An important factor that needed to be taken into account was 
that among independence supporters, only 4% hoped for immediate separation. 
Others preferred to maintain the status quo and gradually seek independence. "The 
proportion of independence-oriented respondents has remained stable" during 1994 
and 1995.414 The low percentage of independence supporters in all public opinion 
surveys, in particular, the small number of die-hard independence proponents in the 
total population meant that the promotion of an independent Taiwan would make 
little progress in 1995 and 1996. 
With most residents in the island feeling that the status quo was the most 
favourable, and safest, course for the future, any independence appeal obviously 
411 • In addition, 16.6% of the public identified itself as Chinese and 33.1 % viewed themselves as 
Taiwanese. See Chen Wen-chun, "National Identity and Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan: A 
Study of the Problem of Democratization in a Divided Country," Issues & Studies, Vo1.33, No.4, 
Aprill997, p.14. 
412 • According to an analysis of public attitudes on the Taiwan unification/independence issue, "a 
united China remains the core value of a group totalling about 25 percent of the Taiwan public," see 1-
chou Uu, "Generational Discrepancies in Public Attitude on Taiwan's Unification Issue," Issues & 
Studies, Vo1.32, No.9, September 1996, p.107. About 15% proportion of mainlanders in the Taiwan's 
total population, see John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's 
Democratization. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997, p.95. 
413. For a survey of public opinion on the Taiwan unification/independence issue, see I-chou Uu, 
"Generational Discrepancies in Public Attitude on Taiwan's Unification Issue," Issues & Studies, 
Vo1.32, No.9, September 1996, pp.103-121. 
414. see I-chou Uu, "Generational Discrepancies in Public Attitude on Taiwan's Unification Issue," 
Issues & Studies, Vo1.32, No.9, September 1996, pp.106-107. 
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violated the common desire of the majority of Taiwan people. Various political 
parties and major politicians were compelled to take public opinion seriously. Even 
the pro-independence DPP, under pressure from the voices of the overwhelming 
majority of Taiwan people, was more modest than before. In particular, Taipei's 
policy on national identity was shaped by the island's mainstream popular will. This 
manifested that Taiwan's status would not be able to be rashly changed. 
Fear of a possible PRC invasion was a major reason for support of the status quo. 
Most Taiwanese feared that immediate unification would change the ruler of the 
island into the repressive communist government in Beijing. Although the PRC's 
growing military might and economic power was lost on some pro-independence 
supporters, the general public was worried that any move toward independence was 
to invite a military attack from mainland China. Indeed, Beijing's threat to attack in 
the event of the island declaring statehood deterred support for the idea of promoting 
Taiwan as an independent country. Taiwan's mainstream opinion suggested that the 
stability of the status quo was a good way to avoid a cross-strait war. Meanwhile, 
there were other reasons for maintaining the status quo. An important factor was that 
a single reunified nation under the Communist regime was unacceptable for the 
Taiwanese people. When a desirable unification with a sound political system was 
still in the remote future, they would prefer to maintain the status quo. Although 25 
percent of Taiwanese people threw their support behind unification with the Chinese 
mainland, activists for immediate reunification with the mainland were a tiny group. 
From 1994 to 1995, public opinion polls had shown that only 2.5% respondents 
hoped to see speedy unification of Taiwan and mainland China. Another 22.5% said 
they thought Taiwan should maintain the status quo and gradually move toward 
unification with the mainland.415 This demonstrated that among unification 
supporters only a few accepted an immediate unification that would be ruled by 
mainland communists. Most Taiwan residents opposed Beijing's formula of "one 
country, two systems" as a unification mode1.416 This indicated that acceptable 
conditions for a merge of the mainland and the island had not yet been reached. 
415. I-chou Uu, "Generational Discrepancies in Public Attitude on Taiwan's Unification Issue," Issues 
& Studies, Vo1.32, No.9, September 1996, pp.106-107. 
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These surveys delivered a clear and strong message to Beijing: mainstream popular 
will did not want unification with Communist China. Therefore, Beijing should not 
expect any likelihood of a hasty reunification. 
3.4-2. The Presidential Election and Candidates' Positions on 
U nification/Independence 
Formally, the island's first-ever direct presidential election in March 1996 was for 
the office of the 9th president of the Republic of China.417 It was a four-person 
race.418 Incumbent president and KMT chairman Lee Teng-hui received the 
nomination ofthe ruling Nationalist Party to seek re-election. Meanwhile, the DPP 
nominated Peng Ming-min as its presidential candidate. He had been imprisoned in 
the 1960s and lived in exile abroad before 1992 because of his promotion of the 
Taiwan independence movement. An independent candidate was a former KMT 
leader, Lin Yang-kang. He infuriated Lee and was expelled from the party for 
running against its presidential candidate.419 Although failing to win the KMT 
presidential nomination, Lin gained strong support from the CNP, and while in name, 
he ran as independent but he was backed by the CNP. 420 The other independent 
candidate, Nationalist heavyweight, Chen Li-an also challenged Lee for the 
presidency. He voluntarily withdrew from the party in order to run in the presidential 
election. 
416. Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Taiwan's Security in the Changing international System. Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, p.9; Shelly Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Votingfor 
Democracy. London; New York: Routledge, 1999, pp.190-191. 
417 • For an overview of the March 1996 Taiwan presidential election, see Hung-mao Tien, "Taiwan in 
1995: Electoral Politics and Cross-Strait Relations," Asian Survey, VoI.XXXVI, No.1, January 1996, 
pp.33-40; Tun-jen Cheng, "Taiwan in 1996: From Euphoria to Melodrama," Asian Survey, 
VoI.XXXVII, No.1, January 1997, ppA3-51. 
418 • For a survey of the candidates for the presidential election in Taiwan in March 1996 and their 
main campaign themes, see Shelly Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Votingfor Democracy. London; New 
York: Routledge, 1999, pp.17 4-17 5. 
419. In December 1995 the party's disciplinary committee decided on the expUlsion and the Central 
Standing Committee approved this decision. In a response to the expulsion, Lin declared that it was 
illegal and he did not recognise it. See Ling Yunhe, "A Comment on Li Denghui's Constitutional 
Reform That Was Packed Up With the Taiwan Independence Line," ( iN. .zr i% ' " if '$ ~ %'¥ ' m llit 
?~ 1j'i:' 1Q, ~ r B~ , t§1 ~!k ' Jill} ~, ") Outlook Weekly ( 71/l), January 1, 1996, p.31. 
420. Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 1999, pA. 
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The presidential candidates were not as far apart on most issues as they might 
seem, despite trying to differentiate themselves from each other. The main area 
where they differed was cross-strait affairs. Because the issue of "unification and 
independence" involved war and peace, mainland-island relations became the main 
campaign theme and dominated the election. Thereby the election was fought on the 
basis of independence versus unification. 
Generally speaking, Lee walked a centrist line between those who wanted 
independence and those who sought unification.421 He aimed at presenting himself as 
an impartial and moderate champion of the island, in contrast with Peng's 
independence rhetoric and the pro-unification stances of Lin and Chen. His 
campaign theme was one of "managing the great Taiwan and nurturing a new 
Chinese culture".422 On one hand, his stance on eventual unification remained 
unchanged. He denied that he sought independence and stressed a pledge to unifY 
with mainland China.423 However, he underlined the fact that national unification 
should be performed under the "three principles of the people". In particular, he 
urged Beijing to respect the ROC democratic system as a prerequisite for the 
reunification of China and insisted that the reunion of the two sides of the Taiwan 
Strait should come out of freedom and democracy on the mainland.424 On mainland 
policy, he assumed a moderate centrist stance, promising to improve cross-strait 
relations and seek better ties with the Chinese mainland.425 On the other hand, in 
emphasising Taiwan first and Taiwanese interests, he claimed the island's political 
autonomy. Lee's centrist line catered to the people's expectations. Peng's leftist 
421 • "Lee urged the people to put aside their differences on the unification vs. independence issue, 
saying all people on the island today are 'new Taiwanese' who should work hard for the ROC on 
Taiwan." See Virginia Sheng, "Lee Says March 23 Victor Must Pursue a Peace Pact," The Free 
China Journal, March 1, 1996. 
422. Ling Yunhe, "A Comment on Li Denghui's Constitutional Reform That Was Packed Up With the 
Taiwan Independence Line," ( iffi: ~ ~ , " if '* 5ff ~ , * 1& BJc 1j!i , § ~ T B~ , i1 am ' N* ~ , " ) 
Outlook Weekly (? 1Il), January 1, 1996, p.3!. 
423 • Sheng Lijun, China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2001, p.I33. Taipei's official media even underlined that Lee "reiterated the ROC's one-
China policy" and "Lee's statement should thus stand as a clear and convincing rebuttal to Peking's 
accusation that he is a 'covert separatist' ". See Editorial, "Toward a Community ofInterests," The 
Free China Journal, March 22, 1996. 
424. Editorial, "Toward a Community ofInterests," The Free China Journal, March 22, 1996. 
425 . Lee "vowed to 'make a historic contribution to ending hostility across the Taiwan Straits'." See 
Virginia Sheng, "Presidential Rivals in TV Forum Present Platforms to the Public," The Free China 
Journal, March 1, 1996. Also see Sheng Lijun, China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 200 I, p.I33. 
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DPP line scared many electors and the two independent candidates that stood to the 
right side of the political spectrum had difficulties in drawing supporters.426 As the 
frontrunner among four presidential candidates, Lee had greater support than the 
three others in opinion polls. It appeared that he would have a strong chance of 
retaining the presidency.427 However, in order to sweep back into office with a 
majority, he had to campaign hard to cope with a threat from the two rebellious 
contenders, Lin and Chen, who allied the CNP and the anti -Lee forces within the 
KMT while also meeting the DPP's challenge.428 
The two independent candidates attacked Peng for stirring up independence 
sentiments and tried to convince voters that Taiwanese statehood was illegal and 
dangerous.429 It seemed that the position of Lin Yang-kang and Chen Li-an on the 
unification vs. independence issue was the same as Lee. However, they adopted a 
more definite stance toward eventual unification while more firmly opposing 
independence.43o Chen criticised Lee's vague policy on national unification. Lin 
assailed Lee as a "traitor" for deviating from the ruling party's hallowed commitment 
to China's reunification. As a native-born politician, Lin consented to political 
autonomy for the island but did not think this and China's unification were mutually 
exclusive. This demonstrated that not all Taiwanese, in particular Taiwan-born 
politicians, favoured Taiwan's separate identity while keeping the Chinese mainland 
at arm's length. Lin criticised Lee's policies for fuelling tensions with Beijing and 
advocated a less confrontational line with mainland China. He argued that Lee's 
policies and his support for independence were behind the Taiwan Strait crisis. 
426 • John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle and 
London: University of Washington Press, 1997, pp.l53-154. 
427 . Christie Su, "Lin and Chen Qualify for Ballot; Lee Opens Campaign Headquarters," The Free 
China Journal, January 26, 1996. 
428 . The KMT leaders were uncertain whether the electorate would give Lee more than 50 percent of 
the vote, see Shelly Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Votingfor Democracy. London; New York: 
Routledge, 1999, pp.174-175. 
429 . Virginia Sheng, "Presidential Rivals in TV Forum Present Platforms to the Public," The Free 
China Journal, March 1, 1996. 
430. For the two independent presidential tickets' criticism of Lee on the unification/independence 
issue as well as his pragmatic diplomacy, and their standpoints on cross-strait relations and mainland 
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Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997, pp. 89-92; 
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Should Lee retain power, his re-election would invite more troubles with the 
mainland and that could jeopardise the island's security. Lin promised to offer major 
initiatives to ease cross-strait tensions and re-establish dialogue. He favoured 
economic exchanges and the development of other links with the mainland. As a 
devout Buddhist and former defence minister, Chen spoke more of peace. In 
emphasising the importance of good ties between the two sides, he advocated a non-
confrontational stance toward the mainland. He called for greater flexibility on 
cross-strait policy than the Lee administration. Both Lin and Chen sought to 
highlight the dangers of Lee's foreign policy. They were opposed to Lee's pragmatic 
diplomacy, mainly his US visit and the ROC drive for a UN seat. They believed 
these moves provoked Beijing, sparking cross-strait confrontation. In terms of the 
island's status, Lin and Chen believed that China was one country and Taiwan only a 
province. They espoused national unification. However, in refuting the DPP's 
allegations that they were allying with China against Taiwan, they tried to dispel 
suspicion among some groups that they might make a major concession or yield to 
force in facing the Chinese Communists. Both Lin and Chen tried to appeal the 
middle ground despite their basic pro-unification stance. Lin favoured maintaining 
the status quo and Chen called for the putting aside of differences between 
independence and unification sentiment. They declared that there was no hurry for 
reunion between the two sides of the Straits and did not support reunification under 
the Communist regime. In addition, they criticised Beijing's military exercises and 
called for peaceful unification.431 
During the campaign, the DPP's pro-independence stance had softened because of 
rising pressure both inside and outside the island. However, this softening also 
resulted from a struggle within the party over its electoral strategy. Internal strife 
over the party's independence platform and cross-strait policy intensified as the 
campaign progressed. Fundamentalists, headed by Peng Ming-min, the "godfather" 
of the Taiwan independence movement, and pragmatists led by DPP chairman Shih 
New York and London: Routledge, 1999, p.188; Virginia Sheng, "Presidential Rivals in TV Forum 
Present Platforms to the Public," The Free China Journal, March 1, 1996. 
431 • Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of 
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Ming-teh, were two sharply opposed sides in the party's programme for the 
presidential election.432 Initially, Peng prepared to cast around the idea of Taiwan 
independence for his campaign theme. However, Shih expressed his strong 
disagreement with such an aggressive plan considering that this indicated a desire for 
formal and immediate Taiwan independence, which would concern electors. Many 
residents of the island feared that the DPP would declare independence if it came to 
power, and that this could trigger a war across the Taiwan Strait. Thereby, they 
would vote against the DPP's presidential candidate in order to prevent such a 
disaster. Shih believed that Peng's idea could gain only a small number of firm 
supporters who held strong pro-independence views, but would lose public appeal, in 
particular the votes of most native Taiwanese who should have been won over by the 
party. Also, Chen Shui-bian, a mayor of Taipei, one of the "Taiwan independence" 
protagonists, and current ROC president, persuaded Peng to soften his independence 
stance. It was because Chen mellowed his own pro-independence stand that he won 
the Taipei mayoralty in the 1994 elections. According to his own successful 
experiences, he advised Peng that the independence issue was electoral poison.433 
Despite failing to reach a consensus on dropping its independence platform within 
the party, the DPP's campaign theme did not focus on independence alone in order to 
win over middle-ground voters.434 Peng had to moderate his position, changing his 
campaign theme from "define national territory, draw international recognition" into 
"peace, dignity and Taiwan president". However, he did not abandon his pro-
independence stand. He wanted to ensure the loyalty of the 20 percent of the 
electorate that had always cast their ballots for independence and who did not 
seriously think that the DPP might lead the island into conflict. On the other hand, 
he tried to avoid provocative calls for Taiwanese statehood seeking to downplay the 
1999, p.5; Virginia Sheng, "Presidential Rivals in TV Forum Present Platforms to the Public," The 
Free China Journal, March 1, 1996. 
432. For Peng's internal rift with Shih over the independence issue and the DPP's cross-strait policy 
during the campaign, see "Taiwan: Setback for the Godfather of Independence," Asiaweek, October 
27, 1995, p.36; Christie Su, "Two Months to Presidential Vote, Four Candidates Remain," The Free 
China Journal, January 19, 1996; Staff Reporter, "The DPP Faced a Splitting Plight," (;zjs: TU ic 1!f ' 
" IS' 1~ ~ :itt'R: 00 Ilffi :5t 1t ~ :Ii, " ) Outlook Weekly ( 7 1§), May 27, 1996, pp.36-37. 
433. Shelly Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Votingfor Democracy. London; New York: Routledge, 1999, 
p.1n; "Taiwan: Setback for the Godfather ofIndependence," Asiaweek, October 27, 1995, p.36. 
434 • In its "campaign platform, the party made no explicit mention of independence, instead using 
indirect language such as 'ensuring Taiwan's sovereignty'." See "Taiwan: Setback for the Godfather 
ofIndependence," Asiaweek, October 27, 1995, p.36. 
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issue of independence in the party's charter in order to broaden his support. He 
repeatedly said he had no intention of rushing to formalise the island's de facto 
autonomy. In emphasising a gradual change for Taiwan's status in the future, he 
stated that whether the island should declare independence should be decided 
unhurriedly through a referendum. By showing that his own history of agitation for a 
separate state was not to be feared, he intended to remove an impression that he was 
reckless toward cross-strait relations. He even held out an olive branch by discussing 
amicable ties across the Straits and maintaining constructive dialogue with the 
mainland.435 His foreign policy was born out of an assertion of Taiwan's status as a 
sovereign independent state and whose standpoint was to strive to obtain 
international recognition for such de facto sovereignty. Peng backed away from his 
earlier tough independence talk and Shih showed even greater moderation. The Party 
boss toned down the DPP's pro-independence position to reassure voters that the 
party would not provoke a dangerous confrontation with mainland China. He carried 
out a policy of grand reconciliation, seeking to resolve provincial differences 
between native Taiwanese and mainlanders for a reconciled Taiwan society, in an 
apparent attempt to win over voters with middle-of-the-road tactics. More positively, 
he tried to convince voters the DPP was a stabilising force because of its on-going 
moderate stance on cross-strait relations, suggesting that a DPP government would 
not take precipitate action. In an effort to dilute the independence issue, he 
emphasised the fact that the party's sound public policy would improve welfare 
service projects and provide social material benefits for Taiwanese. Peng's revised 
campaign theme and Shih's milder position had relaxed the formal independence 
stand and adjusted the party's mainland policy. 
The result of the presidential election on March 23 1996 gave Lee Teng-hui 54 
percent of the vote, a triumph but a slim majority of the total vote.436 Despite coming 
second to Lee, Peng Ming-min failed miserably picking up just 21 percent of the 
votes, which was far less than the DPP had hoped. Respectively, Lin Yang-kang and 
Chen Li-an received 14.9 percent and 10 percent. Raised here is a question: What is 
435 • Christie Su, "Lin and Chen Qualify for Ballot; Lee Opens Campaign Headquarters," The Free 
China Journal, January 26, 1996; Virginia Sheng, "Presidential Rivals in TV Forum Present 
Platforms to the Public," The Free China Journal, March I, 1996. 
161 
the implication of the outcome of the presidential elections for the balance of the 
political forces between pro-unification and pro-independence within the island? In 
reviewing the messages that voters delivered, scholars' perspectives offer several 
explanations. Some, such as John W. Garver, interpret Lee's and Peng's combined 
vote, 75 percent, as the will and wishes of Taiwanese to resist unification.437 
Meanwhile, others such as Sheng Lijun, consider that the 54 percent of the vote that 
Lee captured was not "necessarily indicating support for Taiwan independence", but 
an endorsement of his middle-of-the-road policy toward the mainland. Moreover, 
Lee's triumph was partly because of his denial of the pursuit of independence and his 
promise to eventually reunify and improve relations with mainland China.438 In view 
of Lee's campaign theme of eventual unification, his 54 percent of the vote plus 25 
percent that Lin and Chen gained could mean that 75 percent of the electors 
supported unification. Actually, neither pro-reunification nor pro-independence 
groups dominated the minds of most residents in the island. The results confirmed 
that three-fourths of the Taiwan people still favoured the status quo. More 
significant, Peng's setback underscored the antipathy and fear that many people still 
felt toward the DPP. The voters' message was a clear one, most Taiwan residents 
opposed Taiwanese sovereignty. This indicated that support for pro-independence 
forces was weak and the DPP's influence did not have much significance regarding 
the island's status. Another question raised for discussion is: How much did cross-
strait tensions, in particular, Beijing's military threats, influence voters? In terms of 
the effects of the PRC war games, whether it was effective in undermining voter 
confidence, the assessments are mixed.439 Indeed, on one hand, Beijing's efforts to 
scare those who originally wanted to vote Peng or Lee led to some second thoughts 
among voters. On the other hand, Beijing's missile tests, intended to influence 
Taiwanese voters, backfired, failing to prevent those who supported Peng or Lee 
from voting for their chosen candidates. This study suggests although the PRC 
436. For the outcome of the presidential elections, see Virginia Sheng, "Lee Sweeps to Victory in 
Presidential Poil," The Free China Journal, March 28, 1996. 
437 • John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle ,and 
London: University of Washington Press, 1997, p.l54. 
438 • Sheng Lijun, China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2001, p.I33. 
162 
military exercises affected the election, the election's result was basically decided by 
a trial of strength between the political forces of pro-unification and pro-
independence inside the island. 
3.4-3. Lee Teng-hui's Controversial Role in the Issue of Unification I 
Independence 
Analytical inquiries into the issue of Taiwan independence involve a question of 
whether Lee Teng-hui was an independence advocate. This directly relates to the 
justification of Beijing's belligerence against Taiwan during the period mid 1995 and 
early 1996, aimed at stopping Lee's pursuit of Taiwan independence. 
Beijing had an inconsistent view on Lee. Until before his visit to the US in June 
1995, the PRC leaders had little doubt about Lee's repeated statements that he 
favoured unification and rejected independence. Although Beijing was dissatisfied 
over what it considered a lack of positive response from Lee toward unification, it 
did not conclude that he had engaged in activities aimed at separating China. Jiang 
Zemin deemed Lee a partner with whom he could cooperate in negotiating on the 
reunification issue. 44o Shortly after Lee's visit to the US, Beijing criticised the visit 
and his delay of reunification, but did not yet accuse him of seeking independence. 441 
However, it seemed that when internal political contention arose about how to 
respond to Lee's US visit, Beijing fundamentally changed its view. Abruptly, it was 
decided that Lee was no longer a Taiwan leader it could trust or work with. Instead, 
439. You Ji, "Changing Leadership Consensus: The Domestic Context of War Games," in Suisheng 
Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis. New York 
and London: Routledge, 1999, p.92. 
440. In Jiang Zemin's new Taiwan policy announced in early 1995, called 'Jiang's eight proposals on 
Taiwan', he expressed his hope to meet with the Taiwan leader to "discuss state affairs, or exchange 
ideas on certain questions first." See Jiang Zemin, "Continue to Promote the Reunification of the 
Motherland," (U ¥~ ~, " 7g {JE itt t:§. ~ ~ ~"* ~ ErtJ % M rm ~I* ~ if 4," ) January 30, 1995, 
in the Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State 
Council ( "p ~ "P :k: is' 1~ I if 1]1 0 ~ / ~ -%- IlJt is' 1~ <$ :%- 1]1 0 ~ ), China's Taiwan issue ( rp /ll/ it t2! /fiJ JJj). Beijing: Jiuzhou Press (11 ¥3'f11!l ~ ill !liZ U), 1998, pp.231-235. 
441 . A leading Chinese expert on Taiwan, Li Jiaquan, ( * *,!Jt ) summarised Lee's mainland policy 
as follows: It integrated, but did not reunify, with mainland China, and separated but did not seek 
independence. It maintained one country, two equal political entities and sought a change in cross-
strait relations and Taiwan's status in the future adopting dilatory tactics. See an interview with three 
scholars in Beijing: "What Has Lee's US visit Brought About the PRC-US Relations?" (" * J1: ~ 
ijJ ~ ~ "P ~:* -* 111 * T 1+ ~ ?") Outlook Weekly ( T fIl), July 3,1995, p.24. 
163 
he became an anathema. Beijing asserted that his US trip illustrated that he really 
favoured independence, representing separatism in deeds despite supporting 
reunification in words.442 Subsequently, Beijing attacked Lee more sharply. In the 
fourth quarter of 1995, Chen Jian, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, blamed 
Lee for stirring up "separatist activities".443 As internal struggle appeared to have 
intensified over Taiwan policy issues, the PRC official media in early 1996 escalated 
their attacks accusing Lee of trying to push Taiwan toward independence.444 
Lee's US visit prompted Beijing to make a new assessment of him. According to 
Suisheng Zhao, "Beijing's adoption of the coercive strategy in 1995 was, to a great 
extent, due to the change in its appraisal of Lee Teng-hui." Beijing had viewed Lee's 
US trip, along with his diplomatic drives, as signs of his intention to betray his 
promise of eventual unification. 445 Unfortunately, Zhao's discourse has little to teach 
us about how and why this reassessment of Lee occurred. In particular, Zhao does 
not analyse or reveal what were the internal political processes in this reassessment. 
On the grounds that these questions are not clarified, this study suggests that we 
should investigate the background and processes of this major change in Beijing's 
view on Lee's stance toward the issue ofunificationlindependence. It appears that a 
more profound cause could be found in the internal politics of Beijing. 
Was Lee a "Taiwan independence" protagonist? Did he promote the 
independence movement? Did he intend to lead Taiwanese to found an independent 
sovereign state, the republic of Taiwan? These are very complex and controversial 
questions, which have to be clarified. 
Lee has repeatedly denied such allegations. According to Lee himself, he has 
never promoted Taiwan independence. While strongly refuting accusations brought 
against him, he even frequently justified his objection to independence in the mid-
442. Ling Yunhe, "U Denghui's Footprints on the Road of Taiwan Independence," (7Jj( ~ t% , " '* 5{;f 
*~ tE 15 Ml Z ~ -.t B9 ,@ ~, ") Outlook Weekly ( 7 JH), August 7,1995, pp.9-1O. 
443 • "News Briefing by Chinese Foreign Ministry," Beijing Review, November 6-12, 1995, p.24. 
444. Wang Yu, "Where Did Lee Deng Hui Intend to Guide Taiwanese Popular Will to Head for?" (:£ 
3i, "* 5{;f ~ ~ 1E. 15 rl1!J ~ "1t '31 rPJ 1fiJ Jr?") Outlook Weekly ( 7 JH), February 12,1996, 
pp.26-27. 
445 • Suisheng Zhao, "Changing Leadership Perceptions: The Adoption of a Coercive Strategy," in 
Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis. 
New York and London: Routledge, 1999, pp.107-113. 
1990s.446 In repeated statements, he spoke of anti-independence 126 times by 
November 1995.447 Since stepping down from the presidency, he has continued 
denying the allegations of his pursuit of Taiwan independence.448 
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Although it seemed that Lee's efforts to carry out political reform and 
democratisation were perceived as a threat to the Chinese Communist regime, 
Beijing made few remarks on his intentions in conducting these political activities. 
However, after his visit to the US in June 1995, the harsh criticism from mainland 
China aimed at him became increasingly intense. Lee was accused of using the 
democratisation of Taiwan to fabricate independence. Beijing perceived his 
constitutional, parliamentary and electoral reforms and, in particular, direct 
presidential elections, together with pragmatic diplomacy as three major moves 
toward a Taiwanese statehood.449 These fierce criticisms appeared to result from 
internal political manoeuvring. In Sheng Lijun's opinion, it was Lee's US visit that 
changed Beijing's view on his political reconstruction. Meanwhile, Sheng believes 
that the visit "intensified the internal strife within the Chinese leadership, which 
could ill afford to appear weak on the Taiwan issue".45o 
Undeniably, Lee was an active promoter of Taiwanese identity,451 yet he had not 
become an advocator of Taiwan independence during 1995 and early 1996. In this 
period, he actually adopted a centrist line in trying to tackle the thorny issue of the 
status of Taiwan. As the first Taiwan-born ROC president, he had strong Taiwanese 
446. In November 1994, Lee "openly denied an accusation" "that he is pursuing Taiwan independence, 
noting that whoever spread such a rumor must be involved in some 'political conspiracy'." See Susan 
Yu, "Lee Denies He Has Independence Plan," The Free China Journal, November 25, 1994. Also 
see Ruan Ming, National Reunification: Project of Lasting Importance ( IDt ~, jllj J¥ .tit - If 1p -* 
it)· Taipei: The Rice Field Publishing Ltd. ( T@ E8 tf:J JlR ~ ~ 0- if] ), 1996, p.7. 
447. See Bi Yun He, "Who Did 'Defame' Lee Deng Hui?" (~ .zr i% ' ";Ii!: it ~ '$ ~ ~ '1* JW,' ?" 
) Outlook Weekly ( T f/l), November 27, 1995, p.34. 
448 • Lee declared that he "has never pushed for Taiwan independence" despite disagreeing "with 
mainland China's idea of unification". See Jay Chen and Fang Wen-hung, "Former ROC President 
'Never Pushed for Independence' ," CNA, October 3, 2000. 
449. Ling Yunhe, "A Comment on Li Denghui's Constitutional Reform That Was Packed Up With the 
Taiwan Independence Line," (j~ .zr i%, "if '$ ~ ~ , * ~ B)( 1¥ ' '§ ~ r a'tJ ' is' 5.!1l. ' N* AA , ") 
Outlook Weekly ( T f/l), January 1,1996, p.3l. 
450 • See Sheng Lijun, China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2001, pp.1 06-107. 
451 • For an overview of Taiwan identity and Taiwanese nationalism, see Yi-chueh Day, Nationalism 
and Democracy: Taiwanese Nationalism and Taiwan's Democratization-A thesis submitted in 
fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Political Science in the University 
of Canterbury. 1999; Alan M. Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization. Armonk, 
N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994. 
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awareness and championed Taiwanese rule of Taiwan. His appeal to local identity 
demonstrated his support of greater Taiwanese autonomy. With his sense of a self-
governing Taiwan, he wanted Taiwanese be the master of their homes. However, 
localisation, identity and political autonomy are not equivalent to Taiwan 
independence. The heart of the matter of these notions is that Taiwan should be 
governed by Taiwanese. This is in line with the PRC policy toward Taiwan, of 
which the kernel is the "one country, two systems" formula. The formula was further 
elaborated in Jiang Zemin's eight-point Taiwan policy. It permitted Taiwan residents 
to run their own affairs after reunification with the Chinese mainland. In particular, 
it pledged that Taiwan would exercise an extraordinarily high degree of local 
autonomy that would be distinguished from other provinces and regions of mainland 
China. Taiwan would have its own administrative power and "independent judicial 
power, including that of final adjudication", even a military prerogative to keep its 
forces. 452 Before mid-1995, Beijing had no objection to Lee's quest for full political 
autonomy for Taiwan. However, hereafter, Beijing changed its view on his pursuit 
of autonomous rule. It labelled Lee's moves in seeking political localisation and 
self-government of Taiwan and Taiwanese interests as marching for Taiwan's 
independence.453 
Great efforts had been made to conduct "Taiwanisation" of the island since Lee 
came into office. Meanwhile, he also identified himself as being first of all 
Chinese.454 Although in favour oflocalism, he had never called for Taiwan's 
independence. This demonstrated that his Taiwanese awareness and continuation of 
carrying on Chiang Ching-kuo' s initiative of "Taiwanisation" did not necessarily 
equate to a quest for a Taiwanese sovereign state. On the contrary, he reiterated his 
452. Jiang Zemin, "Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland," ( u ¥~ ~ , " ]g 1JE Jtt 
ti3. 00 ~ - *- Jt 89 7'G ~ ffiJ gl* ~ 1i 4- ," ) January 30, 1995, in The Taiwan Work Office of the 
CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council ( * ;tt: * ;9(: 1'5' ?~ I 
iF 1], 0 ~! 1!13} I!1G 1§' ?~ $ 3} 1], 0 ~), China's Taiwan Issue ( l' !lfI f1 it! jJ:Jj Iff)· Beijing: 
Jiuzhou Press ( fL ~'H I!I 45 I±l JlR t± ), 1998, p.232. 
453 • Ling Yunhe, "A Comment on Li Denghui's Constitutional Reform That Was Packed Up With the 
Taiwan Independence Line," ( l3i: ~ i% ' " if ::$ 1f: ~ , * il& r& $ , ~ ~ T 8"J ' 1§' 3!R ' N! ~ , " ) 
Outlook Weekly ( 7 f1l), January 1,1996, p.31; Yang Yunhu, "The Comment and Analysis on 
Taiwan Leaders' Recent Statements," ( 1% ill m '" 1'5' ?~ @1 ~ Aili :itA ~ it if tff ' " ) Outlook 
Weekly ( 7 f1l), June 24,1996, p,31. 
454 . Robert Irick, "Lee's Pragmatism at work in Mainland Relations Talk," The Free China Journal, 
April 21, 1995. 
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position on eventual unification.455 Since coming into office in early 1988, he had 
consistently supported unification. The KMT's basic policy was to fulfil national 
unification and the ROC constitution prohibited the separation of China. His 
capacity as party chief and state president meant that he had to maintain his stand 
promoting unification. In terms of China's unification, he promoted the 
establishment of the National Unification Council and the formulation of the 
Guidelines for National Unification. The Guidelines upheld the 'One China' 
principle stipulating peaceful and democratic unification as the ultimate goal and 
mapping out a three-stage development towards achieving unification.456 Despite his 
numerous reaffirmations of commitment to China's unification, the PRC official 
media alleged that Lee had embarked on a conspiracy, behaving as if he was 
supporting reunification but covertly agitating for Taiwan independence following 
his visit to the US.457 
Some scholars hold the view that Lee did not promote the Taiwan independence 
movement during 1995 and early 1996. For example, American political scientist 
John F. Copper does not believe that before 1996 Lee led Taiwan to detach from 
mainland China and disagrees with Beijing's allegation that Lee was a supporter of 
Taiwan independence.458 To be sure, Lee might have indirectly encouraged 
Taiwanese self-determination aspirations. However, this does not justify Beijing's 
charge that Lee had a secret agenda to further Taiwan's independence during 1995 
and early 1996. The nub of the question is that since Beijing had already seen 
through Lee's plots, why did it continue to view him as a Taiwan leader who could 
be trusted and worked with on the reunification issue as late as early 1995? Another 
key point is that since Beijing had been convinced he really favoured independence 
in mid 1995, how did it explain the abrupt shift in its responses to Lee's US visit 
from moderation to belligerence? In any case, there has been no conclusive evidence 
455. Lee vowed solemnly that China would be bound to reunify. See Bi Yun He, "Who Did 'Defame' 
Lee Deng Hui?" (~-'i; ~, ";\i!: it ~ * 1! *f 'J;K~' ?") Outlook Weekly ( T Jil), November 27, 
1995, p.34. 
456 • Yu Ke, "Will It Be Overcast Or Fine Over the Taiwan Strait After March?" ( ~ TPJ ' " = }§ J1 J§ 
~ I!R :if ;\i!: " ? " ) The Perspective ( JI.i :It 1&) , No.31 0, April 1996, p.1S; "Guidelines for National 
Unification, adopted by the National Unification Council on February 23, 1991, and by the Executive 
Yuan Council on March 14, 1991," Free China Review, Vo1.41, No.9, September 1991, p.44. 
457. "Lee's Cornell Speech Rapped on Chinese Press," Beijing Review, August 14-20,1995, p.12. 
458. John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? Boulder, Colorado and Oxford: Westview 
Press, 1996, p.46. 
167 
or information showing that he had conspired to promote Taiwan as a sovereign state 
independent of China during 1995 and early 1996. Therefore, Beijing's opinion of 
the use of the military to smash Lee's conspiracy to carry out independence was 
unconvincing. 
3.4-4. The Domestic Conditions for Taiwan independence 
Restricted by various kinds of deterrence, including international restraints, there 
was no possibility of a declaration of Taiwan independence during 1995 and early 
1996.459 In terms of domestic conditions, the popular will demonstrated that most 
residents wanted to maintain the status quo rather than change the island's legal 
status. Any declaration of independence by way of constitutional change would gain 
little public support. According to the law of the land, an action promoting de jure 
independence remained illegal despite democratisation. Although anyone advocating 
independence no longer faced charges of subversion, they were bound to obey the 
ROC Constitution, based on the principle of 'One China', not a Taiwanese republic. 
The China-unifiers retained legitimacy and pro-unification elements in Taiwan 
predominated over separatists. It was unlikely the pro-independence forces would 
make much progress in the short term as anti-independence political forces were still 
strong. This indicated that the pro-independence DPP would find it impossible to 
gain power in the mid-1990s. Although it seemed that the Taiwan independence 
momentum was gaining, the advocators for separatism found it increasingly difficult 
to declare independence. Fundamentally, the political strength of separatist forces in 
the island lacked the adequate political capital to agitate for Taiwan independence 
during 1995 and early 1996. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the Taiwan 
independence movement's focus was clear and definite: the founding a sovereign 
independent Taiwanese state. However, due to mounting pressure from within the 
island and from the international community, in the mid-1990s its advocacy of de 
jure independence was becoming increasingly modest. Instead, it emphasised the 
459. For an overview of the Taiwan independence movement, in particular, an analysis of its 
impossibility in the mid-1990s, see Hsin-hsing Wu, Bridging the Strait: Taiwan, China, and the 
Prospects/or Reunification. Hong Kong; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp.226-246. 
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dignity of people as well as Taiwan's actual state as a sovereign nation.460 Even 
some DPP leaders realised formal independence might be nothing but wishful 
thinking and moderated their position, turning to a more realistic view on the future 
of Taiwan's status. Thus, the political situation within the island demonstrated that 
there was no possibility of Taiwanese statehood. To be sure, Taipei showed its 
political centrifugal tendencies and took some steps to distance itself from mainland 
China. However, the ROC government had no plan to found another sovereign state 
by splitting from China or by changing its national title into the republic of Taiwan 
despite 45 years of de facto independent rule. Although Beijing viewed Lee Teng-
hui's US visit as a major move in pursuing Taiwan independence, in fact, Taipei did 
not take extreme steps towards independence. The visit was, at worst, a diplomatic 
incident. 
Therefore, Taiwan independence was an issue, but it was far from imminent. 
There was no serious threat of a declaration of independence by Taiwan. Even some 
people inside PRC political circles formed a judgement from analyses of the political 
situation in Taiwan that there was no danger of independence for Taiwan despite 
looking out. For example, Wang Daohan, a principal advisor to Jiang Zeming on 
Taiwan policy, acknowledged that Taiwan independence had not taken shape in the 
administration of Lee Teng-hui despite his intentions.461 Because there was neither a 
scheme to create a new country in Taipei nor a chance for the island to realise de jure 
independence during 1995 and early 1996, Beijing's perception that Taiwan 
independence was approaching was more an argument serving internal political 
contention than an objective judgement of Taiwan's political situation. 
460. Shelly Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Votingfor Democracy. London; New York: Routledge, 1999, 
p.l60. 
461 . See Luo Bing, "Communist China's Policy toward Taiwan Will Loosen," ( ~ 17]( , " r:p ;:It Mil' 
lI& ~ tU ' ;fit $J , , ") Cheng Ming Monthly (1ft- mg), No.223, May 1996, p.9. 
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Chapter Four 
The Structure and Process of 
PRC Policy toward Taiwan 
4.1. The Party-Government Decision Making System 
Kenneth Lieberthal, Michel Oksenberg and David M. Lampton offer a 
comprehensive analysis of the characteristics of the PRC political system and 
decision-making framework. They provide a fragmented authoritarian model for the 
PRC structure and process of policy formulation.462 On one hand, it is a centralised 
and authoritarian regime. On the other, it is fragmented and disjointed below the 
highest levels of power. In fact, the political system and decision-making framework 
are fractionated into a formal institutional structure and fragments that provide 
conditions for informal political networks and activities. Also, there is an 
institutional potentiality for the power struggles at the leadership level. Therefore, 
fragmentations lead to conflict within the political system and make the policy 
structure disjunctive and the policy process diffuse and cumbersome. 
462. Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (eds), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making 
in Post-Mao China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, pp.5-12; Kenneth Lieberthal and 
Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Process. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988, pp.137, 151; David M. Lampton (ed.), Policy 
Implementation in Post-Mao China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987, p.4. However, 
Michel Oksenberg revises his viewpoint, suggesting "an eclectic set of three types of institutions". 
See Michel Oksenberg, "China's Political System: Challenges of the Twenty-First Century," The 
China Journal, No.45, January 2001, pp.21-35. On the characteristics of the PRC leadership system 
and policy decision-making, also see Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao (eds), Decision-Making in 
Deng's China: Perspectivesji'om Insiders. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, pp.xxv-xli. 
170 
Under such circumstances in the early and mid 1990s, PRC Taiwan policy-
making was a complex combination of both the multiple frameworks of divergent 
departments and the manifold-fields of politics, the economy, the military and 
diplomacy. These circumstances made it potentially easy to divide and rule, to 
manipulate and exploit and to establish and defend power bases for rivalries in the 
power struggle. More conspicuous, amid the supreme leadership succession, the 
Taiwan policy-making structure and process involved noninstitutional elements, 
informal political networks mainly interpersonal relationships and leaders' personal 
political intentions, as well as the institutional elements working simultaneously. 
How to view and understand the nature of the so-called party-state decision-
making system is very important. Because leaders are not strictly ruled and limited 
by the law and the Communist Party has not been supervised or balanced by other 
political forces outside itself, functions of the polity and operations of the state 
machine often occur in an informal fashion. 463 In this sense, the political system and 
decision-making of Leninist states makes it impossible to achieve all-round 
institutionalisation.464 Beyond this, the PRe political system and general framework 
of policy formulation are both party and government in one. A confusion of 
responsibility between the party and the government, where governmental function is 
replaced by the party, can often be seen in the PRe Taiwan policy-making system. 
For example, the PRe leadership has maintained a dual, identical party and state 
463 . According to Andrew J. Nathan, the PRC has "one of the most secretive political systems in the 
world". "The Communist Party's Politburo Standing Committee is the highest organ of formal 
political power in China, despite constitutional provisions that legally give that role to the National 
People's Congress". See Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link (eds) ( compiled by Zhang Liang), The 
Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership's Decision to Use Force Against Their Own People. 
New York: PublicAffairs, 2001, pp.xv-xvii. 
464. According to Andrew 1. Nathan, "in the Chinese system there are no horizontal organs-courts or 
legislatures-with institutionalized powers to resolve deadlocks". See Andrew 1. Nathan and Perry 
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Taiwan policy-making system as the working institution for Taiwan affairs since 
1991. The Taiwan Affairs Office consists of the same people, yet is simultaneously 
under both the central authorities of the Communist Party of China ( CPC ) and the 
Chinese government.465 The party-state integration in Taiwan policy-making 
potentially brings in noninstitutional elements, causing problems in mechanism, 
course and outcome. 
The PRC organs of political power are reputed to be six big leading groups. They 
are The National People's Congress' Standing Committee (NPCSC ); The Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference' Standing Committee ( CPPCCSC ); The 
Central Committee of the CPC; The Presidency; The State Council; The Central 
Military Commission ( CMC). It is necessary to examine the function and status of 
these six big leading groups in order to establish which are the most authoritative 
organs. 
Although the NPCSC and CPPCCSC are largely rubber stamp organisations, they 
made efforts to increase their power from the mid-1980s onwards. However, in 
1995-96, they still played a minor role in making decisions on Taiwan. This 
notwithstanding, the NPCSC did some research work and conducted some legislative 
activity relating to Taiwan. For example, in 1979, it published a message to Taiwan 
compatriots proposing to end the military confrontation and make contacts and 
exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.466 In 1981, the chairman of 
Link (eds) (compiled by Zhang Liang), The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership's Decision 
to Use Force Against Their Own People. New York: PublicAffairs, 2001, p.xxxii. 
465 . The Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of The 
State Council ( 'P ~ 'P :5k: -§1 ?'i!J I iF 1], 0 ~ / I!l 9} ~ E! ?'i!J ¥ 9} 1], 0 ~ ), China's Taiwan 
Issue ( l' /ltI tit If IE) Ill)· Beijing: Jiuzhou Press (fL V+11m ~ ill JlR t±), 1998, p.I78. 
466. "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan by the National People's Congress' Standing Committee," 
(" 1: @g A * m ~ ~ * -§1 ?'i!J A ~ ~ , ") January 1, 1979, in The Taiwan Work Office of the 
CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council ( 'P ~ 'P ::k: is' l'i!J I 
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NPCSC, Ye Jianying, put forward a nine-point proposal for the peaceful reunification 
of China.467 To a great extent, this was due to Ye' s prestige in both the party and the 
country, as well as his interpersonal relations with Taiwan politicians. In 1994, an 
act was endorsed by the NPCSC, aiming at protecting the interests and rights of 
Taiwanese businessmen and encouraging their investment on the mainland, as well 
as improving economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait.468 Some preparatory 
work for legislation relating to reunification with Taiwan had also been engaged in 
despite the prospect that reunification would only occur in the remote future. Thus 
the drafting of the Taiwan Basic Law had begun. A bill had been patterned after the 
Hong Kong Basic Law in light of the "one country, two systems" formula although it 
carried some distinct, and important, articles. One such ex~mple was that regarding 
the assertion that Taiwan would retain its armed forces after reunifying.469 
The CPPCCSC, a political advisory body with no real power, plays a smaller and 
less important role in decision-making on Taiwan. Together with the NPCSC, it 
publishes statements to support the party's line, as well as guiding principles urging 
the Taiwan authorities to accept the CPC and PRC stances on Taiwan. Nevertheless, 
these Taiwan affairs in which both the NPCSC and CPPCCSC are engaged are 
undertaken according to the party's instructions. 
11' 1;, 0- ~ / ~ -%- IlJt ~ rW? ;$ -%- 1;, 0- ~), China's Taiwan Issue ( if! @ it if /li) j}Jj). Beijing: 
liuzhou Press ( 11 V+I 00 ~ ill JtlR ~± ), 1998, pp.226-228. 
467 . "Ye lianying's Interview with Xinhua Correspondent," ( " ot J'fr!j ~ rtJ ¥IT 1# ~± i2 ~ 'ii:. *- 89 
i~ i~, ") September 30, 1981, in The Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and The 
Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council ( q:t ;It q:t :Ek: -a- rW? I 11' 1;, 0- ~ / 00 -%- IlJt ~ rW? ¥ -%-
1;, 0- ~ ), China's Taiwan Issue ( l' @ it if //ff j}Jj). Beijing: liuzhou Press (11 1HI 00 ~ ill JtlR 
~±), 1998, pp.229-230. 
468. "Law Stands Surety for Taiwan Investors," Beijing Review, Mach 28-April 3, 1994, p.7. 
469. Chen lingxin, "U liaquan: Beijing Has Made a Draft of the Taiwan Basic Law," ( Il* % ffJT ' " ::$ 
~ 7'R : ~t g B ~ ~ rW? ~ * Wi. ~ ~, ") United Daily News ( J{jt tJ- B jli), October 19, 1996, 
p.l. 
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In contrast to the largely powerless NPCSC and CPPCCSC, the CPC Central 
Committee, the State Council and the Central Military Commission ( CMC ) have 
real power. In the PRC, the party, the government and the military are the real 
decision-making institutions. The State Council is the PRC governmental cabinet. 
However, it is under the party's leadership and its many subordinate ministries are 
directly commanded by the CPC Central Committee. The general secretary of the 
CPC Central Committee or a powerful Politburo member is usually concurrently 
both the state president and the chairman of CMC. 
The party controls all state power, be it political, diplomatic, economic, judicial 
and military. In theory, the National Party Congress is the supreme organ of power 
and the Central Committee exercises that power, representing the National Party 
Congress when the latter is not in session. But the real supreme organ of power is 
the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and its subordinate Central 
Secretariat. The positions of central secretaries are usually held by the members of 
the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee. The Political Bureau meets, but 
some of its members permanently reside outside Beijing because they are the party 
secretaries of major cities and key provinces. Both the Politburo Standing 
Committee and the Central Secretariat are at the heart of the power structure, 
governing party affairs, ruling the state and formulating domestic and foreign policy. 
They divide up the work and share the responsibilities. The Politburo Standing 
Committee makes the most important policy decisions, while the Central Secretariat 
handles routine affairs. Usually, a policy is drafted by the Central Secretariat and is 
then submitted to the Politburo Standing Committee. The members of the Politburo 
Standing Committee, especially the general secretary, who is in charge of these two 
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powerful highest organs of authority and presides over their meetings, have the final 
say. Doubtless, since the party makes all key decisions through the party's 
leadership apparatus, the formulation ofPRC policy towards Taiwan is made in the 
Politburo Standing Committee and the Central Secretariat. 
There are two important issues for consideration, the leadership system and policy 
mechanism. The school of institutional outcome represented by You Ji highlights 
collective leadership within Jiang Zemin's administration. It suggests that collective 
leadership had become the defining factor of the polity during the early and mid 
1990s and the party-state's major policy-making had to be approved by that 
leadership mechanism.470 However, this study seeks to interpret collective leadership 
from a perspective of informal and succession politics. Collective leadership is only 
a provisional or short-term arrangement.471 When a successor consolidates his status, 
grasping more personal power, a new oligarch will emerge from the collective 
leadership and develop into a new dictatorial ruler. In any case, collective leadership 
that is based on weak successor status is derived from succession politics rather than 
democratic politics. Fundamentally, collective leadership scarcely alters the existing 
political system. 
In theory, collective leadership is established on the basis of coalitions of major 
political players. There is a power balance between top leaders with different 
470. See You Ji, "Changing Leadership Consensus: The Domestic Context of War Games," in 
Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis. 
New York and London: Routledge, 1999; You Ji, "Missile Diplomacy and PRC Domestic Politics," in 
Greg Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan's Future: Innovations in Politics and Military 
Power. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian 
Studies, Australian National University, 1997. 
471 . Lucian W. Pye and Tang Tsou consider that collective leadership is not a substantive system but 
"a transitional phase". See Lucian W. Pye, "Factions and the Politics of Guanxi: Paradoxes in 
Chinese Administrative and Political Behaviour," The China Journal, No.34, July 1995, p.38; Tang 
Tsou, "Chinese Politics at the Top: Factionalism or Informal Politics? Balance-of-Power Politics or a 
Game to Win All?" The China Journal, No.34, July 1995, p.107. 
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political alliances. One might look to this power balance as comparable to 
democratic decision-making with elite pluralism. Yet, in practice, collective 
leadership is a gloss despite being advertised as a norm. Such a system almost never 
really operated in the era of Mao Zedong. In the era of Deng Xiaoping, although he 
consulted several elder statesmen on occasion as well as political rivals such as Hua 
Guofeng for a time, there was no real collective leadership system.472 In the PRC, 
collective leadership only flourishes when there is no clear, omnipotent leader. 
Weak leadership, where the successor lacks personal authority, is a prerequisite for 
collective leadership. Due to the unstable successors' status in the leadership 
transition and the uncertainty surrounding succession battles, a collective leadership 
system was introduced during the power transition from Deng to Jiang. Considering 
Jiang's weak and vulnerable successor position, Deng designed the collective 
leadership system for Jiang's administration, under which Jiang had to share power 
with other members of the leading body, including his political rivals. 
Because Deng placed the restrictions of collective leadership on Jiang, he lacked 
personal authority. Outwardly, during 1995 and 1996 he had consolidated his status 
as Deng's successor. Yet, Jiang did not fully gain the reins of power until early 
1997, when Deng died. At a time of ongoing leadership transition, Jiang's leadership 
remained open to challenge. Most unfavourably, the contenders for the leadership 
succession bided their time to take advantage of Jiang's potentially unstable 
472 . Parris Chang believes that there were some conditions, mainly Deng's "relative lack of power", 
that allowed an evolution toward collective leadership in the era of Deng Xiaoping. Meanwhile, 
Lowell Dittmer considers that Deng endorsed "a more collective arrangement" for two years in the 
late 1970s but this was because the leadership was in the succession process. See Lowell Dittmer, 
"Patterns of Elite Strife and Succession in Chinese Politics," The China Quarterly, No.123, 
September 1990, ppA05-408. In addition, Yan Jiaqi believes that Deng and several veteran 
communists formed a collective leadership in the early 1980s but before long it "evolved into 
dictatorship by Deng". See Yan Jiaqi, "The Nature of Chinese Authoritarianism," in Carol Lee 
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successor position and attack him. In competing with him, they effectively took 
advantage of collective leadership to pressure and balance him. Jiang had to use 
political caution, accommodation and consensus-building to even achieve 
compromises and concessions. 
PRC policy decision-making has been noted for its consensus-building. However, 
the evaluations and explanations of this by Chinese politics scholars differ.473 This 
study seeks to explain consensus-building along with informal and succession 
politics. Under informal political conditions, policymaking is, from time to time, 
blocked by factional rivalry and the leadership succession struggle. When frictions 
arise, opposing factions and rival leaders make it difficult for their counterpmis to act 
in a conciliatory fashion and reach mutually acceptable policies. With the 
accommodation of divergent views on issues in policy debate, consensus-building 
may mediate the impasse between factions to relieve the threat ofpolicy-hijacking. 
In reaching a consensus, the compromise proposals must be consented to by the 
various factions involved in political deal making. If a consensus is reached, the 
policy process proceeds will flow and decisions will be made. 
In particular, consensus-building is largely employed in policy decision-making in 
the leadership succession process. During transitions of power, the leadership 
Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao (eds), Decision-Making in Deng's China: Perspectives from Insiders. 
Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, p.5. 
473 • The literature on the fragmented authoritarian model gives an appraisal of consensus-building. 
See Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and 
Process. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988, pp.23-24; David M. Lampton 
(ed.), Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987, 
pp.18, 169-170. With a comparison of the Maoist period and the Dengist period, Frederick C. Teiwes 
makes a higher assessment of consensus-building in the Dengist period despite acknowledging 
Deng's still-authoritarian nature. He views consensus-building as "consensual politics" from the 
perspective of "a cultural proclivity". See Frederick C. Teiwes, "The Paradoxical Post-Mao 
Transition: From Obeying the Leader to 'Normal Politics," The China Journal, No.34, July 1995, 
pp.60-62,89-9l. You Ji thinks better of "consensual politics" under Jiang Zemin's leadership from 
1989 to 1995. See You Ji, "Jiang Zemin: In Quest ofPost-Deng Supremacy," in Maurice Brosseau, 
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succession factional struggle is fierce, giving rise to considerable policy disputes 
over domestic matters and foreign affairs. For example, Lee Teng-hui's US visit in 
1995 became a major issue dividing leaders who represented different factions. 
Under such circumstances, wars of words take place, accusations fly, positions 
harden, tensions mount, and policy decision-making is blocked. This forces policy 
organisations to search out a solution to policy obstruction. Compromises become 
necessary for the maintenance of factional balance. Leaders have to look for 
adjustments and compromises that can accommodate various factions and cobble 
together support for any major policy decision. In achieving a balance between 
different factions, they have to agree to a mutually acceptable form of decisions that 
allows differences to be resolved. Unless a balance between different factions is 
achieved, or one faction makes a major concession to another, no major decision will 
be made. Thus consensus-building emerges in response to the needs of mediating 
factional rivalry. 
On some occasions, especially where the vital interests of various factions are not 
involved, a consensus can be reached. Nevertheless, when various factions have a 
major stake in critical developments, consensus-building often ceases to function. 
It needs to be pointed out emphatically that consensus is built largely behind the 
scenes, in irregular processes through which private deals are made. The policy 
decision-making course becomes a process of bargaining, in which leaders seek to 
secure their power and preserve political benefit while complying with some 
factions' demands. Thus, consensus-building under collective leadership does not 
necessarily improve on policy decision-making. On the contrary, it is likely to 
Suzanne Pepper and Tsang Shu-ki (eds), China Review 1996. Hong Kong: The Chinese University 
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engender more problems in policy timing and quality because of the informal 
political factors, especially resulting from the leadership succession struggle. 
Leadership cleavages and deep divisions on major policy issues amid the succession 
struggle may be postponed or temporarily mediated but they cannot be completely 
settled. More negotiations for compromise have to be undertaken to limit renewed 
conflict. A host of internal pressures force leaders to rely more on factional support 
in the succession struggle. This makes the policy structure more complicated and the 
policy process more diffuse. In reaching a consensus, leaders spend much more time 
bargaining and may fail to respond promptly to major policy issues. Even policy-
hijacking can occur unless one side submits to pressure or the other side makes a 
. . 
maJ or conceSSIOn. 
In the case of the 1995-96 Taiwan crisis, it seemed that the leaders of Beijing 
tried, but failed, to solve disagreement among competing factions over how to handle 
the issue of impeded Taiwan policy-making. However, You Ji argues, by reason of 
the institutional collective leadership, consensus-building played a decisive role in 
shaping the PRe policy toward Taiwan, in particular, Beijing's decision-making on 
events in the Taiwan Strait during 1995 and 1996. This study will examine this 
matter in depth.474 
4.2. The Central Leadership Small Groups and the Taiwan 
Policy-Making System 
Press, 1996, pp.1-27. 
474. You Ji, "Changing Leadership Consensus: The Domestic Context of War Games," in Suisheng 
Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis. New York 
and London: Routledge, 1999, pp.77-97. 
, 
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The Politburo Standing Committee and the Central Secretariat are the highest of 
the policy-making bodies because they are the real force at the core of in the PRC 
state power structure. However, although these two top organs of power are in 
charge of general policy decision making, it is impossible to specifically formulate 
policies for all. Therefore, almost everyone of the most important policy areas is 
assigned to a leading small group. 
The central leadership small groups are the party-state's highest policy-making 
bodies in these major areas. Taiwan is regarded as such an important policy area. 
Thus the Central Taiwan Work Leading Group ( CTWLG ) was established to 
supervise Taiwan affairs and policy. The other areas include foreign policy, finance 
and economics, party organisation and personnel and ideology and propaganda. The 
members of the Political Bureau or its Standing Committee and the Central 
Secretariat act as the group heads. In the mid-1990s, Jiang Zemin headed the two 
groups, Taiwan and finance and economics while Premier Li Peng assumed the top 
position in the leading group on foreign policy.475 Li was a contestant for the 
succession to Deng Xiaoping. He played second fiddle, ranking behind only Jiang 
and was concurrently a powerful Member of the Politburo Standing Committee. 
Qiao Shi was the third ranking leader in the party. At that time, Qiao was a member 
475 • There have been about six standing Central Leading Groups ( CLG ) altogether since the late 
1970s. Among them the central leading group for Taiwan affairs has maintained its place. These six 
groups are as follows. The Diplomatic Affairs CLG ( It is evolved from the Foreign Affairs CLG ); 
The Economic Reform CLG ( It is evolved from the Finance and Economics CLG ); The Organisation 
and Personnel CLG; The Propaganda and Ideology CLG; The Guiding Principle and Policy CLG; The 
Taiwan Work CLG. Luo Bing, "Li Peng Seized Personnel Power," (~ i7.K, "*~<;'f1~A$::kifJ, ") 
The Trend Magazine ( ij/; f/iJ), No.199, September 1999, pp.7-8; Chen Te-sheng, "Mainland China's 
Taiwan Affairs Organizations and Personnel," Issues & Studies, Vo1.30, No.7, July 1994, p.47. For 
Li's headship of the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Group, see You Ji, "Missile Diplomacy and PRC 
Domestic Politics," in Greg Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan's Future: Innovations in 
180 
of the CPC Politburo Standing Committee, secretary of the CPC Central Political and 
Legal Affairs Commission and Speaker of the PRC parliament. He was believed to 
be a formidable rival in the competition for leadership succession. These two areas, 
Li's supervision of foreign affairs and Qiao' s supervision of legal and security 
matters, closely related to Taiwan affairs and policy. Thereby these two contenders 
could exploit their oversight ofthose fields to balance Jiang on the Taiwan issue and 
compete for the right of succession. 
The duty of the leading small group is to form a guiding principle and principal 
policy goals in a specific field. 476 The group's activities are almost never reported in 
the media.477 Their policy decision-making establishes the destiny of the nation and 
has an important bearing on the well-being of the Chinese people, but their 
organisations, functions, establishments and operations have not lawful base. To a 
great extent, these groups replace the parliamentary and governmental functions. 
This potentially disturbs the polity and institutions that the party itself has 
established. 
How are the functions and authorities divided between the Politburo Standing 
Committee, the Central Secretariat, and the central leading small groups? Both the 
Central Secretariat and the central leading small groups work under the leadership of 
the Politburo Standing Committee. There is a division of power between these three 
leading organs, but the Politburo Standing Committee, the most authoritative organ, 
Politics and Military Power. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of 
Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997, pAO. 
476. Regarding the functions of the leading small group, see Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao 
(eds), Decision-Making in Deng's China: Perspectives/rom Insiders. Armonk, New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1995, p.xivii. 
477 • According to Chen Te-sheng, on a few occasions the PRC media reported the existence of the 
central leadership small groups and the Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs. See Chen Te-
sheng, "Mainland China's Taiwan Affairs Organizations and Personnel," Issues & Studies, Vo1.30, 
No.7, July 1994, ppA5-47. 
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makes the final decisions. The Central Secretariat is responsible for formulating 
general policy but must report to the Politburo Standing Committee. The central 
leading small groups are in charge of specific major policy areas and are also 
responsible to the Politburo Standing Committee instead of a single leader. Although 
the members of the central leading small groups including their heads are political 
heavyweights, in theory they are under the leadership of the Politburo Standing 
Committee. Only when authorised by the Committee could they make major policy 
decisions.478 For example, when handling the major Taiwan issues, the CTWLG is 
not able to act independently but has to report and submit its proposals to the 
Politburo Standing Committee.479 However, in practice, the relationship between 
these two organs is very complicated and their interactions are largely affected by the 
different political situations and internal political factors. 
The above exposition has charted the formal organisations of the PRC party and 
state regarding general decision-making bodies, as well as policymaking procedures 
at the highest level. The Taiwan policy-making system works in this context with 
the direct policy-making framework for Taiwan mainly constituted by the Central 
Taiwan Work Leading Group and the Taiwan Affairs Office. In addition, there is the 
Association of Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). Some officials of the 
478 • For the working relationship between the central leading small groups, the Central Secretariat and 
the Politburo Standing Committee, see Greg Austin, China's Ocean Frontier: International Law, 
Military and National Development. st. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin in association 
with the Department of International Relations and the Northeast Asia Program, Research School of 
Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, 1998, pp.229-231; Ruan 
Ming, "The Evolution of the Central Secretariat and Its Authority," in Carol Lee Hamrin and 
Suisheng Zhao (eds), Decision-Making in Deng's China: Perspectives from Insiders. Armonk, New 
York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, pp.l5-23. 
479. For the working relationship between the Central Taiwan Work Leading Group, the Central 
Secretariat and the Politburo Standing Committee, see George W. Tsai, "The Making of Taiwan 
Policy in Mainland China: Structure and Process," Issues & Studies, Vo1.33, No.9, September 1997, 
p.6. 
182 
Taiwan Affairs Office playa role in the ARATS, but, nominally, it is a semi-official 
body in charge of dealing with Taiwan negotiators. 
Under this framework, the Beijing leadership centralises power on Taiwan policy-
making and considers politics more than the economics in pursuing its Taiwan policy 
goals. Thereby the local authorities and the economic departments relating to cross-
strait economic relations have little influence on the establishment of Taiwan 
policy.480 
Within this framework, while the formal organisational system works, the other 
noninstitutional elements also feature. 481 The noninstitutional elements show that 
informal political factors occupy an important place in Taiwan policy-making. 
4.3. The Central Taiwan Work Leading Group ( CTWLG ) 
The activities of CTWLG are never publicised and membership is never 
announced. It is neither included in the PRC government bulletin nor appears on the 
chart of the CPC formal organisational system. The PRC leadership has neither 
confirmed nor denied its existence. However, people both inside and outside the 
country know that such a shadowy powerful apparatus exists. It often appears in the 
CPC and PRC documents that circulate inside the party and around government 
480. You Ji, "Missile Diplomacy and PRC Domestic Politics," in Greg Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy 
and Taiwan's Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power. Canberra: Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997, 
pAO; This thesis's Chapter 7.2-l. Other Domestic Factors That Might Affect Taiwan Policy-Making. 
481 . George W. Tsai points out, "Within the established system, Taiwan affairs offices, and military, 
security, and foreign policy units may transmit their opinions to higher-level units through 
administrative channels. Outside the established system, relevant organizations and persons may pass 
their opinions directly to the central decisionmaking body, either in the form of important or special 
reports or opinion exchanges." See George W. Tsai, "The Making of Taiwan Policy in Mainland 
China: Structure and Process," Issues & Studies, Vo1.33, No.9, September 1997, pp.I-30. 
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officials. Its organisational framework consists of a head, deputy-head, general-
secretary and a handful ofmembers.482 
CTWLG is responsible for making major policy and coordinating the work of the 
various organs involving Taiwan policy and affairs. It functions as the key Taiwan 
policy formulation, coordination, communication, supervision, and consultation 
mechanism between the Politburo Standing Committee, the Secretariat and the 
Taiwan affairs system. Principally, it is charged with deliberating on policy 
principles and guidelines for cross-strait relations and reunification with Taiwan. It 
is responsible for formulating and presenting Taiwan policy proposals for the 
Politburo Standing Committee to discuss. The most important duty of CTWLG is to 
form strategic principles and major policy goals regarding the Taiwan issue. Its 
policy formulation ranges over a wide range of crossing strategy, politics, military 
and economy, from broad policy initiatives to major policies to deal with any 
developments. Usually, it draws up middle and long term plans. For example, it 
worked out a strategic programme regarding Taiwan work in 1993 with the approval 
of Deng Xiaoping and other senior statesmen.483 Also, it mapped out one-year 
working plan and two-year schemes.484 
Simultaneously, CTWLG assigns the tasks and responsibilities of various 
departments whose work is relevant to Taiwan, but does not take charge of their day-
to-day administrative management. Also, it is in charge of coordination among the 
party, the military and the administrative branches concerning Taiwan affairs while 
482. Chen Te-sheng, "Mainland China's Taiwan Affairs Organizations and Personnel," Issues & 
Studies, VoJ.30, No.7, July 1994, pp.45-47. 
483 . Li Zijing, "Beijing Deliberates Taiwan Strategy," (~ § ~ ," ~t ~ 1iJf -~t X-T1$ ~:lI; ~ , " ) The 
Trend Magazine ( ij/; (fi]), No. 145, September 1998, pp.19-20. 
484. "It Was Reported That Communist China Has Readjusted Its Taiwan Policy in Short Term," 
( " 1~ r:p ~ ill M 1)fiJ ~ M i3' TI& '*' ' " ) United Daily News ( JYr S E ill), September 11, 1996, p.1. 
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overseeing the implementation of the party central leadership's decisions on Taiwan 
and dealing with cross-strait issues. In particular, in setting directions and giving 
instructions on how to handle relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits, it 
directly leads the departments under the party's Central Committee and the ministries 
under the State Council. 
The making of the party-state's Taiwan policy appears to be conducted under an 
institutional framework but involves a number of political factors and informal 
political elements, in particular the leaders' personal political considerations. The 
sector of Taiwan affairs and policy, as one for the supreme authorities, took an 
unexpectedly prominent place in the party power center because of its extreme 
importance and high sensitivity after the late 1980s. The head of CTWLG was a 
very influential position, assuring power-seekers of considerable control over the 
Taiwan policy and the military. Thus, competition for control of the CTWLG and 
contentions on the making of cross-strait policy became an important aspect of the 
leadership succession struggle. 
Generally speaking, the CTWLG was chaired by political and military 
heavyweights, who simultaneously held top jobs in the party, state and military. 
However, before the period of 1992 to 1993, Jiang Zemin was unable to control these 
most important sectors, such as the military and Taiwan policy, despite being the 
nominal 'leader' of the country. This demonstrated that his authority was not 
completely established. Although Jiang had succeeded Deng Xiaoping as CMC 
chairman at the end of 1989, he had no real power to command the army. Before 
1992, the military dominated policy-making and handling of affairs regarding 
Taiwan. The CTWLG was headed by Yang Shangkun, then state president and 
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military strongman. Although his position inside the party was as a member of the 
Political Bureau, he was widely viewed as being second in real power to paramount 
leader Deng because he was permanent vice-chairman of the powerful CMC and his 
half-brother was CMC general-secretary.485 Yang was a protege of Deng and had 
assisted him when Deng held the post of CMC chairman from the late 1970s to the 
late 1980s. In terms of military power, Yang reduced Jiang to a mere figurehead and 
became an authoritative figure, keeping the handling of routine affairs of the military 
to himself. Yang, however, failed in the power struggle with Jiang at the 14th 
National Party Congress in 1992. He was forced to step down as CMC first vice-
chairman and state president in late 1992 and early 1993 respectively. Jiang replaced 
Yang, becoming state president while continuing to hold the posts of CPC general 
secretary and CMC chairman. As a result, Yang was also replaced as CTWLG head 
by Jiang.486 
During the mid-1990s, Politburo Member and Vice-Premier Qian Qichen, who 
was concurrently Foreign Minister, held the CTWLG deputy-headship. The 
CTWLG secretary-generalship was held by Politburo Member and Director of the 
Taiwan Affairs Office, Wang Zhaoguo. Several senior officials in charge of Taiwan 
policies such as defence and security, were also members. CTWLG members 
included PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Xiong Guangkai, National Security Minister Jia 
485 • According to Andrew J. Nathan, Yang's "formal position was head of state but whose real job 
was Deng's business manager within the leadership". Yang "supervised" "the Politburo Standing 
Committee on behalf of Deng and the Elders" and "directly managed" "the Central Military 
Commission" "on Deng Xiaoping's behalf'. See Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link (eds) (compiled 
by Zhang Liang ), The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership's Decision to Use Force Against 
Their Own People. New York: PublicAffairs, 2001, pp.xxix-xxxii. 
486. "Before Yang Family Generals Were Removed from Office, Yang Shangkun Had Intended to 
Oust Jiang Zemin and Li Peng from Office," (" i% * ¥f 'MU ~J mr i% fi!O Ef:. ~ 1! m IT 1~ !% . * 
~ r is' ' " ) TTNN ( :$ i'fl1ti E /1f/i /JfJ), September 20, 1998; Wang Mingyi, Uncertain Straits: 
When the Republic a/China Met with the People's Republic a/China ( 1: f1l5 )(, /F 1jJ/j ;E !J!J jfl} JIj/{-
.§ rp:$ fjJ m 1i11 L rp:$ Ate ft: jp m)· Taipei: The Times Cultural Publishing Enterprise Ltd. 
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Chunwang and Chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits 
Wang Daohan.487 Both Xiong and Jia were members of the CPC Central Committee. 
Jiang had overall supervision and took charge of strategic principles. Qian assisted 
Jiang and acted on his behalf when Jiang went abroad for state visits or was absent 
from CTWLG meeting on other business. As the supervisor of Taiwan policy and 
affairs, as well as foreign policy and relations, Qian was in a position to coordinate 
with both of them. Wang Zhao guo was concurrently CPPCCSC Vice-Chairman and 
Head of the CPC United Front Work Department (UFWD). However, his inclusion 
in CTWLG was due to his positions as a Politburo member and leader of the 
departments concerned for Taiwan work. This did not mean that both CPPCCSC and 
the UFWD played an important role in the making of the Taiwan policy. Wang 
Zhao guo was responsible for the CTWLG's routine duties and coordination between 
various departments concerning Taiwan affairs. Xiong took charge of commanding 
military intelligence, diplomacy and strategy. He was the military representative in 
CTWLG. Jia Chunwang's role was to provide intelligence for CTWLG in 
formulating Taiwan strategy. Wang Daohan's specific responsibility was to 
participate in Taiwan policy-making and the handling of cross-strait affairs after 
retirement from the Shanghai mayoralty. 
It was believed that Wang Zhaoguo and Jia were not influential in the CTWLG. 
There were two reasons for this. Their roles were restricted by Jiang and their 
departments' competence was limited. Wang did not playa major role in 
formulating Taiwan strategy. He even lost his CTWLG secretary-generalship, and 
(at t~ x.1t tI:\ ~ ~.ill'. E~ {7} ~ Ill! 0 if]), 1993, p.313. 
487 . Xu Zhijia, "CTWLG Will Directly Administer Coordination on Taiwan Affairs," ( if ;G; ~ , "9=r 
~ 9=r :!k: ~ * W1 ~ t1J iffiJ $1[, " ) Central Daily News, International Edition (r:p~ E iii, 
lJl/!tftJ!!i), December 11,1996, pA. 
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was replaced by Xiong despite Wang retaining CTWLG membership in mid-1995.488 
As the authority of the Ministry of National Security was downgraded on Taiwan 
affairs,489 Jia's importance in the making of cross-strait policy was similarly lessened. 
Xiong and Wang Daohan played bigger roles than Wang Zhao guo and Jia within the 
CTWLG. 
In terms of factional division, Xiong was close to Jiang and Wang Daohan was 
Jiang's key protege. Jiang favoured Xiong with promotion to a higher military post 
and rank, in an attempt to secure him as a trusted follower within the military. 
Although Xiong had such links with Jiang, he still needed to preserve the military's 
own vital interests as a whole, allowing for the potential to conflict with Jiang. 49o 
Xiong, as a spokesman on the military's strategy, was responsible for both military 
intelligence gathering and defence policy towards Taiwan. Thus, he was widely 
viewed in the Western countries, in particular the US, as a key architect of the PRC 
Taiwan policy. Wang Daohan was Jiang's former superior. He had made great 
contributions to Jiang's rise to power and Jiang had a special and deep confidence in 
him. Although Wang was no longer at his post as a member of the CPC Central 
Committee, Jiang still appointed Wang to the CTWLG in order to strengthen his 
political influence and dominate the body.491 
In contrast with Xiong and Wang Daohan, Wang Zhaoguo and Jia Chunwang had 
no personal political ties with Jiang. Both had historical affiliations with former 
488 • John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle and 
London: University of Washington Press, 1997, pp.61-62. 
489 . See Chapter 4.1-7. The Roles ofIndirect Departments in Making Taiwan Policy. 
490. For the relationship between Xiong and Jiang, see Dan Bo, "Reasons Why Replaced National 
Security Minister," (i~ ~S ' " I!! !:fJ:. 'It~ * J'b A j; 1!lJ~ ~x, ") The Trend Magazine ( if/; f/iJ), No.152, 
April 1998, ppAO-42. 
491 . For the relationship between Wang and Jiang, see Chapter 4.8. Two Centres of Taiwan Policy-
Making. 
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general secretaries, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. Hu died in 1989 but Zhao was 
still alive. Jiang replaced Zhao as the party's general secretary in 1989. Although 
Zhao was no longer at his top post, he appeared to maintain influence in political 
circles through interpersonal relationships as a result of his promotion of many 
people who became senior officials.492 Jiang constantly watched out for his possible 
return to power and could not readily trust those senior officials who were former 
subordinates of Zhao.493 
Jia was a protege of Qiao Shi.494 It appeared that there were few possibilities for 
Wang and Jia to give their sincere support to Jiang's efforts to consolidate his 
successor position, despite implementing Jiang's Taiwan policies. Qian Qichen had 
no close links with Jiang, appearing not to have bound himself with Jiang in the 
succession struggle. Hence, although he implemented many of Jiang's Taiwan 
policies, it was more to maintain the established official stance than to take Jiang's 
personal political considerations into account. 495 
Therefore, Jiang was not in complete control of the CTWLG, despite being 
backed by Wang Daohan and counting on Xiong for support. In particular, according 
to You Ji, "effective control" over Taiwan affairs had "fallen to" Premier Li Peng.496 
492 • Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China after Deng Xiaoping: The Power Structure in Beijing since 
Tiananmen. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 1995, pp.353-359, 381-382. 
493 . Yue Liming, "Zhao Ziyang's Elements Are Increasing in the Political Circles of Communist 
China," (.ffi iL ~ , " .:p ~ Ig)c ±i 1M ~ ~S lEl ~ J: 7t ' ") China Spring ( rp & ~ R), No.l39, 
May 1995, pp.13-16; Li Zijing, "Distinguishing and Analysing the Hearsay on Zhao Ziyang," ( 1% § 
:$:," M:l' ~S 1~ I~ ~ {j;; m,") The Trend Magazine ( #11 (fi]), No~106, June 1994, pp.14-15. 
494. According to Willy Wo-Lap Lam, then MNS Minister, Jia Chunwang was seen as having close 
links with Qiao. See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice 
Hall, 1999, pp.33-34. For the relationship between Jiang and Jia, see Ming Lei, "Deng Xiaoping 
Calls a Halt to Anti-Corruption in the Beijing Municipal Machinery," ( ~ 11 , " :x~ ;J\ f xt ~t: :$: &. 
JlJG' 114 ~ , , ") Cheng Ming Monthly ({If P.$), No.218, December 1995, p.34. 
495 • For the relationship between Jiang and Qian, see Chapter 4.1-8. Two Centres of Taiwan Policy-
Making. 
496. You Ji, "Missile Diplomacy and PRC Domestic Politics," in Greg Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy 
and Taiwan's Future: Innovations in Politics and Militmy Power. Canberra: Strategic and Defence 
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As the top Taiwan policy-maker, Jiang sought to exploit his position and power for 
personal political benefit. However, if he did not accurately estimate the political 
circumstances surrounding him, especially the balance of political forces within the 
CTWLG and Politburo, his policy initiatives on Taiwan could complicate succession 
and undermine his position. 
4.4. The Taiwan Affairs Office ( TAO) 
During the early and mid 1990s, the TAO was the party and government's agency 
for dealing with cross-strait relations, but was not the most important and active 
Chinese agency formulating Taiwan policies. 
According to the official documents, as the main working organ regarding 
Taiwan, it carries out the guiding principles and policies of the CPC Central 
Committee and the State Council regarding Taiwan, organising the formulation of 
rules and regulations concerning Taiwan affairs, while translating abstract principles 
of central leadership on Taiwan into policies that could be implemented in practice. 
It coordinates and manages relevant affairs to promote the exchange of mail, air and 
shipping services as well as trade between the mainland and Taiwan, coordinating 
and directing exchanges and contacts with Taiwan, and directing news and 
propaganda toward Taiwan jointly with the departments concerned. 
Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997, 
pAO. 
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There are seven functional bureaux in the TAO: secretariat, the comprehensive, 
research, information, economic, exchange and liaison units.497 
The above-mentioned functions of the TAO suggest that it is the executive body 
for Taiwan affairs. Outwardly, it is the highest government agency focussed on 
charting PRC policy toward Taiwan. But it must work under the CTWLG 
leadership. Sometimes it has published Taiwan policy statements, for example, The 
Taiwan Question and Reunification a/China in 1993.498 However, those statements 
were authorised by the CTWLG, which is not itself suitable for conducting foreign 
contacts because of its shadowy nature. In terms of the Taiwan policy establishment, 
the main functions of the TAO are to make the secondary policy and translate the 
principles of the central Taiwan policy-makers into policies that can be implemented 
in practice. In addition, it is responsible for drawing up policy options and 
submitting policy proposals to the party's central leadership. In the process of 
formulating policy toward Taiwan, it also provides information and feedback to 
CTWLG members. However, its main responsibilities are to supervise Taiwan 
policy implementation, including organisation, direction, management and 
coordination. In particular, it is responsible for the day-to-day administration of 
Taiwan affairs, supervising and handling technical affairs. 
Therefore, the TAO does not hold the keys of Taiwan policy-making. To a great 
extent, its main duty is to implement, rather than make, Taiwan policy. Even though 
497 • The Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and the Taiwan Affairs Office of The 
State Council ( !=f ~ !=f ::k: i:l ~~ I 110 1], 0- ~ / ~ :%- ~ i:l j"i!g • :%- 1], 0- ~ ), China's Taiwan 
Issue ( l' /lfI & tif Iii] 1Jj). Beijing: Jiuzhou Press ( 1L ~+I 00 ~ ill !lR t± ), 1998, pp.l78-179. 
498 • Taiwan Affairs Office & Information Office, State Council, the People's Republic of China: "The 
Taiwan Question and Reunification of China," (I!! :%- ~ i:1' ?~. :%-1], 0-1i../ I!! :%- ~ ~JT !lg1],0-1i.., 
" i:1' r~ !1:iJ tm -'=i 9=t ~ Et<J ~ ~ , " ) August 1993, in The Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central 
Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council ( !=f ~ 9=t ::k: i:1' ?~ I f1=: 1], 0- ~ / 
~ :%- ~ i:1' ¥~ • :%-1], 0- 1i.. ), China IS Taiwan Issue ( l' /lfI & ;q jlij 1Jj). Beijing: Jiuzhou Press 
( 1L YJ'H 00 ~ ill !lR ;f±), 1998, pp.244-260. 
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sometimes it plays an important role, it never acts as a decisive body in the policy 
making structure and process. Any subtle or significant change and any response to 
sudden events and major decisions concerning Taiwan policy are beyond the limits 
of power of the TAO and must be submitted to the CTWLG for consideration. In all 
Taiwan policy-setting units, the CTWLG is the highest policy-making body, with 
immense real power.499 
Although the TAO has no a final say in Taiwan policy decision-making, it is still 
an essential organ, especially as it serves to a link the upper and lower levels and 
coordinate the ministerial departments concerned. During the early and mid 1990s, 
various factions, in particular contestants for succession to Deng Xiaoping spared no 
effort to dominate it. This involved a debate over its capacity, which became one the 
focuses of the struggle. The Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee was 
established in 1979.500 When there was no the working organ for Taiwan affairs in 
the governmental apparatus, it took the administrative management on Taiwan affairs 
into its own hands. After the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council was 
established in 1988, these two Taiwan affairs offices inevitably competed with each 
other. Both were merged into a single whole in 1991 to avoid duplication and 
conflicts. 50 I Its characteristics were that it was both party and government in one. It 
was simultaneously subordinate to both the Central Committee of the Party and the 
State Council. A small difference was that, when it appeared in the party's name it 
499. George W. Tsai considers that "the importance of the TAO should be particularly emphasized." 
Meanwhile, he acknowledges that the TAO possesses" 'relative' power to make suggestions and 
decisions." See George W. Tsai, "The Making of Taiwan Policy in Mainland China: Structure and 
Process," Issues & Studies, Vo1.33, No.9, September 1997, p.1l. This study argues that the TAO 
seldom can make policy decisions except the secondarily important policy matters. 
500 • George W. Tsai, "The Making of Taiwan Policy in Mainland China: Structure and Process," 
Issues & Studies, Vo1.33, No.9, September 1997, p.6. 
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was called the Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and when it 
represented the government it was called the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State 
Council. This illustrates the ambiguity of the TAO's capacity, which crossed the 
boundaries of the party and government. 
However, even though the merger was motivated by a desire for convenience and 
effectiveness, in theory, the TAO was more the party's than the government's. For 
example, the Vice-Premier Qian Qichen ( who was concurrently Foreign Minister ), 
held positions in the State Council but, to a great extent, served as a Politburo 
Member and the CTWLG deputy-head acting in a party capacity. When directing the 
TAO, he acted mainly in the capacity of the CTWLG deputy-head through the 
party's system. A peculiar phenomenon was that the head ofthe State Council, the 
Premier, by and large did not directly instruct the TAO, which worked under the 
CTWLG leadership. In both the 1980s and the 1990s, none of the premiers were 
CTWLG members. Basically, except for administrative and economic affairs 
regarding Taiwan, they should not have had a hand in the TAO in light of the 
division of labour and individual responsibilities of the paramount leaders.502 
Nevertheless, Premier Li Peng meddled in the TAO and intended to influence 
Taiwan policy despite this not being in conformity with the party's principles of 
501. The Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the 
State Council ( q:t ;t!;: q:t -!k: t11~ I fro 11, -0 'E[ / ~ :9}- ~ 5' 1~ $ :9}- 1;, -0 'E[ ), China's Taiwan 
Issue ( r:p jjJ! it If ;h7 JlJf). Beijing: Jiuzhou Press ( 11 111'1 00 15 ill tlfiZ f± ), 1998, p.l78. 
502. For the division of labour between the party's general secretary and the premier, see You Ji, 
"Jiang Zemin: In Quest ofPost-Deng Supremacy," in Maurice Brosseau, Suzanne Pepper and Tsang 
Shu-ki (eds), China Review i996. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1996, p.5. For the 
division of labour between Jiang and Li over Taiwan and the actual operations, see You Ji, "Missile 
Diplomacy and PRC Domestic Politics," in Greg Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan's 
Future: innovations in Politics and Military Power. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997, pAO. 
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dividing up the work and partaking the responsibilities.503 The point at issue was that 
the TAO should be run by the party, yet the TAO's budget and personnel was not 
administered by the party's system. This led to the TAO being simultaneously 
administrated by the State Council. This circumstance made it possible for Jiang 
Zemin's rivals to meddle in the TAO. Li's intervention and Jiang's defence of his 
dominance in Taiwan policy were part an overt and covert power struggle. Jiang 
found it hard to reorganise the system to formally and entirely include the TAO in 
the party's organisational system under the control ofthe party's general secretary. 
His desire was satisfied only after his position was consolidated as paramount leader 
in reality as well as in name in 1998.504 
During the early and mid-1990s, Jiang found it extremely difficult to fend off his 
rivals from becoming involved in Taiwan policy. Regarding it as a field of 
competition with Jiang, Li sought to intervene. Li's intervention came by way of his 
headship of the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Group ( CF ALG). Though Jiang 
was party chief and head of state, Li was one of the members of the CPC Politburo 
Standing Committee, head of government and in charge of foreign policy. As a 
result, Li largely and substantively controlled Taiwan affairs.505 However, in light of 
the party-state norms, it was Jiang's prerogative to take charge of Taiwan policy 
503 • George W. Tsai believes that Premier Li Peng "is very powerful" and "supervises and controls 
TAO operations." See George W. Tsai, "The Making of Taiwan Policy in Mainland China: Structure 
and Process," Issues & Studies, Vol.33, No.9, September 1997, p.lO. 
504 • Xiao Peng, "The National Meeting on Taiwan Will Be Convened in the Short Term-Jiang 
Zemin Makes Plans for New Policy on Cross-Strait Relations," ( y,m: rom ' " :i: OO:xt '8" I 11= 4i; iY. :llI 
M 13 7f-u1f ~ ~ :!<;~ ~ p;g i¥ iIit Jjt ," ) Sing Tao Daily, New Zealand Edition ( Jil .$ 8 jll, !if 
il!f ~ J/!i), May 8, 1998, p.2. 
505. You Ji, "Missile Diplomacy and PRC Domestic Politics," in Greg Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy 
and Taiwan's Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power. Canberra: Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997, 
pAO. For Li's intervention in Taiwan policy and the contentions between Li and Jiang over how to 
respond to Lee Teng-hui' s US visit amid the leadership succession struggle, see Chapter 8.1. The 
PRC Leadership Succession and a Tough Taiwan Policy. 
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rather than Li. Although Li' s intervention could be justified by the close relationship 
between foreign and Taiwan affairs, his involvement violated party principles. Jiang 
appeared to be the legitimate 'frontman' for Taiwan affairs because of his CTWLG 
headship. However, putting personal political considerations, such as the 
consolidation of his power and Wang Dohan's political appointment, into the making 
of Taiwan policy proved disruptive. More unfavourably, with Li effectively 
controlling Taiwan affairs, Jiang would run risks in initiating his new Taiwan policy, 
inevitably causing serious consequences. In a word, both Li and Jiang disturbed 
institutionalisation in their Taiwan policy-making. 
4.5. The Association for Relations Across the Taiwan 
Straits (ARATS ) 
ARATS is reputed to be the PRC semi-official body which deals with Taiwan. To 
be specific, ARA TS plays an instrumental role in conducting direct negotiations with 
the Taiwan authorities and parties concerned. In particular, ARATS consults on 
matters relating to exchanges and concerns surrounding cross-strait contacts with its 
reciprocal Taiwan body-the Straits Exchange Foundation ( SEF). ARATS again is 
both a party and governmental institution. It is state-funded but ostensibly private. It 
was formed in 1991 to handle sensitive exchanges with its Taiwan counterpart, the 
SEF. The SEF works under the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), an 
administrative agency responsible for the Taiwan authorities' mainland policy. 
MAC is the same as the Taiwan Affairs Office, which is a cabinet-level body 
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monitoring the island's mainland policy. Actually both ARATS and SEF represent 
the governments of Taiwan and mainland China respectively to deal with bilateral 
exchanges. Under the circumstances, mainland China and Taiwan moulded 
themselves into virtually two parts of the same mechanism for the channel of 
dialogue, which established a framework for formal exchanges of opinions across the 
Taiwan Strait. However, in emphasising and maintaining the SEF nongovernmental 
capacity, the MAC vice-chairmen were not concurrently SEF vice-chairmen and its 
bureau-chiefs were concurrently departmental deputy-heads under SEF. 
According to the PRC official documents, ARA TS accepts direction and acts 
under the authorisation of the Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee 
together with the Taiwan Affairs Office under the State Council. Although ARA TS 
declares that it works under its constitution, the Comprehensive Issues Bureau under 
the TAO is in charge of handling day-to-day work of ARATS. ARATS's aims are to 
strengthen contacts with social organisations and public figures from various circles 
who agree with the ARATS purposes; assist the parties concerned to promote 
contacts and exchanges between both sides of the Taiwan Strait; assist the parties 
concerned to handle issues of cross-strait compatriot contacts; preserve legitimate 
interests of cross-strait compatriots; accept entrusting by the parties concerned of 
mainland China to negotiate with the parties concerned and the authorised 
organisations and figures of Taiwan on relevant issues in cross-strait exchanges and 
sign documents on the nature of agreements. 506 
Ostensibly, ARATS is a social organisation. But in reality it is an official organ. 
Such an important matter as Taiwan is naturally under control of the party and 
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government. Not only is the responsibility between the party and the government 
confused, but also the functions between state and society are only slightly 
differentiated. Thus ARA TS is three organisations consisting of the same people-
the Taiwan Worle Office of the CPC Central Committee, the Taiwan Affairs Office 
under the State Council and ARATS. Their deputy-heads even branch-chiefs hold 
positions with each other. For example, in the mid-1990s, Tang Shubei was the 
ARA TS executive vice-chairman and secretary-general, and concurrently deputy-
director of the Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and the Taiwan 
Affairs Office under the State Council. His subordinate bureau-chiefs in these two 
party and government institutions were concurrently departmental deputy-heads 
under ARATS. A small difference was that Wang Zhaoguo, director of the Taiwan 
Work Office, was not concurrently ARA TS chief. Wang Daohan was the chairman. 
ARATS is an organisation to manage and handle concrete Taiwan affairs. More 
exactly, it is a Taiwan policy implementation body rather than a Taiwan policy-
making organ. It is not in a position to decide whether to accept the cross-strait 
political arrangements or proposals from Taipei because it has not been given the 
right to deal with thorny political problems. Even though it can conduct high-level 
cross-strait negotiations including political talks, and sign accords on the handling of 
technical issues as well as commercial and other practical matters, it can not take a 
major initiative or give any substantial concession by itself. In theory, ARATS is 
authorised by the Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and the 
Taiwan Affairs Office under the State Council. But actually ARATS is authorised by 
CTWLG. Any contact and meeting between ARATS and SEF must be approved by 
506. The Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the 
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CTWLG. In particular, any decision on new approaches towards Taiwan will be 
made by CTWLG. 
However, ARATS chairman Wang Daohan was in a unique position. On one 
hand, although Wang Zhao guo was a director of the Taiwan Work Office and the 
competent person overseeing the ARATS, he was not in a position to directly lead 
Wang Daohan. On the other hand, Wang Daohan had to be supported by Wang 
Zhaoguo and his staff. In particular, in conducting cross-straits talks, Wang Daohan 
could not work without the assistance of Wang Zhaoguo's subordinates. This was a 
strange organisational framework. It reflects the fact that the system ofPRC policy-
making on Taiwan was more heavily influenced by personal factors more than by 
institutionalisation. 
A further analysis can deepen understanding of how the mechanism ofPRC 
policy-making on Taiwan operated during the early and mid-1990s. Wang Daohan 
was chairman of ARA TS and was in charge of the mission to conduct cross-strait 
talks. He showed his face as the top PRC negotiator, handling bilateral talks with his 
Taiwan counterpart, Koo Chen-fu. Wang Daohan had a say in making Taiwan 
policy. However, on some occasions he preferred to express his opinion privately in 
the PRC Taiwan policy establishment, rather than as a representative of ARATS. 
Sometimes he published Taiwan policy statements as ARA TS chairman whilst 
actually speaking in his CTWLG capacity or representing Jiang Zemin flying a 
kite. 507 
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Wang Daohan was directly authorised by Jiang Zemin rather than his nominal 
ARATS superior-Wang Zhaoguo. Moreover, theoretically, Wang Daohan's 
working relationship with Qian Qishen was governed by the principle that the lower 
level was subordinate to the higher level. Qian was deputy-head of CTWLG and 
Wang was one of members of CTWLG, but in practice Wang Daohan often followed 
his own course, even conflicting with Qian. Wang accepted only Jiang as his 
supenor. 
The relations between these departments and figures were very complex. It 
revealed that the architecture of Taiwan affairs and policy and its formulation and 
execution were a body of contradictions. While the formal organisational system 
worked in handling the Taiwan issue, there were other noninstitutional elements. 
The most conspicuous example was the complicated relations between Wang Daohan 
and Wang Zhaoguo. In this case, the incumbent and superior did not playa key role 
in making Taiwan policy but the retiree and subordinate were influential in forming 
cross-strait strategy. These noninstitutional elements, structurally impacted upon the 
Taiwan affairs and policy system, causing internal conflicts. 
4.6. The Taiwan Policy-Research Institutions and 
Information Network 
In the mid-1990s, the Taiwan policy-research institutions and information 
network were divided into five sub-systems, which were responsible for providing 
the central leadership with advice on major issues and some guidelines for future 
policy. 
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First was the sub-system of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was headed by 
Qian Qishen. Chief among this sub-system were the Institute of International Issues 
under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Council's International Studies 
Centre. 
Second was the sub-system of the Taiwan Affairs Office, which was headed by 
Wang Zhaoguo. Its major departments were the Research Bureau and the 
Information Bureau under the Taiwan Affairs Office, as well as the Research 
Department under ARA TS. 
Third was the sub-system of the National Security Ministry, which was headed by 
Jia Chunwang. One of its main branches was the China Institute of Contemporary 
International Relations, which was nominally an independent research institution but 
actually the Eighth Bureau-the Research Bureau under the National Security 
Ministry. Another was publicly known as the Institute of Taiwan Studies of the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences but was secretly affiliated with the National 
Security Ministry as a bureau-level unit. 
Fourth was the sub-system of the military, which was headed by Xiong Guangkai. 
One of the principal bodies was the China Institute for International Strategic Studies 
under the Military Intelligence Branch of the PLA General Staff Department. 
Another was the China Association for International Friendly Contacts under the 
Liaison Branch of the PLA General Political Department. 
Fifth was the sub-system of Shanghai think-tanks, which was headed by Wang 
Daohan. Its basic elements were the Shanghai Institute ofInternational Studies, the 
Taiwan Issue Research Centre under the Shanghai Academy of Social Science, the 
Shanghai Institute of Taiwan Studies and the Strategy Research Association in 
Shanghai. In addition, other Shanghai think-tanks on international affairs and 
Taiwan also served Wang Daohan.508 
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In addition, there were other Taiwan policy think-tanks. For example, the China 
Institute for International Economic Relations was composed of well-known scholars 
and influential government officials and retired senior diplomats. It was viewed as 
an important think-tank on foreign policy, while also dealing with the Taiwan issue. 
The Taiwan studies institutions were also established under some universities such as 
the Taiwan Research Institute at Beijing Union University and the Taiwan Research 
Institute of Xi amen University. However, they were not particularly influential. 
After sorting and analyses, the research results and information from these five 
sub-systems were presented to Wang Zhao guo, general-secretary of the CTWLG. He 
would then differentiate the important from the less important and the urgent from 
the less urgent to submit intelligence and policy proposals to Jiang Zemin and other 
state-party leaders to look over and decide on any action to be taken. However, in 
practice, every sub-system had its own channel to communicate with the highest 
leaders. Various sub-systems could offer opinions to the paramount policy-makers 
through their own immediate superiors in the form of urgent reports, circulations on 
special topic, monographic studies or even concrete policy proposals and operation 
schemes. This fragmentation and diffusion lad to competition between various sub-
systems. Although Wang Zhaoguo was the general-secretary of CTWLG and was 
responsible for synthesising relevant materials for the top leaders, he had little 
control over the whole Taiwan policy-research institution framework and information 
network. Meanwhile, a handful of persons in the central leadership wanted to be 
508. "A Survey of Communist China's Party, Government and Military Think-Tanks on Taiwan," 
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offered the different opinions from the foreign press, especially regarding the PRe 
leaders' authorities, standings, personal affairs and interpersonal relationships, in 
order to utilise them in attacking their political opponents in the struggle for power. 
For this purpose, the highest leaders felt that the information provided by these 
research institutions was not enough. Every Politburo member had his or her own 
secretary of foreign affairs, who was in charge of collecting information from, and 
reflecting on the foreign press, especially the Western media. External public 
opinions and foreign governmental leaders' remarks could be exploited to 
consolidate their own power bases and weaken the positions of political opponents.509 
Under such circumstances, control of the Taiwan policy-research institution 
framework and information network became an important aspect of the struggle for 
dominance in the formulation of policy toward Taiwan during the succession 
struggle. 
These Taiwan policy research institutions did not take an independent place in the 
general system of Taiwan policy-making because they were respectively affiliated 
with different departments responsible for the field-work. The five sub-systems 
represented their own departments and reflected various factional viewpoints. They 
pursued their own departmental interests competing with various ministries and other 
agencies. Every sub-system sought to influence the top leaders in the Taiwan policy 
process. There was a rough division of labour between them, but no clear definitions 
of duty. As such, they were not limited to their own fields. 
Among them, the sub-system of Shanghai think-tanks headed by Wang Daohan 
was the most influential. It occupied a prominent position in the structure and 
(" f-l til !f! ft 1t ll& 4I X1 t3' ~ W' ") TTNN ( :$ ifC if} /3 lfli Ill!), May 11, 1998. 
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process of making Taiwan policy. It was loyal to Jiang Zemin and he entrusted 
Wang Daohan to deal with Taiwan issues. Wang gathered the research institutions 
regarding the Taiwan issue in Shanghai together, and directly reported policy 
proposals to Jiang. Thus the sub-system of Shanghai think-tanks became an advisory 
group under Jiang's direct control. Therefore, he attached more importance to the 
research reports of the Wang Daohan-Ied Shanghai think-tanks than other Beijing-
based groups. The Shanghai-based think-tanks also had greater leverage than the 
sub-system of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed by Qian Qishen and the sub-
system of the Taiwan Affairs Office headed by Wang Zhaoguo. 5JO 
The basic ground was that Jiang made his political fortune from Shanghai with the 
help of Wang Daohan and was promoted from being the Shanghai party boss straight 
to the national party leadership. Jiang's power foundation in the central leadership 
was fragile in the early 1990s and, in terms of Taiwan policy making, he was 
believed to feel impelled to confide in his Shanghai loyalists. The formulation of 
PRe policy toward Taiwan had an important place in the leadership succession while 
these Taiwan policy-research institutions represented their own departmental 
interests and reflected various factionary viewpoints. In the process of leadership 
succession, the contenders had their own views on Taiwan policy, and those research 
branches of the party and government under the control of the contenders followed 
their stances on the Taiwan issue. In terms of strategic principles and major goals, 
internal dissent was present in the Taiwan policy establishment with Jiang being 
offered differing viewpoints and even conflicting advice. However, Jiang found it 
509. Dan Bo, "Communist China's Intelligence, External Affairs Research Organs," ,"( 1~ rs , " 9=' ~ 
I¥J 'IW r€l' R ~r $1iff Jr: m t~ , " ) Cheng Ming Monthly ( '1r !!l$), No.227, September 1996, p.29. 
510. "A Survey of Communist China's Party, Government and Military Think-Tanks on Taiwan," 
(" 13 Wi 9=' ~ ~ ll& ~ xt i3' 19 $,") TTNN (:$ if{, fij E lfli 1'If!), May 11,1998. 
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difficult to ascertain whether these Taiwan policy-research institutions affiliated with· 
various departments were truly loyal to him. He had to be wary of falling into a trap 
which would likely be laid by his political opponents. Under such circumstances, he 
trusted the Wang Daohan-Ied Shanghai think-tanks more than the Beijing-based 
policy-research institution framework and information network concerning Taiwan. 
Such means of securing information and adopting advice is in conflict with 
institutionalisation. In an institutionalised system, the roles of the formal 
organisational system should be essential and leading. However, Jiang practised 
nepotism and relied less on the official think-tanks for Taiwan policy. 
Consequentially, this could lead to misunderstanding of the cross-strait situation and 
make his Taiwan policy goals unrealistic. 
4.7. The Roles of Indirect Departments in Making Taiwan 
Policy 
In the mid-1990s, the policy-making system on Taiwan crossed the fields of 
diplomacy and the military representing different departmental interests. Besides 
departments directly involved, it included indirectly related departments such as the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Foreign Affairs Office under the State Council, the 
Ministry of National Security, as well as the military. The military played a bigger 
role in making Taiwan policy than other departments but this will be dealt with in 
Chapter Five-The Role of the Military in the PRe Taiwan Policy-Making. 
With regard to the CPC United Front Work Department ( UFWD ), it had taken 
charge of Taiwan affairs before the Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central 
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Committee was established in 1979. Hereafter the UFWD shared in the work 
regarding Taiwan with the Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee. 
After the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council was established in 1988, the 
UFWD's authority in Taiwan affairs was further reduced. In the mid 1990s, the 
UFWD's influence on Taiwan policy was limited.511 Although the UFWD head, 
Wang Zhaoguo, played an important role in making Taiwan policy, this was mainly 
in his capacity as CTWLG member and the director of the Taiwan Affairs Office. 
As for the Ministry of National Security ( MNS ), its duty was to provide 
intelligence for CTWLG in formulating Taiwan strategy. It took charge of collecting 
and analysing political and economic materials as well as data concerning Taiwan, 
and selecting and interpreting this information. Its other tasks included dispatching 
spies to slip into Taiwan and infiltrate Taiwanese society, especially the upper 
classes, and preventing the Chinese overseas democratic movement from combining 
with Taiwanese political forces in opposition to the communist regime. In addition, 
it was responsible for coping with Taiwan's agents and countering political 
infiltration and subversive activities by the Taiwan authorities in mainland China. 
The MNS's Third Bureau was in charge of Taiwan affairs and some research units, 
mainly the Eighth Bureau, were responsible for research on Taiwan.512 In the Mao 
Zedong era, the MNS held immeasurable power including responsibility for external 
relations, Taiwan affairs and policy. Nevertheless, in Deng Xiaoping's time, the 
MNS declined. Deng and other senior statesmen were politically persecuted by MNS 
511 • For the UFWD's position in the Taiwan policy making structure and its working relations with 
the Taiwan Affairs Office, see Tong Zhan, "The United Front Work System and the Nonparty Elite," 
in Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao (eds), Decision-Making in Deng's China: Perspectivesfi~om 
Insiders. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, p.69. 
512 • Dan Bo, "Spy Headquarters Behind the Shrubs," ( 1~ 18 , " :tt: * :Jt ~ B~ rEi] ~ ,/,3 'If~ , " ) 
Cheng Ming Monthly (-1r PJ!j), No.233, March 1997, pp.35-36. 
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officials following Mao's orders in the Cultural Revolution and they believed that the 
MNS was the power base of their political opponents, the ultra-Leftist faction led by 
Hua Guofeng in the late 1970s. Since Deng defeated Hua and wielded the sceptre, he 
had strictly limited the MNS' s power and scope. As a result, the MNS had been 
downgraded in the power structure of both party and government. Accordingly, in 
the fields of both foreign relations and Taiwan affairs, the MNS was relegated to a 
secondary position.5J3 Since Jiang Zemin came into office, the MNS had become still 
less important in the formulation of Taiwan policy. Jiang had put little trust in the 
organisation because Qiao Shi, one of Jiang's political opponents, was influential 
there.514 Qiao, as Secretary of the CPC Central Political and Legal Affairs 
Commission which was the higher authority, supervised the MNS. Despite Jiang 
vying with Qiao for control, the MNS did not held a key place in Taiwan policy-
making. 
In contrast to the state security sector, the system of foreign affairs was considered 
the higher authority on Taiwan policy. It was at the forefront of handling Taiwan 
affairs because the issue involved a wide array of external concerns, in particular the 
PRC-US relationship. Thus the central leaders attached importance to it and strove 
to keep a firm hand on it. However, the system of foreign affairs was divided into 
two main sections, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ( MFA) and the Foreign Affairs 
Office (FAO ) under the State Counci1.515 A motley picture can be seen indicating 
513. Dan Bo, "Communist China's Intelligence, External Affairs Research Organs,"( 1~ ~S ' " i=f ;t1;: 
8~ ,It ~€l' JJz :17" $1iJf 9't tIL f1;] , ") Cheng Ming Monthly( 'if PJ$), No.227, September 1996, pp.28-29. 
514. Dan Bo, "Reasons Why Replaced National Security Minister," (1~ ~S ' " 00 '!i.: ~~ * § A 1; iNJ~ 
rut,") The TrendMagazine (ij/; rfiJ), No.152, April 1998, ppAO-42. 
515. Initially, the establishment ofthe FAO largely resulted from a power struggle between Mao 
Zedong and Zhou Enlai. In the mid-1950s, Mao "attempted to weaken Zhou's position by relieving 
him of the foreign affairs portfolio". In February 1958, Zhou resigned from the post of foreign 
minister, despite retaining the premiership. Zhou's authority over foreign policy was reduced and the 
F AO was "newly created". After that, Mao became increasingly dictatorial. In August 1958, he 
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the extremely complicated, competitive situation. Obviously, the system of foreign 
affairs overlapped. The F AO was a cabinet-level unit and paralleled MFA. On the 
principle of the division of labour, the MFA placed emphasis on state-to-state 
relations, especially diplomatic matters. One of the key roles of the MFA was to 
implement foreign policy and participate in formulating external strategy, led by the 
Central Foreign Affairs Leading Group ( CF ALG). F AO had a greater focus on 
coordination with various ministries and local governments involved in foreign 
affairs. One of the main responsibilities of the FAO was to coordinate the diplomatic 
and national security functions of different government departments. However, both 
the MFA and F AO were on an equal footing and ranked as first-level subordinate 
bodies. They had equal rights to issue documents or instructions directly to relevant 
departments. Although in theory the work was divided up between them, in practice 
it was difficult to draw a clear line of demarcation between both responsibilities and 
the two departments were in conflict with each other. 
In particular, the relationship between the two heads of the foreign affairs organs 
was complex and quite subtle. The F AO director, Liu Huaqiu, was concurrently 
senior Vice-Foreign Minister. This arrangement originally aimed at facilitating 
coordination between MFA and F AO, but unexpectedly caused more contradictions. 
Foreign Minister Qian Qishen concurrently held the post of Vice-Premier, 
comprehensively overseeing foreign affairs. In this sense, Liu could be viewed as 
Qian's subordinate. However, Liu was prominent in the Party's foreign policy 
group. 
single-handedly initiated the second Taiwan Strait crisis. See Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-
Policy Decisionmaking in China. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997, pp.151-153. 
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As one of the limited alternate and full members of the Central Committee 
representing the diplomatic party organisations, he had status in the system of foreign 
affairs. More influentially, he was the director of the general office of the Central 
Foreign Affairs Leading Group ( CF ALG). The CF ALG was chaired by Premier Li 
Peng while Qian served as his deputy. Liu's portfolio was mainly to assist Li in 
formulating the party-state's foreign policy. Meanwhile, Qian, as Politburo Member 
and the CTWLG deputy-head, supervised Taiwan affairs. In this regard, Liu worked 
under Qian's supervision while coordinating with the MFA. This situation made 
relations between these two departments and these two figures very complex. They 
competed to have a larger say in foreign and Taiwan policies. It inevitably led to 
conflicts between the two foreign affairs organs and their heads. The political 
factors, in particular the informal political elements involved and the circumstances 
in the foreign and Taiwan policy area, became more complicated. It seemed that 
such a divided design for the system of foreign affairs was institutional, but could 
give space to the noninstitutional elements and internal political disputes. 
With regard to the function of the F AO, some reports and reviews believe that it 
could be comparable with the US National Security Counci1.516 The F AO was 
responsible for coordinating with other government organs on foreign, defence and 
security policies. The MFA was dealing with daily diplomatic affairs but was not a 
coordinative body. While it would find it difficult to deal with the comprehensive 
security problems faced by the MFA, the F AO had the capacity to coordinate the 
external-affairs work of various agencies. The head ofFAO was able to consult with 
516 . For more information about the relationships between MFA and FAO as well as Qian and Liu, see 
Liu Ning Rong and Wang Jianmin, "Will Beijing Cooperate with Washington on Nuclear?" ( xU T 
*. ± il ~ , " ~t * ~ Jff m ~ T fr 1'F?") The International Chinese Weekly ( JJl ;WI)lf) f(j), 
December 30, 1996-January 5,1997, pp.34-35. 
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minister-level officials from national defence, intelligence and state security organs 
when major foreign policy or diplomatic issues were raised. Liu was called the PRC 
foreign affairs state council minister, being viewed as a senior PRC national security 
official, who appeared to be like an assistant to the US President for national security 
affairs. Yet, the F AO was in fact not so similar to the US National Security Council 
as a result of its very different responsibilities. Unlike the US National Security 
Council, the F AO did not hold the power to work as a policy-setting body while 
overseeing operations. This notwithstanding, the F AO director, Liu himself, indeed 
played an important part in the handling of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis. When 
the crisis reached a critical moment in March 1996, Liu visited the US and held 
negotiations with American National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher and Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry.5J7 
How does one explain such a phenomenon? This study proposes that it was the 
noninstitutional elements in foreign and Taiwan policy-making, born out of informal 
politics and power struggles, that played a larger role than institutional functions and 
normal politics. At that time, the MFA headed by Qian had been violently attacked 
by the military and had been relieved of the bulk of its duties regarding negotiations 
with the US and the handling of Taiwan affairs. He had no close personal ties with, 
or political allies with connections to Jiang despite largely implementing Jiang's 
interlinked policies toward Taiwan and the US. The military's attack on Qian and 
demand for his dismissal were in fact aimed at Jiang, in an attempt to force him to 
change his soft-line and toughen his stance toward Taiwan and the US. Jiang himself 
517. Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents And China: An Investigative History. New York: 
PublicAffairs, 1999,30-32; Cheng-yi Lin, "Lake Held Talks with Liu to Prevent the 1995-96 Taiwan 
Strait Crisis From Losing Control," ( if*iE 51-. , " m :XU ~ i~ fM IIiJ 15 #tJ: ;@; m ;k 1~ , " ) Central 
Daily News, International Edition ( rp:!f¢ E iii, /JlI~jJfff), April 10, 1997, p.3. 
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was politically vulnerable and struggling to defend his leadership, and so was unable 
to protect Qian from the attack.518 In the meantime, Li Peng andother contenders for 
the leadership succession joined forces with the military to compel Jiang to adopt a 
tough policy against Taipei and Washington.519 During this period, Li sought to take 
advantage of Jiang's political difficulties and dominate foreign and Taiwan policy in 
an attempt to weaken Jiang's successor position. Li and Liu had close relations. 
Qian would have to retire from the post of foreign minister because of his advanced 
age while retaining the vice-premiership in charge of foreign affairs. Amid the 
I 
leadership succession struggle, Liu became a protege of Li and Li nominated Liu for 
next foreign minister. Meanwhile, Qian recommended Tang Jiaxuan, the present 
Chinese foreign minister, to succeed himself. Jiang favoured Tang.52o When the 
Taiwan crisis reached a critical point, Qian lost his dominant foreign and Taiwan 
policy position and Jiang found it very difficult to control the diplomatic field and 
Taiwan affairs. Liu followed Li, taking a tough stance on events in the Taiwan Strait 
during 1995-1996, which was in favour with the hard-liners. 521 Thus it was Liu 
rather than Qian who came forward to negotiate with the heads of the US National 
Security Council, State Department and Defense Department on the Taiwan crisis. 
Under such circumstances, Liu played a bigger role in handling the Taiwan crisis 
518. For the military's attack on Qian and pressure on Jiang, see Chapter 8.2-2. The Military's Role in 
Pressing upon Jiang Zemin the Adoption of Strong Measures against Taiwan. For the relationship 
between Qian and Jiang, see Chapter 4.8. Two Centres of Taiwan Policy-Making. 
519 . For the joint actions of the military with the rivals for the leadership succession to pressure Jiang 
during the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, see Chapter 8.1. The PRC Leadership Succession and a 
Tough Taiwan Policy. 
520. For detailed information about the relationship between Li and Liu, see Li Beiping, "A 
Competition for the Position of Communist China's Foreign Minister," ( * ~~ f' " r:p ;t:t: ;9~ j( ~~ 
-if z {ft '* ;g; P'J4, ") The Front-Line Magazine (§if Pj!j), March 1997, pp.28-29; Liu Ning Rong and 
Wang Jianmin, "Will Beijing Cooperate with Washington on Nuclear?" ( :XV T 5R . -=r.il ~ , " ~~ :ijl: 
:$ Jff 1~ ~ T i1 it ? " ) The International Chinese Weekly ( JJE 1/1/ /lfJ fIJ), December 30, 1996-
January 5, 1997, p.35; Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents And China: An Investigative 
History. New York: PublicAffairs, 1999, p.31. 
than Qian. However, this owed more to noninstitutional elements than to normal 
organisational functions. 
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In short, the PRC's fragmented political system and the partly informally 
politicised policy decision-making framework made the structure of Taiwan policy-
making more complicated and diffuse than it would have otherwise been. In 
particular, because of the partially irregular Taiwan policy process under succession 
politics, the leadership in Beijing found it extremely difficult to formulate and 
implement realistic and rational interlinked policies toward Taiwan and the US. 
4.8. Two Centres of Taiwan Policy-Making 
During the early and mid-1990s, there were a variety of actors and unwritten rules 
in the PRC Taiwan policymaking structure and process. The key problem was that 
there were two centres making Taiwan policy. One was in Beijing and the other in 
Shanghai. The Beijing centre was led by Qian Qishen. Because of his dual capacity 
as Politburo Member and the CTWLG deputy-head, as well as being Vice-Premier 
and Foreign Minister, he was in charge of the Party and government's Taiwan 
policy-making system while supervising foreign policy. According to bureaucratic 
norms, the Beijing centre held the formal power and included all the Taiwan-related 
official organs. It was considered the government's highest authority on Taiwan 
policy-making. The Shanghai centre was headed by Wang Daohan. Wang occupied 
a place with the decisionmakers at the core making Taiwan policy while taking 
charge of the direct negotiations with Taiwan as the supreme negotiator on the 
521 . Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents And China: An Investigative History. New York: 
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mainland side. Wang's specific responsibility was to participate in the Taiwan 
policy decision-making after retirement from the Shanghai mayoralty. Wang had his 
think tanlc for Taiwan policy and his own team for negotiations on Taiwan affairs. 
The Shanghai centre was in a delicate position. As such, it is necessary to analyse 
Wang's subtle capacity. On one hand, he was a former senior official, who had been 
retired for a long time. Strictly speaking, he was not within the bureaucratic system 
because he was a non-permanent bureaucrat. The Shanghai centre headed by Wang 
was extraofficial and not included in the formal organisational framework concerning 
Taiwan affairs. Nevertheless, Wang was assigned to engage in making Taiwan 
policy because of his close personal relations with Jiang Zemin. 522 Born in 1915 he 
had been relieved of his post of Shanghai mayor in 1985. Wang gave guidance and 
support to Jiang and helped him rise through the ranks of Communist leadership. 
When Wang stepped down as mayor, he highly recommended Jiang, who craved for 
the position, as an excellent successor. With Deng Xiaoping's approval, both Wang 
and Jiang obtained what they wished. Jiang had worked under Wang's leadership for 
a long time. Wang had held the deputy ministers' position of the First Ministry of 
Machine-Building Industry and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, as well 
as the post of first deputy-director of the State Import and Export Administration and 
the State Foreign Investment Administration, from 1949 to 1980. In the earlier 
stages, Jiang served on Wang's subordinate staff and became his assistant in later 
days. Wang was Jiang's chief political benefactor throughout his career. He fostered 
PublicAffairs, 1999, p.31. 
522 • Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, p.248. 
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Jiang's rise to the inner circle of power, of which the Shanghai mayoralty was one 
key step. Wang and Jiang had a deep personal bond and a close friendship.523 
Wang held official positions despite the fact that he was no longer a public 
servant. The PRe was slowly moving to an open and modern state under huge 
pressures from both inside and outside the country, but it remained a state ruled by 
man rather than by law. A retirement system had been established since the early 
1980s. However, this system had proved imperfect and its rules had not been strictly 
complied with. For example, Deng Xiaoping retired in the late 1980s, but he 
remained in possession of the actual supreme power until his death in 1997. 
According to the regulations, leaders at the level of ministry, major city or key 
province must retire after the age of sixty-five. Wang had been retired for a long 
time because of his advanced age. Nevertheless, Jiang broke the regulations and 
appointed Wang as a member of the central Taiwan work leading group and the 
president of the association for relations across the Taiwan Straits, despite it 
appearing to be in the nature of a part-time job. Wang's assignment to be in charge 
of Taiwan policy was a political deal rather than one based upon professional 
considerations. It was both indicative of Jiang's political repayment to Wang and his 
confidence in him. Wang had no previous experience or expertise on Taiwan. When 
Wang's appointments as president of ARATS in 1991 and as a member ofCTWLG 
in 1993 were published, the unexpected news caused surprise on both sides of the 
523 • For more information about the relationship between Wang and Jiang, see Wang Mingyi, 
Uncertain Straits: When the Republic a/China Met with the People's Republic a/China (:E ~ )(, 
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Publishing Enterprise Ltd. ( Bt t~ )l: 1t ill !ltZ if:: 2& B9: {)j- ;ff ~ -0 m ), 1993, pp.313-317; Bruce 
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Press, 1998, pp.35, 38, 60-61, 66, 75, 94,115-120,133-135,334. 
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Taiwan Strait.524 Wang had lived in Shanghai all year round but Jiang gave him a 
greater authority in making policy and handling affairs on Taiwan. Jiang told many 
visitors that he had a good opinion of Wang and counted on him in the fields ofPRC 
policies toward Taiwan and the United States.525 Wang was viewed as Jiang's 
mouthpiece on Taiwan policy, while also having a great influence on Jiang in Taiwan 
affairs. 526 Wang's statements about Taiwan affairs had thus drawn much attention. 
The fundamental reason why there were two centres for the making of Taiwan 
policy is that Jiang had political difficulties in dominating Taiwan policy-making in 
the transitional period succeeding Deng. It is a tradition that the paramount leaders 
leave the power centre in Beijing for Shanghai, establishing a new strategic base to 
launch a counterattack on their political opponents when their absolute authority is 
challenged. Between 1965 and 1966, Mao found it very difficult to start the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Beijing so he went to Shanghai, mobilising the 
movement and relying on his trusted followers in the CPC Shanghai Municipal 
Committee. Between 1991-1992, Deng was unable to carry out his new policies, 
shifting the focal point from the conservative line of anti-peaceful evolution ( anti-
West) and deflation to the radical approach ofre-opening the door to foreign 
countries and starting a new upsurge of economic development. As such, he also 
524. Wang's appointment as member ofthe CTWLG in 1993 was published by the PRC organ, The 
Wenhui Daily( Jt IC jll) in Hong Kong rather than announced by the PRC official body. See Wang 
Mingyi, Uncertain Straits: When the Republic a/China Met with the People's Republic a/China (3: 
~ 5l.., ;r: lj$ j£ $g !fj JIj/f-}!j l' f:jJ te /1f/ 1fJi L l' f:jJ A te ft!ll /1f/). Taipei: The Times Cultural 
Publishing Enterprise Ltd. ( Bt tit )( it l±l Ji 11:: .ill!. B~ ffi' :ff ~[t -0 P] ), 1993, pp.313-314. 
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went to Shanghai and the south preparing public opinion for his new political 
campaign.527 
The existence of two Taiwan policy-making centres indicates that Jiang followed 
Mao and Deng's behaviour in defending power and breaking through the barriers of 
making and implementing policies. In Jiang's case, he did not have the established 
authority of Mao and Deng. In the early period of his rule, Jiang did not have secure 
hold on Beijing's bureaucratic organisations because he was viewed as a political 
lightweight and a transitional figure. Thus, Jiang strove to cultivate political support 
within the party, government and military to strengthen his political influence over 
the central authorities. He used his tenure as mayor of Shanghai, building an 
extensive connection network, called the "Shanghai faction". He exploited his 
position and power by promoting and moving members of the "Shanghai faction" 
into departments under the CPC Central Committee and the State Council. While 
relying on this "Shanghai faction" in consolidating his leading position in the central 
apparatus, he still had to seek support from his power base of Shanghai. There were 
a lot of his trusted followers there and he believed it was its stronghold. In particular, 
Wang was his one-time patron, who had helped him to consolidate power and 
advised him on statecraft. The national strategy toward Taiwan was very sensitive 
and took an important place in the power struggle for leadership succession. For 
Jiang, such a major matter needed to be entrusted to his henchmen rather than relying 
on the professional officials inside formal institutions. Thus, it was Wang who 
became an advisor to Jiang on Taiwan affairs and Shanghai played a major role in 
527 . Suisheng Zhao, "Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour: Elite Politics in Post-Tiananmen China," Asian 
Survey, VoI.XXXIII, No.8, August 1993, pp.739-756. 
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making Taiwan policy by entering into a rivalry with the Beijing centre headed by 
Qian Qishen. 
The Beijing centre dominated the Taiwan policy establishment in the central 
government. It played an essential, but not decisive, role in the formulation of 
Taiwan policy. In light of norms and regulations, it was responsible for providing 
the basis for the party's central leadership on the PRC strategy toward Taiwan. 
Usually, it supervised drafting and readjusting Taiwan policy and submitted results 
and options to the CTWLG and the Politburo and its Standing Committee to discuss 
and determine. It also oversaw Taiwan affairs and policy implementation nation-
wide, while coordinating cross-strait relations management among all the 
departments concerned. Theoretically, it was the government's highest authority on 
Taiwan policy-making because it represented the central authorities while the 
Shanghai centre was the second tier of authority. Because of this legitimacy, it was 
in a much better position than Shanghai. The Shanghai centre although closely tied 
with Jiang, was far removed from Beijing. However, despite being an informal 
organisation, it sought to playa major role in Taiwan policy. Its working range was 
very wide, stretching from the collection of information, research on the Taiwan 
issue, brains-trust of the PRC-US disputes over Taiwan and major Taiwan policy, 
even to the handling of cross-strait relations and spokesman for the central authorities 
on some occasions. Backed and directly instructed by Jiang, it occupied an 
important place in the PRC policy-making system on Taiwan. Without being 
authorised by the party and state, the existence and activities of the Shanghai centre 
demonstrated the noninstitutional elements of Taiwan policy-making based on 
informal politics, in conflict with the formal organisational system's functions. 
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Competition and conflict between the two centres making Taiwan policy lay in 
the fact that both points of departure were fundamentally different. Qian Qishen 
clung to established guiding principles and wanted to make and implement an 
orthodox policy on Taiwan. He had no close personal ties with Jiang despite short-
term historical affiliations.528 It seemed that the cautious bureaucrat, did not bind 
himself together with Jiang in succession politics despite being involuntarily 
involved. Probably the bitter lessons of past succession struggles led to Qian 
wishing to stay aloof from the contention between Jiang and his rivals. Generally 
speaking, having few intentions to serve Jiang's personal political considerations and 
make innovations, he was believed to be inclined to a conservative policy on Taiwan 
and gradual development of cross-strait ties leading to eventual reunification. 
In contrast to sticking to the conventions of the Beijing centre led by Qian, the 
politically dynamic Shanghai centre headed by Wang sought to break through 
Beijing's stereotyped routine. Obviously, the Shanghai centre aimed at establishing 
Jiang's legitimacy and prestige as supreme leader through great achievements in 
Taiwan policy and affairs. Jiang was highly dissatisfied that no major breakthrough 
had been achieved over Taiwan despite several years of on-off talks. In attempting to 
satisfy Jiang, the Shanghai centre was enterprising and strove for an early solution of 
the Taiwan problem by trying to bring forth original ideas. It showed goodwill 
toward Taipei, adopting a more moderate stance than the Beijing centre. Trial 
balloons were launched from Shanghai to test reactions from Taiwan and 
international opinion in order to create favourable and effective Taiwan policy 
options for Jiang. Wang led his team in continuously proposing new tactics on 
528 . Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
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Taiwan, many of which suggestions were adopted by Jiang. It sought to make 
greater contributions to the consolidation and promotion of Jiang's status by 
associating him with enlightened and future-oriented policies on Taiwan. 
With such a background, Jiang took the political offensive and announced a new 
Taiwan policy in early 1995, called Jiang's eight propositions on Taiwan. Jiang 
declared that the PRC would not militarily threaten Taiwan, appealing to Chinese on 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait not to fight with each other and to strive for a peaceful 
reunification of China. 529 The Shanghai centre played a larger role than the Beijing 
centre in mapping out Jiang's moderate eight point policy toward Taiwan.530 In 
Jiang's handling of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, Wang and his team were trusted 
more than Qian and his Party or the rest of the government's Taiwan policy-making 
system in providing information and advice. For example, at an early stage of Lee 
Teng-hui's US visit, Jiang's decisions basically echoed Wang's advice and 
assessment of the political situation. 531 The Beijing centre was overshadowed, but 
strove to preserve its own legitimacy and position of primacy. As such, it adopted an 
unfavourable attitude to the Taiwan policy proposals put forward by the Shanghai 
centre in its eagerness to initiate a new phase in cross-strai.t relations and move 
toward immediate reunification. 
California Press, 1998, p.133; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: 
Prentice Hall, 1999, pp.28-29. 
529 . Jiang Zemin, "Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland," ( ll1~ ~ , " -j;; 1ft:itt 
tl3. ~ ~ - * it e"J % nlG rm £1* ~ -ti -4," ) January 30, 1995, in The Taiwan Work Office of the 
CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council ( r:p ~ r:p :!R: is' ?~ I 
f1:: 11, 0- ~ / ~ 9r ~ '§' ?~ $ %-11, 0- ~), China's Taiwan Issue ( * !lJl ft Iff IE) Jllf). Beijing: 
Jiuzhou Press (fL V+I 00 ~ ill JtlR *±), 1998, pp.231-235. 
530. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, p.l72; 
Lin Wenzheng, "Mr. Qiu Jinyi Revealed the Inside Story of the Koo-Wang Talks of 1993," (*tc X 
Ig((, " ~ :itt :@::f~ 3f -* J:. i? i~ f!lZ, $, " ) The Journalist Uff /iff If]), October 18-24, 1998, p,44. 
531 • Ruan Ming, National Reunification: Project of Lasting Importance ( [ljC ~, jtfj J/1 iii - If df -* 
N)· Taipei: The Rice Field Publishing Ltd. ( 1@ B3 ill JtlR if ~&. -0 P] ), 1996, p.96. 
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On the Taiwan policy issues, Wang and Qian took differing stances. By and 
large, Qian's Taiwan policy statements were more reflective of the PRC 
government's position than his personal opinion. In particular, when the top leaders 
were in the process of internal policy debate and political disputes, he had to 
maintain the established official stance. In contrast to Qian, Wang spoke for Jiang on 
Taiwan affairs. When Jiang had some new ideas involving delicate and sensitive 
issues not ripe for publication, he had no way to personally promote them, but Wang 
could raise them in his ARATS capacity. However, Wang also promoted policy 
approaches of his own conception. After recommending ideas to Jiang and gaining 
approval, Wang published them to 'fly a kite' domestically, while collecting 
responses from Taipei and the major powers, particularly the US. In doing so, he 
wished for prompt discussion and consensus-building among the party's central 
leaders to reshape Taiwan policy in some respects. However, while Wang had 
become the focus of news reports in Taiwan, Hong Kong and the international media, 
his remarks were not viewed as representing an official Chinese statement. Instead, 
Qian was regarded as the official spokesman on Beijing's Taiwan policy. This 
complicated the PRC position on cross-strait relations bringing about troublesome 
problems and sending some mixed signals to Taipei. 
The focal point of contention between Wang and Qian was whether to revise the 
traditional concept of 'One China' or to seek a more moderate Taiwan policy for the 
promotion of earlier reunification. In November 1992, a consensus on the' One 
China' issue was reached between the SEF and ARATS. Both agreed to adhere to 
the 'One-China' principle despite differing over the political definition.532 According 
532 • For more information about the consensus, see Chapter 3.3-3. Mainland Policy. 
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to Taipei, the ARATS declared that it had made a concession by respecting and 
accepting the SEF's suggestion in reaching the consensus. 533 This demonstrated that 
Wang preferred to adopt a more flexible stance to try to bring the two sides together, 
in order to woo Taipei into softening its stance against immediate reunification. 
However, Qian adopted an equivocal attitude toward the consensus. He continued to 
interpret 'One China' as meaning the PRC. His Party and the government's Taiwan 
policy-making system reiterated its past stand on the substance of 'One China'. In 
August 1993, a white paper was published reasserting Beijing's long-standing claim 
that there is only' One China', Taiwan is part of it and that the PRC is the only legal 
government of all China.534 This was viewed by Taipei as violating the 1992 
consensus, and was not expected to be conducive to the development of cross-strait 
relations. 535 Before mid-1995, Qian shunned the consensus but did not publicly deny 
it. Soon after Lee visited the US in June 1995, Qian did deny the original consensus 
that both sides upheld the' One-China' principle but each had a different 
understanding of the meaning of 'One China'. On June 22, Qian published a seven-
point statement to govern Taiwan-Hong Kong relations, which indicated that he 
regarded Beijing as the central government and degraded Taipei as a local 
government, equivalent to Hong Kong. He pointed out emphatically the PRC 
government's official position on the 'One China' principle and asked "the Taiwan 
533 . See the Mainland Affairs Council, the Executive Yuan, Republic of China, "Major Events Across 
the Taiwan Straits ( January 1912 to December 1999 )," on the World Wide Web at 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/chronology/scemap.htm. 
534 . Taiwan Affairs Office & Information Office, State Council, the People's Republic of China: "The 
Taiwan Question and Reunification of China," (~ 9} ~ i3' t~ .. 9} ~\ 0 'ill ~ 9} ~ if)f IIU 
~\01l, " i3' t~ IB] IDI Ej 9=t ~ e"J ~ -," ) August 1993, in The Taiwan Work Office of the CPC 
Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council ( 9=t ~ 9=t :5k: i3' 1~ I 1"1" ~\ 
0'il/ ~ 9} ~ 15 1~ • 9} ~\ 01l), China's Taiwan Issue ( rp !llI tit iff! /liJ Ilf)· Beijing: Jiuzhou 
Press ( :tL ¥J+II!I .::j:5 tl:l !1R t± ), 1998, p.256. 
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authorities to make a clear analysis of ( the) current situation". 536 By intending to 
treat Taiwan the way Beijing had treated Hong Kong and demanding Taipei accept a 
subordinate position, he, in fact, denied the 1992 consensus, imposing on Taipei 
Beijing's own version of 'One China'. The remarks about the 'One China' principle 
and Taiwan-Hong Kong relations became a keynote of Qian in his harsh criticism of 
Taipei during late 1995 and early 1996.537 Under such circumstances, Xinhua News 
Agency, Beijing's official medium declared that Beijing insisted on Taipei's 
acceptance of the PRC version of the 'One-China' principle as a precondition to the 
resumption of bilateral talks. However, Taipei rejected this, stating that it was 
unacceptable.538 
By comparison, Wang adhered to the 1992 consensus, seeking to express the 
principle of' One China' in a new form. 539 On several informal occasions, even as 
the Taiwan crisis reached its height in January 1996, he tried to revise the orthodox 
policy, in particular the traditional political definition of 'One China', in an attempt 
535 • The Mainland Affairs Council, the Executive Yuan, Republic of China, "Major Events Across the 
Taiwan Straits (January 1912 to December 1999 )," on the World Wide Web at 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/chronology/scemap.htm 
536. Christie Su, "With Koo-Wang Talks Postponed, Taiwan-Hong Kong Issue Arises," The Free 
China Journal, June 30, 1995. For the full text of Qian's seven-point statement, see The Taiwan 
Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council ( r:p 
~ r:p :!k: f3' ?~ I fp 1} 0 ~ I 00 :9} Il1G f3' ?~ $ :9} 1]1 0 ~ ), China's Taiwan Issue ( l' flII it Iq 
Ib] J!lj). Beijing: Jiuzhou Press ( 11 m'l 00 45 tl:l JlR T± ), 1998, pp.261-262. For more information 
about Beijing's denial of the 1992 consensus after Lee's US visit, and Qian's Party and the 
government's Taiwan policy-making system's reiteration of its stance on the substance of 'One 
China', see Wu Tiandai, "Taiwan Is the Lighthouse of the Chinese Nation in Chinese Mind's Eyes," 
(~X ill, " f3' ?~-r:p $ ~ ~ S"J 1J *' ") Cheng Ming Monthly (11- PJ$), No.223, May 1996, 
p.38; Li Qihong, "Former MAC Chairman Su Chi: Chen Shui-bian Denied the 1992 Consensus 
Aiming at Repudiating the Established Basis of Cross-Strait Relations," ( * '9: !Ill , " §fJ Mr ~ is ± 
~ "iJt ~ : Il* 7.k fmj ~ JE 11 -= ~ iR ~ ~~ tiE 11 rm J$ * -* !l)t 1f S"J ~ :PtIJ ' " ) United Morning 
Daily ( JfJ it If!. !Ii), November 7, 2001; "News Briefing by Chinese Foreign Ministry," Beijing 
Review, July 17-23, 1995, p.20. 
537 . For example, on this basis, he demonstrated his tougher stance on Taiwan in the middle ten days 
of March 1996. See "Qian On World and Regional Issues," Beijing Review, March 25-31, 1996, 
pp.7-9. 
538. "How ROC Tries to Cope With Peking's Behaviour," The Free China Journal, November 10, 
1995. 
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to ease cross-strait tension to reduce the heavy pressure on Jiang from his political 
rivals and the military. He sought to redefine the 'One China' principle with a 
neutral term, not subject to anyone-sided interpretation, in order to shelve debates on 
the meaning of 'One China' and create favourable conditions for reunification. He 
considered that 'One China' referred neither to the PRC nor to the ROC, but to a 
reunified China that would be commonly created by compatriots on both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait. He described the political situation between Taiwan and mainland 
China as more "China's division" than "a divided China". The description of 
"China's division" was close to Taiwan's idea of "a divided China", reflecting a new 
approach by Wang toward Taiwan. Wang's opinion indicated that he believed that 
Taiwan's political status could be negotiated under the 'One China' principle and 
Beijing might accept a new form of government if Taipei agreed to reunification 
talks. This demonstrated his unremitting efforts for a more flexible treatment of 
Taipei's status and a more pragmatic solution for reunification in order to preserve 
and promote Jiang's leadership. Qian, however, unlikely to agree with Wang's 
approach, could only maintain the orthodox policy on Taiwan. He had been hurt by 
the outburst of the anti-"Taiwanese separatists" and anti-"American hegemonists" 
among senior military officers following Lee's US visit. In the struggle for power in 
the Zhongnanhai that was under way, the leaders had become more aggressive in 
their Taiwan policy. In order to win the confidence of the military and preserve his 
own position for foreign and Taiwan affairs, he had to maintain the old form of 'One 
China', indicative of a more conservative Taiwan policy.540 
539. Luo Bing, "Wang Daohan's Version of '''One China'" Caused a Disturbance," ( )i5J /71< ," rx :@: 
t&§ --1- 9=t IE ~ ]XI, tEi:, " ) The Trend Magazine ( ij/; ;fij), No.l48, December 1997, pp.10-11. 
540. Qian had come under heavy pressure from the military following Lee's US visit. His resignation 
as foreign minister was demanded by reason of his weakness towards Taipei and Washington. He 
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The divergences between Wang and Qian over Taiwan policy had some 
undesirable consequences for cross-strait ties. In particular, their conflicting remarks 
on the 1992 consensus confused the PRC position on Taiwan affairs, affecting 
Taipei's confidence in Beijing. In Taipei's eyes, Beijing unilaterally breached the 
1992 consensus by forcibly placing Taiwan within the framework ofPRC 
sovereignty.54l Taipei accused Beijing of a lack of sincerity and goodwill in its 
observation of the inconsistency. In terms of the definition of 'One China', Taipei 
argued that the original oral agreement permitted the two sides to have their own 
explanations of the' One China' concept. According to SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu, 
Taipei had "never deviated from the "One-China" principle", refuting Beijing's 
accusation that Taipei was creating 'two Chinas" in the world community. Although 
Taipei believed that Beijing broke its promise and violated the consensus, it 
continued to pursue unification in light of its own understanding of 'One China' . 
Taipei had maintained that the 'One China' concept referred to the future rather than 
the present. The two sides were not yet unified, but were equals, separately ruled. If 
Taipei accepted Beijing's view, then it would downgrade itself to the level of a local 
level government body within the PRC. Thus Taipei rejected the principle of 'One-
China' on Beijing's terms. Also, after Beijing suspended regular cross-strait talks in 
retaliation for Lee's US visit, Taipei refused to accept Beijing's precondition that 
was forced to make a self-criticism for his mistakes in handling major Taiwan issues. See Chapter 
5.6. Evaluation of the Military's Influence upon Taiwan Policy-Making. 
541. For Taipei's accusation of Beijing's backtracking from the 1992 consensus and imposition of its 
view upon Taipei, as well as Taipei's justification of its adherence to the' One-China' principle from 
1993 to 1996, see the Mainland Affairs Council, the Executive Yuan, Republic of China, "Major 
Events Across the Taiwan Straits (January 1912 to December 1999 )," on the World Wide Web at 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/chronology/scemap.htm; Christie Su, "Taipei Acts to Reset Straits 
Talks But Peking Again Rebuffs Move," The Free China Journal, May 3, 1996; Sofia Wu, "Taipei, 
Beijing Need New Framework for Relations: MAC Chief," CNA, June 13,2000; Christie Su, 
"Unification Guidelines Not Rigid: MAC Chief," The Free China Journal, August 16, 1996; Christie 
Su, "ROC Reasserts Policies on 'One-China', US Relations," The Free China Journal, July 21, 1995. 
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bilateral dialogue could only resume if Taipei accepted Beijing's version of the 'One-
China' principle. In particular, when Beijing intimidated Taiwan by force, Taipei 
was determined not to concede political ground in the face of military threats. 
Beijing's inconsistency on the consensus, and misinterpretation of it, resulted from 
informal domestic political factors. This was resisted by Taipei, producing adverse 
effects on the relations between the mainland and the island, which caused new 
disputes and led a standoff. More unfavourably, it deepened Taipei's doubt about 
Beijing's sincerity in developing cross-strait relations and real intentions regarding 
reunification. 
The divisiveness between Wang and Qian highlighted the wide divergence of 
views which prevailed among the PRC Taiwan policy-makers that they were 
incapable of coordinating because of mechanism problems and issues of informal 
politics. Thus, it can be seen that each policy-making centre tried to make its own 
Taiwan policy. This inevitably led to competition and conflicts between the two 
centres as each sought a bigger say in formulating PRC policy toward Taiwan. This 
made the policy process abnormal and policy principles and goals changeable. For 
instance, Jiang's eight propositions on Taiwan appeared to offer reasonable grounds 
for a compromise but, under the circumstances of succession politics, only half a year 
later a 180-degree turn was made. Under the pressure of his rivals and the military, 
Jiang was forced to adopt a tough stance on Taiwan. On the grounds of Lee's US 
visit, the PRC unilaterally suspended all cross-strait negotiations and launched a 
military intimidation of Taiwan. Therefore, the two centres hindered the procedural 
and rational establishment of a Taiwan policy. The irregular process of Taiwan 
policy-making contributed to its low effectiveness, and hindered the accomplishment 
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of its goals. It also led to less consistency and credibility in the PRC decision-
making on Taiwan's affairs, which was harmful to its long-term policy objectives. 
Such inconsistent and unstable policy behaviour exposed the contradictory elements, 
institutional and noninstitutional, within the PRC Taiwan policymaking structure and 
process. Finally, it suggests that there were strong links and interactions between 
succession politics and Taiwan policy, affecting the course of Taiwan policy 
formulation. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the relationship between the 
leadership succession problem and the Taiwan policy process. 
Chapter Five 
The Role of the Military in the 
PRC Taiwan Policy-Making 
5.1. The Military's Position in the Political System and 
Decision-Making 
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Before discussing the military's influence upon Taiwan policy-making, it is 
necessary to clarify its position in the PRC power structure and general framework of 
decision-making. The military has played a pivotal political role since 1949. 
Although it has lost some of its importance since 1978 with the country's strategic 
shift from war preparations externally to domestic economic priorities, it is still the 
most powerful political force in the country. The military views its main role as 
safeguarding the country's security, unity and stability, including coping with 
internal unrest that could threaten its own position of power and privilege and the 
Communist regime. Domestically, the key concern of the PRC armed forces is the 
suppression of opposition political forces within the country. Therefore, the military 
is much more than just an organisation of armed forces, it is the source of power for 
the regime. 
The military's position in the political system of the PRC is based on the complex 
power relationship between the Communist party and the military. Politically, both 
party and army need with each other. The army supports and safeguards the one-
party rule of the Communist Party of China ( CPC ), whilst the party provides the 
army with privilege and regards it as a guardian. Without the army the party would 
lose control of the polity. Nominally, the CPC and its paramount leaders have 
control over the army by way of their power to appoint and place military officers. 
However, to a great extent, and especially at the critical moment of a power struggle 
inside the CPC, the top leaders of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) decide on 
personnel themselves and act in their own self-interest. Therefore, whether CPC 
paramount leaders have control over the PLA is questionable. By far the biggest 
ongoing concern for the CPC paramount leaders is loyalty of the military to the 
civilian leadership. 542 
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The military has a great influence upon PRC politics. It has the dual function of 
social and political service; especially it is positioned to act as a kingmaker and a key 
decision-maker. Whenever either internal conflict or external crises break out, the 
PLA comes to the fore to stabilise the political situation and, where appropriate, 
decide who should become the new ruler. The political survival of leaders depends 
on the military's support, because it is always involved in any power struggle inside 
the party and can playa leading role in deposing a leader. In particular, leadership 
succession provides the military with opportunities to greatly influence politics and 
policy decision-making. 
With regard to the military role and influence in politics and policy decision-
making, Jonathan D. Pollack believes that "the PLA remains an extremely powerful 
bureaucratic actor" and plays a major domestic political role. He suggests that "the 
persistence of traditional norms amidst a serious, sustained effort to professionalize 
the Chinese military establishment seems likely to remain a continuing source of 
long-term conflict within the policy-making process.,,543 However, in recent years, 
some scholars have argued that "the PLA officer corps since 1978 has become more 
'professionalized' .,,544 They believe that the PLA is developing more professional-
type networks and that such trends are prevailing throughout the army. Nevertheless, 
this study argues that although military professionalism has developed rapidly in 
recent years, the PLA is still a highly politicised army. Indeed, in the mid-1990s, the 
political role ofPRC armed forces remained unchanged. The National Defence Law, 
legislated by the PRC parliament in the mid-1990s, formalised the army's "dual 
542 • According to Michael D. Swaine, the PLA status in the polity may be described as a "state within 
a state". See Michael D. Swaine, The Role o/the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking. 
Santa Monica, Ca: Rand Corporation, 1996, pp.l2, 54-55. In addition, Andrew J. Nathan and Robert 
S. Ross believe that "the PLA was in fact a self-contained organisation". "There is even some 
question whether Jiang, despite his formal authority, has been able to exercise full authority over 
senior military officers." See Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty 
Fortress: China's Search/or Security. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997, 
p.141. 
543. See Jonathan D. Pollack, "Structure and Process in the Chinese Military System," in Kenneth G. 
Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (eds), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao 
China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, pp.169-1n. 
544 . James C. Mulvenon, ProJessionalization o/the Senior Chinese Officer Corps: Trends and 
Implications. Santa Monica: Rand, 1997, p.l. 
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function" of defending the nation from invaders and ensuring social and political 
domestic stability.545 Although the professionalization of the army is now a general 
trend, it is acknowledged that "there is little evidence to suggest that the PLA is 
withdrawing from politics".546 
The military continues to play an important role in party and governmental 
policy-making processes. In the CPC Central Committee of 1995-96, elected by the 
Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992, 24.3 percent of the membership represented the 
military establishment. 547 The military also had its own two representatives out of a 
total of20 in the ruling CPC Politburo.548 More importantly, in the mid-1990s the 
Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Admiral Liu Huaqing, was a 
member of the permanent committee of the party's Political Bureau, which groups 
the CPC regime's most powerful leaders and makes all important political decisions, 
as well as formulating principles and policies. He was the only military official 
among the seven members of the CPC Politburo Standing Committee, but he had a 
strong voice.549 Traditionally, the military has taken a positive role in the 
formulation of domestic and foreign policies. 
The military sees itself as the defender of national unity, trying to hold together 
China's separate islands and remote ethnic frontiers. Taiwan affairs constitute an 
important element of both national reunification and foreign policy. More 
importantly, the PRC policy towards Taiwan has a direct bearing on national 
defence, especially military strategy, and even war and peace. The military insists 
545. A bill "Law on National Defence of the PRC" was submitted to the NPC in 1996 and was adopted 
by the NPC in 1997. This law also stipulates the relationship between the PLA and the CPC. See Mel 
Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China's Security: The New Roles a/the Military. Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1998, p.34; James Mulvenon (ed.), China Facts & Figures: 
Annual Handbook, Vol. 23, 1998. Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 1998, pp.90-
93. 
546. See James C. Mulvenon, Pro/essionalization o/the Senior Chinese Officer Corps: Trends and 
Implications. Santa Monica: Rand, 1997, p.76, and its book review by Jianhai Bi, The China Journal, 
Issue 41, January 1999, pp.222-223. 
547. Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The Army in the Succession to Deng Xiaoping: Familiar Fealties and 
Technocratic Trends," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIII, No.8, August 1993, p.758. 
548. "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation ( compiled by Robeli F. Ash )," The China Quarterly, 
No. 133, March 1993, p.194. 
549 • Compared with that there was no professional serviceman in the CPC Politburo Standing 
Committee of the Thirteenth Central Committee in the late 1980s, the military's representation in the 
ruling circle significantly increased in the early and mid-1990s. See You Ji, "Missile Diplomacy and 
PRC Domestic Politics," in Greg Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan's Future: Innovations 
in Politics and Military Power. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of 
Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997, p.43. 
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that it will firmly protect the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The 
military has time and again threatened the use of force if Taiwan declared 
independence or in the event of a foreign invasion of the island. More seriously, an 
independent Taiwan or long-term division from mainland China would encourage 
ethnic separatism in the country's border regions such as the Muslims in western 
China. The military wants to play its role as China's central unifying structure and 
thus it is extremely important in seeking to understand how the PRC Taiwan policy 
is made. 
5.2. The Military Leadership and Institutions Involved in 
Taiwan Policy-Making 
Before analysing the major PLA units involved in Taiwan policy making, it is 
necessary briefly to view the military's general organisational structure and decision-
making system.550 At the top level, the Central Military Commission ( CMC ) of the 
CPC is the country's supreme body in charge ofthe armed forces, and the highest 
military policy-making body. The state CMC is bracketed with the party CMC, as 
both organisations consist of the same people. The PRC leadership has maintained 
dual, identical party and state military commissions since the 1980s in order to 
enhance the legitimacy of the CPC regime with a nominal governmental role in 
administering the army.551 Between 1995 and 1996, the then chairman of the CMC 
of both party and state was Jiang Zemin, who was also both Communist Party chief 
and head of state. The CMC has overall responsibility for military affairs, thereby 
centralising power on major issues. Its main duty is to take decisions on defence 
strategy and national security. For example, it has the power to initiate the use of 
force, despite the fact that the power to decide on questions of war and peace is 
nominally exercised by the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee. 
550. For a chart of the basic organisational structure of the PRC military, see Michael D. Swaine, The 
Military & Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, Beliefs. Santa Monica, Ca: Rand 
Corporation, 1992, p.245. For an overview ofthe military's decision-making structure, see Michael 
D. Swaine, The Role o/the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking. Santa Monica, Ca: 
Rand Corporation, 1996. 
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Thus, it has the real power to take a final decision on whether to use military means 
against Taiwan. However, the CMC does not supervise all military affairs. Matters 
such as defence planning and the army's training are assigned to the PLA three 
general departments to oversee. 
There is a close linkage between the CMC and the Central Taiwan Work Leading 
Group ( CTWLG). Taiwan policy is largely military in nature. Jiang Zemin's 
assumption of a leading position in the CTWLG originated in part from his 
chairmanship of the CMC. Such circumstances established a connection between 
defence policy and Taiwan policy, more generally providing the military plenty of 
room to become involved in a range of critical Taiwan policy decisions. The PLA 
had a representative, Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of the general 
staff of the army, on the CTWLG, strengthening the military's ties with the top 
Taiwan policy makers. At a time when Jiang did not have complete control of 
Taiwan policy, the military's role in shaping the country's strategic objectives was 
particularly significant, thereby increasing its leverage.552 
Four CMC vice-chairmen were professional servicemen, Admiral Liu Huaqing, 
General Zhang Zhen, General Zhang Wannian and General Chi Haotian. 553 Admiral 
Liu and General Zhang Wannian were viewed as the key defence strategists, and 
were known to be involved in, and influence, Taiwan policy.554 First Vice-Chairman 
Liu Huaqing was also concurrently a member of the CPC Politburo Standing 
Committee in charge of day-to-day military affairs. He had a decisive role in 
discharging the CMC responsibilities. Second Vice-Chairman General Zhang Zhen 
had a low public profile. His military career after 1949 was served mainly as a senior 
551. Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China's Security: The New Roles a/the Military. Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1998, p.14. 
552. You Ji, "Missile Diplomacy and PRC Domestic Politics," in Greg Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy 
and Taiwan's Future: innovations in Politics and Military Power. Canberra: Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997, 
ppAO-43; John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization. 
Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997, p.61; Michael D. Swaine, The Role of the 
Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking. Santa Monica, Ca: Rand Corporation, 1996, 
p.27, n19; p.28, n20. 
553 • Michael D. Swaine, The Role a/the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking. Santa 
Monica, Ca: Rand Corporation, 1996, pp.15-16. 
554. Harlan W. Jencks, "Wild Speculations on the Military Balance in the Taiwan Straits," in James R. 
Lilley and Chuck Downs (eds), Crisis in the Taiwan Strait. FT. McNair, Washington, D.C.: National 
Defence University Press, 1997, p.l46; Tai Ming Cheung, "Chinese Military Preparations Against 
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official leading the defence science, technology and education organisations rather 
than as a commander directing operations. He was not regarded as an active 
participant-in Taiwan policy making.555 General Zhang Wannian who had real power 
despite being fourth in the top military hierarchy, had served previously as chief of 
the PLA general staff. He was good at mapping out strategy and tactics while also 
experienced as a field commander. He planned and executed the military exercises 
held during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96.556 
General Chi Haotian served concurrently as Minister of Defence. Although 
visible internationally as the top PRC military leader, Chi was less powerful than 
General Zhang Wannian, or the two veterans, Admiral Liu Huaqing and General 
Zhang Zhen.557 This suggests that the Ministry of National Defence (MND ) is not 
an organ of real power, and exists in name, rather than in reality. It was set up in 
light of international custom, performing mostly protocol and ceremonial functions, 
such as liaising with foreign military units. The important defence decisions are 
made at the CMC, while routine military administrative affairs are handled by three 
general departments of the PLA.558 Chi did not playa leading role in national 
security affairs or military strategy. His career was mainly served as a political 
commissar, specialising in military political work. As a state councillor and Minister 
of National Defence, Chi oversaw military research and development while 
coordinating relations with the administrative departments. Chi was not as 
Taiwan Over the Next 10 Years," in James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs (eds), Crisis in the Taiwan 
Strait. FT. McNair, Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1997, pp.61-62. 
555. Michael D. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking. Santa 
Monica, Ca: Rand Corporation, 1996, p.18. Although, according to Tai Ming Cheung, "Zhang Zhen 
is believed to oversee the formulation of strategic doctrines toward Taiwan", Cheung does not offer 
any evidence to support his opinion. See Tai Ming Cheung, "Chinese Military Preparations Against 
Taiwan Over the Next 10 Years," in James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs (eds), Crisis in the Taiwan 
Strait. FT. McNair, Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1997, p.62. 
556 • Before launching the first round of military exercises and missile tests from July 21-28, 1995, 
Zhang Wannian delivered an internal speech indicating the aims of these operations. The speech was 
transmitted to officers by all services and arms and seven major military regions. See Luo Bing, "The 
Inside Information on the Test of Firing Missiles," ( ~ oj( , " ~ S!'J! irt M 1*1 ,It ' " ) Cheng Ming 
Monthly( '!r JUg), No.214, August 1995, p.6. When the Taiwan crisis reached a critical moment, a 
"Southeast War Zone" was set up on March 10 1996. It was commanded by Zhang Wannian. See 
Luo Bing, "The Inside Information on the Southeast War Zone of Communist China," ( ~ ilj( , " l:j:t 
ft* 1$j ~)I; 13:1*1 ,It, ") Cheng Ming Monthly( '!r mg), No.222, April 1996, p.lO. 
557 • On the interpersonal and working relationship between the four CMC vice-chairmen, see Michael 
D. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking. Santa Monica, Ca: 
Rand Corporation, 1996, p.43. 
558 • Michael D. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Militmy in National Security Policymaking. Santa 
Monica, Ca: Rand Corporation, 1996, pp,34-36; p.44, n16. 
influential as the other three CMC vice-chairmen in the Taiwan policy process, 
despite participating in making the major decision to launch the military exercises 
intimidating Taiwan in 1995-96. 
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The PLA three general departments, the General Political Department ( GPD ), 
the General Logistics Department ( GLD ) and the General Staff Department (GSD), 
represent a second tier of the military leadership.559 The GPD is a general branch of 
the CPC within the PLA. It is responsible for overseeing political education, 
discipline and the supervision of officers and soldiers. The GLD is in charge of 
defence finance, military supplies and PLA-related construction and properties. The 
GSD is the highest organ in charge ofPLA military matters, directing troop 
movements and operations. It plays a key role in the policy-making process 
particularly regarding war readiness and mobilisation. Among the three general 
departments, the GSD plays a larger role than the GPD or the GLD in influencing the 
formulation of defence strategy and Taiwan policy.560 The heads of the GPD, the 
GLD and the GSD are all members of the CMC. Although the directors of the three 
general departments do not participate in all critical decision-making, they have a 
strong voice and their advice is taken into account. Of the directors and deputy-
directors of three general departments, the chief of the general staff and deputy chiefs 
have a predominant role in the national security affairs and Taiwan policy making. 
This study proposes that the GSD and its chid and deputy chiefs are more 
influential than the GPD and the GLD and their directors and deputy-directors in the 
military's approach to national security affairs and Taiwan policy. 56! This argument 
559 • The PLA had three general departments between 1995 and 1996, but has four general 
departments now. In 1998 the PRC Government announced that it had added a fourth department to 
the army. The General Equipment Department ( GED ) is a new department to oversee the PLA 
weaponry, equipment, and armaments acquisition in particular. See Edward Chen, "Mainland China 
Deploying Over 400 Missiles Opposite Taiwan: Report," CNA, August 8, 2000. 
560. Michael D. Swaine believes that "of the three general departments and other executive agencies 
of the military affairs system, the GSD has by far the greatest input into the national security and 
defence policy process." See Michael D. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National 
Security Policymaking. Santa Monica, Ca: Rand Corporation, 1996, pp.46-47. 
561 • According to Michael D. Swaine, the GPD and GLD "reportedly do not playa major formative 
role in the defence policy process." Chief of the General Staff, Fu Quanyou played a role in advising 
on the national security policy. See Michael D. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National 
Security Policymaking. Santa Monica, Ca: Rand Corporation, 1996, pp.50-52, p.16. On policy 
toward Taiwan, it is basically the same situation. George W. Tsai believes that the GLD does not play 
a major role in the Taiwan policy process. He puts the roles of both the GSD and the GPD in 
influencing Taiwan policy on an equal footing, but recognises that Xiong "is an important transmitter 
of the military'S stands on Taiwan affairs" and is in a position that can have an effect on Jiang 
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is based on the following three points. Firstly, the GSD is a key unit in charge of 
military strategy on Taiwan including the collection of Taiwan information and 
mapping-out of the battle plan. Secondly, Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai, 
deputy chief of the general staff was the PLA representative on the Central Taiwan 
Work Leading Group. Thirdly, Xiong was in charge of foreign affairs and 
information for the whole army, and was responsible for coordinating all strategic 
intelligence materials in the field of military intelligence, in particular, Taiwan-
related military affairs. 
Below the level of the three general departments, there are seven major military 
regions, mainly made up of ground forces. Other services and arms are the Air 
Force, Navy and the strategic nuclear force (the Second Artillery Corps). In 
addition, there are non-combatant units such as: the Commission of Science, 
Technology and Industry for National Defence, the Academy of Military Science and 
the Defence University. Among them, the Defence University is the most active in 
Taiwan policy, but does not have a substantive influence. Of the seven major 
military regions, the Nanjing Military Region, which oversees the Taiwan area, is 
responsible for preparing possible military action against Taiwan. The Second 
Artillery Corps, is involved in the Taiwan policy process but is less influential. 
However, motivated by its own vital interests, it tried to influence Taiwan policy. It 
demanded a formal change of name to the PLA Strategic Rocket Force, in order to 
promote its position from an arm to a service. It believed that cross-strait tensions 
could justify its important position. It prepared a lightning war to attack Taiwan and 
proposed this battle plan to Jiang Zemin during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995_96.562 
The Air Force lobbied for sophisticated aircraft to deal with the Taiwan contingent. 
However, among all the services and arms, the Navy has seen the most active 
Zemin's view on Taiwan policy. See George W. Tsai, "The Making of Taiwan Policy in Mainland 
China: Structure and Process," Issues & Studies, Vol.33, No.9, September 1997, pp.16, 24. 
562 . Luo Bing, "The Military Hawk Grows More Powerful and Jiang Zemin Is Forced to Make Self-
Criticism-Communist China Reviews Its Interlinked Strategies toward America and Taiwan," ( !9' 
17j( , " 4I jj JJ!f ~ ~ * U ¥~ 1% 1Bl 3Jl ;j;i it- r:p ~ -jJiiJ ~ ~ is' ~ ~ , " ) The Trend Magazine 
(ij/j [fij), No.ll8, June 1995, p.8; Qu Tao, "Can an Attack with Missiles on Taiwan Become Effective 
within Three Minutes?" ( aa t1;f , " !¥f sit! :r& is' ' .:::: 5J\. # ~ ~)( 7' " ) Cheng Ming Monthly( -fi-Ilfj), 
No.219, January 1996, pp.21-22. 
involvement in Taiwan policy making because it relates closely to its strategic 
ambitions. 563 
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The PLA Navy ( PLAN) had played an increasing role in Taiwan policy-making 
since the early 1990s, when conditions were favourable for its lobbying on Taiwan 
policy. The PLAN's commanders, who had been far away from the decision-making 
centre in the previous forty years, now had powerful representatives in the party-state 
and military. The former commander of the navy, Liu Huaqing became a member of 
the Standing Committee of the CPC Politburo and first CMC vice-chairman in 
1992.564 Liu was credited with expanding the PRC naval ambitions, and made 
important contributions to the PLAN's reconstruction and modernisation while 
stressing its important role in resolving the Taiwan issue.565 The former PLAN vice-
commander and naval airforce commander, Vice-Admiral Li ling, promoted to vice-
chief of the general staff in the early 1990s, was regarded as the Navy's chief 
representative at the level of the PLA three general departments. 566 Li played a key 
role in lobbying the civilian and military leadership to decide to import warships and 
submarines from Russia, and to plan purchase of a Russian-made aircraft carrier to 
cope with the Taiwanese and American Navies.567 The promotion of PLAN's elite 
into the paramount political strata and the top military leadership set up the navy's 
input into Taiwan policy-making. 
Apart from accelerating naval modernisation, the PLAN lobbied on Taiwan policy 
for two main reasons. Strategically, a strong Beijing stance would help promote a 
PRC national security priority shift from land-dominated military strategy to 
563. Michael D. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking. Santa 
Monica, Ca: Rand Corporation, 1996, ppA7-4S; Bates Gill and Kim Taeho, China's Arms 
Acquisitionsfrom Abroad: A Questfor 'Superb and Secret Weapons'. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, pp.60-61. 
564 . "New Party Leadership Line-Up," Beijing Review, November 2-S, 1992, p.12. 
565. You Ji and You Xu, "In Search of Blue Water Power: The PLA Navy's Maritime Strategy in the 
1990s," Pacific Review, VolA, No.2, 1991, pp.139-140; Bates Gill and Taeho, Kim, China's Arms 
Acquisitions from Abroad: A Quest for 'Superb and Secret Weapons '. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, pp.60-61, lOS. In addition, with Liu Huaqing's influence and efforts, the 
navy was one of the best funded ofPLA services in the early 1990s. See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China 
after Deng Xiaoping: The Power Structure in Beijing since Tiananmen. Singapore: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1995,pp. 196-197,200. 
566. The Editorial Board of Who's Who in China ( 9=t 00 A 4't * im dJ!!. ~ ~~::g~), Who's Who in 
China Current Leaders ( l' !JfI A 15 ;t itt! j/f.: If{f (F Jt: 1ft ¥ @! -%J A !#' 4ft). Beijing: Foreign 
Languages Press (:7~ X ill Jli t±), 1994, p.300. 
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maritime defence. Politically, an important role in resolving the Taiwan issue would 
mean a higher status in the armed forces and greater national prestige for the PLAN. 
Specifically, the PLAN hoped to gain a greater share of the military budget and more 
advanced warships, including the aircraft carrier, through its vigorous lobbying 
activities. The PLAN viewed resolution of the Taiwan issue and reunification of the 
country as its primary combat mission, followed by defence of marine territory and 
protection of China's maritime interests.568 The prominence of the Taiwan issue 
pushed the PLAN forward a step and provided a golden opportunity for it to lobby 
the PRC paramount strata. 
The PLAN was a prominent actor in provoking the crisis of 1995-96 when Beijing 
made the decision to militarily intimidate Taiwan. For example, as principal 
commanders, Vice-Admiral Li Jing, deputy chief of the general staff of the PLA, and 
Rear Admiral He Pengfei, PLAN vice-commander conducted manoeuvres called 
"95-Independent No.8", one of the most important military exercises in intimidating 
Taiwan. The live-firing manoeuvre involved the three armed services, mainly the 
naval airforce, naval coastal artillery, naval missile unit and the East Sea Fleet. 569 
The PLAN's lobbying gained the attention of the highest leadership. During the 
Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96, Jiang Zemin made an inspection tour of the PLAN's 
units and viewed a naval exercise directed at Taiwan.57o The PLAN's profile had 
risen. It canvassed for its own aggressive views on Taiwan policy and strove to see 
them adopted. Basically, the policy was a naval blockade of Taiwan. 571 Such a 
blockade would display the PLAN's naval power and increase its leverage while 
567 • As the former navy and naval airforce commanders, both Liu and Li took a personal interest in 
acquiring an aircraft carrier. See Bates Gill and Kim Taeho, China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad: 
A Questfor 'Superb and Secret Weapons'. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p.l08. 
568 • Bates Gill and Kim Taeho, China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad: A Quest for 'Superb and 
Secret Weapons'. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp.60-61. 
569. Li Zijing, "An Actual Account on the Exercises of Blockading Taiwan," (~ § ~ , "Xi' IS' tt 
<fJii ~1it )j ~ m.,") Cheng Ming Monthly( $I- PJ$), No.215, September 1995, pp.12-13. 
570 • During his inspection, Jiang emphasised that it was very important to improve the naval force and 
quicken the pace of its modernisation to ensure coastal defence and resolve the Taiwan issue. Jiang 
praised the PLAN's military build-up achievements. Encouraged by his remarks, the PLAN vowed to 
strive for better performance of its military role in the country and contribute to national reunification. 
See Huang Caihong, "Witnessing the PLAN's Naval Exercise on the Sea," ( • ~ ~I , " r:p 00 1Hf: ~ 
iHf: L r1it )j § * i2,") Outlook Weekly ( 7 f1l), November 6,1995, pp.6-7. 
571 . Since the late 1980s, the PLAN has researched the possibilities of a naval blockade against 
Taiwan and the related issues of international law. See Jianhai Bi, "The Rules of Naval Blockade in 
International Law," ( ¥ 1i ¥Hi: ' " 00 ~~ 15. r:p *- T #fj: L ~ * it fJii s"J ~Jt JE , " ) The ( P LA) 
Naval Journal (1fij.It ~ ,7iJ), November 1987, pp.42-43. 
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side-stepping the fact that it was incapable of launching and sustaining an 
amphibious assault. Both the air and the ground forces would only playa supporting 
role. The military held a number of exercises blockading Taiwan in PLA war games 
during the crisis of 1995-96. This suggested that the PLAN's strategy of blockading 
Taiwan had been approved by the military high command.572 In the meantime, the 
possibility of blockade was taken into account by the PRe leaders in search of a 
coercive solution of the Taiwan issue.573 
The military has its own information units and research institutes for dealing with 
Taiwan, and intelligence apparatuses playa leading role. 574 The two most important 
of these are the Military Intelligence Branch of the GSD and the Liaison Department 
of the GPD. The Military Intelligence Branch, which is also called the Second 
Department ( the Er Bu ) is in charge of foreign military intelligence. The collection 
of military intelligence on Taiwan, is one of its major missions and includes the use 
of clandestine special agents in Taiwan. The First Bureau under the Second 
Department is responsible for gathering information on Taiwan. It focuses on 
intelligence about the Taiwan army, such as armaments, operational preparations and 
battle plans, while also collecting information about politics and society as regards 
the military. When the Second Department engages in public activities and 
exchanges with foreign military and academic institutions, as well as Taiwanese 
572 • See Li Zijing, "An Actual Account on the Exercises of Blockading Taiwan," (~ § )j'l: , " M El 
it tJJi ~~ )] :fk (£ , " ) Cheng Ming Monthly ( 'if mg), No.215, September 1995, pp.12-13; Luo Bing, 
"The Ground Force and Airforce under the Command of Three Major Military Regions Moved into 
Fujian and Jiangxi," (?JJ (jj(, " '=::k ~ IR Mr 2:~ lfliJ j!lij f~ , ") Cheng Ming Monthly( 'if mg), 
No.221, March 1996, pp.6-7. At a meeting entitled "The Report on Strategic Principle regarding 
Taiwan", convened by the Ministry of National Defence and the General Staff Department and 
attended by most top military leaders, one of the mains views was that advocating a blockade of 
Taiwan. See Yi Fan, "Communist China Prepares Public Opinion for Forcible Invasion of Taiwan," 
( Jl, fL , " rp ft )g :fER; fJ :l1t El fF ~ it it "* ' " ) Cheng Ming Monthly ( 'if mg), No.208, February 
1995, pp.25-26. In addition, CMC Vice-Chainnan Zhang Wannian bragged that the PLA was capable 
of blockading the Taiwan Strait within 24 hours. See Yi Fan, "The Top Military Leaders Brag that 
the PLA Will Need Less Than Two Days to Mount a Successful Invasion of Taiwan," (Jl, fL, " ~ 
~ <tff 1"1 f,ij 3C:l1t ~~ El rWJ ' ") Cheng Ming Monthly ('if !!fj), No.218, December 1995, pp.29-30. 
573 • The PRC leaders have delivered many speeches about a naval blockade of Taiwan while 
threatening the use of force. See Martin L. Lasater, Beijing's Blockade Threat to Taiwan. 
Washington, D. C.: Heritage Foundation, 1985, p.l; The Government Information Office, A Study 0/ 
a Possible Communist Attack on Taiwan. Taipei: The Government. Information Office, 1992; David 
Shambaugh, "The Insecurity of Security: The PLA's Evolving Doctrine and Threat Perceptions 
Toward 2000," Journal a/Northeast Asian Studies, VoI.XIII, No.1, Spring 1994, pp.13-14. 
574 . For an examination of the PRC military'S strategic research, analysis, and intelligence institutions 
in the national security affairs including Taiwan affairs, see Michael D. Swaine, The Role a/the 
research bodies and visiting scholars, it is operating in its capacity as the China 
Institute for International Strategic Studies.575 
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The Liaison Department ( Lianluo Bu ) of the GPD was formerly called the 
enemy affairs unit. Now publicly known as the China Association for International 
Friendly Contacts, its main duty is to stir up insurrection within enemy armies with 
psychological warfare. It is also responsible for gathering political, economic, social 
and other relevant military intelligence regarding Taiwan. However, it is principally 
tasked with instigating rebellions within the Taiwanese military. It conducts 
ideological and political work, political offensives and wars of nerves against the 
Taiwan army, attempting to undermine it by dampening servicemen's morale.576 
The duties of the Second Department and the Liaison Department are to research 
military strategy regarding Taiwan and prepare studies on questions presented by top 
military leaders. In addition, the two departments provide another channel of 
information for the paramount leaders beyond that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the Foreign Affairs Office, the Taiwan Affairs Office and the Ministry of National 
Security. Sometimes these two military departments prepare information for 
reference to the Politburo of the CPC. They report new developments in Taiwan 
affairs to the central decision-makers and advise on means for inserting military 
opinion input into the inner Taiwan policy process.577 
In the mid-1990s, both the Second Department and the Liaison Department were 
directed by Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai. Although the Liaison Department 
belonged to the GPD system, it was put under Xiong's command. Xiong was in 
charge of foreign affairs and information for the entire army and was responsible for 
coordinating all strategic intelligence materials in the realm of military intelligence. 
Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking. Santa Monica, Ca: Rand Corporation, 1996, 
pp.57-71. 
575 • Dan Bo, "Communist China's Intelligence, External Affairs Research Organs,"( 1JR ~S ' " "P ;tt: 
e~ 'tJ ~it :& 5'~ ¥1iJf JE 1JL til , " ) Cheng Ming Monthly ( 13- P.J$), No.227, September 1996, p.30; 
George W. Tsai, "The Making of Taiwan Policy in Mainland China: Structure and Process," Issues & 
Studies, Vo1.33, No.9, September 1997, p.24. 
576. Dan Bo, "Communist China's Intelligence, External Affairs Research Organs,"( tJR is ' " "P ;tt: 
Et9 'tJ ~€l :& 5'~ ¥1iJf JE 1JL til ' ") Cheng Ming Monthly (13- !lfj), No.227, September 1996, p.30; 
George W. Tsai, "The Making of Taiwan Policy in Mainland China: Structure and Process," Issues & 
Studies, Vo1.33, No.9, September 1997, p.l6. 
577 • Dan Bo, "Communist China's Intelligence, External Affairs Research Organs,"( yJR is ' " "P ;tt: 
e~ 'tJ {it :& 5'~ ¥1iJf JE 1JL til,") Cheng Ming Monthly (13- !lfj), No.227, September 1996, pJO; 
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Of all military officers below the CMC level who were involved in the formulation 
of Taiwan policy, Xiong was one of the most politically influential generals.578 
Xiong sat as a military representative on the powerful CTWLG that sets policy 
toward Taiwan. Apart from the military strategy, he was seen as rather actively 
involved in a number of other Taiwan concerns. While frequently travelling abroad, 
he had substantial contact with important visitors from maj or powers as well as 
Taiwan. He had firsthand material on Taiwan and reported directly to Jiang Zeming, 
boasting considerable political influence for his militarily aggressive views. From 
time to time, he also published tough opinions on Taiwan policy as the military's 
representative. He showed himself to be a strident critic of US policy toward Taiwan 
while advocating a strong PRC stance toward the US. For example, he was best 
known for his threat that the PLA could hit Los Angeles with a nuclear strike if the 
US intervened in the conflict during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96.579 Xiong, 
representing the PLA, had a key voice in setting Taiwan policy. 
PLA veterans are also an important force in influencing the Taiwan policy 
process. Although retired, veterans who held senior posts in the PLA remained 
privileged and influential with a strong conservative and negative voice. They 
continued to be involved in the party-state politics and policy decision making 
including foreign policy.580 They expressed their views on national security affairs 
and defence policy by writing letters and sending petitions in joint names. Taiwan 
was one of the major issues that concerned them and they had influence upon the top 
Taiwan policy makers. They questioned the civilian leadership's rapprochement 
with the United States while American support for Taiwan continued and demanded 
a tough PRC stance. In the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping was capable of resolving 
George W. Tsai, "The Making of Taiwan Policy in Mainland China: Structure and Process," Issues & 
Studies, Vo!.33, No.9, September 1997, pp.l6, 24. 
578 • For Xiong's position in the party-state leading circles and the military authorities and his role in 
Taiwan policy making, see Michael D. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security 
Policymaking. Santa Monica, Ca: Rand Corporation, 1996, p.32; Dan Bo, "Reasons Why Replaced 
National Security Minister," ( 1iR 18, " ~ !:fi:. 'tf~ * ~ A 7'1 i!J.I~ ~ , " ) The Trend Magazine ( ij/; f/iJ), 
No.l52, April 1998, ppAO-42; George W. Tsai, "The Making of Taiwan Policy in Mainland China: 
Structure and Process," Issues & Studies, Vo!.33, No.9, September 1997, p.24. 
579 . James Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, fi'om Nixon 
to Clinton. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999, pp.334, 342. 
580. John W. Garver, "The PLA as an Interest Group in Chinese Foreign Policy," in C. Dennison 
Lane, Mark Weisenbloom and Dimon Liu (eds), Chinese Military Modernization. New York: Kegan 
Paul International, 1996, pp.254-255. 
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their differences and dissatisfactions within the policy apparatus. However, by the 
mid-1990s when Deng's successors as party-state leaders, particularly Jiang Zemin, 
took charge, they found it hard to resist pressure of these retired PLA elders. As a 
result, the PLA veterans' interference in the Taiwan policy process strengthened the 
military's influence on the paramount makers on decisions concerning Taiwan. 
However, this put the civilian leaders in a dilemma and made it more difficult to 
formulate a rational and practical Taiwan policy, especially for Jiang.58 ! 
5.3. The Military's Interests in Taiwan Policy-Making 
With its special capacity, the military plays an important, at times even decisive, 
role in Taiwan policy-making. Apart from acting in defence of the nation's unity the 
military has its own vital interests in Taiwan policy embodied in three aspects: 
preservation of the military's political privilege, military build-up for modernisation 
drives and more budgetary resources for defence.582 Only through an active 
involvement in the Taiwan policy-making process, can the military achieve these 
three major objectives. It is known to favour aggressive stands which derive from its 
particular interests and it benefits most from tension with Taiwan. 
Firstly, the military strives to regain power and, through participation in Taiwan 
policy-making, to resurrect its social stature and maintain its position of privilege. 
The military achieved almost mythical status from the 1950s to the 1970s but has 
faced tough times since the 1980s. During the 1960s and 1970s, especially the 
period of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the military dominated the 
country through maintaining social order and political stability. After the return of 
civilian rule, its power declined. The developing market-oriented economy and the 
process of opening-up to the outside world have had a strong impact on the military's 
privileged position. Economic reform from the planned economy to a market 
economy began in 1980s and did not require a military social-control function. 
581 . Michael D. Swaine, The Role a/the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking. Santa 
Monica, Ca: Rand Corporation, 1996, pp.l2, 33-35. 
582. George W. Tsai, "The Making of Taiwan Policy in Mainland China: Structure and Process," 
Issues & Studies, Vol.33, No.9, September 1997, p.l7; Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China's 
Security: The New Roles a/the Militmy. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1998, pp.276-
279. 
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Faced with the country's dramatic transformation, the military reluctantly agreed 
to participate in economic reform, but refused to join in political reform. Its position 
in the country was diminished. In previous decades, servicemen enjoyed living 
standards superior to people in other occupations. However, beginning in the 1980s, 
the stature of the servicemen's profession depreciated. The military's lower social 
station was demonstrated by the fact that officers and soldiers suffered from pitiful 
salary scales.583 The military' socio-political status declined, it lost much of its 
importance in the state and no longer enjoyed pride of place in society. In order to 
reverse the unfavourable situation, the military had to find and prove an externally 
realistic danger to the country to underline the urgency of enhancing its power. 
Taiwan was a ready-made ideal policy area that demonstrated the indispensable 
nature of the military, automatically helping to increase the military's importance and 
prestige. 
Large-scale military cuts were coupled with the declining status of the army. In 
1985, the PRC Government announced that the armed forces would be cut by one 
million.584 From 1985 to 1990, PLA manpower was reduced from 4.4238 million to 
3.199 million. 585 The major military regions were pared down from 11 to 7. The 
PLA officer corps was also reduced and future enlargement was curbed. Many 
military officers especially generals lost their promotion prospects. 
Although the military voiced concerns that it could with stand no further down-
sizing and stressed the importance of stepping up defence modernisation in order to 
deal with the threat of external invasion, it found it hard to convince the civilian 
leaders that the security of the PRC,was truly threatened. The PRC leadership 
judged that another world war was unlikely to break out in the next several decades 
and peace and development had become the dominant international trends. Civilian 
leaders were planning a new round of troop cuts for the army in the face of stiff 
resistance from the military in the early 1990s. The total PLA staff establishment 
was expected to be cut from 3.2. million to 2.7 million. The proposed move was 
583 • Arthur S. Ding, "China's Defence Finance: Content, Process and Administration, " The China 
Quarterly, No.146, June 1996, p.442. 
584. "China Decides to Cut Its Army," Beijing Review, June 17, 1985, p.6. 
585 . Zhao Vining, "China Will Cut 500,000 Troops from Its Armed Forces," ( iFX 'tl T ' " 9=t §I ~ '* 
In Wi 50 ]J , " ) Outlook Weekly (T llf), November 17, 1997, p.8. 
politically risky for the civilian leaders. The generals fought the reductions in a 
lobbying campaign bitterly opposing more layoffs. 
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The military believed that underlining the Taiwan issue could be an excellent 
means to stop further disarmament. What is more, it would provide an opportunity 
for the military's resurgence. Thus, the military managed to stress that there was a 
possibility of armed conflict over the Taiwan issue, particularly with Taiwan's 
guardian, the United States. Taipei's pragmatic diplomacy, in particular, the Taiwan 
president's US visit and Washington's permission for his trip, gave the military an 
argument to alert the paramount leaders to the possibility of permanent national 
division heightening tension in the Taiwan Strait. Although the civilian leaders 
believed that the international environment was still peaceful, favourable and likely 
to help promote peaceful reunification with Taiwan, they had to yield to the army's 
powerful pressure because the military had an important leverage over their political 
destiny during the period of leadership succession. The disarmament plan cutting a 
further half-million troops that was prepared in 1995, was thus postponed until the 
Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96 ended a year and halflater. 586 
One of the reasons that the military intended to spark Taiwan as a flashpoint was 
to restore the Fuzhou military region. The big reduction of one million personnel 
between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s eliminated a large number of higher-
ranking positions at the regional-Ievel. 587 The generals faced increasingly tough 
competition with each other for positions as commanding officer at the regional-
level. A way to develop more opportunities was to be found in the restoration of the 
abolished major military regions. The generals knew that it would be impossible to 
re-establish all of them, but placed their hope on recovering the Fuzhou military 
586. You Ji, "The PLA's Military Modernisation in the 1990s," in Stuart Harris and Gary Klintworth 
(eds), China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region. 
Melbourne: Longman Australia, 1995, p.238; Bear Lee, "Defence Ministry Comment on Reports of 
Beijing's Mil. Dismantling," CNA, December 9,1997; Jiang Zemin announced that the PRC would 
demobilise 500,000 military personnel in the next three years at the 15th Party Congress in 1997. See 
Jiang Zemin, "Hold High the Great Banner ofDeng Xiaoping Theory for an All-Round Advancement 
of the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics into the 21 5t Century-Report 
Delivered at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on September 12, 1997," 
Beijing Review, October 6-12,1997, p.28. 
587 . Since the cut of one million personnel and the PLA evolution of a trend towards professionalism, 
a series of measures of regular ising the army, such as a strictly formal organisational system, 
mandatory retirement and gradualised promotion, have been introduced. Thereby the commander 
241 
regIOn. Of the four major military regions abolished, only the former Fuzhou 
military region, with its proximity to Taiwan, would stand a chance ofrestoration. 588 
The generals therefore sounded the alarm on Taiwan to provide impetus for its 
reestablishment. 589 When the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96 broke out, a 
compromise was reached between the generals and civilian leaders. Instead of 
restoring the Fuzhou military region the Nanjing War Region (NWR) was 
established. However, the NWR was a provisional unit outside the formal system of 
military organisation.590 Since the mid-1990s, the tense situation in the Taiwan Strait 
between 1995 and 1996, the civilian leadership has remained under strong pressure 
from the generals to restore the Fuzhou military region.59] 
5.4. Defence Modernisation and the Military's Involvement 
in Taiwan Policy 
A strong desire for defence modernisation impels the military to keenly involve 
itself in Taiwan policy. Taiwan is the main focus of the PLA modernisation efforts. 
A powerful modern army has been the military's long-held dream.592 Although it 
claimed to be the largest standing army in the world, until the mid-1990s, the PRe 
combat forces were considered to be backward in both weapons and military 
doctrine. From the late 1940s to the mid-1990s, the PLA weapomy had evolved 
posts of major military region were mandatorily limited. See James C. Mulvenon, Projessionalization 
of the Senior Chinese Officer Corps: Trends and Implications. Santa Monica: Rand, 1997. 
588 . When the major military regions were reorganised into seven, the Fuzhou military region was 
eliminated and its defence area was merged into two neighbouring military regions, mainly the 
Nanjing military region. After merging, the Nanjing Military Region oversaw the Taiwan area. 
589. John W. Garver, "The PLA as an Interest Group in Chinese Foreign Policy," in C. Dennison 
Lane, Mark Weisenbloom and Dimon Liu (eds), Chinese Military Modernization. New York: Kegan 
Paul International, 1996, p.261. 
590. Harlan W. Jencks, "Wild Speculations on the Military Balance in the Taiwan Straits," in James R. 
Lilley and Chuck Downs (eds), Crisis in the Taiwan Strait. FT. McNair, Washington, D.C.: National 
Defence University Press, 1997, pp.145-146. 
591 . "Communist China Plans to Re-establish the Fuzhou Military Region," (" 9=T ;tt: t~ "I: J.t tll'i 1'1'1 
~ 13:,") Cheng Ming Monthly (.". P.J!j), No.264, October 1999, p.23; Guan Qingning and Wang 
Jianmin, "To Outward Seeming the Tension Eases But a Crisis is Latent in the Taiwan Strait," ( *- J3( 
T . .:E 1ii ~ , " * m ~ fQ m {;itm; m , " ) The International Chinese Weekly ( jjJ! iff! /l!J ftf), 
August 29, 1999. 
592. For an overview of the PRC military modernisation, see Larry M. Wortzel (ed.), China's Military 
Modernization: International Implications. New York: Greenwood Press, 1988; C. Dennison Lane, 
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from old-fashioned equipment to relatively sophisticated warships, fighter planes, 
nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles including a few Russian-made advanced 
conventional weapons. Generally speaking, however, the PLA was still equipped 
like a fighting force from the 1950s. Many elements of the military were outdated, to 
the point of being equipped with US and Japanese equipment captured during World 
War II. Thus, combat forces remained backward in weaponry and equipment, as the 
PLA had not acquired and assimilated advanced technology in its armament. It was 
in need of new types of weapons and sophisticated technology, smart weapons and 
high technology military armaments in particular. 
Nevertheless, top priority had been given to national economic development since 
1978, despite defence modernisation being one of the Four Modernisations' 
programme ( the other three objectives are modernisation of industry, agriculture and 
science and technology). If military modernisation was to be a focal point of the 
country's work, it would undertake a huge spending program over many years and 
require a major diversion of resources from the civilian economy. However, many 
Chinese would oppose such a shift and so in order to consolidate the Communist 
regime's legitimacy the PRC leadership had to scale down its agenda for military 
modernisation and focus on the more immediately pressing economic issues. 
The 1991 Persian Gulf War, which became a favoured theme of the elite officers, 
provided the PRC military with an argument to speed up defence modernisation.593 
Comparatively, the Gulf War demonstrated the value of modernised military power 
and revealed the PRC's military backwardness. This promoted the PRC military 
quest for a leaner but technologically more advanced approach to national defence. 
However, there was no danger of war for the PRC. Although it fought with India in 
the early 1960s and with Vietnam in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Beijing was 
negotiating with New Delhi and Hanoi on border issues. Also, while there were 
disputes for territorial claims between the PRC and Southeast Asian countries over 
the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and between the PRC and Japan over the 
Diaoyutai ( Senkakus in Japanese) Islands, Beijing has displayed a consistent stance 
Mark Weisenbloom and Dimon Liu (eds), Chinese Military Modernization. New York: Kegan Paul 
International, 1996. 
of shelving disputes or settling them in a peaceful and rational manner. The PRe 
basic foreign policy since 1978 has been to seek a stable world order to pursue its 
primary goal of economic development. The military therefore needed more 
convincing grounds to place military modernisation on the agenda of the PRe 
leadership. 
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The most reasonable grounds for renewing military modernisation are to prove the 
primary importance of safeguarding national security and unification. The Taiwan 
issue could be premised upon developing the capability to win local wars under high-
tech conditions. The military modernisation drive would advance the PLA' s ability 
to achieve objectives of national security and unification, particularly the forceful 
integration of Taiwan into the mainland, while deterring supposed interference by the 
American forces on Taiwan.594 The military could take advantage of the Taiwan 
issue to justify the development and maintenance of a powerful national defence and 
military as vital for national security and reunification. A war game in the Taiwan 
Strait would provide a strong sense of crisis and help prepare the PLA for hi-tech 
conflict. An improvement of the PRe military capabilities would enable Beijing to 
improve its ability to wage war on Taiwan while bargaining with Washington on the 
issue, thus forcing Taiwan to reunify with the mainland. For this purpose, the PRe 
needed credible means of threatening the use of force. As such, civilian leaders had 
continuously been urged by the military to push the modernisation of the armed 
forces to a new stage and enhance their combat readiness and defensive capabilities 
by way of high technology. 
The priorities ofPLA modernisation were the navy, the air force and the strategic 
rocket force aimed at invading Taiwan. 595 The PLA naval modernisation in particular 
would be raised to a new leve1.596 The naval force was one of the weakest areas of 
593. You Ji, "The PLA's Military Modernisation in the 1990s," in Stuart Harris and Gary Klintworth 
(eds), China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and Challenges in the ASia-Pacific Region. 
Melbourne: Longman Australia, 1995, pp.234, 237. 
594. You Ji, "The PLA's Military Modernisation in the 1990s," in Stuart Harris and Gary Klintworth 
(eds), China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and Challenges in the ASia-Pacific Region. 
Melbourne: Longman Australia, 1995, pp.235-236. 
595. You Ji, "The PLA's Military Modernisation in the 1990s," in Stuart Harris and Gary Klintworth 
(eds), China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region. 
Melbourne: Longman Australia, 1995, p.237; Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting 
China's Arrival," International Security, Vo1.22, No.3, Winter 1997/98, p.52. 
596. For an extended analysis of the PLAN's modernisation, see You Ji, "A Blue Water Navy: Does It 
Matter?" in David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds), China Rising. London and New York: 
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the PRC armed forces. In the mid-1990s, the PLA Navy ( PLAN) was the third 
largest navy in the world, with 260,000 men, equipped with 50 principal surface 
combatants and 52 submarines. It had reached a considerable level of expertise in 
naval operations with a growing fleet of missile-equipped destroyers and nuclear- . 
powered submarines. However, the PLAN was still a shrinking and outdated navy 
because many warships were obsolete and it had no battleships or cruisers. Its main 
fighting platform was 15 older Luda class destroyers and two modified Luda. 
Although they had been re-equipped and upgraded, most of them were constructed in 
the 1970s and the early 1980s, and were generally considered obsolete by Western 
standards. 32 frigates constituted another part of the naval main force, but 26 were of 
the older generation Jianghu class. The PLAN had a large fleet of submarines 
including nuclear-powered and a nuclear-fuelled ballistic-missile submarine.597 
However, by and large, the older conventional submarines were powered by diesel 
engines. The PLAN's marine corps was small and weak. It only had a brigade with 
5,000 men, equipped with light landing craft and weapons. 598 The PLA Naval Air 
Force was also considered outdated.599 Its 855 fighter planes and 68 armed 
helicopters were mainly shore-based.60o Although new type guided-missile 
destroyers were equipped with antisubmarine helicopters, most of combat aircraft 
were based on land. In a strict sense, it was an air force rather than a naval air force. 
The PLAN was able to take advantage of the Taiwan issue to accelerate its 
modernisation while improving its fighting capability.601 The PRC leadership has 
Routledge, 1997, pp.71-89; You Ji, "The PLA's Military Modernisation in the 1990s," in Stuart 
Harris and Gary Klintworth (eds), China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and Challenges in the 
Asia-Pacific Region. Melbourne: Longman Australia, 1995, pp.247-249. Also see Greg Austin, 
China's Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military and National Development. st. Leonards, 
NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin in association with the Department of International Relations and the 
Northeast Asia Program, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National 
University, Canberra, ACT, 1998, pp.282-289. 
597 . International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1995/96. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, p.l77. 
598. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1995/96. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, p.l78. 
599. You Ji, "A Blue Water Navy: Does It Matter?" in David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds), 
China Rising. London and New York: Routledge, 1997, p.82. 
600 • International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1995/96. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, p.l78. 
601 • For the factor of Taiwan, in particular, events in the Taiwan Strait during 1995-1996, in 
promoting the PLAN's modernisation, see You Ji, "A Blue Water Navy: Does It Matter?" in David 
S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds), China Rising. London and New York: Routledge, 1997, 
pp.71, 76, 78, 83; Greg Austin, China's Ocean Frontier: InternationaL Law, Military and National 
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quickened the pace of seeking to resolve the Taiwan issue since the 1980s. Beijing 
has repeatedly warned Taiwan that it could use force against the island if a 
declaration of independence was attempted. The naval command took the 
opportunity to speed modernisation, in particular, the acquisition of an aircraft 
carrier. In 1995, the PLA was the world's biggest army with 2.93 million soldiers 
while Taiwan had about 376,000 troops.602 But the PLA would be incapable of 
occupying Taiwan because it was not able to wage amphibious warfare.603 The key 
to the PRe recovering the island by force is to make a large-scale crossing of the 
160-mile-wide Taiwan Strait while simultaneously preventing the United States from 
supporting Taiwan. The PLAN is key in any such plan, but the Taiwanese navy had 
the balance of power in its favour, particularly after its acquisitions of French and 
American-made missile frigates in a major mid-1990s naval upgrade.604 The naval 
command stressed the urgent need to deploy sophisticated warships to destroy the 
Taiwanese Navy while deterring the US Navy's intervention, if any invasion were to 
be successful. 605 
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) was a weak service. 606 It was large, numbering 
about 470,000 and was equipped with 4,970 combat aircraft in the mid-1990s.607 
However, the vast majority of its warplanes were more than 30 years old and overdue 
for decommission. In light of new trends in air power development in the 21 st 
century, the PLAAF was backward in vital fields such as reconnaissance, 
communications and electronic warfare capabilities and in-flight refuelling systems 
Development. St. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin in association with the Department of 
International Relations and the Northeast Asia Program, Research School of Pacific and Asian 
Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, 1998, pp.288-289. 
602. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1995/96. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, pp.176, 192. 
603 • For the PLA Navy's combat effectiveness in an attack on Taiwan, see Chong-Pin Lin, "The 
Military Balance in the Taiwan Strait," The China Quarterly, No.146, June 1996, pp.588-589, 591. 
604. Taiwan ordered 6 LaFayette-class missile frigates from France in 1992 and most of them were 
delivered in 1996. Also, it acquired 6 Knox-class missile frigates from the United States between 
1992 and 1996. In addition, Taiwan ordered 7 American-made Perry-class frigates, which were 
delivered between 1993 and 1998. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military 
Balance: 1999/2000. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp.178-179. 
605. You Ji, "A Blue Water Navy: Does It Matter?" in David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds), 
China Rising. London and New York: Routledge, 1997, pp.71, 76, 78, 82-83. 
606. For the Modernisation of the PLAAF, see You Ji, "The PLA's Military Modernisation in the 
1990s," in Stuart Harris and Gary Klintworth (eds), China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and 
Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region. Melbourne: Longman Australia, 1995, p.244-247. 
607. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Militmy Balance: 1995/96. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, pp.178-179. 
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to extend its range and sustainability. 608 The PLAAF was in need of new types of 
electronic-war aeroplane, high-speed fighters, airborne warning and control systems, 
as well as more advanced and accurate missiles to fill in gaps in the aIr defences. 
Externally, because Communist China is a rival to the United States and other 
Western powers, Western countries especially had observed an embargo on sales of 
arms to the PRC since the Tiananmen Square military suppression in 1989. As such, 
the PRC had to rely largely on itself to develop weaponry and equipment for the air 
force. Although the PRC basically had the capability to produce combat aircraft, it 
had had difficulty developing a fighter to match international standards. Generally 
speaking, from the 1980s to the mid-1990s, the military had tried very hard to 
enhance the airforce self-reliantly. The PRC air defence had improved and 
strengthened somewhat in weaponry and equipment, but most was still in a 
developmental stage. Overall modernisation was still far from complete. 
The PLAAF had long cherished the hope of developing from a defensive force 
into one that would also be offensively capable.609 However, it lacked such 
capabilities up to the mid-1990s. A war game in the Taiwan Strait could provide an 
opportunity for such a strategic transformation. Tension across the Taiwan Strait 
would confirm the PRC needed to beef up its air power capabilities. Taiwan's air 
force was small but higher-quality, with modern fighters like the French Mirage and 
the American F -16. 610 Although the PLAAF had the numerical advantage, most 
combat aircraft were out of date. Thus, it would be difficult to gain the air 
superiority required to cover the navy and support the army in an attack on Taiwan. 611 
Moreover, the American military would probably help in Taiwan's defence and the 
powerful American airforce would pose a massive threat. The PLAAF believed that 
it should have more advanced fighter aircraft to attack Taiwan's well-defended 
608. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1996/97. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996, p.171. 
609. You Ji, "A Blue Water Navy: Does It Matter?" in David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds), 
China Rising. London and New York: Routledge, 1997, p.72. 
610. Taiwan ordered 150 F-16s and 60 Mirage 2000s in 1992. They were delivered in succession until 
1999. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The military balance: 1999/2000. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999, pp.178, 175. 
611. For the PLA Air Force's battle-worthiness to attack Taiwan, see Chong-Pin Lin, "The Military 
Balance in the Taiwan Strait," The China Quarterly, No.l46, June 1996, pp.585-588, 591. 
airspace. It had imported 26 Sukhoi-27 supersonic warplanes from Russia in the 
early 1990s but these were insufficient. 612 
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The PLA missile unit also needed to be improved and strengthened.613 Between 
1995 and 1996, the PRC had 17 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 70 intermediate 
range ballistic missiles and a large number of short range missiles.614 The PRC had 
detonated its first atomic bomb in 1964. Besides strategic nuclear strike power, most 
of its short range missiles could carry a conventional, biological, chemical, or nuclear 
warhead. However, the Second Artillery Corps-that is, the PLA strategic rocket 
force, was still a small nuclear force, about the size of that of France. It remained far 
behind America and was comparatively backwards technically. The missiles it had 
were still below world standards in terms of speed and accuracy, while also being 
impossible to launch quickly. While badly needing new-type conventional missiles, 
the Second Artillery Corps expected to modernise its nuclear arms as well. If Beijing 
were to seek to determine the future of Taiwan by force, it would increase the risk of 
military confrontation between the PRC and the US. In terms of missile force 
confrontation, if the PRC used missiles to attack Taiwan, the US would help Taiwan 
defend itself covering it with an anti-missile umbrella or firing ballistic missiles into 
mainland China in a conflict between two nuclear powers. In this case, the PRC 
would be threatened or deterred by the US. The PRC therefore would have to thwart 
any American intention to protect Taiwan with conventional missiles and strategic 
nuclear weapons. Although missiles could strike almost anywhere in Asia and even 
reach Los Angeles, the PLA missile unit had to continue efforts to modernise and 
diversify its nuclear arsenal, especially developing newer mobile ballistic missiles 
and improving warheads. A crisis in the Taiwan Strait would stress the strategic 
necessity of modernisation for the Second Artillery Corps which would provide 
imperatives for a major expansion of forces and upgrade of its capability to cope with 
the US strategic nuclear force while striking Taiwan. The PLA missile inventory, 
production, installations and maintenance such as tactical ballistic missiles and long-
612. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1995/96. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, p.178. 
613 . For the modernisation of the PLA missile unit, see You Ji, "The PLA's Military Modernisation in 
the 1990s," in Stuart Harris and Gary Klintworth (eds), China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and 
Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region. Melbourne: Longman Australia, 1995, p.237-244. 
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range cruise missiles would be highly valued. Meanwhile, because medium and 
short range missiles play an important role in enhancing the PLA capability of attack 
ag-ainst Taiwanese or US forces, they needed urgently to be expanded and upgraded 
while improving their accuracy. The Second Artillery Corps could avail itself of 
tension with Taiwan to flex its missile muscle and obtain preferment in the 
modernisation. 
5.5. The Defence Budget and the Military's Involvement in 
Taiwan Policy 
Greater budgetary resources for defence are another major objective for the 
military having taken the initiative in its involvement with Taiwan policy.615 From 
1949 to 1978, national finances had prioritised military expenditure. However, the 
military faced a difficult situation as economic development ascended to a position of 
higher priority than a military build-up. The government had little choice but to 
restrain military spending in favour of other pressing domestic needs.6I6 
The defence budget had been virtually unlimited from the 1950s until the late 
1970s but available budgetary resources for the military had decreased from then to 
the mid-1990s. The defence budget was reduced from 5.6 per cent of the gross 
domestic product ( GDP) in 1979 to only 1.3 per cent in 1994. Military expenditure 
had declined successively, from 18.5 per cent of the total national expenditure in 
614. For information on the PRC strategic missile force from 1995 to 1996, see International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1995/96. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p.176. 
615. Western military analysts believe that the PRC's actual defence spending is substantially higher 
than the published figures. This study still cites Beijing's official figures on defence budgets in 
illustration. of its viewpoints because they can shed light on military expenditure in the PRC. For an 
analysis of the PRC defence finance in detail, see Arthur S. Ding, "China's Defence Finance: Content, 
Process and Administration," The China Quarterly, No.146, June 1996, pp.428-442; "China's 
Military Expenditure," in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1995/96. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp.270-275. 
616. Deng Xiaoping, "The Army Must Subordinate ltselfto Serve the Overall Situation of Nation's 
Economic Construction," ( )(~ /J\ Jf ' " ~lR ~ B~ M. ~ 1'" 00 * Jt i&t * fifI, " ) in Selected Works 
of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3 ( XjJ /j\ 5f Jt jj§ : $ ~ iff)· Beijing: People's Press ( A ~ ill JlR f± ), 
1993, pp.98-100; Lu Weimin, "The Military Criticises Deng Xiaoping of Delaying National 
Defence," ( ~IIf giE ~, " ~ 1J 1~ ~)(~ /J\ Jf 9l£ ~ 00 Il1J ' ") Beijing Spring (j/5}j{ L If), No.29, 
October 1995, pp.21-23. 
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1979 to 9.5 per cent in 1994.617 Budgetary constraints made it difficult to purchase 
and develop PLA weapons systems. The military believed that it had been weakened 
by declining budgets. 618 
There were two main reasons for the military demanding an increase in the 
defence budget. One was the modernisation programme and another was the 
inflationary factor. The military has been pursuing its ambitious and expensive 
modernisation drive focusing on high-technology warfare. It needed large amounts 
of money to upgrade its arsenal, but it had been constrained by direct budget 
limitations. The request for an expensive new weapons program was treated with 
indifference by the civilian leaders. As for the inflationary factor, it had a clearly 
adverse effect on the increase in defence expenditures. Prices had been increasing 
rapidly and the paper currency had been inflated since the late 1980s.619 Inflation 
even led to decreasing servicemen's real salaries.620 Thus, the military had already 
taken the inflation factor into account when it made the request for more defence 
spending. 621 It contended that the annual increase was largely in line with inflation, 
with added costs for maintaining the standard of living of army personnel and 
pensions rather than purchasing and maintaining weapons and equipment. 622 
617. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China: Anns Control 
and Disarmament (November 1995, Beijing )," Beijing Review, November 27-December 3, 1995, 
p.15. For a further analysis ofPRC defence expenditures, see Richard A. Bitzinger, "Military 
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However, the military's claim on the national budget for a larger share by reason of 
inflation was declined. The reason for this was that not only the armed forces, but all 
trades and professions had been affected. The civilian administration was already 
facing mounting unemployment and budget deficits, together with a huge public 
spending programme intended to address the problem. The government therefore did 
not satisfy the military's wish for compensation. Only 71.65 per cent of the 
military's demands were met.623 
The budget shortfalls pressured the military into finding alternative financial 
sources, and it was forced to engage more heavily in business to provide funding for 
itself. As such, the PLA established a colossal empire of about 20,000 companies 
employing a large number of soldiers and civilians, which raised a substantial 
revenue for additional army spending. At one time when the government was years 
away from instituting a fully functioning national budget to provide for all the needs 
of the PLA, civilian and military leaders had tacitly consented or implicitly 
encouraged the PLA commercial business operations. However, although it engaged 
in widespread commercial activities, as extra-budgetary earnings substituted for lost 
defence expenditures and helped to finance the long-desired military modernisation, 
corruption greatly increased and military discipline seriously worsened, leading to 
rampant smuggling and other such illegal activities. As a result, business impaired 
the PLA military capabilities.624 In view of the seriousness of the situation, attempts 
had been made by the civilian and military leaders to break the myriad of links 
between the army and business. Civilian leaders declared that, in principle, the 
allocation of necessary funds for the PLA to carry out its duties should be regularised 
and more reliant on state finances, while the army should be more obedient to state 
directives. The civilian and military leaders therefore ordered the PLA to gradually 
Council of the People's Republic of China, "China: Arms Control and Disarmament (November 
1995, Beijing )," Beijing Review, November 27-December 3,1995, p.15. 
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624. For an overview of the LA commercial activities, see Tai Ming Cheng, "China's Entrepreneurial 
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narrow its business fields, leading over a period of time to a final withdraw from 
commercial activities. However, nothing happened because the military officers 
were unwilling to give up money-making assets and the civilian leadership did not 
ensure the PLA had the necessary budget, despite the government's promise that it 
would gradually increase the defence allocation.625 The PLA had to demonstrate to 
the government by other means that it needed a substantial boost to its budget. 
Taiwan issues again provided the necessary argument.626 The military saw 
national reunification as an opportunity for a bigger slice of the budget. If there was 
no serious threat to the security and sovereignty of the country, defence expenditures 
would not increase by a wide margin. Only if the military played up the urgency of 
the Taiwan issue to expedite reunification by way ofPLA support, could it obtain 
more budgetary resources. If the Taiwan Strait were to see arise in tension, big 
boosts in the defence budget would be considered necessary. Thus, the PRC found 
itself in a period when supreme power was in a state of transition, with top leaders 
competing for the right of succession open to the argument that Taiwan should be put 
at the top of the PRC agenda and relevant defence spending should be given priority. 
No leaders could withstand a decrease in military expenditure that might affect the 
use of force against Taiwan in the pursuit of national reunification. 627 The PLA 
stressed that it would need to increase its military expenditure before a successful 
invasion of Taiwan was possible. It pushed for bigger budgets for sophisticated 
weapons and training programs focusing on naval power projection and amphibious 
lift-all vessels, crucial to an invasion of the island. 
The PRe military had cited efforts by the Taiwan government to modernise the 
Taiwan army as a reason to spend more on sophisticated hardware. 628 The military's 
625. Jianxiang Bi, "The PRC's Active Defence Strategy: New Wars, Old Concepts," Issues & Studies, 
Vol.31, No.11, November 1995, pp.92-94; Ralph A. Cossa, "The PRC's National Security Objectives 
in the Post-Cold War Era and the Role of the PLA," Issues & Studies, Vo1.30, No.9, September 1994, 
pp.22-23. 
626. Ellis Joffe, "How Much Does the PLA Make Foreign Policy?" in David S.G. Goodman and 
Gerald Segal (eds), China Rising. London and New York: Routledge, 1997, p.61; Michael D. 
Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking. Santa Monica, Ca: 
Rand Corporation, 1996, p.75, n2. 
627. Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrivals," International Security, 
Vo1.22, No.3, Winter 1997/1998, pp.67-68. 
628. You Ji, "Missile Diplomacy and PRC Domestic Politics," in Greg Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy 
and Taiwan's Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power. Canberra: Strategic and Defence 
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argument was that Taiwan had made an enormous investment in its defence system 
from the 1970s to the 1990s. Indeed, Taiwan's defence spending had taken 40.3 
percent of the total budget, and the military accounted for 6.98 per cent of the 
island's GNP in the 1980s.629 More dramatically, from the early 1990s onwards, 
Taipei had given the army a huge amount of money in an extra-budgetary allocation, 
purely for the purchase of American and French advanced weapons systems.630 The 
military expressed concern that by procuring more hi-tech weapons in the coming 
years Taiwan's forces would constitute a threat to the PLA. If the PRe did not 
provide a continued investment in its armed forces, it would lose its margin of 
military superiority to Taiwan over the next decade. The military drew attention to 
Taiwan's fast-growing defence spending, while highlighting that the mainland's rate 
of military expenditure growth had slowed. The military called for the government 
to increase its defence budget to upgrade the PLA combat preparedness for 
reunification by force. 631 Therefore, the Taiwan issue became the most immediate 
and reasonable ground to argue the military's requirements for greater budgetary 
resources. 
5.6. Evaluation of the Military's Influence upon Taiwan 
Policy-Making632 
Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997, 
pp.47-48. 
629. Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, United States-Taiwan Security Ties: From Cold War to Beyond 
Containment. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994, p.64. 
630. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1998/99. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998, pp.169, 197. 
631 . You Ji, "Changing Leadership Consensus: The Domestic Context of War Games," in Suisheng 
Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis. New York 
and London: Routledge, 1999, p.89; Ralph A. Cossa, "The PRC's National Security Objectives in the 
Post-Cold War Era and the Role of the PLA," Issues & Studies, Vo1.30, No.9, September 1994, pp.l2-
14, pp.23-24; Michael D. Swaine, The Role o/the Chinese Military in National Security 
Policymaking. Santa Monica, Ca: Rand Corporation, 1996, p.78, n5. 
632. For an overview of the military's major influence on Taiwan policy, see John W. Garver, "The 
PLA as an Interest Group in Chinese Foreign Policy," in C. Dennison Lane, Mark Weisenbloom and 
Dimon Liu (eds), Chinese Military Modernization. New York: Kegan Paul International, 1996, 
pp.246-28l; Ellis Joffe, "How Much Does the PLA Make Foreign Policy?" in David S.G. Goodman 
and Gerald Segal (eds), China Rising. London and New York: Routledge, 1997, pp.53-70. 
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The military did not feel it was necessary to lobby on the Central Taiwan Work 
Leading Group ( CTWLG ) before 1992 but it considered it imperative to influence 
the top Taiwan policymakers after that date. Before 1992, the military itself 
dominated the policy-making and handling of affairs regarding Taiwan. Then the 
CTWLG was headed by President Yang Shangkun who had a close personal 
relationship with Deng Xiaoping. Yang had control over Taiwan policy while 
keeping the handling of routine affairs of the military in his own hands as permanent 
vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission ( CMC). When there were 
disputes between the civilian administration and the military authorities, Yang was 
able to resolve or mediate them playing a balanced role on the military's behalf.633 
Although Jiang Zemin was CPC General Secretary and CMC chairman, he only had 
a small say in Taiwan policy. At that time the military's profile on the Taiwan issue 
was low, for it did not need to act as a lobbyist to inject its views into the policy 
process. After Yang's failure in the power struggle with Jiang Zemin in the 14th 
National Party Congress in 1992, Jiang replaced Yang, becoming state president and 
CTWLG head. However, Jiang was not viewed by the military as 'one of them' 
because of his lack of a military service. This caused him difficulty in winning 
respect and loyalty from the military. Although there still was a professional 
serviceman, Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai, in the CTWLG, the military 
believed that its influence was insufficient for it to gain the upper hand on Taiwan 
issues. Against such a backdrop, with its role in the Taiwan policy process impaired, 
the military had to conduct lobbying activities with the CTWLG. In the meantime, 
with Jiang Zemin not yet predominant in Taiwan policy-making, the military had 
room to exercise influence. 634 
Unlike its approach prior to 1992, the military sought to significantly influence 
the Taiwan policy process in the mid-1990s, fuelled by its pivotal role in the 
succession politics of the post-Deng era. Jiang's political survival depended on the 
633. Tai Ming Cheng, "Chinese Military Preparations Against Taiwan Over the Next 10 Years," in 
James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs (eds), Crisis in the Taiwan Strait. FT. McNair, Washington, D.C.: 
National Defence University Press, 1997, pA6; Chen Te-sheng, "Mainland China's Taiwan Affairs 
Organizations and Personnel," Issues & Studies, Vo1.30, No.7, July 1994, p.S8; Michael D. Swaine, 
The Role o/the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking. Santa Monica, Ca: Rand 
Corporation, 1996, pp.34-36; pAl, n9. 
634 . John W. Garver, Face OfJ: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle and 
London: University of Washington Press, 1997, p.61 
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military's support but that support was conditional. Jiang had to give the military 
more for its defence budget and greater participation in policy decision making. 
Thus, the military was able to bring pressure to bear on him. The changes in the 
hierarchy of Taiwan policy-making was exposing rifts between the military and the 
civilian leadership. There were an increasing number of dissenting voices within the 
PLA over Beijing's Taiwan policy. However, Jiang was unable to easily smooth 
over the divergence between the civilian officials and the military officers. Ifhe 
attempted to rein in the PLA, his own position might be in jeopardy. Jiang found it 
difficult to take controversial stands on military issues and Taiwan affairs as the 
military became more assertive, threatening to unseat him while unhinging the 
civilian management of the Taiwan issue. This situation, finally, led to Jiang's 
decision to intimidate Taiwan by use of force. Succession politics and the mid-l 990s 
events in the Taiwan Strait provided the military with the opportunities to greatly 
influence the Taiwan policy process.635 
The military does its best to lobby on the National People's Congress (NPC ) and 
the National People's Congress' Standing Committee (NPCSC). Although the NPC 
and NPCSC are generally acknowledged to be rubber stamp organisations, they are 
still the PRC's top legislative body. Theoretically and legally, their responsibility is 
to approve or reject suggestions issued by the State Council, including the election of 
state leaders. They have the constitutionally mandated power to legislate, oversee 
law enforcement and supervise the government. The election and appointment of 
state leaders and the adoption of the law must have over half of the votes of all 
members of the NPC and NPCSC to be passed. More imperatively, the national 
budget including the defence budget and final accounts, must be examined and 
approved by the NPC. Before the mid-1980s, the top legislators followed the party's 
order to adopt with nearly unanimous votes. All bills and motions, and decisions 
made by the State Council were passed. Nevertheless, as democratisation took its 
635. David Shambaugh, "China's Commander-in-Chief: Jiang Zemin and the PLA," in C. Dennison 
Lane, Mark Weisenbloom and Dimon Liu (eds), Chinese Military Modernization. New York: Kegan 
Paul International, 1996, pp.210-211; Ellis Joffe, "How Much Does the PLA Make Foreign Policy?" 
in David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds), China Rising. London and New York: Routledge, 
1997, pp.53-70. 
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course, the PRC parliament began to change its symbolic image.636 Lawmakers had 
nullified draft laws tabled to them for approval. There were two cases in which bills 
proposed by the State Council were not approved by the NPCSC.637 Under such 
circumstances, especially when the NPC discusses and approves the defence budget, 
the military cannot afford to slight the NPC and NPCSC, despite inputs into the 
policy process of the central party's leadership and national government on major 
political and foreign decisions.638 Before the mid-1980s, the PLA delegation was 
organised to attend the annual NPC but was not active. However, since the early 
1990s the military has exerted itself to lobby the nationallegislature.639 The PLA 
delegation proposed its own motions on the budget expansion emphasising the 
army's urgent needs in accomplishing reunification in the mid-1990s.640 In the 
meantime, to make its requirements on Taiwan issues appear legitimate, the military 
utilised the NPC and NPCSC as important policy forums. The PLA delegates to the 
NPC and the military'S representatives on the NPCSC took advantage of the situation 
to propagandise their hard-line on Taiwan, preaching war-like rhetoric while 
attacking the civilian departments concerned for their soft stance.641 
The interactions between the military and the civilian departments demonstrated 
that it seemed the military did not intend to become a directorate. What it wanted 
636 • According to You Ji, the NPC influence on PRC policy decision making has increased, despite its 
role as rubber stamp remaining substantively unchanged. See You Ji, "Missile Diplomacy and PRC 
Domestic Politics," in Greg Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan's Future: Innovations in 
Politics and Military Power. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of 
Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997, p.40, n24; Also see You Ji, "Jiang 
Zemin: In Quest ofPost-Deng Supremacy," in Maurice Brosseau, Suzanne Pepper and Tsang Shu-ki 
(eds), China Review i996. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1996, pp.I-27. 
637. Before 1996, the Seventh NPCSC ( 1988-1993) once voted down a draft law on urban 
neighbourhood committees. The second time was in 1999. During the Ninth NPC, a Highway Bill 
was not adopted. These two cases have caused the military to attach importance to the power of the 
national legislature. See Daniel Kwan, "Snub for Zhu as Fuel Tax Proposal Rejected," The South 
China Morning Post, Apri130, 1999. 
638. You Ji, "Missile Diplomacy and PRC Domestic Politics," in Greg Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy 
and Taiwan's Future: innovations in Politics and Military Power. Canberra: Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997, 
p.45, n30 
639. For an extended analysis of the military'S position and lobbying activities in the NPC and 
NPCSC, see John W. Garver, "The PLA as an Interest Group in Chinese Foreign Policy," in C. 
Dennison Lane, Mark Weisenbloom and Dimon Liu (eds), Chinese Military Modernization. New 
York: Kegan Paul International, 1996, pp.252-254. 
640. Michael D. Swaine, The Role o/the Chinese Militwy in National Security Policymaking. Santa 
Monica, Ca: Rand Corporation, 1996, p.78, n5. 
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was a larger say. However, at crucial moments, when it believed that its political and 
economic benefits would be affected, or its strategic interests impacted by 'soft' 
civilian policy, the military strove to take the initiative. It strongly demanded the 
civilian departments concerned readjust Taiwan policy in responding to the course of 
events in the Taiwan Strait during 1995-1996 and adopt the military's views. Yet 
this did not appear to show that the military intended to dominate Taiwan policy 
formulation. It sometimes criticised the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO ), but seldom 
targeted it for attack. The TAO is the PRe's main working organ for Taiwan but, to 
a great extent, its main duty is to implement rather than make Taiwan policy. 
Instead, the military aimed its attack at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ( MFA) and 
focused its criticism on the MFA head, Qian Qichen, because much of the Taiwan 
issue involves the PRC-US-Taiwan relationship, and the Vice-Premier and Foreign 
Minister, Qian, was one of the key Taiwan policy-makers and was concurrently the 
CTWLG deputy-head. The military resented his weakness toward Washington and 
Taipei and blamed the MFA for bartering away sovereignty and encroaching upon 
the military's interests. In terms of American arms sales to Taiwan and other issues 
ofPRC-US relations over Taiwan, in particular Lee Teng-hui's US visit, the military 
believed that the MFA had, in failing to take countermeasures, not responded 
strongly enough. The MFA was severely criticised for its false moves and Qian was 
attacked for his supervisory failures. His resignation as foreign minister was 
demanded. The military maintained that Beijing should take an intransigent attitude 
toward the United States over Taiwan and should handle the Taiwan issue with a 
high hand. Jiang Zemin had to defend the accused Qian, which in turn affected his 
authority. 642 
Further, while forcing Qian into making a self-criticism, the military also 
criticised Jiang for following a soft-line and urged him to toughen the PRC stance on 
641 • John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle and 
London: University of Washington Press, 1997, pp.57-58; Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism 
and Foreign Policy After Deng," The China Quarterly, No.142, June 1995, p.314. 
642. Lo Bing, "The epc Military Attacks the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," ("r:p ft ~ 1J J&;9r ~ 
$,") Cheng Ming Monthly ( o/J-Il$), No.201, July 1994, pp.6-8; David Shambaugh, "China's Military 
in Transition: Politics, Professionalism, Procurement and Power Projection," The China Quarterly, 
No.l46, June 1996, pp.273-274; John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's 
Democratization. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997, pp.57-59; Luo Bing, 
"Jiang's US Tour Causes a Disturbance in Zhongnanhai," ( ?J) i;j( , "u M~ iJ I '£. r:p m ¥Hf: )Xl ylt," ) 
Cheng Ming Monthly (o/J-I!l$), No.217, November 1995, pp.6-8. 
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Taiwan. The PLA chiefs claimed that Jiang's moderate eight point policy toward 
Taiwan had failed. In order to seek the military's support to consolidate his position 
as Deng Xiaoping's successor, Jiang had to accept the plan of intimidating Taiwan 
even though he did not favour such an adventurist plan. Under military pressure, 
Jiang even undertook a self-criticism for his wrong decisions on interlinked policies 
toward America and Taiwan.643 The aggressive positions taken by the military forced 
the civilian leaders and departments concerned to take a stronger stance. Generally 
speaking, the civil-military disputes resulted in resolutions favourable to the military. 
Although the military did not attempt to playa central role in Taiwan policy decision 
making, its influence undoubtedly increased in the mid-1990s. The absence of a 
political strong man after Deng Xiaoping resulted in no leader wielding sufficient 
power to be predominantly influential over Taiwan policy, allowing the military to 
push its views into the Taiwan policy-making process. Such circumstances made the 
already fragmented Taiwan policy-making structure more diffuse. Worse, the 
Taiwan policy process was politicised. 
In addition to the above-mentioned channels of influence over Taiwan policy, the 
military took public opinion seriously. It made use of the media to whip up 
nationalist sentiments and press the civilian leadership to take a hard-line on Taiwan. 
During the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96, the military intensified its activities in 
propaganda and public relations. On one hand, it kept up a propaganda barrage in its 
own organs such as The Liberation Army Daily. Simultaneously, the top PLA 
generals published many strong statements trying to illustrate that safeguarding 
national reunification and territorial integrity was becoming an urgent concern. The 
military claimed in many hawkish comments that US intervention in a conflict 
between mainland China and Taiwan would result in serious repercussions while also 
intensifying a barrage of criticism aimed at the "Taiwan independence force headed 
by Lee Teng-hui". The military also launched its propaganda offensive in the 
civilian media to exert a heavier pressure on the civilian leadership to meet the PLA 
643. David Shambaugh, "China's Commander-in-Chief: Jiang Zemin and the PLA," in C. Dennison 
Lane, Mark Weisenbloom and Dimon Liu (eds), Chinese Military Modernization. New York: Kegan 
Paul International, 1996, pp.210-211; John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and 
Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997, pp.61-62; 
John W. Garver, "The PLA as an Interest Group in Chinese Foreign Policy," in C. Dennison Lane, 
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demands. During the tensest period of the Taiwan crisis, the PRC state media was 
filled with pictures and reports of war games.644 The military's propaganda implicitly 
criticised Jiang Zemin's poor decisions on Taiwan policy and urged Jiang to take 
resolute steps against Taiwan. At a time of mounting tension over Taiwan, the 
Beijing leadership was scheduled to gather at the seaside resort of Beidaihe for its 
annual mid-year policy review in summer 1995.645 Top item on the political agenda 
was the Taiwan question. The military flexed its political muscle to press Jiang to 
accept its views at the Beidaihe, which was focussed on charting the new PRC policy 
toward Taiwan. The military stepped up its war of words over Taiwan before the 
Beidaihe meeting putting Jiang under heavier pressure. In an atmosphere of strong 
nationalism fostered by the military, Jiang, vulnerable in the midst of the succession 
struggle, could not allow himself to appear soft on Taiwan. He managed to stabilise 
his successor position through satisfying the armed forces. After the Beidaihe 
conference, Beijing declared that it would take stronger military measures against 
Taiwan. As more PLA military exercises tool place, tensions across the Taiwan 
Strait grew.646 Thus, military adventurism along with public opinion reduced the 
civilian leaders' room to manoeuvre. They could not help but make some 
compromises to the PLA hawkish appeals. As a result, it became more difficult for a 
pragmatic Taiwan policy establishment to develop. 
Mark Weisenbloom and Dimon Liu (eds), Chinese Military Modernization. New York: Kegan Paul 
International, 1996, p.272. 
644 . Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China. New York: A. A. 
Knopf, Distributed by Random House, 1997, p.163. 
645 • Beidaihe is a seaside resort, located in Qinhuangdao City, Hebei Province, close to Beijing. It is 
the summer retreat, where the Beijing leadership gathers for its annual meeting to plan economic and 
political strategies for mid-year or the coming year. Beidaihe conferences usually start in late July or 
early August. 
646. Fu Mosha, "Contending for the Dominance of Public Opinion: Jiang and Zhu Jointly 'Liberate' 
the Army," ( 11 * tb ' " $- ;(f W. it ± 75JJ ;j:J( : rr * If* :=p fij¥ 1f!i. ' ~ , , " ) The Journalist. (/ff!i /ff!i 
/ifJ), August 5-11, 1999, p.33. 
Chapter Six 
The PRC Leadership Succession Problems and 
Jiang Zemin's Motives regarding Taiwan 
6.1. Jiang Zemin's Efforts to Defend His Status as 
Successor to Deng Xiaoping 
259 
6.1-1. The Failure of Deng Xiaoping's Succession Strategy and Jiang 
Zemin's Rise to Power 
The PRe's leadership succession problem proved very hard to settle. A transition 
to supreme power is never procedural and peaceful and is always undertaken with the 
predecessors' single-handed choice or changes of successors behind closed doors. 
This has an important negative impact on the party and country, bringing about 
political umest. Mao Zedong earmarked two men to be his successors, Liu Shaoqi 
and Lin Biao, but remained reserved about who should hold absolute power. Later, 
he dumped them, prompting ruthless power struggles within the party and great 
national upheaval. Deng, who never officially took the posts of party chief and 
government head, but was known as the actual paramount leader, followed Mao's 
footsteps in designing his succession strategy, but he also failed. 647 After missteps in 
anointing heirs, the leadership succession became more problematic over the years. 
Deng designated Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang to be his heirs as the general 
secretaries of the party one after another. Nevertheless, when he came to believe that 
neither was loyal to him, and even sought to take over from him in advance, both Bu 
and Zhao were dethroned. He needed to introduce other candidates for the position 
of' crown prince'. Thus Jiang became a beneficiary of Deng' s succession. 
647 • In response to Italian Journalist Oriana Fallaci's opinion that "Mao himself" "chose Lin Biao as 
his successor" "in the same way as an emperor chooses his heir", Deng remarked that "for a leader to 
pick his own successor is a feudal practice" which is "an incorrect way" and "an illustration of the 
imperfections in our institutions". However, he repeated the mistake of Mao. See Selected Works of 
Deng Xiaoping,1979-1982. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984, p.328. 
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Early in the 1980s, Deng began arranging the matters for the succession to himself 
and other leaders of the older generation. He stated that, in order to ensure the 
continuing vitality of the Communist regime, younger officials should be promoted 
to leading positions, requiring the old guard give up their posts to the next 
generation. Topping this agenda he set a personal example by not holding the highest 
offices and requiring other older top leaders to follow his example and resign office. 
However, he did not really want to leave the power centre. He tried to maintain his 
authority as the chairman of the Central Military Commission ( CMC ), while letting 
younger leaders take care of day-to-day matters of the party-state. Although semi-
retired and without other official posts in the highest leading body, he still held 
immeasurable power, mainly in his ability to appoint senior officials and lead 
decision-making on major issues. Even after retirement from the CMC 
chairmanship, ill, and in the last days of his life, he mustered his forces to ensure 
continued political influence. The resolution to any problem involving the party-
state could not come while Deng was an overlord in the PRC. Under such 
circumstances, a successor would not have real power until the death of Deng. 
Deng chose Hu as his first heir. Hu became the party chief in the early 1980s, 
courtesy ofDeng's single-handed arrangements. 648 However, Deng became 
increasingly displeased with Hu, who stood for more openness in culture, ideology, 
politics and society, and was against the standpoints taken by Deng regarding stricter 
Communist control. Hu advocated political restructuring but the Deng-Ied old guard 
viewed this as a threat to the nation's political stability and unity, particularly the 
Communist monopoly on power. From the perspective of Deng, Hu went against the 
principle and tradition of a Leninist party-state and drew fire for his liberal stance. 
He was blamed for rightist deviation, for being inclined to democracy and liberality 
and for not insisting on the four cardinal principles.649 The student demonstrations 
for democracy and freedom at the end of 1986 and the beginning of 1987 became an 
648 • Hu at first held the post of party chairman then served as the party general secretary. According 
to the party constitution of 1982, the party chairmanship was changed into the party general 
secretaryship. See Hu Sheng (ed.), The Seven Decades a/the Communist Party a/China (8fl rll! ± 
~ , rp /If/ fl r Jt lit! .-f:; + if)· Beijing: The History of the Communist Party of China Press ( rep 
~ 1t 5t: tB JtEZ t±), 1991, p.585. 
649 . The four cardinal principles were put forward by Deng promoting upholding the socialist road, 
the proletariat dictatorship, the leadership of the Communist party of China and Marxism-Leninism 
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excuse to sack and discredit him. Hu was condemned for encouraging "bourgeois 
liberalisation" and conniving at "total Westemisation". Especially he was criticised 
by Deng for going soft on political dissidents and taking a passive approach to 
persecution ofintellectuals.650 Deng also believed that Hu would seek to take up the 
chair of the CMC and require Deng to resign as chairman.651 Hu was dismissed from 
his post as secretary general on the grounds of his supposed responsibility for the 
student protests nation-wide. Although he was allowed to remain a member of the 
Politburo, he only played a symbolic role in maintaining the party's unity.652 
However, Deng paid a high price for his mistake in appointing and dethroning such 
an heir. Hu's dismissal was widely believed unjust. He became a hero in the eyes of 
the people. His death two years after his political downfall triggered the 1989 
protests. 
In the process of selecting a new successor after deposing Hu, Jiang was not 
considered a candidate by Deng. Theoretically, each member of the Politburo stood 
a chance of succeeding to the supreme leader, but Jiang was beyond Deng's vision. 
This explains how he became the unexpected heir. Jiang's behaviour in dealing with 
the student demonstrations was average. He held a conservative stance when 
tackling students on their political demands but failed to promptly calm down their 
demonstrations in Shanghai.653 Deng did not mention him in making a summary of 
the suppression of the student protests nation-wide. However, Deng gave praise to 
another member of the Politburo, Li Ruihuan, who was concurrently party chief in 
Tianjin, the third largest city in China. Despite holding a dialogue with the student 
demonstrators, Li declared that the party and government upheld the four cardinal 
principles and objected to the protests. Thus the student demonstrations in Tianjin 
and Mao Zedong Thought. See Deng Xiaoping, "Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles," in Selected 
Works ofDengXiaoping, 1979-1982. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984, p.1n. 
650 • For Deng's criticism of Hu' s right leaning deviationist view on "bourgeois liberalisation" and "all 
out Westemisation, see Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3 ( XjJ /j\ 3fZ X i& : $ ~ :fi). 
Beijing: People's Press ( A !% ill )ji f± ), 1993, pp.l94-202. 
651 • Lowell Dittmer, "Chinese Informal Politics," The China Journal, No.34, July 1995, pp.25-26; 
David S. G. Goodman, Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution: A Political Biography. London; 
New York: Routledge, 1994, p.106. 
652. Hu Sheng (ed.), The Seven Decades of the Communist Party of China (iSJj r1i!. .±. ~ , rp !lfI fl::;rr: 
it IF) -t + :if). Beijing: The History of the Communist Party of China Press (~ :tt: R: 5:: ill !lR t±), 
1991, pp.597-599. 
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were smaller in scale and over earlier than those in Shanghai.654 There were signs in 
Deng's praise ofLi that he would be further promoted. Indeed, a year and a half 
later, he became a member of the party's Politburo Standing Committee. It seemed 
that he would have a brighter future political career than Jiang. Most remarkably, 
Deng favoured him to succeed himself in mid-1989 when the party elders considered 
replacing Zhao Ziyang with a new successor.655 This demonstrates that the later 
choice of Jiang as party chief was not a part ofDeng's original succession strategy. 
Deng's praise of Li might have stimulated Jiang to take a stronger stance in tackling 
student protests. A year and a half later, Jiang was in Deng's good grace with his 
hard-line position in suppressing a student-led democratic movement in Shanghai 
and was selected as Deng's third successor. 
Zhao Ziyang was originally Deng's second choice. Zhao was then premier and a 
member of the Politburo Standing Committee, second only to Bu in the Communist 
Party hierarchy. Zhao was a leading reformer being seen as the vanguard ofDeng's 
modernisation program. Be tried to maintain a balance between conservative politics 
and a liberal economy through putting forward a strategy in the party's thirteenth 
congress known as "one centre" and "two fundamental points".656 Zhao sought to 
carry out a substantial reform of the political system introducing and promoting 
elements of democracy such as a certain openness of the press, higher governmental 
transparency, social dialogue and anti-corruption mechanisms. Even though he 
favoured gradual and moderate reform rather than a radical political liberation, he did 
not gain Deng's support for his plan. Deng paid lip service to political reform but 
what he wanted was only an improvement of governmental institutions and an 
653. For Jiang's handling of the student demonstrations in Shanghai between the end of 1986 and the 
beginning of 1987, see Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, pp.84-94. 
654 . Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3 ( XfJ /j\ .If Jt jjff : fI ~ ::f$). Beijing: People's Press 
( A ~ ill !iR *±), 1993, pp.l97, 405. 
655. Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link (eds) ( compiled by Zhang Liang), The Tiananmen Papers: 
The Chinese Leadership's Decision to Use Force Against Their Own People. New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2001, pp.256-263. 
656 • "One centre" was concentrated on economic development and "two fundamental points" were 
that maintenance of the four cardinal principles on the one hand and the policies of reform and 
opening to the outside world on the other. See Hu Sheng (ed.), The Seven Decades of the Communist 
Party of China (8J3 gig .:E ~ , tp !JJ/ :# r jff; ;Jj .-t; T :If). Beij ing: The History of the Communist 
Party of China Press ( i=f ~ J't 51:!. ill !iR *± ), 1991, p.60 1. 
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increase of administrative efficiency, without weakening the Communist rule. 657 
Tensions between Deng and Zhao had been simmering as their political differences 
widened. Deng had considered replacing Zhao with another heir as early as 1989.658 
A conflict of opinions on how to tackle the most difficult problem, the pro-
democracy student demonstrations triggered by the death of Hu Yaobang brought 
both of them into crisis.659 The demonstrations were considered by Deng to be a 
major threat to the Communist regime. An editorial in The People's Daily on April 
26 based on a keynote speech of Deng blamed the student protests for amounting to 
"a planned conspiracy" to negate the party's leadership while creating national 
turmoil. It demanded a prompt stop to all the demonstrations and threatened that 
activists would be severely punished. This indicated that Deng would use force 
against the peaceful protestors and was ready to sacrifice thousands of lives if that 
was the price of preserving Communist power. Meanwhile, Zhao did not think the 
students' aim was to topple the party, regarding their protests as patriotic. He 
articulated this judgement in his address to the Beijing conference of the Asian 
Development Bank on May 4. He sympathised with widespread student 
dissatisfaction with corruption and Communist Party mistakes, while suggesting it 
would be a positive impact on the nation's reform and modernisation drive. He 
expressed optimism over the protests, believing that tensions would be eased through 
the introduction of democratic principles and the rule oflaw. 660 
The publication of the actual state of affairs by Zhao whilst Deng remained 
wielding power despite retirement, led to a political rupture. When meeting the 
Soviet president, Michael Gorbachev, who was conducting a landmark visit to the 
PRC, Zhao revealed that although Deng was not in service in the highest leading 
body, he continued to be in charge of all important decisions in the party-state. 
Unravelling this poorly-kept secret provoked Deng to irritation. He viewed it as 
evidence of a political attempt by Zhao to pressure him to hand over power. Deng 
657 . Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China after Deng Xiaoping: The Power Structure in Beijing since 
Tiananmen. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 1995, pp.284-286. 
658 . Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, p.130. 
659. For more information about the power struggle among the PRC leaders and the divergence of 
their views on how to deal with the pro-democracy student demonstrations. See Andrew 1. Nathan 
and Perry Link (eds) (compiled by Zhang Liang), The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership's 
Decision to Use Force Against Their Own People. New York: PublicAffairs, 2001. 
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believed that Zhao was seeking to rush to take over from him on the excuse of being 
authorised to handle the students protests.661 In mid-May 1989, Deng decided to 
impose martial law. At the meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee on May 17, 
a resolution on the declaration of martial law was adopted by a maj ority under 
Deng's powerful pressure. Zhao voted against declaring martial law, appealing 
instead for a peaceful end to the protests, but his arduous efforts failed. Premier Li 
Peng declared martial law and called in the military on May 19.662 The day before 
imposing martial law, Zhao made a tearful, pre-dawn visit to the student 
demonstrators in Tiananmen Square.663 Following his appearance in public for the 
last time, Zhao was expelled from the party leadership and placed under virtual house 
arrest. In late-May, Deng made up his mind to replace Zhao with another heir. 664 
In view of the failure of his original choices ofHu and Zhao, Deng regarded 
conservative political standpoints, especially a tough stand toward the student 
demonstrations, as an important criterion in selecting a new heir while ignoring other 
factors. However, in order to avoid deepening the peoples' post-Tiananmen hostility, 
he did not choose a prominent figure, implicated in the massacre, such as Li Pengo 
He had to introduce a new face to stabilise the critical political situation. 665 Jiang 
Zemin was picked to replace Zhao because Deng appreciated Jiang's firm 
Communist position, especially his strong stance and firm hand on the pro-
democracy student movement in Shanghai. Moreover, Jiang was not publicly 
involved in the Tiananmen massacre.666 An appointment of Jiang as new party chief 
660. "Students in Favour of Zhao's Words," Beijing Review, May 15-21,1989, p.7. 
661. Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link (eds) (compiled by Zhang Liang), The Tiananmen Papers: 
The Chinese Leadership's Decision to Use Force Against Their Own People. New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2001, pp.176-177, 184-190; Report on Putting Down Anti-Government Riot. Beijing: 
New Star Publishers, 1989, pp.29-30. 
662. "Martial Law: Declared But Not Enforced," Beijing Review, May 29-June 4, 1989, p.5. 
663. "Strikes Spark Political Crisis," Beijing Review, May 29-June 4, 1989, p.9,. 
664. Luo Bing, "Jiang Zemin Owed Blood Debts Over the June 4 Incident ," ( !51 ill< ' " u 1~ ~ :fft /\ 
1m ll'n.1iJl: , ") Cheng Ming Monthly ( ~ Ill$), No.236, June 1997, p.S; Andrew J. Nathan and Perry 
Link (eds) ( compiled by Zhang Liang), The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership's Decision 
to Use Force Against Their Own People. New York: PublicAffairs, 2001, pp.256-263, 30S-314. 
665 • Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, p.131. 
666 • Although Jiang was not entirely untainted in the public impression at home and abroad, it seems 
that Jiang was not personally involved in the decision and enforcement on the Tiananmen 
suppression. 
On Jiang's role in the crackdown on Tiananmen Square, there are two different versions. One 
demonstrates that on the eve of the Tiananmen massacre in late-May 1989, Jiang had been called to 
Beijing, actually filling the defacto vacancy created by the informal dismissal of Zhao Ziyang who 
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could not intensify the confrontations between the Communist regime and the people 
inflamed by the Tiananmen m~ssacre. When the 1989 student-led demonstrations 
broke out, Jiang was the Communist party secretary of China's biggest city. The 
World Economic Herald was a Shanghai-based weekly with a circulation of about 
200,000, which was one of the PRC most outspoken newspapers. It advocated 
reforms, especially political reform, and had done so for 1 ° years. It had a great 
political influence nation-wide. Jiang ordered the paper shut because of its reports on 
Beijing's students' mourning for the death ofHu and its opinion on support for the 
pro-democracy student movement. Jiang's crackdown on the World Economic 
Herald impressed Deng who later turned to him to replace Zhao.667 Shortly after the 
Tiananmen massacre, at the Fourth Plenum of the 13 th Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China on June 23-24, Zhao was officially ousted as general 
secretary. Jiang was appointed as the new party chief. 668 His acquisition of right of 
succession took people both inside and outside the country by surprise because he 
had neither an outstanding political history nor popularity.669 
Summarily speaking, the fundamental political differences centring on how to 
deal with the pro-democracy student demonstrations became the principal reasons for 
the disgrace ofHu and Zhao by Deng. Taiwan policy never was a major factor in the 
political conflicts between the predecessor and his first two successors. For Hu's and 
Zhao's part, the Taiwan issue was not in their strategy of defending their own 
successor positions. Both generally carried out Deng's Taiwan policy, although 
had been under virtual house arrest. Although Deng gave the direct order to fire on the 
demonstrators, Jiang took part in making decisions and leading actions on the suppression of the 
"counter-revolutionary rebellion." See Luo Bing, "Jiang Zemin Owed Blood Debts Over the June 4 
Incident," ( lW oj( , " lll$ ~ ~ /\ !TIl .rfil {:Vt ' " ) Cheng Ming Monthly ( 11- P.J$), No.236, June 1997, 
pp.6-8. Another source indicates that at the time of the crackdown although Jiang had been called to 
Beijing to help deal with the Tiananmen pro-democracy protests and took part in suppressing them, 
he did not attend the meetings of making final decisions on the Tiananmen massacre on June 2 and 3. 
See Andrew 1. Nathan and Perry Link (eds) (compiled by Zhang Liang), The Tiananmen Papers: 
The Chinese Leadership's Decision to Use Force Against Their Own People. New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2001, pp.354-362, 368-370. 
667 • Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, pp.1l5-125, 132. 
668. Hu Sheng (ed.), The Seven Decades a/the Communist Party a/China (M fill. ± Ej, *' fifl ft;r 
jt; 1ft! ~ 1- :if). Beijing: The History of the Communist Party of China Press(I=j=! ;tt}t 5/:. ill IlR ;f±), 
1991, pp.611-612. 
669. Bruce Gilley, Tiger an the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, pp.l46-148. 
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Zhao maintained his own views.67o In an overall plan of political reform, Zhao put 
forward a proposal concerning dialogue between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait 
on the basis of equality. This went against Deng's approach of treating Taipei as a 
mere provincial government under the PRC central government. Furthermore, when 
meeting senior military officers in the province of Fuji an, Zhao proposed that the 
PLA should withdraw further from the mainland's southeast coast, on the opposite 
side of the Taiwan Strait. However, Deng maintained that Beijing had reduced its 
military forces enough since the late 1970s for a thaw in cross-strait relations and 
criticised Zhao's proposal as arbitrary.671 Nevertheless, this does not mean that Zhao 
was drawing up his own Taiwan policy. Neither Zhao nor Hu considered their most 
pressing task to be the review ofPRC policy towards Taiwan. Instead, both felt the 
most important issue they faced was how to gain the military command to 
consolidate their successor positions.672 The power of controlling the army is a 
crucial and sensitive question in the succession process. Hu never shouldered the 
duty of a leader in the high military command, despite his CPC chairmanship and 
position as general secretary, and when he revealed his intentions to become CMC 
chairman, he lost Deng's confidence.673 Although Zhao was the party general 
secretary, he only obtained the CMC first vice-chairmanship, was unable to 
command the army and had little say in military affairs. The CMC chairmanship was 
held by Deng who centralised power on major military issues and ensured the army's 
loyalty to himself. Therefore, Hu and Zhao struggled to obtain military power while 
striving to enjoy the trust of Deng. Meanwhile, Taiwan policy was not on the agenda 
670. Hu had followed Deng, delivering speeches about a naval blockade of Taiwan while threatening 
the use of force against Taiwan. See Martin L. Lasater, Beijing's Blockade Threat to Tatwan. 
Washington, D. C.: Heritage Foundation, 1985, p.1; The Government Information Office, A Study of 
a Possible Communist Attack on Taiwan. Taipei: The Government Information Office, 1992, pp.18-
19,22-23. 
671 • Neither Zhao's personal viewpoints on Taiwan policy nor his proposal that the PLA forces 
directed at Taiwan should withdraw further from the mainland's southeast coast were published. 
Zhao's documents and talks on these issues were detected by state security personnel and reported to 
Deng. See Tao Jianghe, "Deng Xiaoping Talked About the Use of Force Against Taiwan in a Series 
ofInternal Addressees," ( JltJ U ;f!l, " x~ /J\ Jf -* f xlj i:l ffl ~ 8~ * 3!U I*J 1f~ iiJt iJ!i' ' " ) Beijing 
Spring ( :It }j( Z $), No.24, May 1995, pp.53-54. 
672 • You Ji, "Jiang Zemin's Leadership and Chinese Elite Politics after 4 June 1990," Working Paper, 
No.221. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, December 
1990, p.12. 
673. Lowell Dittmer, "Chinese InfOlmal Politics," The China Journal, No.34, July 1995, pp.25-26; 
David S. G. Goodman, Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution: A Political Biography. London; 
New York: Routledge, 1994, p.1 06. 
during the struggle for leadership succession between Hu and Zhao, and their 
contenders. 
6.1-2. Jiang Zemin's Vulnerable Successor Position 
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Jiang Zemin's successor position was very weak and vulnerable immediately 
subsequent to his assumption of office.674 There was strong disapproval of his 
leadership succession by both the general public and elites. He suffered from a 
politically congenital deficiency which stemmed from Deng Xiaoping's hasty and 
rough succession rearrangements. Most unfavourably, his attainment of the position 
of party chief was through irregular processes. 
Initially, Deng did not take Jiang into account. However, confronted by radical 
changes in the political situation and an apparent absence of suitable candidates 
acceptable to the party elders, Chen Yun and Li Xiannian, two veteran communists, 
recommended Jiang as a party chief. Deng allowed himself to be persuaded over the 
period of a week. As a result of compromise, Deng nominated Jiang for party 
general secretary and other elders agreed with this nomination. Nevertheless, the 
removal of Zhao Ziyang and Jiang's approval as general secretary were totally 
unconstitutional according to party rules, due to procedural irregularities. 
Theoretically, this decision should have been made by the Politburo Standing 
Committee, the top-ranking organ of the Communist Party. The elders' meetings 
possessed no lawful right to select the next general secretary. They had retired from 
most of their official posts in the party and government. Without going through the 
official procedure of a standing committee vote, Jiang was not a legitimate heir. 675 
This meant that his status as Deng's successor was weak and unstable. 
Although Jiang was not widely seen as one of the most popular politicians in the 
PRC and did not enjoy close personal ties with Deng, he did fit by and large, Deng's 
criteria. Deng endorsed Jiang's resolute, hard-line stance and effective measures in 
674 • For an overview of Jiang's vulnerable successor position, see You Ji, "Jiang Zemin 's Leadership 
and Chinese Elite Politics after 4 June 1990," Working Paper, No.221. Canberra: Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, December 1990. 
675. Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link (eds)( compiled by Zhang Liang), The Tiananmen Papers: 
The Chinese Leadership's Decision to Use Force Against Their Own People. New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2001, pp.256-263, 308-314. 
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putting down pro-democracy student demonstrations in Shanghai, without calling in 
the army and causing bloody conflict. Jiang appeared to follow Deng's reform 
policies and seemed capable of facilitating a modernisation program. Deng also saw 
Jiang as a conciliator who would be likely to reconcile different party factions, 
playing off the two main factions against each other in an attempt to achieve a 
balance between reformists and conservatives. Such an arrangement would replicate 
the manipulation of factional struggles by Deng to retain his power.676 Without other 
competent candidates to fulfil Deng's criteria, Jiang, a dark horse, was selected to fill 
the post of party general secretary from virtual obscurity. 
The suddenness of assuming the highest office even left Jiang finding himself at a 
10ss.677 As a newcomer to the central political stage, he lacked the background, 
influence, seniority, prestige, experience and requisite ability. He did not have much 
administrative experience in the central authority, despite working at the ministerial 
level for several years and becoming the politburo member of local residents ( who 
live in major provinces and cities but sometimes travel to Beijing for conferences) 
nearly two years before.678 More crucially, it was questionable as to whether the 
military would support him, given his lack of military background.679 Most 
questionably, his statecraft was widely doubted because he had no remarkable 
administrative achievements to prove that he would be able to lead a major country 
with a population of 1.2. billion. 680 Under these circumstances, he had a weak 
mandate among the great majority of the people and had to do much to win a 
mandate and popularity. 
Meanwhile, Jiang did not hold real power and had little authority within the 
governing strata. His rulership was encroached upon by the challenges of the 
676 . Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994, pp.295-296; James AR. Miles, The Legacy ofTiananmen: 
China in Disarray. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996, pp.275-276, 58. 
677 . Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
CalifomiaPress, 1998, pp.134-135. 
678 . James A.R. Miles, The Legacy ofTiananmen: China in Disarray. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1996, p.58. 
679 • Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994, p.301. 
680. Many people viewed Jiang as a mediocre technical bureaucrat. When Jiang was in charge of the 
machinery and electronics industries as a minister of the State Council and served as mayor and party 
chief of Shanghai, he did not prove himself an effective administrator or accomplished leader. See 
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contenders for the succession as well as by other political heavyweights such as Yang 
Shangkun.681 Jiang's weak leadership was reflected in his puppet-like capacity under 
Deng's overlordship. As the hand-picked successor of Deng, he was viewed both 
inside and outside the country as being under Deng's thumb.682 He strove to win 
Deng's trust, being in the same position as a boy emperor who would have obeyed 
the retired Emperor father in the old dynasties. It is generally recognised that when 
Jiang came to power, Deng, in fact, remained supreme ruler despite having no an 
official position in the highest-ranking body. Deng did not really want to leave the 
political stage, and he attended to party-state affairs behind the scenes making all 
major foreign and domestic policies. Most importantly, Deng was still the final 
arbiter of all key party and governmental personnel appointments and dismissals, 
while continuing to playa role as an arbitrator in disputes between different factions. 
Outwardly, Deng handed over the party leadership to Jiang, but Jiang was only an 
implementer of Deng's decision-making. 
Under these circumstances, Jiang lacked any sense of security. His relations with 
various party factions were far from stabilised. He became the man in the hotseat, 
and felt the pressure to deliver.683 Without any assurance of how long he could stay 
in power, he had to struggle for his political survival. He was haunted by fear of 
becoming a second Hua Guofeng. Whether he would be just a transitional figure 
became a popular topic at home and abroad and many expected his tenure to be 
short.684 Compared with previous PRC leaders who decisively established their 
Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China after Deng Xiaoping: The Power Structure in Beijing since Tiananmen. 
Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 1995, pp.340-341. 
681 • Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, pp.146-147, 183. 
682. James A.R. Miles, The Legacy of Tiananmen: China in Disarray. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1996, p.58. 
683 • Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, p.148. 
684. Hua Guofeng, Mao Zedong's hand-picked successor, is known as a transitional figure in the 
transfer of political power. He never held real power and was finally defeated by Deng Xiaoping in 
the power struggle for rulership in the post-Mao era. When Jiang assumed office, foreign specialists 
on Chinese politics, the international press and many domestic sources compared Jiang with Hua, 
merely an interim leader. This opinion had brought pressure to bear on Jiang during the early period 
of coming into power. See You Ji, "Jiang Zemin 's Leadership and Chinese Elite Politics after 4 June 
1990," Working Paper, No.221. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University, December 1990, p.12; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New 
York: Prentice Hall, 1999, p.12; Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New 
Elite. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, ppA, 146-147, 183. 
leaderships, Jiang was the most vulnerable. With insufficient authority from the 
outset he did not occupy a dominant position. 
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Contenders for succession posed a threat to Jiang's new but weak leadership. On 
one hand, he had to prevent Zhao from re-appearing on the political scene. Zhao 
could always rehabilitate because he retained his party membership. When Mao 
Zedong purged Deng Xiaoping during the Cultural Revolution, Mao let Deng remain 
a member of the party, providing Deng with conditions through which he could 
restore his former posts and become the actual paramount leader. Drawing a lesson 
from this, Jiang watched Zhao carefully to prevent him from restoring himself to 
power. 685 Although Zhao had been politically sidelined and was under virtual house 
arrest, he retained influence.686 Some officials, even members of the party's central 
committee, had asked for a suitable position for Zhao.687 Jiang feared Zhao could yet 
re-emerge as a rallying point for pro-democracy reformists in the party and 
government while also worrying that he enjoyed high prestige among the general 
public. Zhao retained his political resources and affiliations and these could impinge 
upon Jiang's leadership. For example, Tian Jiyun, a member of the Politburo, 
concurrently then vice-premier subsequently vice-chairman of the parliament, was a 
former right-hand man of Zhao, and used some occasions to attack Jiang.688 Those 
who occupied influential leading posts became more formidable rivals to Jiang, 
negatively impacting on his leadership stability in the critical moment of transferring 
685. At the Fourth Plenum of the 13 th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on June 23-
24, 1989, Zhao Ziyang was dismissed from all leading posts in the party but was not expelled from 
the party. The Plenum decided Zhao's case would be further investigated. The Ninth Plenum ofthe 
13th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China of1992 made a decision to "sustain the 
verdict in the case". See "Zhao's Case Brought to an End," Beijing Review, October 19-25, 1992. 
For further information about Zhao's political activities after stepping down and Jiang's prevention of 
Zhao's restoration to power, see Yue Liming, "Zhao Ziyang's Elements Are Increasing in the Political 
Circles of Communist China," ( ill :fL gIj , " 9=t ft If;t :ti jfX ~ ~S 131 * L 7f- , " ) China Spring (1' 
!lfI Z 1/), No.139, May 1995, pp.13-16; Li Zijing, "Distinguishing and Analysing the Hearsay on 
Zhao Ziyang," (~ El JR ' " 7FX ~ ~S 1~ IIg ~ ftJ m '" ) The Trend Magazine ( ij/; [/i]), No.1 06, June 
1994, pp.14-15. 
686. For an overview suggesting that Zhao remained politically influential with the remnants of the 
Zhao faction, see Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China after Deng Xiaoping: The Power Structure in Beijing 
since Tiananmen. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 1995, pp.353-359, 381-382. 
687. Li Zijing, "The Newest Information About Zhao Ziyang,"( ~ El JR, "jfX ~ ~s 8'9 :;: ¥JT if\, ,@, ," ) 
Cheng Ming Monthly (~mg), No.212, June 1995, pp.29-31. 
688. Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.), The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng (Second 
Edition). New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp.502-503, 507, 522; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, 
China after Deng Xiaoping: The Power Structure in Beijing since Tiananmen. Singapore: John Wiley 
& Sons, 1995, p.382. 
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Deng's power to his new administration. They were reluctant to accept Jiang's 
succession and would not resign themselves to their defeat in the contest for supreme 
power. They considered Jiang as incompetent. They tried to block Jiang's 
leadership and even boycott his administrative policies to undermine his authority 
and credibility. 
When analysing the contenders for the succession, it is essential to examine those 
specific individuals who were the most important contestants and, hence, most 
influential upon the succession process. In terms of the seniority, prestige, 
experience and political strength, those best able to contest the succession to Deng 
were Li Peng, Qiao Shi and Li Ruihuan. Both Li and Qiao were older than Jiang. 
These two principal rivals of Jiang became members of the Political Bureau in 1985 
and members of the Politburo Standing Committee in 1987. They respectively 
represented two opposite factions at the top of the power structure, hard-liners and 
reformers. Both Li and Qiao had an advantage over Jiang in that their own factions 
stood firmly behind them. Li' s faction was known as the state council faction while 
Qiao had his political and legal faction. Li had strong support among conservatives, 
in particular, the old guard. The party's liberal wing, advocating reform and 
openness, was at Qiao's back. Jiang was reluctantly acceptable to different factions, 
but had no solid power base. His own faction in the party-state centre had no time to 
organise in the early days when he came to power.689 Under such circumstances, the 
contention was fiercest between Jiang, Li Peng and Qiao. 
Li Peng was number two in the Communist Party hierarchy after Jiang. As then 
premier, he had directed the State Council, the central body of government since 
1987. He had the governmental system under his control and made most ministers 
side with him.690 Li sought to become Deng's successor and had vied with others for 
this goal for a long time. Li utilised the opportunity of the 1989 protests to take 
advantage of Zhao's unfavourable circumstances, especially Zhao's adverse handling 
of the student demonstrations, and played an important role in promoting Deng's 
689. Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, p.l46. 
690. Li became premier in 1988 and was re-nominated as premier in 1993. See The Editorial Board of 
Who's Who in China ( 9:r rm A;g * -j,RJ ~ ~ ~ '$), Who's Who in China Current Leaders ( rp fjJf 
A 15 ;t itt! JfI!.: J!l! f£ Jt i!1 J'j! fJf -ff'i A lif fi)· Beijing: Foreign Languages Press (:J~ )( ill 1lRt±), 
1994, p.312. . 
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resolve to dismiss Zhao and use force against the peaceful demonstrators. Yet Li did 
not realise his ambition of becoming the successor despite taking the lead in the 
Tiananrnen crackdown to defend the Communist regime. He was deeply convinced 
that Jiang had rushed into seizing the fruits of victory over Zhao. Li's views were 
shared by Chen Xitong, a member of the Politburo and Beijing party chief, who also 
played an important role in the Tiananrnen crackdown. Li and Chen considered 
Jiang's winning of the right of succession unreasonable and his successor position as 
weak. This bore the seeds of the next round of struggle for the leadership 
succession.691 Meanwhile, Li, as a hard-liner, made an evil reputation for himself for 
his leading role in the 1989 events and was blamed by many for the Tiananrnen 
massacre after he barked out the order declaring martial law on television on May 20. 
He found himselflargely isolated following the appointment of Jiang as party 
chief. 692 In order to retrieve his reputation and improve his own position, he had to 
compromise with Jiang.693 Jiang was ready to corne to terms. Both shared the same 
basic conservatism and sought for a balance of power in favour of themselves. This 
was why the contention between Li and Jiang remained, but did not intensify 
dramatically.694 
691 • Although Li failed to become the successor and would have to step down as the premier because 
of "the two-term limit set by the Chinese constitution, he is said to be unwilling to retire. Reportedly, 
he aspires to be either the PRC president or the general secretary of' the CPC, "both positions 
currently occupied by Jiang Zemin". See Minxin Pei, "Racing Against Time: Institutional Decay and 
Renewal in China," in William A. Joseph (ed.), China Briefing: The Contradictions o/Change. 
Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997, pp.16-17. 
692 • For a view of the political environment surrounding Li, see Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China after Deng 
Xiaoping: The Power Structure in Beijing since Tiananmen. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 1995, 
pp.351-353. 
693 • There are different views about Li Peng's political resources and influence. According to Ruan 
Ming, a former political adviser to the late CPC secretary general, Hu Yaobang, Li was in a weak 
position because of Jiang's limits on his power. While discussing the PRC political situation after the 
1989 Tiananmen massacre, Ruan expressed his views to Michael Oksenberg, a top American 
specialist in China, who considered Li powerful. See Ruan Ming, "The PRC WTO (the World Trade 
Organisation) Entry and Dual Character the Jiang Zemin Empire," ( IlTG 4iiS ' " A t!:t £j U ¥¥ ~ W 00 
B~ XJ.ll 'Ii ** ' " ) Cheng Ming Monthly ( 1r P.fj), No.266, December 1999, p.39. 
694 • You Ji, "Jiang Zemin 's Leadership and Chinese Elite Politics after 4 June 1990," Working Paper, 
No.221. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, December 
1990, p.6; Chwenliang Pao, "The Founding of Jiang's Era-A Perspective from the 'Occupation 
Distribution Model' ," (1!1 ¥¥ ~ , "U ~ I~' B~ ~ :fL-J{f{ %- 3J"- Me *l :rt; B'9 xJII, ,~ , " ) China 
Affairs ( 4' !Jf! I/J if), No.1, July 2000, p.95. For further analyses of the contentions between Jiang 
and Li and their coalition, see You Ji, "Jiang Zemin: In Quest ofPost-Deng Supremacy," in Maurice 
Brosseau, Suzanne Pepper and Tsang Shu-ki, (eds), China Review 1996. Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press, 1996, pp.4-6. 
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Qiao Shi was the third ranking leader in the party. Qiao had his own solid power 
base. He held the PRC parliament chairmanship as his main duty. In addition, as 
previous chief of the party's Organisation Department and then president of the Party 
School of the party's Central Committee, he had an important voice in most party 
and government personnel decisions. He had served as secretary of the Central 
Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the party's Central Committee since 1985 
and as secretary of the party's Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection since 
1987.695 With two such powerful positions, he dominated the state security apparatus 
and was in charge of purging the party of disloyal or corrupt members. More 
importantly, as an internal security czar, he had power over the People's Armed 
Police, a paramilitary organisation. A major move was that he had taken full 
advantage of the parliament as a strong power base to weaken Jiang's leadership.696 
Widely considered a reformist leader, he had the political capital to take the initiative 
on major issues. Thus he was believed to have a greater political influence than Li 
Pengo Of the three top contenders, the struggle for succession to Deng between Qiao 
and Jiang was fiercer than that between Li Peng and Jiang or Li Ruihuan and Jiang.697 
Qiao was backed by President Yang Shangkun. When the party elders decided to 
dismiss Zhao Ziyang and discussed the question of who would be the more suitable 
successor, Yang proposed that "I would nominate him ( Qiao ) to be general 
secretary". 698 In 1992, Yang and Qiao took advantage ofDeng's tour of southern 
China and Jiang's political crisis, conspiring to replace Jiang with Qiao as general 
695. See The Editorial Board of Who's Who in China ( .p ffiI A1'1 "* -jj!J" M!i ~~ if~), Who's Who in 
China Current Leaders ( rp /llI A :f!i ;t iPJ Jff!.: !Jl1 tE Jf!: if!{ ¥ @[ ~ A iff 4fl). Beij ing: Foreign 
Languages Press ( ~r )( ill JlR t±), 1994, pp.502-S03. 
696. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, pp.l09-
122. 
697. See Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.), The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng (Second 
Edition). New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp.521-522. Also see Minxin Pei, "Racing 
Against Time: Institutional Decay and Renewal in China," in William A. Joseph (ed.), China 
Briefing: The Contradictions of Change. Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997, p.l6. However, 
Frederick C. Teiwes suggests that it seemed that Qiao Shi did not make "an attempt to oust Jiang" and 
unlikely challenged Jiang's successor position. See Frederick C. Teiwes, "Normal Politics with 
Chinese Characteristics," The China Journal, No.45, January 2001, pp.73-74. 
698. Andrew 1. Nathan and Perry Link (eds) (compiled by Zhang Liang), The Tiananmen Papers: 
The Chinese Leadership's Decision to Use Force Against Their Own People. New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2001, pp.256-263. 
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secretary.699 However, generally speaking, Jiang and Qiao managed to avoid an open 
and direct conflict. 700 
Li Ruihuan is a singular case and is different from Li Peng and Qiao. He was 
sixth-ranking member of the party hierarchy in mid-1989 and ranked fourth on the 
hierarchic list of leaders in 1992.701 He had an advantage in the competition to be 
Deng's heir. His valuable political capital was Deng's backing. Deng favoured him 
to succeed himself when the party elders considered replacing Zhao Ziyang with a 
new successor. Deng had a high opinion of him despite his lack of qualifications.702 
He was 8 years younger than Jiang and, before being elevated to the Politburo 
Standing Committee, he ranked almost the same as Jiang in seniority and experience 
within the party leadership. In addition, he was famous as a moderate who was open-
minded about social change. Having the reputation of a reformist, he advocated 
economic and political reform and openness to the outside world. With this 
approach, he enjoyed public support among the grassroots and intellectuals. He felt 
sympathy for the broad masses of the people and was concerned with their wellbeing, 
while often expressing his opinion in favour of liberal intellectuals. In sharp contrast 
to Jiang's hard-line and low popularity, he was a popular figure. Yet, in competing 
to fill the vacancy that Deng left, he lacked political strength and influence over the 
coercive apparatuses.703 From 1989 to 1992, he was in charge of the party's ideology 
but had no real power in the party, government and military. He became less 
influential after holding the position of head of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference in 1993, a largely powerless group playing a symbolic role 
as a democratic facade. However, he had been at loggerheads with Jiang contending 
699. Ao Feng, "Jiang Zemin Intends to Reduce Hu Jintao to a Mere Figurehead," (7fl. ~ , " tr {~ ~ 
it -* ~:2: iiJl ~ l%f, ") Cheng Ming Monthly (ijf I!!$), No.290, December 2001, pp.23-24. 
700 • Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China after Deng Xiaoping: The Power Structure in Beijing since 
Tiananmen. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 1995, pp.286-287. 
701 • "Profiles of the Party's Leaders," Beijing Review, July 10-16, 1989, pp.17-21; "New Party 
Leadership Line-Up," Beijing Review, November 2-8, 1992, pp.9-13. 
702. Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link (eds) (compiled by Zhang Liang), The Tiananmen Papers: 
The Chinese Leadership's Decision to Use Force Against Their Own People. New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2001, pp.256-263. 
703 . According to Bruce Gilley, Li Ruihuan was "hopelessly liberal" and "powerless", see Bruce 
Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1998, p.198; For more information about Li's political standpoints and place in the power 
structure, see Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China after Deng Xiaoping: The Power Structure in Beijing since 
Tiananmen. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 1995, pp.361-363. 
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for the status ofDeng's successor. Thus, in this study, he is viewed as a long-term 
competitor for Jiang's successor position. 
Comparatively speaking, in the early period when Jiang took charge of the leading 
body other rivals, some ordinary politburo members, emerged to struggle for the 
succession for a time. There were two main cliques. One was the Chen Xitong-led 
Beijing faction.704 Another was the Yang family generals/OS President Yang 
Shangkun and his younger half brother Yang Baibing, the Secretary-General of the 
CMC.706 Neither Chen nor Yang were viewed as suitable or possible successors. 
However, Chen was a wild-man who dared to challenge Jiang and Yang was a 
powerful man who had leverage in the centre of power. The Chen-led Beijing 
faction controlled the capital, the political heartland. This seriously concerned Jiang 
for his leadership. The Yang family generals held military command which played a 
decisive role in the succession struggle. These two cliques were perceived by Jiang 
as the two political forces most likely to immediately threaten his position. 
6.1-3. Jiang Zemin's Struggles to Consolidate His Successor Position 
Faced with these contenders for succession, the consolidation of his successor 
position became Jiang's most pressing task. Yet, he was cautious in dealing with his 
political opponents. His strategic principle was to maintain and enhance his position 
as Deng's stable successor, to accumulate strength and wait for his chance to defeat 
704 . For more information on Chen, see The Editorial Board of Who's Who in China ( i=f 00 A 45 * 
im :A ~ m if~), Who's Who in China Current Leaders ( '*' fflI A. 15 ;t iff] j/!f.: If{J it Jt i!ft ¥ 1Jf ~ 
A. !fiT:f#)· Beijing: Foreign Languages Press (>'~)( ill JfflZ t1), 1994, p.65. 
705 • Because the Yang brothers formed an unprecedented family group at the top of the military 
apparatus, the two Yangs are widely called the Yang family generals, drawing the name from a 
famous story in China history. 
706. Yang Shangkun had concurrently been Politburo member from 1987 to 1992 and permanent vice-
chairman of the CMC from 1987 to 1989. He replaced Zhao Ziyang becoming CMC first vice-
chairman from 1989 to 1992. See Hu Sheng (ed.), The Seven Decades afthe Communist party of 
China (i5')3 ~Ijl, ± ~ , '*' fflI;# r Jf!: Ii) -C --;-- :1:p). Beijing: The History of the Communist Party of 
China Press ( i=f ~ }t ~ ill JfflZ f±), 1991, p.603; "Deng Retires, Jiang Appointed Military Chief," 
Beijing Review, November 20-26, 1989, p.5. For further information about Yang Shangkun, see 
Michael D. Swaine, The Military & Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, Beliefs. 
Santa Monica, Ca: Rand Corporation, 1992, pp.33-35. In addition, Yang Baibing had concurrently 
been Secretariat member of the party's Central Committee and director of General Political 
Department of the PLA from 1989 to 1992. See The Editorial Board of Who's Who in China ( i=f 00 
A 1; * im A ~ *f1: if~ ), Who's Who in China Current Leaders ( '*' fflI A 15 ;t iff] j/!f.: If{J {E Jf!: i!ft 
¥ @J! ~ A Iff $}. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press (1~ )( ill JfflZ U), 1994, pp.768-769. 
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his rivals while relying on Deng's support. With a cautious approach to the defence 
of his position, his strategic calculations of purging political opponents were 
successfully brought about over several years. He settled with the Beijing faction led 
by Chen Xitong and backed by Li Peng in 1995, as well as the Yang family generals 
in 1992, thwarting their intentions to usurp his position as 'crown prince'. Primarily, 
in the initial stages of his succession, Jiang depended on Deng for leadership 
stability. Jiang's tactic of succeeding to Deng was that there would be no haste. 
Jiang was not anxious to assert control over all party-state departments while sharing 
power in a collective leadership.707 He avoided invoking fear of his overlordship 
while doing his best to win Deng's confidence. 70S He was prepared to wait to fill 
Deng's vacant chair after the death of his mentor. Jiang's tactic finally proved 
successful despite Deng's suspicions about his loyalty and ability at one time.709 
As Jiang strove for Deng's backing, Deng made an effort to bolster Jiang's image 
and authority as leader. Indeed, he was aware that it was unlikely that his successor 
would have much of a mandate. Deng backed up Jiang and helped to train his 
administrative ability. For example, he looked for an invitation to visit Washington 
for Jiang to help boost his international profile.71O Mainly, Deng undertook two 
major moves to consolidate Jiang's heirship. One was that he handed over military 
command to Jiang and deterred those who sought to replace him. Deng resigned as 
the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC ) and granted Jiang the 
CMC chairmanship in November 1989.711 Few people believed that Deng's position 
as overlord would be affected by his formal resignation from his last leading post. 
This notwithstanding, Deng had bolstered Jiang's position as his heir by leaving the 
command of the country's military forces in the hands of his favoured successor. 
Neither Hu Yaobang nor Zhao Ziyang had obtained control over the CMC. This 
707 • Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, p.l83. 
708 • Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, p.168. 
709. For an examination of Jiang's efforts to consolidate his successor position, see Paul Cavey, 
"Building a Power Base: Jiang Zemin and the Post-Deng Succession," Issues & Studies, Vo1.33, 
No.l1, November 1997, pp.l-34. 
710. Yet Deng's proposal that Washington should extend an invitation to Jiang Zemin for his visit to 
the United States failed, with the Bush Administration politely refused this proposal. See "Deng 
Xiaoping Had a Great Mind to Patronise Jiang Zemin after the June 4 incident," [ " ( X~ /j\ f ) ;\ 12] 
J§ ~JH1U~Jt ~1I r~ ~,"] TTNN (:$ ifl iiJ E JJIj /lfI), October 3,1998. 
711 • "Deng Retires, Jiang Appointed Military Chief," Beijing Review, November 20-26, 1989, p.5. 
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indicated that the Deng Xiaoping era was approaching its end and Jiang was taking 
over. In the meantime, when Jiang's heirship invoked opposition, Deng protected 
him from the contenders for succession. Originally, they had been waiting for an 
opportunity to step into the shoes of Deng. However, following Zhao Ziyang's fall 
from power, they failed in the competition with Jiang. While giving credit to the 
capability of Jiang, Deng taught them that they could not but submit themselves to 
Jiang's leadership. Deng also called for unity among members of the central leading 
body to solve the country's urgent problems. In an effort to persuade them to accept 
Jiang's new administration, Deng tried to adopt a code of conduct to bring order to 
competing claims over the leadership succession and curb their ambitions to replace 
Jiang. Deng named Jiang the core of the third-generation leadership while describing 
Mao Zedong and himself respectively as the leaders of the first and second 
generations of revolutionaries in order to make Jiang's succession appear 
legitimate. 712 Meanwhile, Deng established the collective leadership system for 
Jiang's administration, indicating that Jiang had to share power with other members 
of the leading body, including his political rivals.713 
Although Jiang had established his leadership, he still faced severe challenges in 
consolidating his power. Two years after coming into office, he had to rise to a 
challenge that threatened his successor position. The source of the biggest political 
crisis since he assumed power stemmed from Jiang's overlord, who was losing his 
trust in Jiang. The main reason for this was that Deng began to doubt whether Jiang 
could loyally follow the reformist policy that he had initiated since 1978. When 
Jiang failed to make reform and promote openness as a centrepiece of his rule, Deng 
had become displeased with him and, in particular, his misadministration of the 
economy. In the early days when Jiang came to power, Deng required that the new 
leading body must be reform-oriented. He instructed Jiang to satisfy the people by 
delivering economic benefits. He warned his heir that the party's relationship with 
the people was damaged by the Tiananmen events and had to be mended. Jiang was 
told that an economic performance with further reform and opening-up would be the 
712. Benjamin Yang, Deng: A Political Biography. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998, p.259; 
.Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3 ( XjJ /j\ Sf X jj§,' f/! -=: $). Beijing: People's Press ( A 
~ t±l JlR *±), 1993, pp.296-301, 309-310. 
713. Selected Works ofDeng Xiaoping, Vol. 3 ( XjJ /j\ Sf X jj§,' f/! -=: $). Beijing: People's Press 
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basis for winning public support and stabilising the regime. In doing so, another 
Tiananmen event would be avoided and Beijing's international status would be 
improved.714 Deng was disappointed that Jiang moved in the reverse direction and 
did not implement his instructions. Jiang placed emphasis on Marxist ideological 
rectification while seeking to downgrade the focus on economic development. He 
had carried forward an anti-peaceful evolution drive to raise the country against an 
alleged American plot to overthrow Communist China. In view of the mistakes of 
two former general secretaries of the party regarding "bourgeois liberalisation" and 
"total Westernisation", Jiang took an extremely conservative stance on reform and 
opening- up. Jiang's representative theory consisted of two different visions of 
reform socialist and capitalist. His view was given full expression in his keynote 
speech of 1991.715 He warned of the danger that some hostile forces at home and 
abroad, under the banner of reform and opening-up, were attempting to create a 
"peaceful evolution" in the PRC to change its socialist reform into capitalist one. He 
placed the stress on ideology in pursuit of orthodox socialism, leaving concern about 
the country's economy in second place. 
Deng's guiding principle in ruling the country was pragmatism.716 Deng was 
nicknamed the chief architect of the PRC reform and open policy and helped usher in 
historic economic reforms. He anxiously watched Jiang's conservative 
administrative programme, maintaining that Jiang's two different visions ofreform 
were wrong.717 He summed up his own theory as socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, which had provided a model for blending communism in politics and 
capitalism in economy. With these two different hands, economic liberalisation and 
political stability could be reconciled, keeping the Communist Party in power. Jiang 
wrongly understood Deng's statecraft, holding that both economy and politics should 
be controlled tightly. Such a mistaken understanding nearly resulted in a political 
blunder. Worse, in terms of how to deal with the impact of the dissolution of the 
(A ~ t±:l JlR *±), 1993, pp.318-319. 
714 • Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3 ( )?jJ /j\ .s;z X jj§ .' jff ~ :fff). Beijing: People's Press 
( A ~ t±:l J!R *±), 1993, pp.296-300, 312-314, 317-318, 321. 
715. "Building Socialism the Chinese Way-A Speech Delivered by Jiang Zemin on July 1, 1991 at a 
Meeting Marking the 70th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China," Beijing 
Review, July 8-14, 1991, pp. 14-3 1. 
716 . Deng's famous dictum was that "it does not matter if a cat is black or white as long as it catches 
mice." This is widely circulated among Chinese people. 
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former Soviet Union and the people power revolutions in Eastern Europe, the 
political differences between Deng and Jiang deepened. Thrown into panic and 
confusion by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, Jiang focussed 
his minds on politics and ideology to hang on to Communist power. He intensified 
his program of anti-peaceful evolution while quickening the move away from Deng' s 
reformist policy. However, Deng held opposite views, believing that Jiang 
magnified the peril and did not have a clear understanding of the crux of the matter. 
A central lesson that Deng drew from the fall of Soviet communism was that the 
Communist party's legitimacy could be called into question by economic failure. 
Deng had been worried about the nation's future economic development two years 
after Jiang became his successor. Deng believed that under the leadership of Jiang, 
the PRC was returning to a hard-line on the economy and its reform and opening-up 
was regressing. After 12 years of great expansion since 1978, the PRC began to 
witness a decline in economic growth beginning in 1990. Deng was concerned that 
the country's economy was sliding downhill and maintained that the country must 
sustain rapid economic development to maintain the survival of Communist China. 
He resolved upon clarifying the party's political programmes and governmental 
policies that had been confused by Jiang while teaching his successor a lesson.718 
In early 1992, Deng made his landmark tour of southern China, launching a 
campaign for more and faster reform and opening-up. Deng's significant public 
appearance after retiring came as an astonishing domestic political change, amazing 
the world. During the trip, he declared his disapproval of Jiang's economic 
conservatism and gave his blessing to continued economic reform. He strongly 
believed that the goal of market socialism was correct and that the party should stick 
to this line and devote its resources to economic construction. In terms of the 
essence of socialism, he maintained that to judge a move as "socialist" or "capitalist" 
would depend mainly on whether it would be assessed as raising productivity, living 
standards and the nation's strength, rather than by political and ideological labels. 719 
717. Benjamin Yang, Deng: A Political Biography. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998, p.260. 
718. For the political differences between Deng and Jiang as well as Deng's displeasure with Jiang, see 
James A.R. Miles, The Legacy ofTiananmen: China in Disarray. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1996, pp.71-107. 
719. For Deng's talks during his 1992 tour of southern China, see Selected Works ofDeng Xiaoping, 
Vol. 3 ( XjJ /)\ If X jj§: J% ~ 1#}. Beijing: People's Press ( A ~ ill Jl!X U), 1993, pp.370-383. 
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In a call for faster and deeper economic change, Deng placed pressure on Jiang to 
force forward the stalled economic reform plans. Most seriously, he gave Jiang a 
serious warning that those who vacillated and failed to adhere to the road of reform 
and opening-up should step down from their positions of power. This came amid 
speculation that Jiang could be forced into resignation to make way for economic 
reformers favoured by Deng.720 
1992 was a pivotal year for Jiang, in which the political storms sparked by Deng's 
tour of southern China haunted his general secretaryship of the party. Being aware of 
the seriousness of this political crisis, Jiang tried to satisfy the angry overlord. The 
key to defusing the crisis was to promptly respond to Deng's reformist policy. In a 
bid to quell growing censure of his administration, especially his extremely 
conservative economic policy, he made a self-criticism. Jiang acknowledged his lack 
of enthusiasm for reform and took responsibility for the problems resulting from 
stagnant reform and opening-up. He stated his deep commitment to carrying out 
Deng's policy to adhere to economic reform and development as his central task. 721 
In addition, Jiang undertook a set of major measures to relieve his political crisis. 
Under Jiang's instructions, the media had switched to playing up Deng's theory of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics while propagating Deng' s speeches during his 
trip to south. A special conference of the Politburo presided over by Jiang was held 
to discuss how to respond to Deng's remarks. The conference declared that the 
Politburo would lead all the party members to study and implement Deng' s 
"constructive speeches" during his "inspection tour".722 This was Jiang's most 
dramatic attempt to ease the biggest political crisis of his two year general 
secretaryship. In mid-year, he delivered a speech to senior officials at the Central 
Party School, hailing Deng's instructions and urging them to carry out Deng's 
reformist and opening-up policies more boldly.723 By correcting mistakes and 
proceeding with his work on reform and opening-up, he had gained much needed 
720 • James A.R. Miles, The Legacy ofTiananmen: China in Disarray. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1996, p.98; "Before Yang Family Generals Were Removed from Office, Yang 
Shangkun Had Intended to Oust Jiang Zemin and Li Peng from Office," (" 1m ~ ~ j!jlj 1Y. §fJ 1m riD 
ff:. ~ j.Et ttr u1:f: ~ . '$ ~ T ~ , " ) TTNN ( 1/1 ifl it} B /ffij /ifJ), September 20, 1998. 
721 • Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.), The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng(Second Edition). 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.500; Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin 
and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, pp.186-187. 
722 • "Politburo Urges Bolder Reforms," Beijing Review, March 23-29, 1992, p.5. 
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credit after his earlier moves tightening ideological campaigns. Furthermore, at the 
party's 14th National Congress at the end of the year, Jiang spoke highly ofDeng's 
theory on building socialism with Chinese characteristics, particularly his policy of 
reform and openness, and encouraged delegates to discuss how this theory would be 
practised. Jiang's political report proclaimed that Deng's southern tour had charted 
the course for the party and country, while defining the historical role of his remarks 
during this tour as a bid to guide the present and future work. Jiang pledged to 
follow Deng's line and devote himself to the reformist course while conducting less 
ideological indoctrination. His report introduced the market economy, putting 
forward concrete measures concerning how to quicken the pace of the country's 
economic construction.724 Jiang had used the congress to boost his image as a keen 
follower of his mentor. As a result, he rode out the biggest political crisis since he 
assumed power. 
Deng did not press ahead with his plan to dismiss Jiang. Analytically speaking, 
there were three main reasons. Principally, Deng was moved by Jiang's self-
criticism and expression of his deep commitment to reform and opening-up. Deng 
found Jiang was sincere and fearful in criticising himself and believed that Jiang had 
learned a lesson from the crisis and should be given another chance to atone for his 
misdeeds. This gave Deng an important reason to retreat from a dethroning 
process. 725 Additionally, on deciding whether to oust Jiang and appoint a new 
successor, Deng's considerations that another dismissal could cause political 
instability played a large role. He clearly knew that the contenders for the succession 
were trying to find an opportunity to arise again for a new contest. Meanwhile, his 
poor health in his last years made him unable to withstand a new political struggle. 
Also, another succession struggle could damage Deng's own credibility. He had 
deposed two heirs, invoking a bad reputation, an inconstant sort of fellow, for 
723 • "China's Reform Called a 'Revolution' ," Beijing Review, June 22-28, 1992, pA. 
724. For full text of the political report delivered by Jiang Zemin at the party's 14th National Congress, 
see "Accelerating Reform and Opening-Up," Beijing Review, October 26-November 1, 1992, pp.9-32. 
725 • Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, pp.190; "Before Yang Family Generals Were Removed from Office, Yang 
Shangkun Had Intended to Oust Jiang Zemin and Li Peng from Office," (" 1% %: '* ~u tx rw fm [';'ij 
ffi l/!fj rlt Dr U ¥~ ~ . '-$ ~ T ~ , ") TTNN ($ ifl ftj E !iii j}fj), September 20,1998. 
himself. This forced him to give up his original deposition plan.726 As a result of 
these second thoughts, Jiang's successor position was retained. 
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After changing his mind about replacing Jiang with other successors, Derig 
supported Jiang's consolidation of his leadership.727 In order to shake off the yoke of 
veteran leaders on Jiang, Deng abolished the Central Advisory Commission 
(CAC ).728 This strengthened Jiang's political place in the power structure, reducing 
the informal power of the retired senior officials. Further, Deng proposed Jiang for 
the state presidency, another major move in propping him Up.729 By holding the 
presidency in addition to the two other top posts of party chief and head of the 
military, Jiang concentrated all the power of party, military and state on himself, 
boosting his authority. More significant, with the help ofDeng, Jiang defeated his 
two political enemies, the Beijing faction headed by Chen Xitong and the Yang 
family generals, reinforcing his political strength. 730 
One of Jiang's triumphs in the defence of his successor position was that he led 
his Shanghai faction to defeat the rebellious Beijing faction headed by key rival, 
Chen Xitong.73I When the new central leading body was reorganised with Jiang as 
its core after the 1989 Tiananmen events, Chen was placed in the back rows of the 
leading list, and complained that he was unfairly being sidelined. As a state 
councillor and mayor of Beijing, Chen was a key figure in the 1989 crackdown on 
726. The Editor's Note, "The Hidden Danger inside the Red WaI1,"(~ J§ iX, "~I Jl Z [7;] a-iJ ~~ }~,") 
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the pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen square.732 After the crackdown he 
was elevated to Politburo member and Beijing party boss but he believed that he 
should be promoted to a higher rank, even the top job as a reward for his meritorious 
deeds. In Chen's eyes, Jiang made little contribution to the Tiananmen crackdown to 
defend the Communist regime, but had rushed in to seize the fruits of victory over 
Zhao Ziyang. A resentful Chen built a rebellious clique against Jiang. A ruler of 
Beijing from 1983 to 1995, Chen had enjoyed unchallenged power in the capital. He 
had sought to forge an opposition coalition with the state council faction headed by 
Premier Li Peng to remove Jiang from of the party general secretaryship. Also, Chen 
caballed with some local political forces led by provincial leaders to oppose Jiang's 
incremental promotion of Shanghai native officials into the central authority.733 
Unless Jiang could squash this rebellion, it would damage his authority and lead to 
his downfall. Yet, with Chen entrenched in the capital, Jiang found it hard to hit his 
political opponent. Nevertheless, Jiang suppressed this rebellion by taking advantage 
of its corruption and scandals to damage it.734 The capital's graft scandal broke in 
April 1995 when then Beijing's executive vice mayor Wang Baosen, a close 
associate of Chen, committed suicide as the central authority' investigators closed in 
on him. Shortly after the suicide of Wang, Chen was detained on suspicion of 
leading a cabal of corrupt Beijing officials. Premier Li Peng sought to protect his 
ally but was unable to save Chen. Chen was arrested, stripped of his posts and given 
a 16-year sentence. Deng supported Jiang for purging and imprisoning Chen and 
many of his followers. Dozens of other senior members of the Beijing party 
committee and municipal government had been dismissed and sentenced due to 
732 • His strong demand on tough response to the student-led protests was one of the shrillest voices 
calling for a crackdown. He earlier reported to Deng Xiaoping on the conspiracy behind the protest 
urging Deng to make a decision to suppress the peaceful demonstrators. Subsequently, Chen signed 
the orders to enforce martial law in the capital and announced the army's strike on Beijing while 
participating in commanding the massacre. See Report on Putting Down Anti-Government Riot. 
Beijing: New Star Publishers, 1989; Scott Simmie and Bob Nixon, Tiananmen Square. Vancouver: 
Douglas & McIntyre, 1989, pp.133-134. . 
733 • Luo Bing, " 'Jiang Core' Is Besieged on All Sides," ( ?JJ ilj( , " ~I i* iL' II9 ITO ~ We, " ) Cheng 
Ming Monthly (fj Ill$), No.207, January 1995, pp.6-8; Wang Haitao, "The Chen Xitong Case 
Involves Officials at the Top Leadership," ( r£ #if: ~, " Il* * iEJ ~1t/1 iI ~ Fz1: ' " ) Open Magazine 
( Jf Jti), No.l13, May 1995, p.15. 
734 • Jiang launched an anti-corruption crusade in early 1995, targeting his political opponents, mainly 
his chief political enemy, the Beijing faction led by Chen. See "Renewed Campaign Against 
Corruption," Beijing Review, February 13-19, 1995, p.6; The Research Institute for Peace and 
Security, Tokyo ( compiled ), Asian Security: 1995-96. London: Brassey's, 1995, pp.82-83. 
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accusations of corruption. 735 The downfall and imprisonment of the capital's 
strongman and his clique strengthened Jiang's resolve to punish rebellions, sending a 
sharp warning to other high-ranking officials and encouraging obedience. Thereby 
Jiang had deterred those who intended to challenge his authority and consolidated his 
leadership. 
One of Jiang's important moves consolidating his right of succession was to form 
his Shanghai faction and entrench itself in the central authority. At his assumption of 
office, Jiang was alone and helpless. Under the pressure of jealousies and despite 
hostilities among officials of the central bureaucratic system, he felt keenly the 
necessity to forge a ring of his own people in the centre of power.736 When he took 
up his post, he brought just one senior official from Shanghai, Zeng Qinghong, with 
him to Beijing. Zeng was his associate, then deputy secretary of the Shanghai party 
committee. From 1989 to 1993, he served as deputy director of the general office of 
the party's Central Committee, the nerve centre of the party. Then, he was shifted 
into the chief position and was concurrently secretary of the work committee of 
central party and state organs. He had control over most of the key sectors by 
keeping routine affairs of the party-state under his direct control.737 With the 
assistance of an energetic and talented Zeng, Jiang had expanded the Shanghai 
faction's ranles and influence. Loyal Jiang Faction members had become a powerful 
conglomerate, and, by 1995, had been assigned to a number of important posts in the 
central apparatus, while also being placed in high posts in other provinces and major 
cities, even Beijing.738 Major personnel changes in favour ofthe Shanghai faction 
reached a height between 1994 and 1995 when Jiang moved to speed up rejuvenation 
735 • Chen Xitong stepped down from his post as Beijing party chief and was put under house arrest in 
April 1995. In the Fifth Plenary Session of the CPC 14th Central Committee in September 1995, he 
was dismissed from the Political Bureau and Central Committee and then was handed over to 
prosecutors. He was jailed for 16 years for corruption and dereliction of duty in August 1998. For 
more information about the Chen Xitong case and the power struggle between Jiang and Chen, see 
Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, pp.31-32; 
Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, pp.241-247, 
736. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, p.l7. 
737 • Pan Yongchang and Zhong Shi, "The Red Patron for the Major Favourite under Jiang," ( #i J]( 
I§ . # ~, ":U.f- T *- tt A S9 tt ~:3 IlJ ' ") Cheng Ming Monthly (11 Il!$), No.219, January 
1996, p.42; Pan Yongchang and Zhong Shi, "Zeng Qinghong on the Quite Organises the Team of 
Jiang Core," (#i J]< I§ . # ~, " ~ IX ~1 B* rg:U ft ie,':WI m;;, ") Cheng Ming Monthly (11 Il!$), 
No.221, March 1996, pp.39-42. 
738. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, p.21. 
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in various party departments and state ministries. Wu Bangguo, member of the 
party's Politburo and secretary of the party's Shanghai committee, was elevated to a 
Secretariat member of the party's Central Committee and was appointed as the vice-
premier of the State Council in charge of industry. Mayor of Shanghai, Huang Ju, 
succeeded Wu as Shanghai party chief and was added to the Politburo. In the 
meantime, Jiang filled many posts at ministerial-level with Shanghai native officials. 
Also, Jiang promoted some senior military officers garrisoned in Shanghai to the 
Beijing headquarters of the armed forces. For example, Jiang promoted Ba 
Zhongtan, commander of the Shanghai Garrison to commander of the national 
People's Armed Police ( PRP ), while elevating the PRP from the vice-military 
region level to the military region level. 739 Furthermore, Jiang nominated Ba and 
Zeng as members of the party's central committee enlarging both power and 
influence.74o By promoting officials associated with Shanghai to form a circle of 
proteges in the leadership hierarchy, Jiang had strengthened his status as the core of 
the third-generation leadership.741 
For Jiang, the relief of his biggest political crisis and the renewal ofDeng's 
confidence, the settlements with the Beijing faction headed by Chen Xitong as well 
as the Yang family generals, the assumption of the RPC presidency and the 
establishment of the Shanghai faction as his power base in the central authority had a 
major significance on the consolidation of his succession. Encouraged by the 
739 • Han Chen, "The Shanghai Faction Annexed the Beijing Faction," ( ~ Jfc ' " '.1. ¥HI: ~ j( tt '~t 
*~' , ") Beijing Spring (it Jff .z It), No.24, May 1995, pp.l9-20; "NPC Session Ends with 
Applause," Beijing Review, March 27-April2, 1995, p.5; "Party Strengthens Its Leading Role," 
Beijing Review, October 10-16, 1994, p.5. 
740 • Gu Sijin, "Inside Story of 'the Shanghai Faction' ," ( ~ ;It)f 4- ' " '.1. ¥HI: M ' f£' ~ , " ) Cheng 
Ming Monthly (#f PJg), No.218, December 1995, p.64. 
741. One possible member of the Shanghai faction was Zhu Rongji, who Gu Sijin listed as a member. 
See Gu Sijin, "Inside Story of 'the Shanghai Faction' ," ( ~ WT 4- ' " '.1. ¥HI: M ' f£' ~ , " ) Cheng 
Ming Monthly (#f 1!fJ), No.218, December 1995, p.59. In addition, Zhu was perceived as an affiliate 
of the objectionable Shanghai clique by many Chinese. Certainly, Zhu, then member of the Politburo 
Standing Committee and executive vice-premier had connections with elements of the Shanghai 
faction. He had a history steeped in Shanghai politics and served as mayor of Shanghai from 1987 to 
1989, doubling as the city's party chief from June 1989 to April 1991 after Jiang left to work in 
Beijing. However, most specialists on Chinese politics do not generally view Zhu as a key member of 
the Shanghai faction. See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: 
Prentice Hall, 1999, pp.23-24. In the meantime, Zhu was regarded as an independent political force 
in the PRC power structure by some foreign media while being referred as "China's Gorbachev" by 
some Western journalists. Although Roderick MacFarquhar views Zhu as "a potential rival" of 
Jiang's [ see Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.), The Politics a/China: The Eras 0/ Mao and Deng (Second 
Edition). New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.519. ], few people regard Zhu as one of 
the contenders for the succession to Deng or a threat to Jiang's leadership. 
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favourable political situation, Jiang declared publicly that he had taken supreme 
power from Deng.742 Meanwhile, Jiang paid a high price for defending his successor 
position in these ruthless power struggles, suffering a reputation for excluding 
dissidents and practising nepotism.743 The Opposition was still strong and active. 
F or example, some veteran leaders opposed Jiang holding the top party, state and 
military posts, and wanted him to share power with Li Peng.744 This demonstrated a 
danger that Jiang's leadership could be challenged again. Therefore, Jiang's position 
as the crown prince remained potentially unstable. 745 The real test of the security of 
Jiang's right of succession to Deng would come in the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-
96, which thus became a key dimension for verifying the reliability of his leadership. 
6.2. Jiang Zemin's Calculations of Achievements on 
Taiwan for His Leadership Consolidation and 
Historical Position 
6.2-1. Jiang Zemin's Attempt to Consolidate His Leadership 
It is essential to consider Jiang Zemin's calculations to exploit the Taiwan issue. 
Why did he need to prove himself? Why did he select Taiwan as a key factor? What 
were the motives behind his actions? 
In establishing Jiang's intentions, it is necessary to analyse the political 
environment surrounding him at that time. Jiang appeared to be consolidating his 
successor position. However, the conditions of his succession to Deng had remained 
unstable because his ability to lead the most populous nation in the world was still 
questionable. From the outset, his leadership was seen as lacking the authority and 
outstanding accomplishments that should be shown by a supreme leader. Without a 
742. The 1994 party's Fourth Session of the 14th Central Committee announced that the rulership had 
been handed over from the second generation leadership with Deng Xiaoping as its core to the third 
generation leadership with Jiang Zemin as its core. See "CPC Decision on Party Building," Beijing 
Review, October 31-November 6,1994, p7. 
743. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era a/Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, pp.28-
31. 
744 • Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, p.197. 
745. The Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo (compiled), Asian Security: 1995-96. 
London: Brassey's, 1995, pp.82-83. 
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major contribution to the history of Communist Party of China; building the Chinese 
army or promoting the well-being and international prestige of the Chinese state, his 
leadership was fragile. His contenders for Deng's succession still held him in scorn 
due to his limited administrative achievement and considered him to be unfit to run 
the state. Other critics believed that he had not yet proved he was anything more 
than just a mediocre politician. Ifhis governing performance continued to be weak, 
the scorn and criticism would turn into a boycott, de stabilising his leadership. For 
Jiang, the next important move in consolidating his power, therefore, was that he 
must establish the image of an able leader. 746 
Presumably, however, Jiang might have gained credibility and prestige in spheres 
such as culture, society, military and economy. Culturally, Jiang liked to display his 
fondness for music and literature.747 However, the strict Communist control of 
culture did not permit creativity. Even though Jiang might pursue a sound cultural 
program, it would not be sufficient to prove his ability in leading the country. 
Socially, if Jiang was to meet with success, he had to do two key things. One was 
to bring about greater changes in the society under his leadership and promote the 
formation of a civil society. But that would have broken up the PRC social structure, 
widely believed to be one of the world's most totalitarian. Another was to establish a 
welfare state. A massive program for social welfare would be very expensive, 
committing much of the country's financial resources to welfare service projects for 
its 1.3 billion people. However, the PRC is a developing country without the 
necessary conditions for social material benefits to cover unemployment, pensions, 
medical care benefits as well as education. Under Jiang's leadership, therefore, the 
establishment of a comprehensive social welfare system has never been considered 
truly viable.748 
Militarily, although Jiang was chairman of the central military commission, he 
was not viewed as a real soldier because of the absence of a military record as a real 
746. You Ji considers that in 1995 when Jiang consolidated his successor position, the first challenge 
that he faced was "to show the party that he is a capable leader and can contribute to the nation's 
prosperity. Many people in China and abroad think of him in terms of mediocrity." See You Ji, 
"Jiang Zemin: In Quest ofPost-Deng Supremacy," in Maurice Brosseau, Suzanne Pepper and Tsang 
Shu-ki (eds), China Review 1996. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1996, pp.21-22 
747 • Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, pp.232-233. 
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serviceman. Not only did Jiang have little military experience, but the evolving 
international environment was also moving away from the need for militarily minded 
heads of state, leaving him little opportunity to prove himself. Thus, there was little 
to suggest that Jiang could consolidate his position by way of military exploits. 
Economically, Jiang had little knowledge of the modern market economy and 
only had experience in managing the planned economy.749 He was an electronic 
engineer in origin. Before 1985 he served as a senior official leading the electronic 
and machinery industries, mainly technological work. Nor did not prove himself in 
the financial and industrial centre while holding the positions of mayor and party 
chief in Shanghai from 1985 to 1989.750 Since his assumption of national party chief, 
Jiang relied on Zhu Rongji in economic affairs. 751 As for economic reform, the credit 
had already gone to the initiatives of Deng Xiaoping, who has been generally 
recognised as the prime mover on economic reform in the PRe. Jiang had a rigid 
way of thinking on economic reform and lacked the enthusiasm to remake the 
economic structure. 752 
Since it was impossible for Jiang to establish his prestige in the above-mentioned 
spheres, in order to gain credit he had to turn to such areas as foreign affairs, 
domestic politics, Marxist ideology and national reunification. 753 
In foreign affairs, given the limelight effect Jiang's activity in the international 
arena could attract the world's attention and help prop up his status as successor. In 
doing this, he tried to embark on diplomacy designed to raise his international stature 
as leader of a great power. However, several factors restricted the achievement of his 
objectives in foreign affairs. He was not experienced in international issues and 
748. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, pp.56-
58. 
749. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, pp.59-
60. 
750. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China after Deng Xiaoping: The Power Structure in Beijing since 
Tiananmen. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 1995, p.341. 
751 • Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, p.33. 
According to Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Jiang "was no problem-solver" and apperaed to "lack an interest in 
or knack for the complexities of economic and social issues." See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of 
Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, p.3. 
752 • Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, pp.59-
69,77-80. 
753. For Jiang's calculations to make his personal exploits, see "Jiang Zemin's 'Ten Major Meritorious 
Deeds' Disclosed," (~ § *' "tr. rf ~ , + * :r;/J ~fft' 1JIT:;k i[l" ") Cheng Ming Monthly( $Ill$), 
No.273, July 2000, pp.14-16. 
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lacked strategic foresight. Humiliatingly, he even had a record of diplomatic 
gaffes.754 Jiang's diplomatic ambitions also faced serious external constraints, 
mainly the damaging international fall-out from the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
massacre. Following that event, Beijing was subjected to economic sanctions and 
diplomatic isolation. The PRC did not extricate itself from this difficult position in 
the international community until the early 1990s.755 Jiang's diplomatic foundation 
was so weak that most ofthe major powers would not accept his visit. In particular, 
Jiang had been looking for an invitation to officially visit the United States but had 
met with setbacks. Shortly after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, Deng 
Xiaoping proposed that Washington should extend an invitation for Jiang to visit the 
US as an important item within a package solution to a thaw in PRC-US relations. 
However, the Bush administration excused itself from such a visit. 756 During 1993-
94, Jiang sought to be invited for an official state visit to the US, but the Clinton 
administration refused because of the aftermath of the Tiananmen massacre and 
Beijing's insistence on the official verdict, which maintained the bloody suppression 
was necessary and reasonable. In November 1993, President Bill Clinton met Jiang 
in Seattle when both attended an Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting. 757 In 
October 1995, they met in New York while attending ceremonies marking the United 
Nations' fiftieth anniversary.758 However, these two meetings took place by way of 
participation in international leaders conferences and only lasted about two hours 
respectively. Obviously, neither was a formal summit. 
Jiang's diplomatic effort to convince Chinese and foreigners that he could lead the 
country and contribute to the international community raises the question as to which 
is the dominant factor in the interaction between domestic politics and foreign affairs. 
754. Jiang even lacked elementary knowledge of diplomacy. Sometimes he behaved inappropriately at 
diplomatic occasions. See Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, pp.260-262; Benjamin Yang, Deng: A Political 
Biography. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998, pp.259-260. 
755 • Jiang acknowledged that "the Western sanctions were making China's diplomacy more difficult". 
See Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, p.l55. 
756 • "Deng Xiaoping Had a Great Mind to Patronise Jiang Zemin after the June 4 incident," [ " ( :x~ /J\ 
.If- ) /\ 1m J§' ~U -;t *l4 mn ¥¥ §!;, " ] TTNN ( 1jJ iff, if! f! ifli /ifJ), October 3, 1998. 
757 • Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents And China: An Investigative History. New York: 
PublicAffairs, 1999, pp.413, 400-401; James Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious 
Relationship with ChinaJrom Nixon to Clinton. New York: AlfredA. Knopf, 1999, pp.290-294. 
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In light of the theory on domestic determinants of foreign policy, diplomacy is seen 
as an extension of domestic affairs. 759 Since domestic political conditions are a 
prerequisite to foreign affairs, Jiang's remarkable achievements needed to be made 
on the basis of solving domestic problems. Practically, the PRC's internal turmoil, 
evidenced by fluctuating and vulnerable leadership resulting from continual power 
struggles gave rise to its diplomatic problems. For Jiang, the central question in the 
international arena was still whether he could be accorded the international 
confirmation of power, which appeared to elude him on the domestic front. The rare 
burst of diplomatic exuberance would only emerge after Jiang enjoyed a stable 
leading position in his own country. Obviously, Jiang was aware of the need to put 
his own house in order especially after his arduous diplomatic efforts did not produce 
the desired effect. 
In domestic politics, the most important issue was that of political reform.760 If 
Jiang wanted to enjoy remarkable achievements, he could proceed with the reform of 
the political system. Comparatively speaking, Deng Xiaoping's legacy is his great 
contribution to the PRC profound economic reform, and Jiang could leave his own 
rich legacy by accomplishing significant political reform. There was fair chance of 
success for Jiang in this respect, thus suggesting that he might have political reform 
in mind. Such reform had been put on the agenda of the PRC leadership in 1986.761 
The 13th Party Congress of 1987 approved a programme for political reform but its 
implementation was suspended by the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.762 
However, the imperative necessity for political liberation not only remained but 
became increasingly urgent. In the meantime, there was a broad and supportable 
758. "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation ( compiled by Robert F. Ash )," The China Quarterly, 
No.145, March 1996, pp.256-257. 
759. See Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds), Doubled-Edged Diplomacy: 
International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993; 
Robert H. Lieshout, Between Anarchy and Hierarchy: A Theory of International Politics and Foreign 
Policy. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1995. 
760. For an overview ofPRC political reform from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, see Willy Wo-Lap 
Lam, "Chapter Three-Political Reform on Hold: How the Party Consolidated Its Dictatorship," in 
his China after Deng Xiaoping: The Power Structure in Beijing since Tiananmen. Singapore: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1995, pp.239-321. 
761 • Ma Licheng and Ling Zhijun, Crossed Swords-A Detailed Account of the Thought Liberation for 
Three Times in Contemporary China ( Ib if.. i~ . 'iN. Ti!;; ~, 3t 1!f-!!i if tf' j]jf =- IX it! jf!{ if JJY: ]1; 
jJt ). Beijing: Press of China Today (~ S 9=J ~ ill !tR *±), 1998, p.154. 
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social foundation for political reform. The reform of the political system would be 
possibly successful only if Jiang stood to gain from it. 
For Jiang, political reform would have major benefits but did involve risks. Hard-
liners' resistance was an important concern affecting his determination, and his 
personal political quality led to his irresolution. Jiang was not inclined to carry out 
substantial political reform, but favoured readjustments in governmental structures 
and institutions. His concept of political reform was, in fact, administrative reform to 
eliminate bureaucratism, increase efficiency and improve the personnel system. He 
favoured an improvement in the political system only in order to maintain the party's 
supremacy.763 His nightmare was that any substantial political reform could lead to a 
Gorbachev-style disintegration of the Communist power framework. Thus he 
rejected political restructuring, fearing it would weaken his status as leader.764 
There had also been the problem of the June 4 incident. The student 
demonstrations and subsequent massacre in 1989 had particular relevance to any 
change in the PRC polity. Jiang knew well that political reform was at the root ofthe 
1989 democratic movement of Tiananmen Square. The question of June 4 still 
mattered a great deal, and continued to represent a fundamental obstacle to political 
liberation. Jiang faced two major political constraints. Firstly, his own role in the 
1989 protests placed restrictions on his resolution to reverse the official verdict on 
the events of June 4. This involves two issues. One is his handling of the democratic 
movement in Shanghai, mainly the closure of the World Economic Herald. Another 
is Jiang's participation in making decisions on the military suppression within the 
Beijing leadership. The closure of the World Economic Herald by Jiang aggravated 
tensions between the government and demonstrators spreading the crisis nation-wide 
and ultimately pushing the democratic protestors in to a more confrontational stance. 
What is more, Jiang was not entirely untainted by the Tiananmen massacre. He may 
have played a role in making decisions on the suppression of the Tiananmen pro-
democracy protests, despite the direct order to fire on the demonstrators being given 
762 • See Zhao Ziyang, "Advance Along the Road of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics-Report 
Delivered at the 13th Party Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 25, 1987," Beijing 
Review, November 9-15, 1987, "Documents" pp.XV-XXXI. 
763. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, pp.73-
74. 
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by Deng Xiaoping. Anyhow, it is because of Jiang's contributions to the suppression 
that he was catapulted to the top by Deng, replacing Zhao as the newly designated 
successor. Jiang would probably pay a price for any reversal of the official verdict of 
June 4. 
Secondly, any scheme of Jiang's re-evaluating the June 4 incident to promote 
political reform would be strongly resisted by conservatives within the Communist 
Party. There were two powerful political forces in blocking the road to a 
reassessment of the 1989 protests. One was the military and another the old guard. 
The PLA had been trying to improve its poor image of professional servicemen in 
full battle gear assaulting peaceful demonstrators. The military's attitude of 
objecting to any modification of the party-state's public stance on the Tiananmen 
massacre made it difficult for Jiang to reconsider that verdict because he needed the 
military's support for his successor's position. Meanwhile, the old guard remained 
influential in politics despite retiring. These party veterans were associated with the 
bloodshed and would have to bear responsibility for the killings in the case of any 
revision. Most important, Deng was still alive and, although of advanced age and 
seriously ill, he remained influential. Jiang did not dare to irritate Deng, out of fear 
for his own position. 
In short, given the political situation, it might be impossible for Jiang to reverse 
the Tiananmen verdict. However, to a great extent, Jiang did not wish to touch such 
a thorny problem because he lacked the personal will to reform the political system. 
Evidence for this can be seen in the fact that, after Deng Xiaoping's death, the 
original official judgement of June 4 remained as a major obstacle to political 
liberation, with Jiang doing little to address it. 
In Marxist ideology, Jiang expected to play the role of the Maoist-style 
philosopher king but was unsuccessful. 765 Given the Communist leaders' traditional 
preoccupation with ideology, Jiang had sought to found a new theory with his unique 
personal stamp. There were a number of limitations on Jiang. He lacked the explicit 
ideological motivation and strong sense of mission which are essential to become an 
764. Luo Bing, "Jiang Zemin Declared That He Would Not Conduct Political Reform," ( ~ oj(, " U 
r~ ~ 'j§' m /G 11ti ll& ~ , ") Cheng Ming Monthly (13- PJ$), No.219 January, 1996, pp.9-11. 
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architect of Communist theory and movement. In terms of personal quality, he was 
short on original ideas.766 In contrast to the philosophical and poetic Mao Zedong, 
Jiang was not fluent in the sort of ideological issues relating to the governance of a 
Stalinist state. In the meantime, Deng Xiaoping's theories remained guiding 
philosophies, along with Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Zedong. While 
realising that the strict ideological approach was untenable, Jiang was incapable of 
designing a new methodology to replace the theoretical system of the old communist-
era. Moreover, the virtual demise of communist ideology with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc had a strong impact on the PRC and domestic 
conditions were also unfavourable. Faith in communism began to wane following 
the Cultural Revolution, with Marxist ideology crumbling after the 1989 Tianannrnen 
crackdown. 
Jiang did make an effort to produce some theoretical breakthroughs to establish 
his pre-eminent ideological status, but failed to achieve positive results. In 1995, he 
called upon party members, especially cadres, to "talk more about politics". Strictly 
speaking, this was an instruction of the party chief to the whole party to require it to 
give greater attention to politics. It was more an empty slogan than a well-knit 
theory.767 In the same year, he delivered a speech on how to deal with twelve critical 
relationships in the PRC economy and politics. This was believed to copy ten critical 
relationships of Mao Zedong in the 1950s, while still being within the framework of 
Deng Xiaoping's reformist theories. To Jiang's disappointment, the theoretical 
community gave poor reviews to both speeches. Meanwhile, the two speeches were 
interpreted overseas and domestically as a return to orthodox Marxism, in particular 
Maoist doctrine, and were even met with criticism by other top leaders. 76B 
765 • For an overview of Jiang's efforts in bolstering his image by establishing a new ideological 
framework, see Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998, pp.263-287. 
766 . Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, pp.284-285. 
767. Luo Bing, "Quickening the Pace of Tuming to Leftism-There Is More Behind Jiang Zemin's 
'Talk More About Politics' ," (I5J {';./< ' " to Jf rtJ ' 1i ' ~ - U Y4! ~ , iJt II& 1& ' 8~ ~ JB , " ) 
Cheng Ming Monthly (1r Il!$), No.220, February 1996, pp.6-7. 
768. Ai Kesi, "Nothing New in Jiang Zemin's 'Economic Thought'-Making Comments upon Jiang's 
Speech on the 12 Contradictions," (:.It 5l ~Jf, " T 7C ~ iff; B~ ~ m: ' ,m 1'lt '- if~I Y4! ~ 1f * 
-t ="* * * B~ iJt ij!j',") Cheng Ming Monthly (1r Il!$), No.217, November 1995, pp.27-30; 
Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, pp.267-268, 284-285. 
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Finding it hard to establish his leading position in Marxist ideology, Jiang had to 
turn his attention away from the ideological and domestic fronts to other fields. In 
questing for his political achievements, Jiang saw that the Taiwan issue had potential 
as a policy area to be exploited in order to gain the credibility and prestige he 
required.769 
6.2-2. Jiang Zemin's Ambitions to Claim His Place in History with 
the Return of Taiwan 
Apparently, consolidating his status as Deng Xiaoping's successor was not the 
only impetus for Jiang Zemin's ambitions for the completion of the reunification of 
China. In seeking to make a greater contribution to resolving the Taiwan issue, it 
seems that Jiang had more political considerations in mind. 770 He appeared to want 
to leave a legacy holstering his own position in history and to become the first and 
only supreme leader in Chinese history capable of making Taiwan return to the 
motherland after the island's division from mainland China. This is a point worthy 
of in-depth examination because it is fundamental to a true understanding of his 
motivation to achieve the return of Taiwan in his lifetime. 
This study proposes Jiang's point of departure for settling the Taiwan issue was 
primarily politically motivated. Completing national reunification is a key element 
in making his personal political landmark while establishing his legacy. Many 
scholars believe that Jiang was very concerned about his place in history and wanted 
to appear as a great leader through accomplishment of the return of Taiwan.771 
769 • David Bachman believes that the areas within which Jiang deserves credit are severely limited. 
"Arguably only in the realms of changes to the political system and policy toward Taiwan is it 
possible to even imagine dramatic initiatives coming from above." See David Bachman, "The 
Paradox of Analysing Elite Politics Under Jiang," The China Journal, No.45, January 2001, p.95. 
Also see Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, 
pp.53-54. 
770 . Jiang has regarded his political performance on Taiwan as one of the administrative exploits 
required to get himself into the pantheon of splendid figures in the history of Chinese Communists, 
alongside Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, see "Jiang Zemin's 'Ten Major Meritorious Deeds' 
Disclosed," (!Jfg. § J]l:, "IT rt ~ , +"* JjJ ~ , ¥.iIT: ~ 12, ") Cheng Ming Monthly (~P.Jg), 
No.273, July 2000, pp.14-15. 
771 • Jiang strongly desired a settlement of the Taiwan issue to complete national reunification in his 
lifetime in order to secure his place in history. A number of Chinese and foreign scholars see Jiang in 
this way. See Gary Klintworth, "Lessons Learned," in Greg Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy and 
Taiwan's Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power. Canberra: Strategic and Defence 
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Jiang's contribution to the party and country is the least among leaders in the PRC 
history. Without his own glorious achievements, Jiang lacked the prestige enjoyed 
by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. By reuniting the country, he could elevate 
himself into the Chinese communist pantheon along side his two predecessors. In 
establishing a politician's place in history, it is necessary to make a comparison with 
the leaders of a similar stature. Chinese people as a matter of course compare their 
leaders with the political achievements of the past. In assessing Jiang and his 
historical role, they would make a comparison with the deceased Communist giants, 
Mao and Deng. It is also logical for historians to do so. Actually, when courting 
fame in history, Jiang himself would take the historical parallels, Mao and Deng, as 
point of reference. 772 
Looking back to Mao and Deng, both have constituted a role-model for all PRC 
leaders, hereafter and have been listed by most Chinese as being among the great 
leaders. Comparatively speaking, as the leaders of the first and second generations of 
revolutionaries respectively, Mao brought Communist victory in China whilst Deng 
launched economic reform and opened up China to the outside world. Mao played 
the most important role in the building of the Communist Party of China and the 
People's Liberation Army. More remarkably, Mao was the creator of the PRC 
despite being a heartless dictator. He founded the Communist state laying down the 
foundations of the polity so evident today. In foreign relations, Mao gave birth to 
effective Chinese independence and the PRC's status as a major power, despite the 
nation being cut off from the world at one time. Under the leadership of Deng, the 
vast task of modernising China began and the PRC became one of the world's most 
economically successful countries. His reforms and openings helped rid the country 
of much poverty and improved peoples' living standard. Deng was honoured for his 
achievements in reform, opening and modernisation, despite repressing the pro-
democracy movement. Obviously, compared with the brilliant exploits of Mao and 
Deng, Jiang lacked the prestige of his own grand deeds. 
Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997, 
p.247; Paul Wolfowitz, "Remembering the Future," The National interest, No.59, Spring 2000, pA3. 
772. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, pp.80-
82. 
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In a comparison with his three other predecessors, Hua Guofeng, Hu Yaobang and 
Zhao Ziyang, Jiang Zemin's contribution to the country is again shown 
unfavourably. Although generally believed to be a mediocre former supreme leader, 
Hua gave meritorious service to the party-state. He played a leading role in smashing 
the 'Gang of Four' and bringing the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution to an end, 
thereby stabilising the Communist regime. Hu was famous for his political exploits 
in bringing order out of chaos caused by the Cultural Revolution. For example, 
during his tenure as the head of the Party Central Committee's Organisation 
Department, he succeeded brilliantly in redressing the frame-up of a large number of 
old cadres. They had been purged during the Cultural Revolution but were 
rehabilitated because ofHu's resolute actions. Also, Hu had great achievements to 
his credit in the "thought liberation", the ideological struggles that were conducted 
through the 1978 discussion on "practice as the sole criterion of truth", paving the 
way for the introduction of reform and the opening-up of the country. Zhao, a liberal 
reformist, had been credited with his great contributions to the economy. He opened 
the way for the country's market economy with innovative theories on political 
economics while moving away from Soviet-style Marxist and command-style 
approaches. During his assumption of the post of first secretary of the Sichuan 
party's provincial committee he pioneered reforms, mainly in agriculture. After 
becoming premier of the cabinet, he displayed his outstanding leadership in 
launching a series of key reforms, most notably the reform of the economic system. 
More significantly, he had begun to reform the political system, trying to separate the 
role of the party from government, impressing the Chinese people, in particular, 
intellectuals and reformists inside the party. Although his political liberation efforts 
were virtually frozen by the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, his initiatives in 
reconstructing the polity meant that for most people government was being held 
increasingly accountable for its actions. 
Compared with his five predecessors, Hua Guofeng, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang 
and, in particular, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin made little 
contribution to the country. He badly needed his own historical accomplishments. 
He hoped to prove himself the man of destiny that China must have as the nation's 
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supreme leader. Imperatively, he aspired to the authority of Mao and Deng.773 For 
Jiang, national reunification was the most suitable area to achieve his ambitions, for 
this goal had a direct bearing on the nation and such a crucial question for the PRC 
leadership and China's future. 
In terms of national reunification, there were three major problems 'left over' 
from history, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. Jiang devoted time and energy to the 
resolution of the issues of Hong Kong and Macao. He, as the PRC state head, 
announced the PRC Government's resumption of the exercise of sovereignty over 
two colonies from the British and Portuguese Governments while attending the 
formal handover ceremonies in Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 1999 respectively. 
Despite this, most of the credits for the recovery of Hong Kong and Macao go to 
Deng Xiaoping, who played a leading role in the return of these two colonies to the 
motherland. Even Zhao Ziyang shared the achievements of handing over these 
territories, when, as premier, he represented the PRC in signing both the 1984 PRC-
UK Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong and the 1987 Sino-Portuguese 
Joint Declaration on the Question of Macao. Under such circumstances, the eventual 
settlement of the Taiwan question became a principal area of concentration for Jiang 
in calculating how best to score his political achievements in national reunification. 
Taiwan is a vital issue of unsolved sovereignty which has a direct bearing on the 
destiny of the Chinese state. Accomplishing Taiwan's reunion with the mainland, 
resulting in the country's complete reunification as a greater China is a tempting 
political goal. An accomplishment of national reunification in his term of office 
would amount to a milestone in the Chinese history. In this case, it would help boost 
his image as a new, great leader among Chinese. 
Jiang's personal political calculation in claiming his place in Chinese history with 
the return of Taiwan is not groundless. National reunification is one of the most 
important dimensions in measuring PRC leaders' political achievements. Mao 
brought Tibet under the jurisdiction of the PRC government. Deng facilitated the 
return of Hong Kong and Macao returning to the PRC domain. However, Taiwan is 
the area to which the paramount leaders ought to have made major contributions. 
773, Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin, Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, pp,80-
82. 
298 
While the previous leaders had worked hard towards such ends, they had failed to 
produce results. If Jiang should accomplish Taiwan's reunion with the mainland to 
finish the eventual reunification of China, he would carve his own name in history as 
the "Great Unifier". This would help him rise to the level of previous leaders in PRC 
history. Conversely, Jiang would look like a failure ifhe did not make great strides 
forward on the road of reunification with Taiwan.774 
Comparing himself with Communist giants such as Mao and Deng, both of 
whom had devoted themselves to Taiwan's reunion with the mainland but had failed 
to realise their desire, Jiang sought to finish the vast task of reunification with 
Taiwan. Resolution of the Taiwan issue in his lifetime would cap his political career. 
774 • Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, pp.247-248; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New 
York: Prentice Hall, 1999, pp.80-82; Sheng Lijun, China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001, pp.156-157. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Policy Background of the 1995-96 Taiwan Crisis 
7.1. The Background for the PRe Taiwan Policy 
7.1-1. An Overview of the Previous Taiwan Crises and the Evolution 
of the PRC Taiwan policy 
The PRC policy toward Taiwan evolved from the liberation of Taiwan towards 
more peaceful approaches to reunification from 1949 to the mid-1990s. During late 
1949 and mid 1950, BeiJing worked out an operational plan to capture Taiwan and 
the PLA made preparations for the Taiwan campaign. However, this plan was 
aborted because of the outbreak of the Korean War. Beijing dispatched the PLA 
main force to participate in the Korean War and its attempt to seize Taiwan had to be 
postponed.775 Subsequently, the United States placed Taiwan under its protection and 
backed the KMT regime to oppose Beijing, although it did not support the KMT in 
its struggle for the reconquest of the Chinese mainland. 
In the 1950s, Beijing's Taiwan policy was closely tied to the two Taiwan Strait 
crises, and was shaped by domestic political dynamics and the world situation.776 
Domestically, the goal of capturing Taiwan served the purpose of consolidating the 
Communist regime. Internationally, the Taiwan issue was placed in the pattern of 
the Cold War and Beijing sought to liberate Taiwan in undertaking its commitment 
to the Communist camp led by the Soviet Union. 
The Nationalists fled to Taiwan, following their defeat by the communists in the 
civil war in 1949. The Nationalist Chinese government, with American aid and 
support, continued to struggle with the Chinese Communist regime. It claimed that it 
was the legitimate government of China and prepared to use force to recover the 
775 • He Di, " 'The Last Campaign to Unify China': The CCP's Unmaterialized Plan to Liberate 
Taiwan, 1949-1950," Chinese Historians, VoLV, No.1, Spring 1992, pp.1-16. 
776 • For the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954-1955 and 1958, see Thomas E. Stolper, China, Taiwan, and 
the Offshore Islands: Together with an Implication for Outer Mongolia and Sino-Soviet Relations. 
Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1985; John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China 
and American Cold War Strategy in Asia. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997, pp.1-147. 
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mainland. In particular, the KMT army had controlled a number of islands along the 
coastline of the Chinese mainland since 1949 . Its harassing actions disturbed the 
economies and social order in the southeast coastal provinces, while largely 
blockading the mainland's sealane communications and foreign trade route. 
However, confronted with the two major security problems along the PRC borders, 
Korea and Indochina, Beijing was unable to deal simultaneously with the KMT 
army's offshore threat. 
After the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the conclusion of the Geneva peace 
agreement on Indochina in 1954, the Taiwan issue, in particular the removal of the 
KMT's armed harassment from the mainland coastline was immediately put on the 
agenda of Beijing. In the meantime, Beijing considered that Washington was trying 
to form a regional military treaty network, mainly by way of the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organisation ( SEATO) and a similar Northeast Asia equivalent, including 
the KMT regime on Taiwan or a US-ROC military treaty, in an attempt to encircle 
mainland China. In order to frustrate the American intention of containing the PRC 
and prevent Taiwan from permanently splitting from the Chinese mainland, Beijing 
determined to launch military actions in the Taiwan Strait. 
In early September 1954, the PLA began to violently bombard the islands of 
Jinmen, a key group in the Straits protecting Taiwan. This marked the start of the 
first Taiwan Strait crisis. The KMT army retaliated with air attacks and counter-
shelling. The US sent reinforcements to the Straits to provide protection for Taiwan, 
Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu. In January 1955, the PLA attacked and occupied other 
offshore islands originally controlled by the KMT army, but did not launch an 
amphibious attack on the islands of Jinmen. As a result, Beijing removed the KMT's 
armed presence from the mainland coastline and cleared the mainland's sealane 
communications and foreign trade route. On Washington's advice and with the aid 
of the US Seventh Fleet, the KMT troops withdrew from other offshore islands and 
focused on defending Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu. The US-ROC mutual 
defence treaty was signed in December 1954. The treaty covered only the security of 
Taiwan proper and imposed restrictions upon the KMT regime regarding its 
intentions to retake the mainland by military force. 
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In terms of the PRC domestic factors, generally speaking, the leaders' common 
concern about consolidation of the Communist regime and national defence played a 
larger role than Mao Zedong's personal consideration of raising his prestige in 
decision-making duringthe 1954-1955 Taiwan Strait crisis.777 
After the first Taiwan Strait crisis, Beijing clearly appreciated the military 
difficulties of any attempt to seize the island. In the meantime, as the international 
situation tended toward detente, tensions between the two sides of the Straits eased 
somewhat after the mid-1950s. The leadership in Beijing began to consider the 
possibility of a peaceful liberation of Taiwan. In April 1955, in his address to the 
Bandung Conference, Premier Zhou Enlai stated the PRC policy tbward Taiwan, 
saying that "There are two possible ways for liberating Taiwan-one is by war, and 
the other is by peaceful means. The Chinese people prefer using the peaceful means 
if the situation permits". In a conference of supreme state affairs in January 1956, 
Chairman Mao put forward his propositions to seek peaceful means to liberate 
Taiwan. In the second session of the Second Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference in January 1956, Zhou announced an approach for the peaceful resolution 
of the Taiwan issue. The Communist Party's 8th National Congress in September 
1956 endorsed this approach. This was a conspicuous change in Beijing's policy, 
indicating that in the liberation of Taiwan the PRC would strive to use peaceful 
means.778 However, Beijing did not give up threatening the use of military force. 
777 • In viewing the PRC as one of the major sources and causes of the 1954-55 Taiwan crisis, most 
scholars attribute it to Beijing's considerations in consolidating the Communist regime and national 
security, see Bruce Jacobs and Lijiang Hong, "China's Relationship with Taiwan", in Stuart Harris 
and Gary Klintworth (eds), China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and Challenges in the Asia-
Pacific Region. Melbourne: Longman Australia, 1995, pp.215-216; Suisheng Zhao, Power 
Competition in East Asia: From the Old Chinese World Order to Post-Cold War Regional 
Multipolarity. New York: st. Martin's Press, 1997, pp.l03-105; Chi Huang, Woosang Kim and 
Samuel S. G. Wu, "Rivalry Between the ROC and the PRC: An Expected-Utility Theoretical 
Perspective," in Tun-jen Cheng, Chi Huang and Samuel S. G. Wu (eds), Inherited Rivalry: Conflict 
across the Taiwan Strait. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, pp.33-35; Jun 
Zhang, Ending the Chinese Civil War: Power, Commerce, and Conciliation between Beijing and 
Taipei. New York: st. Martin's Press, 1993, pp.21-23; Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World 
Politics. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966, pp.258-263; John W. Garver, Foreign 
Relations o/the People's Republic o/China. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993, 
pp.50-55; Nancy BernkopfTucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the United States, 1945-1992: Uncertain 
Friendships. New York: Twayne Publishers; Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan Canada; New York: 
Maxwell Macmillan International, 1994, pp.26-40; Joseph Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy: The 
Maoist Era and Its Aftermath. Oxford: Martin Robertson & Company Ltd., 1980, pp.30-32. 
778 . Liao Xinwen, "Zhou Enlai and the Approach of Peaceful Resolution of the Taiwan Issue," ( $ IL,' 
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pp.24-26; Li Jiaquan, "The Strategic Thinking of Three Generations' Leadership of the CPC Over 
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On 23 August, 1958, the PLA launched a cluster of artillery bombardments on the 
islands of Jinmen, sparking the second Taiwan Strait crisis. The KMT army struck 
back at the mainland with a heavy shelling of the coastal province of Fuji an. As the 
exchange of threats and abuse intensified, the artillery battle lasted for two months, 
notwithstanding a two week intermission. The PLA enforced a blockade of the 
islands of Jinmen and the KMT army tried to break through the blockade. In making 
responses to Beijing's war-like actions, the US took strong moves mobilising 
military power to protect Taiwan and its related territories, mainly Jinmen. The US 
sent large numbers of warships, including six aircraft carriers, to the Taiwan Strait to 
reinforce the Seventh Fleet. The US armada convoyed Taiwan supply vessels to 
Jinmen. Faced with the display of the powerful American naval force, Beijing 
appeared to have tested US determination to defend Taiwan. Under such 
circumstances, Premier Zhou, on September 6, proposed that PRC-US 
ambassadorial-level talks should be resumed. While showing its determination to 
repulse the aggressive actions the PRC forces were engaging in, Washington also 
opened the door for a peaceful resolution of the on-going disputes. Thus, the US 
promptly accepted the offer. This helped to avoid a PRC-US armed conflict at a time 
when the Taiwan crisis reached its height. The KMT leaders prepared to launch air 
attacks against mainland China's shore batteries but the Eisenhower administration 
dissuaded them from doing so. From October 6 to 19, the PLA suspended its 
bombardment. After the two week interval, the PLA resumed shelling. However, on 
October 25, Beijing announced that the islands of Jinmen would be bombarded only 
on odd-numbered days. Although the 1958 Taiwan crisis was over, the artillery 
harassment continued, on and off, for two decades until January 1, 1979. Thus the 
outcome of the second Taiwan Strait crisis could fairly be called a stalemate. 779 
Beijing did not instigate further cross-strait military tension until mid-1995. 
Meanwhile, the KMT leaders declared that they would seek to complete their goal of 
returning to the mainland by way of the Three People's Principles, rather than 
China's Reunification," ( * ~ 7~ , " 9:t ft -=: 1-t @f Ji'f. A xt ~ - 9:t ~ 8-9 ti:lG ~ ,~ ~ , " ) Xinhua 
Digest ( jff!j:$ Jt !j/!j), No.259, July 2000, pp.60-62. 
779. He Di, "The Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy toward the Offshore Islands," 
in Warren 1. Cohen and Akira lriye (eds), The Great Powers in East Asia: 1953-1960. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1990, pp.240-241. 
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through military force. Ambassadorial talks between the PRC and the US resumed 
and were held, on and off, until the early 1970s. 
The international academic community has generally agreed that Beijing 
provoked the 1958 Taiwan crisis. However, what were Beijing's motivations in 
starting the crisis? Scholars' explanations differ. Some interpret Beijing's 
perceptions of cross-strait relations as based upon the triangular relationships 
between Beijing, Taipei and Washington, while attributing the origins of the crisis to 
Beijing's view on Chinese-American-Russian diplomatic jockeying.780 Others 
believe that the Communist leadership needed to take an offensive move in the 
Taiwan Strait in order to mobilise the support of the Chinese people and complete the 
goals of the Great Leap Forward.781 Thomas J. Christensen points out emphatically 
that Mao Zedong's domestic mobilisation and manipulation were responsible for the 
outbreak and the course of the 1958 Taiwan crisis. Mao intended to exploit the crisis 
to mobilise domestic support for his radical political line, particularly the Great Leap 
Forward.782 
Meanwhile, Lu Ning believes that Mao's personal political consideration 
regarding his grip on power was the most important underlying cause for provoking 
the 1958 Taiwan crisis. According to Lu, after the 20th Congress of the Soviet 
Communist Party and the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1956, 
Mao found it very difficult to maintain his absolute leadership. He intended to 
reduce other leaders' political powers. In particular, he "attempted to weaken Zhou's 
position by relieving him of the foreign affairs portfolio". Under such circumstances, 
780. For different points of view on the underlying cause of the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, see 
Xiaobing Li and Hongshan Li (eds), China and the United States: A New Cold War History. Lanham: 
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Mao sought to create tension in the Taiwan Strait, in an attempt to preserve his 
monopolistic hold on power. In August 1958, he "almost single-handedly" initiated 
the second Taiwan Strait crisis. In demonstrating external threat and his essential 
authority, "throughout the crisis, Mao personally made all the decisions with little 
consultation with his Politburo".783 As a result of the Taiwan crisis, he consolidated 
his authoritarian rulership and concentrated decision-making in his own hands. 
This study proposes that Lu's conclusion is convincing. Indeed, by and large, 
Mao did personally decide to provoke the 1958 Taiwan crisis and handled Beijing's 
course during the crisis. This has been verified in recent years by official Chinese 
documents and primary materials.784 He arbitrarily changed the moderate PRC 
policy toward Taiwan in the mid-1950s, which indicated the use of political means, 
more than military force, in striving to peacefully liberate Taiwan. His initiation of 
the crisis was primarily politically motivated as it sought to boost his leadership in an 
inner-party power struggle. 
In 1962, the cross-strait situation became tense again. 785 A few scholars view it as 
a crisis. Chi Huang, Woosang Kim and Samuel S. G. Wu call it "the Taiwan Strait 
crisis of 1962". Harold C. Hinton regards it as "the third Taiwan Strait crisis". 
Nancy BernkopfTucker calls it "the third" Jinmen-Mazu "crisis". However, the 
great majority of the academic community refer to it more modestly as an event, or 
'flare-up' . 
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In mid-1962, ROC President Chiang Kai-shek intended to take advantage of the 
grave problems of the Communist regime to return to the mainland China by military 
means. Beijing was beset with difficulties both at home and abroad. The country 
was engulfed in a famine, leading to the deaths of thousands. The PRC-Indian 
disputes over border issues were becoming serious, Beijing was fiercely struggling 
ideologically with Moscow and the PRC-Soviet alliance was splitting. Chiang 
believed that the KMT should seize the opportunity to launch a counterattack on the 
mainland in order to recapture state power. ROC troops were ordered to prepare to 
stage an assault on the Chinese mainland. However, Washington was afraid that 
such an assault could drag the US into war with the PRC. Thus it did not support 
Chiang's plan. The ROC military operations to attack the mainland could not 
succeed without American backing, in particular air and naval support, so Chiang 
was compelled to give up the plan. In the meantime, Beijing significantly increased 
its military readiness. A larger number of troops were despatched to the areas 
opposite Taiwan, reinforcing the PLA's force along the coastline. Simultaneously, 
the PRC made diplomatic representations to the US through ambassadorial talks in 
Warsaw, seeking American pressure on the Chiang government to abandon its 
invasion plan. The event ended with no cross-strait military confrontation occurring. 
Huang, Kim, Wu, Hinton, Tucker and lun Zhang believe that the Chiang 
administration was a source of tension in the Taiwan Strait in 1962. Its military 
manoeuvring and determination to recover the mainland by force initiated the event. 
In their opinion, Beijing stepped up combat readiness but aimed at preventing a KMT 
army from invading the mainland. However, Weiqun Gu offers a different version of 
events. According to Gu, "in early 1962, Mao ordered the PRC military to form a 
contingency plan for taking over Taiwan to be implemented in the middle of 1962". 
In light of the plan, when the US militarily intervened the PRC would join forces 
with its allies to take anti-American moves in Asia and Africa simultaneously. 
Because of divergence among the military commanders, this plan "was implemented 
on a trial basis". However, the PLA spearhead units, with "intelligence and armed 
guerrillas", failed to sneak into Taiwan. As a result, Mao was forced "to cancel his 
plan". "Mao's motivation in doing this perhaps was severalfold. He may have 
hoped to divert domestic attention away from the economic disaster that resulted 
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from the Great Leap Forward. He may have hoped to regain power that had been 
eroded after 1961 due to pressure from the Liu Shaoqi faction with the 
encouragement of the Soviet Union. Also he may have hoped to disrupt the ROC's 
plan to invade the PRC.,,786 
It seems that, in contrast to the 1954-55 and 1958 Taiwan crises, the ROC took 
the offensive, with the PRC on defence. However, in viewing the event by stages, 
Beijing played a provocative role in early 1962 before Taipei became more bellicose 
in mid June 1962. As such, Mao's personal political consideration should be taken 
into account because he was in a time of trial and was badly in need of the 
provocation of a Taiwan crisis. Before long, he called for promotion of the intense 
class struggle and the beginning of the Socialist Education Campaign in the 10th 
Plenary Session of the Eighth CPC Central Committee in September 1962. 
Furthermore, he initiated the Cultural Revolution in 1965, finally defeating his 
political enemies.787 This could be a reasonable interpretation of the brief tension 
across the Taiwan Strait in 1962 in terms of Mao's role. 
In the mid-1960s, Beijing sought to revert to its efforts for peaceful resolution of 
the Taiwan issue. In particular, it tried to accommodate the KMT regime politically. 
In 1963, in light of Mao's train of thought, Zhou Enlai summarily put forward a 
reunification policy, which consisted of "a key link and four major points". This 
policy stressed the 'One-China' principle insisted upon by both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait and included some essential elements of the "one country, two systems" 
formula. In particular, Zhou proposed that the two sides should reach an agreement 
that neither would despatch spies across the Straits and neither would disrupt the 
internal unity of the opposite side. 788 In 1965, Beijing successfully encouraged 
former acting ROC president Li Tsung-jen to defect and take up residence on the 
mainland. Taking advantage ofLi's defection, "Beijing stepped up its peace 
786. Weiqun Gu, Conflict of Divided Nations: The Cases of China and Korea. Westport, Connecticut: 
Praeger, 1995, pp.26-27. 
787 • James C. F. Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction ( Fifth Edition). Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995, pp.23-30. 
788 • Li Jiaquan, "The Strategic Thinking of Three Generations' Leadership of the CPC Over China's 
Reunification," ( * * ~ , " 'P ;tt.:=. 1-t ~.N $fAX;J m ~ 9:J 00 8~ JIJ)t ~ ,w, ~ , " ) Xinhua Digest 
(/f!i $ X jjlj), No.259, July 2000, pp.60-61. 
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campaign toward Taiwan".789 Although the KMT leadership did not make a formal 
response to Beijing's political accommodation, Li Jiaquan believes that Beijing's 
political manoeuvre had produced an important influence upon various circles in 
Taiwan. He argues that the peaceful liberation of Taiwan was interrupted by the 
Cultural Revolution and subsequent ultra-"Left" trend ofthought,190 
During the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution, cross-strait relations were largely quiet 
and steady. In particular, because it was incapable of bringing Taiwan under 
communist rule by force, Beijing could only shout the slogan that "we must liberate 
Taiwan". 
7.1-2. Deng Xiaoping's Taiwan Policy 
The PRC domestic political situation had fundamentally changed and major 
policy had shifted since the late 1970s. The establishment ofPRC-US diplomatic 
relations significantly changed the triangular relationships between Beijing, Taipei 
and Washington. The PRC leadership began to reconsider Taiwan policy, trying to 
make long-term political arrangement. Against this historical backdrop, Beijing 
launched a series of soft offensives toward Taiwan. On January 1,1979, the National 
People's Congress' Standing Committee (NPCSC ) published the "Message to 
Compatriots in Taiwan". The message proposed that the two sides of the Taiwan 
Strait should end the military confrontation and make contacts and exchanges.791 In 
particular, for the first time, Beijing explicitly declared that it advocated resolving the 
reunification issue by peaceful means rather than by military confrontation. On 
September 30, 1981, the chairman ofNPCSC, Ye Jianying, put forward a nine-point 
proposal for the peaceful reunification of China. In particular, Ye's Nine-Points 
789. Jun Zhang, Ending the Chinese Civil War: Power, Commerce, and Conciliation between Beijing 
and Taipei. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, pp.29-30; "Li Tsung-jen's Press Conference," 
Peking Review, October 1, 1965, pp.22-27. 
790. Li Jiaquan, "The Strategic Thinking of Three Generations' Leadership of the CPC Over China's 
Reunification," (* aR 7'R ' " r:p ;t!;. ::::'1-t @! iff. A xif &E ~ r:p ~ 1'1'9 ~Ji; ~ ,Iffi', ~ , ")Xinhua Digest (/Iff 1# X 1fIJj), No.259, July 2000, pp.60-61. 
791 • "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan by the National People's Congress' Standing Committee," 
(" ~ ~ A*- 'ffi ~ % E is' r~ A ~ .::j:5, ") January 1, 1979, in The Taiwan Work Office of the 
CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council ( r:p ;tI,: r:p !k: 1'5' r~ I 
ft 1]\ 0 ~ / ~ :%-1!7E 1'5' l"~ $ :%-1]\ 0 ~), China's Taiwan Issue ( l' !JJ/ it Iff fa] JJj). Beijing: 
Jiuzhou Press ( JL t1+1 00 ~ ill Jj& f± ), 1998, pp.226-228. 
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proposed holding talks between the CPC and the KMT "on a reciprocal basis" over 
the reunification issue.792 Ye's Nine-Points developed Mao and Zhou's reunification 
policy of "a key link and four major points", creating an embryonic form of the "one 
country, two systems" formula. 
Although these offers to Taiwan were published in the name of the NPCSC, in 
fact they were Deng Xiaoping's Taiwan policy proposals. As the actual supreme 
leader, he set up the framework of Taiwan policy and formulated guidelines for 
handling the reunification issue. Adding to Ye's Nine-Points, Deng himself 
published a six-point proposal for peaceful reunification, which suggested more 
specific measures for resolving the Taiwan issue and appearing to be more 
generous.793 In further enunciating the PRC policy toward Taiwan, Deng's Six-
Points showed the formation of the "one country, two systems" formula. Principally, 
under the formula, Taiwan would be able to retain its existing social and economic 
systems and even its own armed forces while maintaining the socialist system in the 
mainland. 
Deng acknowledged that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait had divergent social, 
political and economic systems. It would be impossible to resolve these issues over 
decades and a greater flexibility was necessary to meet the needs of the two sides in 
order to complete ultimate reunification. Therefore, as an interim-arrangement, the 
"one country, two systems" formula would be the most suitable solution to the 
Taiwan problem. It supposed that the two different systems on the mainland and on 
the island could co-exist amicably for a long period without one swallowing up the 
other. The formula was designed to make Taiwan's capitalism compatible with 
Beijing's Communist rule on the mainland. It demonstrated that Deng calculated to 
eliminate the ground for Taipei's excuse which always cited the different social 
systems between the two sides as a reason to refuse reunification, in an effort to pave 
the way for negotiation on the reunification issue. 
792 • "Ye Jianying's Interview with Xinhua Correspondent," (" pt tlU 1jf rPJ jfJf $ f± -J,c :?if :& *- i¥J 
i~ ijli, ") September 30, 1981, in The Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and The 
Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council (9=t ~ 9=t -!k: is' ?~ I 11: 11, 0- ~ / gj :t- JB'G is' ?~ $ 93-
11, 0- ~), China's Taiwan Issue ( l' /llI it if!! jb] H)· Beijing: Jiuzhou Press (11 y)'H ~ -=j:5 ill XR U), 
1998, pp.229-230. 
793. "Deng Xiaoping's Ideas on Peaceful Reunification of Mainland China with Taiwan," (" :x~ ;j\ ."Sf 
9=t ~ *- IiUf fU 'is'?~ fU."Sf tff, - 1& 1&t, ") People's Daily (A Ie E JR), June 26,1983;" 'One 
Country, Two Systems' Born of Reality," Beijing Review, February 4, 1985, p.l5. 
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According to Li Jiaquan, in a comparison of Mao and Zhou's thinking on the 
peaceful liberation of Taiwan, Deng's ideas represented a fundamental change in 
Taiwan policy, from military liberation to peaceful reunification. Although declining 
to explicitly renounce the use of force in settling the Taiwan issue, the military 
option only was reserved as a final means. The central guiding idea was "peaceful 
reunification, one country, two systems".794 The "one country, two systems" formula 
had became a set policy toward Taiwan since the early 1980s. 
In Deng's Taiwan policy, there were considerations of strategy, diplomacy and 
politics. He was keen to resolve the Taiwan issue and complete national 
reunification at an early date, specifically in his lifetime. Thus he intended to 
expedite the process of peaceful reunification. In January 1980, he set a three-point 
agenda for the 1980s for both party and country. Firstly, it opposed hegemonism and 
sought to preserve world peace in international affairs. Secondly, it promoted 
completing the return of Taiwan to the motherland and realising national 
reunification. Thirdly, it encouraged stepping up the four modernisations and 
accelerating the pace of economic construction. He pointed out emphatically that the 
PRC would strive to achieve its goal of reunifying Taiwan within the 1980s. Despite 
being full oftwists and turns in the process, resolution of the Taiwan issue had been 
on the agenda all along.795 This demonstrated that he put national reunification high 
amongst his goals. He had devoted himself to Taiwan's return to the embrace of the 
country but had failed to realise his wish. Now it was Jiang Zemin's turn to try to 
accomplish Taiwan's reunion with the mainland and to complete the eventual 
reunification of China. 
7.1-3. The Significance of Reunifying Taiwan and the Importance of 
Taiwan Policy for Elite Politics 
794. For Deng's ideas on Taiwan's reunion with the mainland and the eventual reunification of China, 
see Li Jiaquan, "The Strategic Thinking of Three Generations' Leadership of the CPC Over China's 
Reunification," ( * * * ' " i=j:I ;It =: i-t ~ % A xt &E - i=j:I 00 s"J ~:!G DIj} ,w, ~ , " ) Xinhua Digest (JfIi:f# X jJ1J), No.259, July 2000, p.61. 
795 • See Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 2 ( XjJ /j • .Jf X ifff: $ -= :f1). Beijing: People's 
Press ( A ~ i±l JlR :f± ), 1994, pp.239-241. 
310 
The Taiwan question is arguably the most important issue facing China because it 
is determinative for the destiny of the nation. In particular, resolution of the Taiwan 
issue coupled with the realisation of the complete reunification of the country are 
vital to the PRC. It has an important bearing on the PRC party-state and is of great 
significance for the country. Therefore, the Taiwan issue is given its prominence in 
affairs of state, national policy and politics. 796 It is embodied in the following five 
aspects: 
Firstly, it is crucial to the survival and legitimacy of the Communist regime. 
Since 1949, when KMT troops retreated to Taiwan after the Communist Party seized 
power on the mainland, China has been a divided nation, with separate governments 
on either side of the Taiwan Strait. Although Beijing did not aclmowledge the reality 
of "one China, two governments", it had to take the ROC government seriously. 
From the late 1940s to the early 1960s, the KMT regime was a serious threat to the 
Communist rule on the Chinese mainland. Until the 1980s, the two regimes 
contended for international recognition as the legitimate ruler of the Chinese nation. 
More than four decades of confrontation between the two sides demonstrated that 
only the demise of the ROC government as an independent political entity could 
validate Beijing's claim that the PRC government is the sole legal government 
representing China. 797 
With the growing democratisation of Taiwan in the mid-1990s, the ROC no 
longer competed with the PRC for the right to represent the whole of China in the 
world, and did not challenge the Communist control of mainland China. Thereby 
Taipei had posed less of a military and political threat to the Communist regime since 
the early 1990s. However, Beijing continued to view Taipei as a political 
adversary.798 Taiwan's democracy and freedom and Taipei's opposition to Beijing 
796 • In a discussion of the PRC's view on the Taiwan issue in dimensions of strategy, economy and 
values, Ralph N. Clough, Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross make an analysis ofreasons why 
Beijing regards Taiwan's reunion with the mainland as a weighty matter of the state. See Ralph N. 
Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
1999, pp.11-17; Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: 
China's Searchfor Security. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997, pp.206-207. 
797. John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China. Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993, pp.278-281. 
798 . According to Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, "So long as the Taiwan problem is not 
solved, Taiwan remains an unsinkable carrier not only of military force but of subversive values and 
ideas that are widely attended to on the mainland." See Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The 
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could undermine political stability on the mainland and negatively impact on the 
communist monopoly on power. Communist Party legitimacy had become 
increasingly problematic since the Tiananmen events and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. In trying to overcome the potential crisis over the legitimacy of its rule, 
Beijing had quickened its pace in seeking to resolve the Taiwan issue and merge the 
opposing Taiwan authorities into its political system. This sheds light on the fact that 
the Communist regime always takes its own rulership into account in handling the 
Taiwan issue. In particular, if Taiwan declared itself a sovereign country, such a 
declaration would produce grave consequences for the PRC government. 
Conceivably this might even cause Beijing's one-party rule to collapse as a result of 
its inability to prevent the island's de jure independence. Thus the survival and 
legitimacy of the Communist regime is one of Beijing's foremost concerns that 
promoted their desire to settle the Taiwan problem. Beijing must ultimately reunite 
Taiwan with the mainland under the authority of Communists. 
Secondly, it is a matter of national security. Since the end of the Chinese civil 
war in 1949, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have technically remained at war. 
Beijing had reduced its military forces along the mainland's southeast coast since the 
late 1970s as part of a thaw in cross-strait relations, but it retains certain troops for 
cross-strait contingencies. Economic security has had to be taken into account 
because of potential military conflict in the Straits. The coastal provinces of 
Southeast China are the PRC's most developed economic area. In the late 1980s, 
they made up 40 per cent of the national population and 55 per cent of the national 
gross industrial and agricultural output value. Also, the five special economic zones, 
the fourteen open cities and more than thirty open harbours were located in the 
coastal regions.799 State assets and people's riches, vital to the national economy and 
the country's future, are concentrated in these regions. Should military conflict arise 
in the Straits, these regions could be affected, even damaged, and the PRC sealane 
communications, on which its economic lifelines depended, would be threatened. 
Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search/or Security. New York and London: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 1997, p.207. 
799. Jianhai Bi, "China's Marine Rights and Interests," ( $ ~ #II: ' " fa'iit :J1'; 00 89 r/iJ: ~ 1X :@. , " ) 
The (PLA) Naval Journal (7ii -* ~ ITt), March 1988, pp.22-24. 
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Strategically, the PRC has a stake in Taiwan's status.800 The Taiwan issue 
involves the PRC national defence. From the early 1950s to the late 1970s, the 
island was a US military base. In particular, during the 1950s and 1960s, this base 
posed a serious threat to the PRC national defence. If Taiwan was taken away from 
China's domain by a foreign force, or if Taiwan declared independence, an island 
hostile to mainland China would inevitably emerge. In this case, Taiwan could 
become a military base for the US or even Japan. This would create considerable 
security problems for the PRC. Taiwan might be used as a forward military base 
from which to launch an attack on the Chinese mainland. Also, the PRC coastline 
and routes in and out of the Pacific might be threatened or blockaded. For Beijing, 
such a potential threat to its territorial defence and ocean frontier would be 
unthinkable and intolerable. Should the Taiwan problem be resolved, it would 
significantly improve the security environment for the PRC. Thus, cross-strait affairs 
are an important factor in national security that the Beijing leadership has to 
consider, even if they have been ultimately overemphasised because of internal 
political contentions. 
Thirdly, the Taiwan issue is closely related to concerns surrounding national unity 
and territorial integrity. For more than four decades, Beijing had made efforts to 
strengthen the sense of unity between various ethnic groups and enhance the 
cohesion of the Chinese nation in order to ensure PRC sovereignty. However, it 
proved a long-term, arduous and complex task. Since the early 1990s, separatism 
among ethnic minorities had been clearly evident in three major ethnic groups, 
Uighur, Tibetan and Mongolian. They made up the majority of the ethnic population 
and had their own distinctive identities and histories and ties to foreign countries 
similar to them in race or culture and religion.801 
800 • For Taiwan's strategic importance to the PRC, see Chapter 3.1. Taiwan's Strategic Importance 
and Strength. 
801 . For nationality issues and the secession inclination of ethnic minorities, mainly the three major 
ethnic groups, Uighur, Tibetan and inner-Mongolian, see John W. Garver, Foreign Relations o/the 
People's Republic o/China. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993, pp.266-278; James 
C. F. Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction (Fifth Edition). Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995, pp.163-170; Felix K. Chang, "China's Central Asian Power and 
Problems," GREIS, Vo1.41, No.3, Summer 1997, ppAOI-425; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era 0/ Jiang 
Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, pp.230-234; Sheng Lijun, China's Dilemma: The 
Taiwan Issue. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001, 44-48, 149-150. 
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The rise of Taiwanese nationalism exacerbated ethnic problems within the PRC, 
challenging Chinese pan-nationalism and having impacting upon the PRC national 
unity. This presented a dilemma for Beijing. On one hand, it feared that an over-
promotion of nationalism could arouse separatist tendencies among the ethnic 
minorities. On the other hand, Beijing still had to rely on nationalism in seeking to 
maintain national unity. In the event of the loss of Taiwan, a domino effect could 
ensue, encouraging separatist tendencies elsewhere in the country. Beijing worried 
that the Taiwanese might be in collaboration with Uighur, Tibetan and Mongolian 
secessionists to promote independence, although there were few connections between 
the Taiwan independence movement and these secession movements until 1997. 
However, the Taiwan independence movement could have an influence upon these 
three major ethnic groups in their quest of secessionism. In particular, in Beijing's 
opinion, an independent Taiwan statehood could provide political leverage to Uighur, 
Tibetan and Mongolian separatism and form an internal threat to the Communist 
regime. Therefore, for Beijing, preventing Taiwan from declaring independence and 
reunifying the island would be essential to containing the Uighur, Tibetan and 
Mongolian secessionist movements. 
Fourthly, Taiwan's reunion with mainland China would be significant for the 
PRC's comprehensive national strength, particularly its economic power. 
Undoubtedly, completion of reunification would be favourable for PRC economic 
development. The reservation of using force as an option to settle the Taiwan issue 
had put heavy pressure upon the national finances. Accomplishment of Taiwan's 
return would put an end to the cross-strait arms race. That would enable the 
transformation of the costly military expenditure into pressingly needed resources for 
economic growth. 
In broader dimensions, Beijing favoured a "Chinese economic grouping" that 
could help to merge Taiwan. Since the early 1990s, as the time of the handover of 
Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 1999 from the British and Portuguese 
Governments was approaching and cross-strait relations were nearing 
rapprochement, people had talked about a "Great China".802 In the foreseeable future, 
802. For the issue of greater China, see David Shambaugh (ed.), Greater China: The Next 
Superpower? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995; Christopher Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese 
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this principally meant a "Great China Economic Circle", blending the mainland's 
raw materials, labour force and huge domestic market, Hong Kong's position as 
Asia's financial center and its information conduits and Taiwan's capital, technology, 
management expertise and international market network. Taiwan was the key to 
forming such a Chinese common market, assuming that the cross-strait political 
disputes could be resolved and the reunification process could progress. 
Beijing desired to realise "Great China". Its motivation behind this desire was 
that it longed for a rich economy, a strong army, and a powerful nation. For the 
PRC, a "Great China Economic Circle" would see its economic strength and military 
power enhance. Thus, Beijing advocated facilitating cross-strait economic exchanges 
in order to promote the resurgence and prosperity of China as a whole. In his eight-
point Taiwan policy announcement, Jiang Zemin emphasised the importance of 
Taiwan's reunion with the mainland after the recovery of Hong Kong and Macao for 
completing "Great China" and revitalising the Chinese nation. 803 
Beijing desired to build a new Asian economic superpower through forming a 
"Great China Economic Circle" focusing on merging Taiwan, but this did not mean 
that Beijing gave cross-strait economic integration a higher priority than a political 
merger in pursuing its Taiwan policy goals. Beijing was politically motivated to 
forge economic interdependence as a basis for an earlier reunification. 804 It had tried 
to use all the methods at its disposal to press its intentions upon Taipei but failed, 
especially with its show of military might backfiring. Lacking effective leverage, 
Beijing sought to promote reunification through economic means. By wielding the 
"business card" Beijing intended to compel Taipei to agree to beginning political 
Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society. London; New York: Routledge, 
1997, pp.108-113. 
803. Jiang Zemin, "Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland," ( U {~ ~ , " 7J i@ :itt 
til ~ ~ -"*.ill'. a"J 5G n\(; rm ~I* ~ 1ft --+ ," ) January 30, 1995, in The Taiwan Work Office of the 
CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council ( 9=' ~ 9=' :Ek: is' 1~ I 
tF 1} 0- ~ / ~ %- IlJt is' 1~. 9} 1]1 0- ~), China's Taiwan Issue ( l' /lfI it II! IE] Jf!j). Beijing: 
JiuzhouPress(fLt:HI ~ 45 ill Jt&U), 1998,p.233. 
804. For Beijing's intentions to promote reunification through economic means, see Yu-Shan Wu, 
"Mainland China's Economic Policy Toward Taiwan: Economic Needs or Unification Scheme?" 
Issues & Studies, Vo1.30, No.9, September 1994, pp.29-49; J.D. Kenneth Boutin, "Cross-Strait Trade 
and Investment: Economic and Security Implications for the Republic of China," Issues & Studies, 
Vo1.33, No.12, December 1997, pp.70-93. 
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negotiations on reunification. "For reunification purposes" in the long term, Beijing 
even had to temporarily endure an unfavourable balance in cross-strait trade. 805 
Fifthly, the status of Taiwan is a matter of national consequence in the global 
strategic pattern. It involves the country's international standing and the PRC's 
major power status. 
Principally, it is the issue of the international legal status of Taiwan and the 
legitimacy of the PRC government ruling China that are of concern. Interpretations 
of the international legal status of Taiwan vary.806 Although the PRC government 
has always faced a situation where it needs to deal with the existence of the ROC, it 
has argued that it is a legitimate successor to the ROC and therefore maintains a 
sovereign right to Taiwan. 807 However, this argument of state succession is 
disputable in international law because the claim is inconsistent with reality. Thus, 
the argument is challenged by a number of scholars of international law. For 
example, Chiu Hungdah believes that the ROC government still exists, though its 
jurisdiction is only valid over Taiwan and its surrounding islands. Hence, under 
international law the PRC's claims on Taiwan are void. Chiu points out 
emphatically that according to the relevant provisions of international law, "Taiwan 
is an integral part of' the ROC "and is not a part of' the PRe. 808 This judgement 
805. You Ji, "Changing Leadership Consensus: The Domestic Context of War Games," in Suisheng 
Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis. New York 
and London: Routledge, 1999, pp.80-81. 
806. For a discussion of the international legal status of Taiwan, see Jean-Marie Henckaerts (ed.), The 
International Status a/Taiwan in the New World Order: Legal and Political Considerations. London: 
Kluwer Law International, 1996, pp.l-32. Also see Chiu Hungdah, "The Principle of One China and 
the Legal Status of Taiwan," ( li * jjs , " - r:p 1* iJ1U !:j ~ t~ ws. 1$ :J:1!!. 1lz: ," ) Cheng Ming Monthly 
( !jf Il!$), No.280, February 2001, pp.69-72. 
807 . The Beijing regime asserts that after the foundation of the PRC in 1949, the historical status ofthe 
ROC ended and was replaced by the PRC. It insists that as the sole legal government of China, it has 
enjoyed and exercised sovereignty over the whole of China, including Taiwan, and the Taiwan 
authorities have always remained only a local authority in Chinese territory. For the PRC assertion 
and the ROC's opposing stand, see Taiwan Affairs Office & Information Office, State Council, 
People's Republic of China, "The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China" ( ~ 9}- ~ 15' ?~ $ 
9}-1],0 '!Ii 00 9}- ~ ffiIT I~ 1], 0 ~, " 15' t~ IP] IDI!:j r:p 00 s"J ~ -, ") August 1993, in The 
Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State 
Council ( r:p ~ r:p :5k: ~ y~ I flF 1) 0 ~ / ~ 9}- ~ 15' y~ $ 9}- 1], 0- ~ ), China's Taiwan Issue ( 
l' fiJI it iff liij JJ!Jf). Beijing: Jiuzhou Press (11 1}H 00 .::j:5 t\j JlR *±), 1998, pp.244-260; The Mainland 
Affairs Council, The Executive Yuan, Republic of China ( i-r ll& ~ '* ~ur ~ JJ3. ~ ), Relations 
Across The Taiwan Straits ( it ifj jtfj J¥ .7t /J{ iii f!Ij 1J)· Taipei: The Mainland Affairs Council ( i-r 
ll& ~ '* ~ur ~ JJ3. ~ ), 1994. 
808. Chiu Hungdah, "The international legal status of Taiwan," in Jean-Marie Henckaerts (ed.), The 
International Status a/Taiwan in the New World Order: Legal and Political Considerations. London: 
Kluwer Law International, 1996, pp.3-8; Chiu Hungdah, "The Principle of One China and the Legal 
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suggests that PRC sovereignty does not cover the whole of China. Therefore, the 
PRC has to continuously justify its political power over China in order to win the 
understanding and support of the international community. In particular, the 
existence of the ROC forces the PRC government to persevere in insisting upon 
recognition of itself as the sole legitimate government representing the whole of 
China and obliging other countries to sever, or refrain from establishing, diplomatic 
relations with the ROC if wishing to deal with the PRC. The PRC has to demand 
that most countries express their stance of opposing "two Chinas" or "one China, one 
Taiwan" and "Taiwan independence". 
In practice, the overwhelming majority of nations recognise the legitimate status 
of the PRC government as the representative of China, while also recognising the 
legal status of Taiwan as a part of China. 809 However, this does not mean that all of 
them recognise Taiwan as an integral part of the PRC. 81O In particular, the PRC 
version of the 'One-China' principle, especially its sovereign claim over Taiwan, has 
not been accepted by Japan and the United States. These two major powers have 
never used the wordage of recognition in addressing the issue of the PRC's claim to 
sovereignty over Taiwan. When the PRC and Japan signed a Joint Statement 
announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972, Japan declared that it 
fully understood and respected the PRC position that Taiwan is an inalienable part of 
the territory of the PRC.811 In the 1978 PRC-US Joint Communique on the 
establishment of diplomatic relations, the US "acknowledges the Chinese position 
Status of Taiwan," ( .Ii ;tg :l6 , " ~ r:p ~ YlU Sj i:1 r~ Wi 1$ 1m ill. ," ) Cheng Ming Monthly ( 11-1ll8), 
No.280, February 2001, pp.69-72. 
809. This description differs from the official PRC version. In August 1993, the PRC government 
issued a white paper entitled "The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China". It used a syllogistic 
description: "157 countries have established diplomatic relations with China. All these countries 
recognize that there is only one China and the Government of the People's Republic of China is the 
sole legitimate government of China and Taiwan is part of China." See The Taiwan Work Office of 
the CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council ( r:p ;t!; r:p 9<: is' {~ 
I ft 1), 0 ~ / ~ :% IlJt is' r~ $:% 1), 0 ~), China's Taiwan Issue ( 1'!JJ/ tt II'! IE) Df)· 
Beijing: Jiuzhou Press ( fL tHI 00 45 t8 JlR f± ), 1998, p.248. 
810. For the five "different categories in terms of precise wordage" of the PRC's sovereignty claim 
over Taiwan in signing the recognition agreements when the countries established diplomatic 
relations with the PRC, see Vernon V. Aspaturian, "International Reactions and Responses to PRC 
Uses of Forces Against Taiwan," in Parris H. Chang and Martin L. Lasater (eds), IjChina Crosses the 
Taiwan Strait: The International Response. Lanham; New York; London: University Press of 
America, 1993, p.l28. 
811 • "Joint Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of 
Japan," Peking Review, October 6, 1972, pp.l2-13. 
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that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China". 812 The positions of Japan 
and the US imply that the PRC government has never extended control over Taiwan 
since its foundation in 1949 and the ROC government effectively rules the island. 
This raises the embarrassing situation for the PRC government that its status as the 
legitimate ruler of the Chinese nation remains questionable because it does not 
actually e~oy and exercise complete sovereignty over China. For the Beijing 
regime, this is unacceptable. However, so long as the Taiwan issue is not resolved, 
the PRC cannot gain complete legal and diplomatic recognition for its sovereign 
claim over Taiwan by the international community at large, and the PRC government 
cannot obtain full international legitimacy. 
The disputed international legal status of Taiwan underlines the 
internationalisation of the Taiwan issue, bringing about many diplomatic problems 
for the PRC. More seriously, in the mid-1990s Taipei's drive to expand its 
international acceptance, in particular its campaign for a UN seat and full 
representation in other international organisations, embarrassed and infuriated 
Beijing. The highly internationalised Taiwan issue complicates and disturbs PRC 
diplomatic relations with the rest of the world. The handling of relations with 
Taiwan within the framework of 'One China' is an arduous and long-term goal of 
Beijing and it demands that various nations formally accept it. Beijing has to fight a 
diplomatic war aimed at isolating Taipei from the world community, but this imposes 
costs upon its international political resources. It is compelled to make concessions 
over other issues in exchange for support of its position on Taiwan. This affects its 
leverage in the global power balance and weakens its position of strength in world 
affairs. More unfavourably, Beijing's suppression of Taiwan's diplomatic activities, 
even threatening the use of military force against the democratised island in the mid-
1990s, damaged its international reputation. In the post-Cold War era, the PRC 
wants to ensure its major power status and seek to become a superpower. However, 
the unsolved Taiwan issue disrupts Beijing's strategic intentions. It can not endure a 
split state of the country indefinitely. 
812. "Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between P. R. C. and U. So Ao," Peking Review, 
December 22, 1978, po8o 
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The Taiwan issue has become one of the greatest problems facing the PRe today. 
It is a uniquely emotive issue due to its perceived nationalistic necessity as regards 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity. More importantly, because it involves 
major issues such as national development guidelines, foreign policy and military 
strategy, even war and peace, the sector of Taiwan affairs and policy is quite 
important and sensitive within the PRe leading circle. It incorporates major political 
forces inside both party and government as well as the military, becoming a focus of 
the supreme authorities and potentially an important aspect of any power struggle. 
Therefore, the Taiwan question has always been a vital issue for the PRe leaders. 
The evolution of Taiwan policy reveals that it has involved the political fortunes of 
leaders and their political activities. While considering the PRe party-state rulership 
and national security and interests, the leaders' personal political calculations are a 
significant factor. Taiwan policy goals could be a powerful symbol of success or 
failure in leaders' quest for political accomplishments. The case of Mao Zedong 
provoking the 1958 Taiwan crisis demonstrated that when he had lost credibility 
because of the consequences of the Great Leap Forward, he intended to rebuild his 
authority through manipUlation of the Taiwan issue to mobilise domestic support for 
his unstable leadership. The case of Deng Xiaoping, his impatience for success in 
Taiwan policy indicated his intent to establish his legacy by way of early 
reunification. Thus, it can be seen that at an important political juncture, in particular 
a critical political transition, the area of Taiwan policy is liable to become a focus. 
Some leaders attempt to make gains in cross-strait relations to raise their political 
status while the others seek to exploit Taiwan policy issues, in conjunction with 
political opponents' difficulties, to launch challenges for power. Under such 
circumstances, any conciliatory approach would risk political infighting. On the 
contrary, a tougher stance on cross-strait relations for power manoeuvring could 
create an advantage because it could gather various political factions together. A 
tough Taiwan policy is often the basis for gaining the upper hand over more 
rationally minded constituencies. Amid elite political competition in a succession 
struggle, different perspectives based on leaders' political motivations could become 
complicating factors in Taiwan policy decision-making. 
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This study tries to explore the close relationship between PRC Taiwan policy 
formulation and PRC leadership succession. It hypothesises that succession politics 
would play an important role in, and largely impact upon, Taiwan policy in given 
periods. A transfer of power could cause a major change in Taiwan policy because 
successors have a personal need of the prestige it can provide. As such, Taiwan 
policy contention often arises from contenders in the process of struggling for the 
succession. Leaders have to draw their arguments from the reunification issue. 
Should any leaders behave moderately on Taiwan, their position of power is open to 
attack. This could intensify internal disputes on soft-or-hard choices, giving rise to 
sharper political struggles. Because moderate elements of the Taiwan policy 
establishment vis-a-vis a hard-line course are seldom dominant, it contributes to 
changeable as well as irrational and short-sighted Taiwan policies. Therefore, this 
study hypothesises that succession politics could impinge upon Taiwan policy-
making and produce unexpected consequences for cross-strait relations. This, 
perhaps, would help to explain Beijing's unreasonable belligerence during the 1995-
96 Taiwan crisis. It would demonstrate that the leaders' personal political calculation 
might have played a lager role than strategic and diplomatic considerations in 
influencing decisions to deal with problems of cross-strait and PRC-US relations. 
7.2. Jiang Zemin's New Taiwan Policy 
7.2-1. Other Domestic Factors That Might Affect Taiwan Policy-
Making 
This study has suggested that five factors: national security and interests, 
ideology, nationalism, economic issues and domestic political stability, help to shape 
the PRC policy toward Taiwan, although they are probably not the prime 
determinants in Taiwan policy-making. However, in order to search out what 
variables might have shaped Taiwan policy, these five factors will also be analysed. 
Taiwan was not perceived to be a major threat to mainland China. The Beijing 
leadership acknowledged that international and cross-strait relations had tended to 
detente, although having concerns that the growing political force of pro-
independence might impinge on cross-strait relations and potentially threaten peace, 
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stability and development in the Asia-Pacific region.813 It was because of this 
realistic estimation that the island did not immediately threaten PRC state security 
and Taiwan independence was not imminent, that Jiang sought to take new policy 
initiatives on Taiwan.814 
The role of ideology as a factor in policy-making is declining. Communist 
ideology has been bankrupt since economic reform was conducted and the country 
was opened up to the outside world in 1978. With the global collapse of communism 
in the early 1990s, Chinese communist ideology was defunct. Although the Chinese 
Communist leadership remained behind the camouflage of Marxism and 
Communism in order to continue one-party rule, it had shed most of its ideological 
tenets. In the formation of the guiding principles of Taiwan policy, ideology was no 
longer a substantive element. The kernel of Taiwan policy was the "one country, two 
systems" formula. It permitted Taiwan to retain its political and economic systems 
after reunification with the Chinese mainland. Given the degree of flexibility 
involved, ideology was unlikely to play an important role in Taiwan policy-making. 
Although a discredited Marxist ideology was increasingly replaced by a rising 
nationalism, this had not significantly influenced Beijing's policy toward Taiwan 
either. Beijing had nurtured among the Chinese a sense of nationalism since the 
1989 Tiananmen massacre, in order to maintain the one-party dictatorship. Yet, the 
PRC was not swept by strong nationalistic sentiments in 1995 and early 1996. 
Beijing appeared to consider that nationalism was a double-edged sword and had to 
weigh it against its domestic costs. There were two main concerns. Beijing feared 
that an undue promotion of nationalism could arouse separatist tendencies among 
ethnic minorities and nationalist rhetoric among the people might result in 
demonstrations against the government. 815 Thus Chinese nationalism did not appear 
to be the main driving force for Taiwan policy-making. 
To ascertain whether economic issues affected Taiwan policy, it is necessary to 
briefly review the situation of economic reform and development. Economic reform 
813. The Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the 
State Council ( 1f1 ~ 1f1 !k:. il 7'13 I it 1;1 0 ~ / 00 9} Il1G il 7'13 ¥ 9} 1;1 0 ~ ), China's Taiwan 
Issue ( tp f!f! ft If /fij IJI)· Beijing: Jiuzhou Press (1L t1'H I!I ~ ill JlR U), 1998, pp.87-90, 232-233. 
814 . This estimation will be dealt with in Chapter 7.2-2. The Historical Background of Jiang Zemin's 
Taiwan Initiative. 
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had little involvement in Taiwan policy setting. Although Beijing referred to the 
Taiwan experience in successfully reconstructing the economic system and creating 
an economic miracle, it was on guard against its political impact. 816 This reference 
was not influential in the PRC Taiwan policy-making despite having an effect on the 
reconstruction of economic institutions. Although Taiwanese investment on the 
mainland had contributed to PRC economic growth, Beijing's Taiwan policy has 
always been politically, rather than economically, motivated.817 
Indeed, there were no urgent economic problems between 1995 and 1996. A 
comparison of 1993-1994, 1995-1996 and 1997-1998 helps provide a clearer 
understanding ofthe economic conditions.818 For example, the problems of the state-
owned enterprises emerged in 1993-1994 but did not apparently worsen in 1995-
1996. However, they remained at a critical level and restructuring has become the 
most difficult task facing Beijing since 1997-1998. 
Inflation and deflation are two of the most important indicators in measuring the 
economic situation. Beijing was under heavy stagflation pressures in 1993-1994 
struggling to make a "soft landing" for the economy. In 1997-1998, it was forced to 
cope with the infection of the Asian financial crisis and faced the difficult choice of 
whether or not to devalue its currency. These four troublesome years had shown that 
if these serious economic problems were not dealt with, the consequences could be 
disastrous. 
815. Sui sheng Zhao, "Chinese Nationalism and Beijing's Taiwan Policy: A China Threat?," Issues & 
Studies, Vo1.36, No.1, January/February 2000, pp.76-99. 
816. Ramon Myers, "Transferring the Republic of China's Modernisation Experience to the People's 
Republic of China," in Gary Klintworth (ed.), Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific in the I990s. St. Leonard, 
N.S.W: Allen & Unwin in association with Dept. ofInternational Relations, Australian National 
University, 1994, pp.169-194. 
817. For Beijing's policy of promoting political merger with Taiwan through economic means, see Yu-
Shan Wu, "Mainland China's Economic Policy Toward Taiwan: Economic Needs or Unification 
Scheme?" Issues & Studies, Vol.30, No.9, September 1994, pp.29-49; J.D. Kenneth Boutin, "Cross-
Strait Trade and Investment: Economic and Security Implications for the Republic of China," Issues 
& Studies, Vol.33, No.12, December 1997, pp.70-93. 
818. See David Bachman, "China in 1993: Dissolution, Frenzy, and/or Breakthrough?" Asian Survey, 
Vol.XXXIV, No.1, January 1994, pp.33-36; David Bachman, "China in 1994: Marking Time, Making 
Money," Asian Survey, Vol.XXXV, No.1, January 1995, ppAO-43; John Bryan Starr, "China in 1995: 
Mounting Problems, Waning Capacity," Asian Survey, Vol.XXXVI, No.1, January 1996, pp.13-18; 
Avery Goldstein, "China in 1996: Achievement, Assertiveness, Anxiety," Asian Survey, 
Vol.XXXVII, No.1, January 1997, pp.30-32; Avery Goldstein, "China in 1997: A Year of 
Transitions," Asian Survey, Vol.XXXVIII, No.1, January 1998, pp.44-45; Joseph Fewsmith, "China 
in 1998: Tacking to Stay the Course," Asian Survey, VoI.XXXIX, No.1, January 1999, pp.l03-107. 
In addition, for a review of the economic situation in the mid-1990s, see William A. Joseph (ed.), 
China Briefing: The Contradictions a/Change. Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997,51-77. 
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Relatively, the economic environment was more favourable in 1995 and 1996. A 
"soft landing" was achieved. The inflation rate fell from 25% in 1994 to 15% in 
1995 and less than 7% in 1996.819 With such a dramatic improvement, the country 
maintained momentum for its economic development. Therefore, during the 1995-
1996 period, Beijing was able to sustain the economic growth and continue to reform 
the economic system despite having to overcome difficulties. These economic issues 
had no impact on Taiwan policy. 
The issue of national political stability was another factor that could have affected 
the PRC policy toward Taiwan. A comparison of the domestic political environment 
between the early, mid and late 1990s can shed light on this issue. 82o The mid-1990s 
was a period of relative political stability. It contrasted with the more vulnerable 
regime struggling for survival in light of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre and the 
violent impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc in the early-
1990s. It contrasted too with the weaker position of the regime in the late 1990s 
caused by continuous demonstrations threatening social turmoil even political 
upheaval. In the early-1990s, Beijing was forced to face a crisis. In striving to 
restore its power, Beijing had to cope with rural disturbances caused by protests 
against exorbitant levies and taxes, looting of land and official corruption, in addition 
to its effort to smooth discontent throughout the whole society. The main reason that 
the Communist regime overcame the crisis was that Deng Xiaoping's landmark tour 
of southern China in early 1992 launched a campaign for more and faster reform and 
greater opening-up, seeking to ensure the delivery of economic benefits to the 
people. 
In the late 1990s, the national political circumstances had worsened. While the 
farmers rioted once more, industrial unrest had also become a problem of top 
priority. Unemployment had already become increasingly sharp in these years 
because most loss-making state-enterprises had laid off tens of thousands of workers. 
This could have lead to a national political crisis. In 1998, the founding of the 
Chinese Democratic Party presented an unprecedented challenge to nearly five 
819 • John Bryan Starr, "China in 1995: Mounting Problems, Waning Capacity," Asian Survey, 
Vol.XXXVI, No.1, January 1996, p.13; Avery Goldstein, "China in 1996: Achievement, 
Assertiveness, Anxiety," Asian Survey, Vol.XXXVII, No.1, January 1997, p.30. 
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decades of monopoly rule by the Communist Party. More seriously, in April 1999, 
the Falun Gong spiritual movement mounted the largest protest in Beijing since the 
1989 pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. Beijing was stunned by 
this and called the Falun Gong the most serious threat to Communist Party rule since 
1989, declared it an illegal cult and vowed to suppress it. Beijing attempted to avoid 
this potential danger to its one-party dictatorship, by claiming that stability 
outweighed everything and by delivering constant improvements in living standards. 
However, this had become more difficult by the time the call for freedom and 
democracy swelled as economic growth declined in the late 1990s. 
Comparatively speaking, in 1995-1996 there were no dramatic political events 
and Beijing did not encounter particular political difficulties. It was compelled to 
make a wide-ranging response to various types of domestic problems confronting it, 
but still had control of the state and society. Although this control had diminished, 
ostensibly it continued to stand for "unity and stability". Despite their criticism, 
dissidents were unable to organise the masses to oppose the Communist regime 
effectively because of Beijing's repression. Sporadic protests sometimes happened 
but were swiftly put down, having little immediate impact on the political system. 
Unlike the early and late 1990s, in the mid-1990s Beijing had the political resources 
to mitigate widespread discontent, even though those resources were limited. 
Disputes about ideology and political systems between the mainland and the 
island were not a major issue in Taiwan policy-making. The democratisation of 
Taiwan had little influence over the political situation on the Chinese mainland. The 
administration of Lee Teng-hui stood by Taiwanese localism and did little to promote 
political change in mainland China. 821 Under such circumstances, a democratising 
Taiwan concerned Beijing, but did not upset it because of Taipei's passive attitude 
toward the promotion of freedom and democracy on the Chinese mainland. 
As analysed above, these five factors did not significantly influence Taiwan 
policy-making. 
820. For a comparison of the domestic political situation between the early, mid and late 1990s, see 
annual reviews of Asian Survey on China from 1991 to 1999. 
821 • For further analysis of Taiwanese democratisation and Taipei's mainland policy, see Chapter 3.2. 
The Taiwan's Political Situation and the Political Forces of Unification vis-a-vis Independence and 
Chapter 3.3. Taipei's Pragmatic Diplomacy and Mainland Policy. 
7.2-2. The Historical Background of Jiang Zemin's Taiwan 
Initiative 
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Jiang believed that the cessation of military conflict in the Taiwan Strait had 
created favourable conditions for his reunification program. 822 Tensions between the 
two sides had eased since the late 1970s, implying that nearly half a century of 
hostilities between the two adversaries was coming to an end. Both Beijing and 
Taipei had taken a conciliatory stance, and cautiously started rapprochement, 
lowering the possibility of armed conflict between the two sides. As Beijing had 
announced a major change in its Taiwan policy from military liberation to peaceful 
reunification, the PLA was ordered to stop the bombardment of Jinmen and other off-
shore islands in 1979.823 The PLA reduced its military forces on the mainland's 
southeast coast and the Fuzhou Military Region directed at Taiwan was abolished in 
the mid-1980s. Taipei responded by halting the bombing of the mainland's 
southeastern coastal facilities. The thawing of relations between the two sides had 
made Taipei reassess the decades-old cold war view of Beijing as a mortal enemy. 
Thus Taipei lifted martial law directed at Chinese Communists in 1987, announced 
the termination of "the period of mobilisation for the suppression of Communist 
rebellion" and renounced its earlier stance of using force to recover the Chinese 
mainland in 1991.824 By doing this, the Taiwan authorities were ready to cultivate a 
peaceful cross-strait atmosphere, despite rejecting immediate negotiation for 
reunification. These moves by both sides provided a hope for a lessening of tension 
822. Jiang Zemin, "Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland," ( II ?'f ~ , " J;; i@ :Itt 
1£1. 00 ~ - *- ~ B'9 jC ,$; rm ~'* ~ -Rf -4 ," ) January 30, 1995, in The Taiwan Work Office of the 
CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council ( J:j:l ;tt. J:j:l :!k: 6' 1~ I 
fF 1], 0 ][ I ffiI 9} Il7t ~ 1~ ¥ 9} 1], 0 ][), China's Taiwan Issue ( if' !lfI it;'J!f IE] Jjf). Beijing: 
Jiuzhou Press (11 1J1i 1!I.:j:5 ill JlR U), 1998, pp.231-233. 
823 • "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan by the National People's Congress' Standing Committee," 
(" ~ ffiI A*- 'ffi ~ 4} ~ ~ 1~ A ~ .:j:5 , ") January 1, 1979, in The Taiwan Work Office of the 
CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council ( J:j:l ;tt: J:j:l :!k: 6' t~ I 
it j1' 0 ~ I ffiI-j} Il7t 6' t~ ¥ -j} 1], 0 ~ ), China's Taiwan Issue ( if' !lfI it ;'J!f lli) Jjf). Beijing: 
Jiuzhou Press ( 11 ~'H I!I .:j:5 ill JlR *± ), 1998, p.228. 
824. Lai-to Lee, The Reunification o/China: PRC-Taiwan Relations in Flux. New York: Praeger, 
1991, p.44; Shelly Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Voting/or Democracy. London; New York: 
Routledge, 1999, p.154; "Guidelines for National Unification, adopted by the National Unification 
Council on February 23, 1991, and by the Executive Yuan Council on March 14, 1991," Free China 
Review, Vo1.41, No.9, September, 1991, p.44. 
in the Taiwan Strait and helped forge cross-strait rapprochement. It appeared that 
peaceful coexistence between the two sides was realisable 
325 
Jiang was encouraged by a sound political interaction between the two sides that 
could bring about the return of Taiwan. The establishment of the two nominally 
unofficial governmental organisations in the early 1990s, the Association for 
Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS ) and the Straits Exchange Foundation 
( SEF ), set up a framework for handling affairs and exchanges of opinions. 
Subsequently, greater progress was made between 1992 and 1993 when the two sides 
developed an active dialogue and continued a series of higher-level visits. More 
importantly, in Hong Kong in November 1992, SEF and ARATS officials reached a 
verbal consensus on the "one China" issue. They agreed to adhere to the one-China 
principle despite differing over the political definition. Working for a single 
reunified Chinese nation became, in principle, the mutually accepted and desired first 
step in the reunification process, and produced immediate results. The consensus 
helped pave the way for a meeting between two top negotiators in Singapore the 
following year. The meeting between the two chairmen of ARA TS and SEF, Wang 
Daohan and Koo Chen-fu, was of historic significance because it was the first high-
level cross-strait negotiation since 1949. This was viewed as a major breakthrough 
in cross-strait relations which had long been at a standstill. The fruitful Singapore 
meeting helped establishing a systematic dialogue channel to handle cross-strait 
affairs, especially to solve pressing issues. In 1994, the SEF and ARATS began 
making arrangements for the Second Koo-Wang Talks.825 
In the meantime, remarkable progress had been made in personnel, economic and 
other exchanges across the Taiwan Strait, viewed by Jiang as a solid foundation for 
an enterprising new policy on Taiwan. People-to-people contacts had rapidly 
developed, with Taipei's lifting of the ban on visiting separated relatives in 1987 and 
Beijing's encouragement of such contact. 826 Millions of families divided since the 
1946-1949 Chinese civil war had reunified and many Taiwanese who had no 
825. The Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the 
State Council ( 9:t ;t!;: 9:t -!k: ~ r~ I if 0\ 0 ~ / I!l 9} Ilft ~ tlllJ $ :%- 0\ 0 ~ ), China's Taiwan 
Issue ( l' /lll it Iff! /0 JljJ). Beijing: Jiuzhou Press (11 N+I 00 -15 ill JlR t1), 1998, pp.87-90, 156-164, 
232. 
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relatives on the mainland travelled there. The number of Taiwan residents visiting 
mainland China was on a steady increase, while a number of mainland Chinese in 
turn travelled to the island. By 1991 the number of Taiwanese visiting mainland 
China reached 3 million and from 1992 visits of Taiwan residents to the mainland 
maintained at 1 million per year.827 A large number of Taiwan businessmen 
permanently worked on the mainland, while increasing cross-strait marriages. The 
sharp increase of person-to-person communications and other exchanges between the 
two sides helped in facilitating a more friendly political atmosphere across the 
Taiwan Strait, and were conducive to improving chances of eventual reunification. 
Expansion of cross-strait economic relations stimulated Jiang to make an effort in 
realising his aspirations for national reunification. Economic exchanges began in the 
late 1970s, and rapidly developed and enlarged. With flows of commodities, capital, 
technology, information and businesspeople between the two sides increasing, the 
two economies were appeared to be moving towards a greater China market. The 
trade growth had been remarkable. The two-way trade volume was only US$ 77 
million in 1979,828 but had risen from US$ 8,054.2 million in 1991 to US$ 16.5 
billion in 1994, with an average annual growth rate of 36 per cent.829 In the 
meantime, increasing numbers of Taiwan investors were flocking to the mainland. 
As thousands of Taiwanese manufacturers, businessmen and financiers set up their 
projects, firms in which Taiwanese had investment on the Chinese mainland made 
significant headway. According to figures released by the Taiwan Affairs Office of 
the PRC government, between 1992 and 1995, Taiwan firms had more than US$ 26 
826. For an overview of people-to-people contacts between the two sides and their roles in promoting 
understanding and friendly exchanges, see Ralph N. Clough, Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait: 
People-to-People Diplomacy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993. 
827 • See Ralph N. Clough, Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait: People-to-People Diplomacy. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993, p.l; Yu Mu, "Moving Toward Stability and Political 
Dialogue in the Road of Twists and Turns-Reviewing the Past Two Decades of Crossing-Strait 
Relations and Looking Forward to the Future," ( T Y* ' " 1:£ BE tIT 9=' JE rP:J ~~ 5E ;fQ il& r€l M i;jS-
1W i$ * ~ = + ~ B-1] @] Jjiyt ;fQ Hl :w. , " ) Outlook Weekly ( T 1U), December 28, 1998, p.25. 
828 • The Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the 
State Council ( 9=' ;tt: 9=' :!k: i5' 1~ I fF ~, 0- ~ / 00 9} Il1G a- 1~ $ 9} ~, 0- ~ ), China's Taiwan 
Issue ( l' /If/ it If jJi) J}Jf). Beijing: liuzhou Press ( 1L rJ+1 00 .::f5 ill JlR f±), 1998, p.128. 
829. Allen Y. Tao, "An Analysis of the Trade-Investment Relationship Across the Taiwan Strait," 
Issues & Studies, Vo1.32, No.8, August 1996, p.56. "Two-way trade in 1996 amounted to US$ 23.8 
billion." See Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1999, p.51. 
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billion invested in 28,000 projects on the mainland.830 More remarkably, in terms of 
foreign direct investment in the PRC, by 1994 Taiwan had become the second largest 
investor on the Chinese mainland.83I To be sure, there still were issues to be solved 
concerning cross-strait economic development, such as Taipei's bans on direct trade, 
mail and transport services across the Straits as well as the imperfect legal system on 
the Chinese mainland, but until the mid-1990s, cross-strait economic integration 
reached a height never seen before. 
Expansion of investment and trade across the Taiwan Strait was forging economic 
interdependence and appearing to lay an economic foundation for China's 
reunification. The dramatic development of economic cooperation had brought about 
a growing economic interdependence between the two sides. On one hand, cross-
strait economic exchanges had brought many economic benefits to the Chinese 
mainland with employment, income and tax revenue, making the mainland's 
economy more dependent on the island, particularly regarding its need for Taiwan's 
capital and technology. On the other hand, Taiwan's trade surplus with the mainland 
was driving the Taiwan economy into greater dependence upon mainland China. For 
example, Taiwan's trade surplus dependence on the mainland had gone from 20.11 % 
in 1990 to 82.36% in 1993, with the Chinese mainland replacing the United States as 
the main source of trade surplus for Taiwan.832 Cross-strait economic integration 
became a helpful element for peaceful political interaction. The increase of 
economic ties across the Taiwan Strait brought both sides closer, reflecting the 
possibility that political harmony could come following economic interdependence. 
Although there was a long way to go, the shared economic interests of the two sides 
were ultimately expected to facilitate political reunification. 
However, the two sides remained contentious over major issues because there still 
were fundamentally political differences between Beijing and Taipei despite cross-
strait rapprochement. Most controversies centred around the issue of sovereignty 
830. See The Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of 
the State Council ( I=j:t ft I=j:t :!k:. '6 {~ I 11' 11, 0- ~ / 00 %- ~ '§j {~ $ %- 11, 0- ~ ), China's 
Taiwan Issue ( tp fj[f it Iff Ii!! Df)· Beijing: liuzhou Press ( 11 V'N III 45 ill HR U), 1998, pp.128-
l30. 
83! .George T. Crane, "Greater China: The Ties That Don't Bind," Current History, Vo1.94, No.593, 
September 1995, p.271. 
832 . Yu-Shan Wu, "Mainland China's Economic Policy Toward Taiwan: Economic Needs or 
Unification Scheme?" Issues & Studies, Vo1.30, No.9, September 1994, p.38. 
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over Taiwan and ways in which to resolve cross-strait disputes. Taipei effectively 
waived its claim to sovereignty over China acknowledging the Chinese Communist 
Party's de facto rule over the mainland, but complained of Beijing's failure to 
renounce the use of force against the island. Taipei maintained that the 'One China' 
concept referred to the future rather than the present. The two sides were not yet 
unified, but were equals, separately ruled. Also, it maintained eventual reunification 
could occur by way of peace and democracy, but refused to embrace immediate 
reunion under the Communist regime. In the meantime, the political force of pro-
independence was growing, despite not having significantly affected the island's 
status. Meanwhile, Beijing insisted on its sovereignty claim over Taiwan and still 
considered Taiwan a breakaway province, in adhering to the principle that there is 
only one China in the world and Taiwan is a part of China, and the PRC government 
is the sole legal representative of China. Beijing has refused to rule out the use of 
force to reunify Taiwan. The disputes over the status of Taiwan and the 'One China' 
principle entailed antagonism on both sides. In view of these facts, Jiang had to take 
the difficulties of reunifying Taiwan into account. Nevertheless, those obstacles to 
the return of Taiwan had not blunted his resolution to finish the job of national 
reunification. He appeared to believe that the conditions at that time for China's 
reunification were nearly ripe. 833 
Obviously, Jiang was overoptimistic about the cross-strait situation and the 
prospects for reunification. The new situation which had emerged with regard to 
Taiwan issues might have provided some conditions for a gradual reunion, but was 
not good enough to see any prospects of such a development in the immediate future. 
For more than forty years, circumstances in the Taiwan Strait had become very 
complicated, and there were any number of problems and difficulties to be overcome 
before reunification could take place. Jiang ignored the obstacles on the way to 
reunification, especially the suspicions produced by years of separation between the 
two sides of the Taiwan Strait. For example, he did not deliberate on the question of 
whether the atmosphere would be right to propose an important policy toward 
Taiwan. Actually, 1995 was not a good year for promoting the reunification course 
833 • The Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the 
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because the Qiandao Lake incident of 1994 had violently impinged on cross-strait 
relations, leading to a year of tensions between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. 834 
The shabby handling of the incident by the mainland authorities severely strained ties 
between the two sides which had cast a dark shadow over reunification. It left many 
Taiwanese reluctant to support contacts and exchanges with the mainland, especially 
the victims' relatives who urged the Taiwan government to re-evaluate its stand on 
cross-strait relations. The number who favoured reunification with the mainland 
were declining while support for separate rule was growing. Under the 
circumstances, an eagerness by Beijing to heal the rift created by the incident was 
needed. However, Jiang did not mention the Qiandao Lake tragedy in his eight-point 
proposal on Taiwan. Obviously, this was not conducive to the promotion of bilateral 
understanding and mutual trust in the aftermath of the incident. His ignorance of the 
impact of the Qiandao Lake incident on cross-strait relations was seen as indicating a 
lack of respect for the will and interests of the Taiwanese people, undermining the 
sincerity of his overtures and hindering prospects for reunification. Without serious 
and careful consideration of the problems and difficulties in cross-strait relations, 
Jiang persisted in his reunification program in light of his own optimistic estimates of 
the environment for a resolution of the Taiwan issue. He would have to pay a 
political price for his over-confidence. 
7.2-3. Jiang Zemin's Eight-Point Proposal for Reunification with 
834. The Qiandao Lake incident happened on March 31, 1994, when twenty-four Taiwan tourists were 
murdered in a robbery while visiting the mainland. Mainland authorities at fIrst declared the deaths to 
be the result of an accidental fIre aboard a tour boat. But Taipei rejected this explanation and 
demanded Beijing conduct a comprehensive and thorough investigation into the deaths. Under strong 
pressure from Taipei, the mainland authorities reviewed the case, changing their tone and 
acknowledging the incident as one of robbery and murder. Three mainlanders were hastily found and 
sentenced to death. They confessed to robbing and murdering the Taiwanese tourists and staging the 
boat fIre. The callous and rough handling of the tragedy by the mainland authorities, including an 
information blackout and mistreatment of the families of the victims stirred up public indignation in 
Taiwan. Taipei assailed Beijing over the tragedy, accusing it of being truculent and unreasonable. 
More dramatically, President Lee Teng-hui denounced mainland Chinese authorities as "bandits" for 
their handling of the incident. The incident halted group tours across the Taiwan Strait by the Taiwan 
tourism industry while affecting the economic ties between the two sides. Taipei suspended cultural 
and educational exchanges with the mainland and the political talks between Beijing and Taipei 
bogged down. Cross-strait relations thus sank to their lowest ebb since the rapprochement of the mid-
1980s. See "In 1994, Some Bright Spots in Midst of DiffIculty," The Free China Journal, January 7, 
1995; Sung Kuo-cheng, "The Chientao Lake Tragedy and Cross-Strait Relations," Issues & Studies, 
Vo1.30, No.5, May 1994, pp.llO-1l2. 
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Taiwan and Reactions to It 
Jiang made public his new Taiwan policy on January 30, 1995. He had already 
developed new formulations to deal with Taiwan, but had thought carefully about the 
timing of publication. On the eve of Chinese New Year, China's most festive family 
holiday, he delivered his important speech with a metaphor that the mainland and the 
island would be reunited. This underscored his determination to make his new 
strategy toward Taiwan into a great success. In his speech, he put forward eight 
propositions, aimed at developing cross-strait relations, ending mutual hostilities and 
realising peaceful reunification of China. These great initiatives demonstrated that 
he was working hard to bring about a breakthrough on the impasse between mainland 
China and Taiwan regarding reunion. 
He began by claiming Taiwan as an inalienable part of China while outlining an 
historical account to demonstrate and affirm the significance of national 
reunification. In an appeal to all descendants of the Chinese nation, including 
Taiwanese compatriots for support for national reunification, he called upon the 
entire Chinese people to promote the return of Taiwan to China as a common 
responsibility. After reviewing the PRC policy toward Taiwan since 1979, he 
reaffirmed Deng Xiaoping's doctrine of peacefully reuniting the country under the 
"one country, two systems" formula. By pledging to grant a reunified Taiwan "a 
high degree of autonomy", he promised to respect the island's political and economic 
structure as well as social formation, even allowing it to maintain its own military 
force. Also, he suggested that some leaders of Taiwan could take important positions 
in the central government. In an analysis of the circumstances surrounding the 
Taiwan issue, he was optimistic about the prospects for reunification, despite paying 
vigilant attention to both separatist Taiwanese elements seeking independence and 
interference by foreign forces. He pointed out that the imperative necessity to reunite 
Taiwan for the complete reunification of the "motherland" would loom large as the 
PRC resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997 and Macau in 1999 neared. 
Most importantly, he listed eight proposals on the development of cross-strait 
relations and peaceful reunification with Taiwan, which were the main focus of his 
speech. 
331 
Politically, he required acceptance of the 'One-China' principle from the Taiwan 
authorities. This was the foundation and prerequisite for promoting cross-strait 
relations and peaceful reunification. In terms of Taiwan's legal status, he maintained 
that China's sovereignty and territory cannot be separated. He made it clear that any 
secession of Taiwan from China must be opposed. 
Diplomatically, he was prepared to allow Taiwan a certain place in the world 
community but could not tolerate any separate political and diplomatic status 
internationally. He did not object to Taipei's development of nonofficial relations 
with foreign nations. He declared that Beijing had no objection to the island joining 
relevant international bodies under the name of "Taipei, China", but was opposed to 
membership in any international organisation for which statehood is a requirement. 
In his quest for reconciliation with Taipei, he raised suggestions for peaceful 
coexistence and reunification through negotiations. He said that Beijing was ready to 
engage in constructive political talks with Taipei on any issue under the 'One China' 
principle. For such talks, Beijing would be flexible on the time, protocol, rationale 
and place on both sides of the Straits. He proposed that the two sides should hold 
talks and equal consultation to find a mutually agreeable way to resolve differences 
and end the state of hostility between the two sides. He expected that such talks, 
which would facilitate future cross-strait relations and promote peaceful 
reunification, could take place as early as possible. 
Militarily, he stated that Beijing would spare no effort to achieve the peaceful 
reunification of Taiwan and the mainland. With this prospect in mind, he proclaimed 
that Chinese should not fight against Chinese. Yet he declined to renounce the use of 
force in settling the Taiwan issue, reserving the option in case the island chose to 
declare independence. He argued that the refusal to renounce the use of force was 
not targeted at the Taiwan compatriots, but directed against the intrigue of hostile 
foreign forces meddling in the reunification issue and instigating and supporting 
Taiwan independence. 
Economically, Jiang expressed his hope that the ties between Taiwan and 
mainland China could be increased and strengthened to serve the economic interests 
of both sides. He maintained that bilateral economic relations should be separated 
from political contentions between the two sides in order to further the expansion of 
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cross-strait economic cooperation. He provided assurances that Beijing would 
pursue its long-term policy of encouraging Taiwanese investment in the mainland, 
and promised that the mainland authorities would protect the legal rights and 
interests of Taiwanese investors. More significantly, he hinted at an investment-
protection agreement for Taiwanese businesses. He emphasised the necessity of 
realising the three links, direct cross-strait trade, mail and transportation services, and 
made an appeal to Taipei for the opening of these links between the island and the 
mainland. In addition, he urged ajoint effort to begin negotiations on the 
development of cross-strait economic relations. 
Culturally, he claimed that 5, 000 years of Chinese culture spiritually linked all 
Chinese and provided a national basis for peacefully reuniting the divided China. He 
advocated an inheritance and development of the excellent tradition of Chinese 
culture by people across the Taiwan Strait. 
Tactically, he intended to build an anti-independence and pro-reunification united 
front. In an effort to win over the people of Taiwan, he declared that Beijing would 
respect their freedom to choose their way of life and their desire to be the master of 
their own house, while protecting their lawful rights and interests. He promised that 
the PRC government including its overseas services, would take special care of its 
Taiwanese compatriots, while listening to and considering their opinions and 
requirements. With a friendly and constructive gesture, he expressed his willingness 
to establish wide-ranging contacts with all Taiwan-based parties, groups and 
individuals for exchanges of views on cross-strait affairs and peaceful reunification. 
He encouraged Taiwanese to advance the reunification process, stating that those 
who had done their part for eventual reunion should be given historical credit. 
Finally, he offered a cross-strait summit. With reconciliatory goodwill, he came 
up with a proposal for meetings between leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait 
by a process of exchange visits. He welcomed Taiwan leaders to visit the mainland 
and said he would visit the island if the Taiwan authorities extended an invitation to 
him. He suggested that top-level talks should be held to promote development of 
cross-strait relations and push forward peaceful reunification. Meanwhile, he 
stressed that the Chinese people's affairs should be dealt with by the Chinese people 
and it was not necessary to act out in the international arena. While pointing out 
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emphatically the importance and necessity of the summits to rapprochement across 
the Taiwan Strait and the complete reunification of China, he expressed his 
confidence that he would be able to meet with the Taiwan leader in the future. 835 
An evaluation of Jiang's eight-point proposal is helpful in understanding his new 
Taiwan policy. This was the first time Jiang publicly formulated views and 
propositions to establish his own framework for cross-strait relations. The issuance 
of the proposal marked the initiation of his new reunification strategy, underscoring 
his determination of take charge of Taiwan policy in the post-Deng era. It showed 
that Jiang had made efforts to further consolidate his power while resolving to leave 
his own legacy of national reunification. The release of Jiang's Eight-Points in a way 
showed how important a priority the resolution of the Taiwan question was in his 
administration's policy establishments In the meantime, the publication of 
guidelines for his office's future policy toward Taiwan indicated that Jiang had taken 
the lead in formulating new measures for one of the country's most important issues. 
By presenting a programme for the PRC policy toward Taiwan, he demonstrated that 
he had taken the helm of the country, ushering in Jiang Zemin's era. To sum up, 
making this personal effort to bring reunion to the divided China could have a 
positive effect on the political standing of Jiang at home and abroad.836 
It is necessary to make a comparison between Jiang Zemin and his predecessor 
Deng Xiaoping in evaluating Jiang's new Taiwan policy. Deng once put forward the 
idea of "one country, two systems" and "peaceful reunification" as a solution for the 
Taiwan problem. It had become a cornerstone of the PRC policy toward Taiwan. 
Basically, Jiang's new Taiwan policy remained within the framework ofDeng's 
formulations. It helped to foster an impression at home and abroad that Jiang was 
Deng's natural successor. Jiang reaffirmed "one country, two systems" and 
"peaceful reunification" as the basic principles for resolving the Taiwan question. 
These are the main points in common between Deng and Jiang. Meanwhile, Jiang's 
Eight-Points provided a review ofPRC policy toward Taiwan. Although Jiang did 
835. Jiang Zemin, "Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland," ( ~I ¥~ R; , " Jg i@ :itt 
~Jl 00 ~ ~ *- .ill'. MJ jG nlt rm ~I* ~ ~ -4," ) January 30, 1995, in The Taiwan Work Office of the 
CPC Central Committee and The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council ( 9=' ;J:t.: 9=' :!k: €:l1~ I 
fF)]1 0 ][ /00 %- ~ ~ y~ ¥ -%-)],0][), China's Taiwan Issue ( * !Jf/ f:t iI! /li] J!l!). Beijing: 
Jiuzhou Press (11 1H1 ~ ~ tI:l Jfflt. f±), 1998, pp.231-235. 
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not alter Deng's general principles for settlement of the Taiwan issue, his eight 
views and propositions differed from Deng's Taiwan policy in a number of aspects, 
in particular its means of realising reunification, and were generally more moderate 
and positive versions. Since there had been no vital breakthrough in the impasse 
between the mainland and the island regarding reunification since Deng published his 
Taiwan policy, a readjustment, or revision in Beijing's Taiwan policy was crucial. 
Jiang's Eight-Points sought a significant rethink and re-establishment ofPRC policy. 
They made innovations on the basis of overhauling the original Taiwan policy. 
Indeed, there were new ideas in Jiang's eight-point proposal, showing that he 
strove to be pragmatic and creative in restructuring cross-strait relations.837 For 
example, Taipei took note of new offers to Taiwan in Jiang's Eight-Points focusing 
on two points. One was that Jiang suggested the two sides should hold talks to end 
mutual hostilities, illustrating his hope for peaceful coexistence across the Taiwan 
Strait. Another was that he extended an invitation to Lee Teng-hui to visit mainland 
China in an appropriate capacity while clearly indicating his willingness to accept 
invitations from Taipei to visit the island. 838 This showed that Jiang thought 
seriously about personally meeting Lee and trying to reach a consensus on 
reunification in negotiating cross-strait issues. Thus, by offering some meaningful 
suggestions toward Taipei and sketching out a new framework for sustainable 
peaceful engagement for reunion, Jiang's Eight-Points appeared to have set a new 
course for the reunification of China. 
Goodwill gestures by Jiang boosted his new image as a rational leader. By 
offering unprecedented goodwill, he had adopted a more conciliatory approach 
toward Taiwan. Most remarkably, he was proposing that Chinese people on either 
side of the Taiwan Strait should not be in conflict and should instead help each other 
in the interests of mutual benefit. Although he did not rule out the use of force to 
reclaim Taiwan, given Beijing's often-declared reunification by military means if 
836 • Jonathan D. Pollack, "China's Taiwan Strategy: A Point of No Return?" The China Journal, 
No.36, July 1996, p.114. 
837 • For the new thinking in Jiang's Eight-Points and its significance, see Li Jiaquan, "The Strategic 
Thinking of Three Generations' Leadership of the CPC Over China's Reunification," ( '$ * 7'R ' " r:p 
~ -= 1-t @! JffAX>t Mt - r:p 00 a<J ~:l4 ~ }~, ~ , ")Xinhua Digest (/fjIj 1ji;lt li1f), No.259, July 
2000, pp.61-62. 
838 • Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, p.250. 
335 
necessary his offer of such a peace overture signalled a meaningful softening of 
Beijing's stance. This can be viewed as a major concession on the part of Beijing. It 
demonstrated that Jiang favoured negotiation with Taipei to try to find a way for the 
two sides to live in peace, not war. With that kind of goodwill, Jiang took an initial 
step towards ending the state of war that had persisted between the two sides since 
the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949. In addition, Jiang offered a wide variety of 
reconciliatory measures, calling for the two sides to pursue economic cooperation 
and other exchanges. In an effort to win over the Taiwanese people, he adopted a 
generous attitude, seeking to meet Taiwan's requirements for maximum autonomy. 
These reconciliatory measures helped to foster the Taiwanese people's trust in the 
Chinese mainland and win the understanding and support of the international 
community. 
Jiang's Eight-Points gave birth to Beijing's manoeuvrable policy of engagement 
with Taipei. In contrast with hard-liners' belligerent rhetoric across the Straits, Jiang 
took a mild attitude toward Taiwan. In order to realise his reunification programme, 
he displayed to Taiwan leaders his sincerity and readiness to take amicable steps to 
work with them. His eight-point proposal began modestly with a search for better 
atmospherics across the Taiwan Strait to foster change in the relationship between 
the two sides leading to eventual reunification. Compared with Beijing's previous 
tough terms for contacts, he tried to develop cross-strait relations by acting more 
flexibly. He suggested that the two sides should negotiate in any form to find an 
acceptable solution for the final realisation of peaceful reunification. Under the 
general principle of 'One China', any topic was open to discussion. Jiang's elastic 
approach to Taiwan seemed to give the two sides maximum flexibility in resolving 
bilateral disputes. 
Jiang's Eight-Points laid the foundation for his new Taiwan policy, which 
revolved around goodwill conciliation, proactive cooperation and constructive 
engagement for the peaceful reunification of China. By adopting a new and more 
inclusive version of the PRC policy toward Taiwan, Jiang's proposal displayed 
sincerity in seeking to solve cross-strait problems while cultivating a peaceful 
atmosphere to facilitate communications and enhance mutual trust. If this proposal 
was to be accepted by Taipei and succeed in practice, it could lead to a major shift in 
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the relations across the Taiwan Strait expediting the pursuit of closer economic ties 
and more frequent and effective political interactions to integrate the two sides into a 
single entity. More.significant, if the proposal for top-level talks and exchanges to 
end the state of hostility was any kind of success, it would be the most hopeful 
development in cross-strait security for a considerable period of time. It seemed that 
a stunning initial breakthrough might be made by Jiang, which would overcome a 
host of difficulties in forging eventual reunification after more than 40 years of 
separation. 
Nevertheless, success in this new Taiwan policy was to elude him. It was still 
early to indulge in talk about the reunification in the near future. Jiang's Eight-
Points were not reliable enough to attract Taiwan people to reunify with the Chinese 
mainland, and were not acceptable to rival Taiwan leaders, who were unwilling to 
fall under Beijing's rule. 
Jiang miscalculated on two fronts. Externally, he overrated the possibility of his 
Eight-Points being accepted by Taipei while underestimating the political forces 
resisting immediate reunification in Taiwan. He overlooked the actual political state 
in Taipei and Taiwan leaders' political intentions on cross-strait relations. 
Particularly, he had considerable but unrealistic expectations about Lee Teng-hui. 839 
Domestically, the complicated political situation and Jiang's own political 
constraints restricted him. He did not deliberate on possible internal strife and 
whether he would be able to rein in the radical elements within the party. Cross-
strait issues were of a controversial nature and could easily lead to disputes while the 
PRC leadership was in its succession process. He did not seriously and carefully 
consider the difficulties for his new Taiwan policy that would be constituted by his 
internal opponents, in particular the contenders for Deng's leadership succession. He 
did not take the military's view on Taiwan into full account and he underestimated 
the hard-liners' considerable political energy who had consistently held a tough 
839 • You Ji gives his opinion that Jiang probably oversimplified the cross-strait problems and did not 
precisely assess Lee. You points out: "Jiang may have been thought too innocent, unable to 
understand Lee thoroughly". "He may have been blamed for being an overt optimist about the 
deepening ties across the strait in recent years, failing to anticipate a possible U-turn." See You Ii, 
"Changing Leadership Consensus: The Domestic Context of War Games," in Suisheng Zhao (ed.), 
Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis. New York and 
London: Routledge, 1999, p.86. 
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stance on Taiwan. These two political forces on both sides of the Straits gathered to 
block Jiang's new Taiwan policy. 
This undercut the significance of Jiang's goodwill gesture, leaving him in a 
dilemma. President Lee Teng-hui issued a statement at the National Unification 
Council on April 8, 1995, making his formal response to Jiang's Eight-Points. Lee 
introduced a six-point proposal for normalising cross-strait relations.84o He proposed 
that the cross-strait relations should still focus on trade and economic exchanges, 
while furthering cultural exchange between the two sides. He called for an effort to 
be made by the two sides to maintain economic prosperity and promote political 
democracy in Hong Kong and Macao, indicating that Taipei was a political entity 
equal to Beijing while advocating the importance of democracy and freedom. In 
giving prominence to the other three key points, he emphasised that both sides should 
face reality and respect each other in resolving cross-strait problems. This implied 
that Jiang's eight-point proposal did not have a realistic basis while demanding in 
return that Beijing should recognise Taiwan as a political entity because the island 
and the mainland were governed separately. In diplomacy, he urged Beijing to allow 
the island to raise its international profile. In an appeal for equal participation of 
both sides in the international community, he actually claimed the status of a 
sovereign state for the ROC on Taiwan. In responding to Jiang's call for a meeting 
between the leaders of both sides on Chinese soil, he proposed in return that they 
should meet on neutral ground. An important point in Lee's six-point statement was 
that he demanded that Beijing renounce the use of force against Taiwan in order to 
facilitate talks on ending the state of hostility. In responding to Jiang's proclamation 
that the Chinese should not fight against Chinese, he proposed that Chinese should 
help Chinese. With a reconciliatory attitude, he reiterated that "both the mainland 
and Taiwan areas are parts of Chinese territory. Helping to bring about national 
unification should be the common responsibility of all Chinese people."841 However, 
by quoting a document called "the Guidelines for National Unification" by Taipei, he 
840. For the full text of Lee's Six Points speech, see "Steps to Normalize Bilateral Relations," Free 
China Review, Vo1.45, No.7, March 1996, pp.43-47. 
841 • PRC scholars considered this as a positive response to Jiang's Eight-Points which was conducive 
to the development of cross-strait relations. See "Beijing Scholars Comment on Taiwan Authorities' 
Speech on Cross-Strait Relations," ( " ~~ ~ ~ :i:f if '6 1~ ~ foij *- r [,ffi J'¥: *- * sl,] ifF i% ' " ) 
Outlook Weekly ( 711l), June 5,1995, pp.19-20. 
stated that unification should be a gradual and democratic process, in view of the 
fundamental differences between the political systems as well as the wide gap in 
economic development between the two sides. In fact, Lee's Six-Points rejected 
Jiang's Eight-Points. 
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It is necessary to examine Lee's motives for this rejection. He had a high opinion 
of Jiang's eight-point proposal, saying that it was "a breakthrough", in its move away 
from Deng Xiaoping's strategy toward Taiwan. Yet, Lee believed Jiang had not 
secured his grip on power and had not gained the military's backing. Thus Jiang 
would find it extremely difficult to carry out his new Taiwan policy. No top-level 
talks between Taipei and Beijing could be held until Jiang's survival in the struggle 
for Deng's succession was clear. There was an interval between 1995 and 1997 
when the 15th national congress of Communist Party of China would be convened, 
which would decide the issue of the leadership succession struggle. Deng's 
successor position was being hotly contested among leaders in Beijing. They were 
absorbed in their own struggle for these two years and had no time or energy to 
ponder the Taiwan question.842 Lee intended to exploit Jiang's Eight-Points in 
seeking to hold on to power through the expansion of pragmatic diplomacy. 843 Lee 
appeared to consider this was a golden opportunity to bolster his own position in the 
expansion of head-of-state diplomacy and to promote the island's international 
status. Jiang's new overtures toward Taipei were viewed as those of a political 
weakling by Lee. 844 Although Jiang did not renounce the use of force against Taiwan 
in his eight-point proposal, Lee appeared to view Jiang's proclamation that Chinese 
do not fight Chinese as a shift in Beijing's consistent stance on its threat ofthe use of 
arms to force the reunification of the two sides. 
In exploiting Jiang's proposal, Taipei had intensified its pragmatic diplomacy 
while sparing no effort in seeking UN membership. More seriously, Lee settled upon 
the US visit in response to Jiang's overtures, a significant step in gaining political 
support among pro-Taiwanese Americans for his re-election, but damaging to Jiang's 
prestige. In his speech delivered at Cornell University, he refused to accept that the 
842 • "Building a New Culture-In an exclusive interview, Lee talks tough about China and' Asian 
Values' ," Newsweek, May 20, 1996, p.64. 
843. For Lee's political calculation for his re-election through head-of-state diplomacy, see Chapter 
3.3-2. The Issue of Lee Teng-hui's US Visit. 
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island would be reunified under the Communist regime. He responded again to 
Jiang's call for a meeting between the leaders of both sides, openly disregarding 
Jiang's suggestion of meeting on Chinese soil and repeating his proposal that he was 
ready to hold a summit with Jiang on an international occasion. 845 Lee's speech and 
behaviour during his US visit angered mainland leaders, in particular senior military 
officers, as Beijing viewed the trip as a veiled move to promote Taiwan 
independence.846 Obviously, Lee had taken advantage of Jiang's goodwill gestures 
toward Taipei, leaving him in a difficult situation. More intolerably, Jiang had been 
thirsting for his own US visit, which would lend needed credibility to his leadership. 
Lee's rejection of Jiang's eight-point proposal on Taiwan and utilisation of this 
proposal for his landmark visit to the US was a political disaster for Jiang's moderate 
Taiwan policy. Jiang was in a tight corner. While meeting strong opposition from 
political opponents and hawks, he was confronted with a crucial decision to 
relinquish or continue his new Taiwan policy. 
844. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, p.54. 
845. "Text of Lee's Cornell Address," The Free China Journal, June 16, 1995. 
846 . Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, pp.251-252. 
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8.1. The PRe Leadership Succession and a Tough Taiwan 
Policy 
8.1-1. Jiang Zemin's Attempt to Maintain His Moderate Taiwan 
Policy and Mounting Pressures upon Him to Change It 
Jiang Zemin tried to maintain his new Taiwan policy, but was forced to give up. 
Lee's negative responses to his Eight-Points on Taiwan, and especially his US visit, 
frustrated Jiang's implementation of a moderate policy toward Taiwan. This created 
a dilemma for Jiang, who was caught in a contradictory situation. On one hand, he 
worried that Lee's rejection of his eight-point proposal, and utilisation of this 
proposal to visit the US, would dampen his effort to achieve national reunification 
through a moderate Taiwan policy. On the other hand, he feared that his own 
leadership would be affected. Originally, his new Taiwan policy aimed to 
consolidate his right of leadership succession while creating his place in history, but 
unexpectedly and contrary to his wishes, it delivered negative results. Lee's actions 
could spell trouble for Jiang in the process of political transition. On the horns of a 
dilemma, although Lee's actions caused him political harm, Jiang found it difficult to 
withdraw himself from his established formulations on Taiwan. He had dedicated 
himself to the country's reunification course and had staked his own political 
reputation on it. Although disputes across the Taiwan Strait were becoming intense 
and he was under criticism, he continued his policy of promoting peaceful 
reunification. When Lee Teng-hui planned his US trip, Jiang's administration 
exercised restraint. When the Clinton administration decided to issue a visa to Lee 
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on May 22, 1995,847 the Jiang administration made representations and issued 
diplomatic complaints, but did not recall its ambassador from Washington. Beijing 
did not suspend negotiations with Taiwan, either. ARATS (The Association for 
Relations Across the Taiwan Straits) Vice Chairman Tang Shubei, mainland China's 
No.2 negotiator with Taiwan, who was also deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs 
Office under the PRC State Council, had planned to visit Taiwan. He embarked on 
his scheduled visit to Taiwan on May 27-28 despite fears by some senior officials 
and think-tank scholars that it might involve considerable risk due to the already 
stormy relationship between the two sides. Tang and his Taiwan counterpart, SEF 
(The Straits Exchange Foundation) Vice Chairman Chiao Jen-ho, held the first 
preparatory meeting for the Second Koo-Wang Talks (Koo Chen-fu and Wang 
Daohan, the chairmen of SEF and ARATS). The meeting concluded with an 
agreement that the second preparatory meeting would be held in June, and the 
Second Koo-Wang Talks would take place in July in Beijing.848 This was due to 
Jiang's approval of the visit. It suggested he thought that the timing for Tang's visit 
as scheduled might not be optimal but that cancelling it would be even worse, due to 
the adverse impact it could have on cross-strait relations and his leadership. He 
wished to carry out his new Taiwan policy.849 During Tang's Taiwan visit, he 
adopted a low profile on the issue of Lee's US visit. He avoided making further 
remarks when replying to journalists' frequent questions.8so On May 29, Chen 
Yunlin, deputy-director of the PRC Taiwan Affairs Office, spoke highly of the Tang-
Chiao meeting of May 27-28 and its agreement, while expressing Beijing's desire to 
continue to facilitate contacts and exchanges with Taipei. Chen pointed out 
emphatically that Beijing would seek common ground on further development of 
cross-strait relations, while reserving political differences between mainland China 
and the island.851 Whilst Lee visited the US, arriving in on June 7 and returning to 
847. John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle and 
London: University of Washington Press, 1997, p.67. 
848. Christie Su, "Taipei Meeting Sets Stage for Second Koo-Wang Talks," The Free China Journal, 
June 2, 1995. 
849 . Sheng Lijun, China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2001, pp.l57-158; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: 
Prentice Hall, 1999, p.173. 
850. "The Tang-Chiao Meeting Blows the Cool Breeze Gently," ( " ~ fa 4} iiR r!7\ - ~ rif )Xl, , " ) 
The International Chinese Weekly ( ill iff/ /lfJ f!/), June 11, 1995. 
851 . "Across Straits Summit Scheduled," Beijing Review, June 19-25, 1995, p.4. 
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Taiwan on June 12,852 Jiang maintained his position politically, mainly publishing 
articles in the official media criticising Lee for his U.S. trip.853 On June 12, shortly 
after Lee's US trip, the PRe Taiwan Affairs Office stated that although Lee's visit to 
the US had caused tensions between Beijing and Taipei, the agreements and 
exchanges between the two sides would not be affected. On June 14, in replying to a 
question whether the PRC responses to Lee's US visit would impinge on the Second 
Koo-Wang Talks scheduled for July in Beijing, ARA TS Vice Chairman Tang Shubei 
declared that the consensus that was reached in Taipei in May between SEF Vice 
Chairman Chiao Jen-ho and himself should stand.854 This restrained behaviour 
reflected the fact that Jiang's moderate policy toward Taiwan remained unchanged. 
Under strong pressure from hard-liners, however, on June 16, the PRC government 
withdrew its ambassador from Washington in protest over the American 
government's approval of Lee's visit. 855 On the same day, Beijing suspended the 
scheduled Second Koo-Wang Talks. 856 Although Jiang's administration had stepped 
up its responses, these reactions were still within reasonable bounds. Beijing did not 
announce its intention to conduct military manoeuvres until July 18.857 
These diplomatic and political responses were seen as not being strong enough to 
check Lee's advance along the' separatist road'. A tough reaction, including 
coercion by Jiang's administration had been urged, and the military in particular 
demanded a stronger response. 858 Jiang's personal political restraints restricted him 
to continue reacting by diplomatic and political means. Originally, Jiang's eight-
point proposal was built on an unstable foundation for which there was no explicit 
and firm support within the leadership. It was viewed as being more personally 
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motivated than based upon the party's policy and national interest. Indeed, the 
proposal stemmed from his strong personal desire to become the leader who would 
bring national reunification to the divided China. Such a motive was difficult to gain 
support for from other leaders. Outwardly, it seemed, there was a rough consensus 
on Jiang's proposals on Taiwan. However, there were indications that when Jiang 
put forward his policy proposals, the PRC leadership had not yet reached a unanimity 
of views on cross-strait issues and different factions had pursued divergent policies 
on the matter. Few senior leaders had joined the chorus to echo Jiang's eight-point 
proposal. 859 For example, Qiao Shi, member of the party's Politburo and the 
parliamentary chief, considered an entrenched Jiang foe, reluctantly consented to 
Jiang's eight-point proposal in public but internally criticised him for his slowness 
and restraint in response to Lee's US visit. 860 This highlighted Taiwan policy as a 
major point of contention between the PRC leaders. Internally Jiang's new Taiwan 
policy had been severely criticised since Lee's US visit and Jiang's restrained 
response to it. Those who had not consented to Jiang's eight-point proposal on 
Taiwan raised doubts and criticisms. They argued that his Eight-Points had been 
deemed a weak position by Lee Teng-hui and the Taiwan authorities. It was 
suggested that the Eight-Points lacked measures to counter Taipei's quest for its 
international living space and independence. They believed that Lee's Six-Point 
response and subsequent international activities had proved the persistence of Lee 
and the Taiwan authorities in pursuing Taiwan independence.861 Faced with sharp 
criticism of the Eight-Points, Jiang had not been able to stifle opinions differing from 
his own. Unlike Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, Jiang was not able to exercise 
absolute power. Under the collective leadership that Deng designed, Jiang had to 
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politically consult and multilaterally cooperate with his colleagues for a compromise. 
He lacked the real political strength necessary to carry his moderate Taiwan policy 
through firmly to its end. The apparent failure of his new formulations on cross-
strait issues left him unable to hold his own against criticism by his political 
opponents. To sum up, Jiang's Eight-Points did not rest on a solid foundation of 
internal approval. Since he was frustrated, Jiang had had a tough time persuading 
hard-liners and the military to press ahead with his new Taiwan policy, which had 
come under considerable pressure amid the leadership succession struggle. 
8.1-2. Leadership Succession Contentions over the Taiwan Problem 
As cross-strait relations reached an impasse, the competition for Deng's 
succession was becoming fiercer. The debate on Taiwan policy had turned into an 
important part of the power struggle to succeed the paramount leader. 862 What 
approach should be taken became a central question in the PRC leaders' debate over 
Taiwan issues. There was a point beyond which no contender for Deng's succession 
could afford to allow Taiwan to become independent and, as such, the contenders had 
been drawn toward assertive stances on the Taiwan status and a tough policy toward 
the US. 863 China's sovereign claim over the island is seen as an important symbol of 
its national prestige and destiny. The Taiwan issue evoked intense emotions and 
high stakes. All contenders had to hold the position that Lee's pursuit of Taiwan 
independence was a dangerous menace to territorial sovereignty and national 
security. Every contender was cautious and fearful about possible accusations of 
treachery. There was a division between moderates and hard-liners on most policy 
issues, but this was less evident with regard to Taiwan. It was very difficult to 
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identify moderates within the Beijing leadership when it came to Taiwan policy.864 
For example, both Qiao Shi and Li Ruihuan, two members of the Politburo Standing 
Committee and respectively NPCSC (The National People's Congress' Standing 
Committee) Chairman and CPPCCSC (The Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference' Standing Committee) Chairman, were generally recognised as reform 
minded moderates, supportive of political reform and further openness to the outside 
world. However, on Taiwan issues, particularly how to respond to Lee's US visit, 
these two more moderate figures took extreme positions.865 
Jiang's soft stance on Taiwan and the US was seen as signalling weakness to the 
"Taiwanese separatists and American hegemonists" by political foes eager to 
denounce him. With the mounting hawkish voices of his political opponents 
surrounding him, Jiang faced extreme difficulties in the pursuit of his amicable 
policy of reconciliation with Taipei for peaceful reunification. Under fire from both 
the new and old conservative factions within the leading circles, he had to avoid 
being blamed for losing Taiwan by the other contenders for the leadership 
succession. Jiang and these contenders were mired in a divisive stalemate as the 
party's central leadership was permeated with an atmosphere of aggression. There 
was little space for manoeuvre to enable him to adhere to his moderate Taiwan 
policy. In light of major principles of righteousness and nationalism, he was being 
forced to toughen his stance towards Taiwan. He had to make such a shift in the 
transition period to avoid making the fatal political mistake of being viewed as weak 
on nationalistic issues. His very survival in the successor position could be in peril 
as opponents threatened him with strong nationalist sentiments. Jiang's new 
reunification strategy had become dangerously vulnerable to attack by his opponents. 
The disputes over how to deal with cross-strait relations after Lee's US visit had 
864 . Edward Friedman, "The Prospects of a Larger War: Chinese Nationalism and the Taiwan Strait 
Conflict," in Sui sheng Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-
1996 Crisis. New York and London: Routledge, 1999, p.262. 
865 . Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, p.252; You Ji, "Missile Diplomacy and PRC Domestic Politics," in Greg 
Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan's Future: innovations in Politics and Military Power. 
Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 
Australian National University, 1997, p.3l. In early 1996, Qiao even threatened that if the PRC were 
struck with nuclear missiles, it would conduct nuclear retaliation by hitting a major American city. 
See James Mann, About Face: A HistOlY of America's Curious Relationship with China,from Nixon 
to Clinton. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999, p.334. 
346 
intensified the scramble between Jiang and the other contenders for the succession to 
supreme power. 
Jiang was facing the second biggest political crisis since his assumption of power. 
His successor position was in jeopardy because of the apparent failure of his 
moderate Taiwan policy. Lee's rejection of Jiang's eight-point proposal on Taiwan 
and his US visit had damaged his credibility, making his position precarious. Jiang 
had been a weak leader since he was selected as Deng's heir six years ago. Nowthat 
weakness had been on display for the world to see, causing renewed opposition from 
internal conservatives. He had been the subj ect of internal criticisms since Lee's 
visit to the US. After the Clinton administration approved Lee's visit to the US, the 
military, various provinces, party departments and a number of governmental 
ministries had, one after another, sharply criticised the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the top leadership's interlinked policies toward Taiwan and the US. This had 
brought powerful pressure to bear on Jiang.866 Following his tardy decision-making 
to take countermeasures against Lee's US visit and continuance of his new Taiwan 
policy, members of opposition factions demanded that Jiang take responsibility for 
his wishful policies on the US and Taiwan, which were viewed as a policy of 
appeasement. 
Both Qiao Shi and Li Ruihuan attacked Jiang's weakness in face of the 
"American hegemonism and Taiwanese splittism", which meant that he was not a 
suitable paramount leader by reason of his rightist deviation and perceived 
capitulation. Li Peng, a Member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Premier, 
had been indirectly critical of Jiang since Lee's US visit while covertly exploiting 
Jiang's difficult political position over the Taiwan issue to plan a forceful political hit 
at his leadership.867 Jiang was challenged and confronted over Taiwan and his 
resignation was called for. Yet these three rivals for the leadership succession did 
not pursue the matter of Jiang's dismissal because the result would invoke Deng's 
suspicion about their ambitions to rush to seize supreme power. Instead, they took 
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the advantage of his political crisis by fuelling anti-Jiang political activities. There 
were many opponents in the central leading bodies who opposed Jiang's interlinked 
policies toward Taiwan and the US and wished to force him from office. On June 
30, in the conference ofthe 8th National People's Congress' Standing Committee 
( NPCSC ), more than ten NPCSC members jointly proposed two motions 
questioning the validity of Jiang's interlinked policies toward Taiwan and the US and 
his leadership. The main purpose of these two motions was as follows: First, Jiang, 
as the state president, had to take responsibility for his mistaken guiding principle, 
policy and false moves vis-a.-vis the US, and explain these lapses to the NPCSC. 
Second, the party's central leadership, with Jiang Zemin at the core, had to take 
responsibility for, and reflect upon, its misjudgement of Lee Teng-hui's responses to 
Jiang's eight-point proposal and its tardy decision-making on countermeasures 
against Lee's US visit. Further, these proponents demanded that Jiang resign for his 
mistakes. Three NPCSC vice-chairmen supported these steps. This was called the 
event of June 30. Jiang was both shocked by and anxious about the development. 
The Standing Committee of the Political Bureau ordered the Central Secretariat to 
investigate.868 In the meantime, a number of army generals, both PLA veterans and 
incumbent senior officers, appealed for the ejection of Jiang from power.869 The 
debate on Taiwan policy had dramatically entered the leadership succession struggle. 
It appeared that Jiang's political fortunes might be dealt a fatal blow as his political 
stock was in rapid decline. He was forced to find his way out of the grimmest power 
struggle of his career. 
Jiang had spared no efforts to defend his successor position. He had attempted to 
disarm his critics and rally support for his moderate Taiwan policy but had failed. As 
the hard-liners' pressure mounted, he raised his voice to denounce "American 
hegemonism and Taiwanese splittism". Jiang's shift in tone was a defensive 
response to a barrage of criticism by conservatives and political opponents, but they 
remained dissatisfied and continued to press their aggressive positions on him. The 
embattled Jiang was treating the threat to his leadership seriously. His next move 
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would be key to the development ofthe resignation drive, and he needed to make a 
compromise to appease the opposition. On May 28, an emergency enlarged meeting 
of the Political Bureau was convened, at which he undertook a self-criticism of his 
mistaken guiding principle and policy toward the US, in an attempt to defuse the 
political crisis and avoid dismissal. He said that he was sorry for his misjudgement 
and mishandling of cross-strait relations as well as PRC-US relations. In 
acknowledging his mistakes, he said that in recent years he had not made substantive 
and forceful responses and had not taken necessary measures against the American 
government's acts in violation of three PRC-US joint communiques. He recognised 
that this had placed the PRC in a passive position on the guiding principle and policy 
toward the US, causing considerable scepticism about decision-making by the central 
authorities in the party, military and various other circles. He alleged that the 
American government's approval of Lee Teng-hui's US visit was a new development 
in plotting to create "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". He promised that the 
party's central leadership would undertake a comprehensive review of the PRC 
strategy toward the US and would revise US policy. In highlighting his anti-
American determination, he said that the PRC would not allow the US to interfere in 
issues of PRC sovereignty and internal affairs, and it would make certain 
preparations for a retrogression, suspension or even a rupture of PRC-US relations. 
In expressing his sincerity that he would rectify his mistakes, he took pains to assure 
participants of the meeting that he would adopt a tough stance toward Taipei and 
Washington.87o 
After criticising himself, tensions with the hard-liners relaxed somewhat, but 
remained unresolved. Having continually been pressed by hard-liners, mainly the 
military's hawks, he had to justify his review and readjustment in interlinked policies 
toward Taiwan and the US, while reaffirming his own strong stance.87! Seeing a 
continuing danger for his successor position, he made another self-criticism, in an 
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effort to squash an opposition-engineered drive to unseat him. He criticised himself 
in five respects, mainly for his mistakes in violation of collective leadership. He said 
that he would strengthen consultation and communication with other members of the 
Political Bureau and exchange different views before making decisions on major 
policies and other measurers. As a member of the collective leadership, he would 
respect and comply with the rules of that leadership.872 Jiang's self-criticisms 
showed that his successor position remained fragile. If should he stick to his 
approach on Taiwan, his own leadership would be endangered in the process of 
political transition. He had already been criticised for taking a soft stance on Taiwan, 
he wanted to avoid being blamed for losing it. As a result of strong pressures from 
hard-liners, especially the military and his contenders for the succession, he would 
have to make some tough Taiwan policy choices, regardless of his own beliefs on 
which path would be wisest. 
However, although Jiang had undertaken self-criticisms and had expressed his 
intention to adopt strong measures in dealing with Taipei and Washington, he 
hesitated to counterattack Lee Teng-hui and America's 'political and diplomatic 
provocations' with military action. Hard-liners urged Jiang to take one further step 
of escalation with a military response to Lee's US visit. When Jiang took no action, 
the contenders for the leadership succession and the military joined forces to press 
Jiang to make a decision to strongly retaliate against Taipei and Washington. 
Premier Li Peng and two CMC Vice-Chairmen, Admiral Liu Huaqing and General 
Zhang Zhen, took the opportunity of Jiang's visit to Germany and Poland to devise a 
plan to conduct war games and fire missiles into the sea near Taiwan. After he 
returned from abroad, Jiang was immediately confronted with the plan. Jiang had to 
accept afait accompli, perforce endorsing the plan regardless of whether he favoured 
such military adventures.873 In the meantime, the military supported Qiao Shi and Li 
Ruihuan attacking Jiang for his weak responses to Lee's US visit and pressing him to 
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change his line on Taiwan and the US.874 The joint actions of the military and these 
three rivals for the leadership succession demonstrated, in fact, there was an anti-
Jiang coalition. The formation of the coalition was according to their respective 
political needs. The military wanted its own strategic, political and economic 
interests, which would not oust Jiang from office so long as he could satisfy it with 
concessions. However, if Jiang failed to consent to a military response, it was likely 
that the military would withdraw its support for him. Meanwhile, Jiang's three rivals 
were committed to replacing him as Deng's successor. They were ready to stand in 
with the military because they lacked the political strength to eject Jiang from power 
alone. Although their respective ends were different, the coalitionists were ready to 
join hands. The military's joint force with Jiang's principal rivals affected his 
successor position, making him vulnerable to criticism and pressure. Jiang was 
fearful that the military might shift its support from him to his contenders. 875 
The infighting for the leadership succession within the highest echelons of power 
in Beijing appeared to have put Jiang on a collision course with the coalition. In 
order to prevent the coalition from undermining his position as the heir to Deng, he 
was compelled to shift his stance to the side of the hard-liners. As a result, he lost 
the initiative in formulating strategy toward Taiwan, being forced to let his political 
rivals participate more in policy decisions. Although Jiang was the head of the 
Central Taiwan Work Leading Group and Qiao Shi seldom handled Taiwan affairs, 
Qiao made a report representing the party's central leadership on "The Present Cross-
Strait Situation and Issue of Peacefully Reunifying Taiwan" at the Beidaihe 
conference for the remaking ofPRC policy toward Taiwan from August 7-11, 1995. 
The conference adopted a resolution pointing out that the PRC would never cherish 
any unrealistic fancies and would not pin hopes on Lee Teng-hui, instead taking 
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resolute measures to complete the motherland's reunification cause.876 This was an 
apparent revision of Jiang's Eight-Points. Although Jiang had never made known his 
moderate Taiwan policy had been changed, in fact, his Eight-Points had been 
undermined internally. This dampened his ambitions of scoring any major 
achievements on Taiwan and weakened his leadership. Trapped by his political 
adversaries on the Taiwan issue, he had been relieved of the bulk of his handling of 
Taiwan affairs. He had no choice but to be tougher toward Taipei and Washington if 
he was to retain his position as the heir of Deng. 
8.2. The Military's Role in Decision-Making on Taiwan 
8.2-1. Jiang Zemin's Relationship with the Military 
The military played a decisive part in succession politics. Whether Jiang would 
be able to gain support in the military was a key question to assure his succession 
from Deng Xiaoping. Indeed, Jiang's poor relationship with the military was his 
greatest weakness in defending his position as the heir of Deng. The challenge of 
contenders for the leadership succession increased the pressing need for strong 
military support. Jiang was eager to ensure the loyalty of the PLA in order to win the 
succession struggle. Yet, without a personal power base in the army, he was not in 
an advantageous position to command the armed forces, although he had held the 
highest military post since November 1989. In theory, the chair of the Central 
Military Commission ( CMC ) allowed him to control the army. However, in 
practice, almost nobody believed that Jiang wielded power as supreme commander of 
the army at the beginning of his CMC chairmanship.877 For Jiang, the biggest 
disadvantage was his lack of a military background. He was never involved in actual 
military operations before he became CMC chairman. Although he had been the first 
political commissar of the Shanghai garrison in the late 1980s, that position was held 
concurrently in his capacity as the Shanghai Communist Party secretary, which was 
rather symbolic for the party's leadership over the army. Strictly speaking, he was 
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the first civilian to hold the CMC chairmanship. As such, officers and soldiers had 
reluctantly paid him allegiance, which had affected his credibility as commander-in-
chief. Jiang himself admitted that he had no experience in military work and vowed 
to modestly learn military affairs. 878 He then had to work hard to win the respect and 
loyalty of the army. A comparison between Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang 
Zemin demonstrates that military experience is essential for those who want to reach 
the height of power. Both Mao and Deng had military careers and exploits as 
professional revolutionaries. Unlike his predecessors, Jiang, an undistinguished 
technocrat, wielded neither real military command nor absolute political power. 
Therefore, he was not in a position to check the most influential force in 
contemporary PRC politics. He had a few political resources for reining in the 
military, mainly the doctrine of "the party's absolute leadership over the gun".879 He 
had conducted an ideological campaign in the PLA to promote loyalty to himself, 
urging all officers and soldiers to follow the command of CMC Chairman Jiang. Yet 
many servicemen remained reluctant to recognise his authority over the PLA as the 
core of the third-generation leadership. He had been handicapped in his relationship 
with the military since the day he became paramount leader. 
Under such circumstances, Jiang had to court the military in exchange for its full 
backing for his right of leadership succession.880 He assiduously cultivated good 
relations with the military by championing its three major objectives. He strove to 
meet their demands for political privilege, army modernisation and defence budget. 
Politically, he allowed the military more participation in the party's and 
governmental policy decision, allowing it to raise its social stature and maintain its 
privileged position. In the Jiang Zemin era, the military had a greater say than in the 
eras of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, reinforcing its place in politics. In terms of 
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defence modernisation, he tried to satisfY the military's wishes. He talked about the 
importance of a strong army calling for the military's rapid modernisation while 
advocating technological improvements to strengthen defence and the military's 
ability to cope with hi-tech regional wars. Basically, he consented to PLA plans to 
modernise its weaponry. He approved many of the military's purchasing lists for 
sophisticated weapons and equipment, including the imports of advanced Russian-
made warships, fighter planes and missiles. With respect to the demand for defence 
budget, he approved the PLA annual double-digit increases.881 In addition, he 
promised more budgetary resources in the future. 882 When the military engaged in 
business activities to make up its financial deficiency, he rode with a loose rein 
allowing the PLA to make money. 883 
Jiang's attempts to both court and control the military appeared to have resulted 
partly in success but have produced side-effects because of contradictory elements. 
On one hand, support was, to some extent, gained. The military had accepted his 
leadership over the armed forces as supreme commander. However, as the price of 
his support, he was forced to make major concessions, lowering himself in the eyes 
of servicemen. On the other hand, he had not thrown the reins to the military 
because his goal was to control the military to make it loyal to himself. This 
intention was in conflict with the military's aggressive demands for keeping a slack 
rein. Although Jiang had sought to court them, the military remained dissatisfied 
with him. Under these circumstances, strained relations emerged, despite Jiang's 
attempts to cultivate amicable ties. As Jiang developed misgivings about his control 
over the military and the military pursued its own particular interests, a divergence 
was exposed between the armed forces and supreme commander. Politically, the 
military's deeper and broader involvement in policy decision making had begun to 
ring alarm bells about Jiang's leadership. For example, Jiang's plans to reduce the 
size of the PLA had to be suspended or slowed up when he met resistance by the 
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generals. 884 This damaged his prestige as commander in-chief. He had to prevent the 
military from increasingly interfering in policy formulations on major issues while 
compromising. This brought him into contradiction with the military. In terms of 
the military's expectations for a quickened defence modernisation drive, he had to 
balance those demands with concerns over the national economy. When he required 
that the PLA should be subservient to overall goals of economic construction, the 
military had become dissatisfied with him. Regarding the military's aggressive 
demand for a bigger budget, he expressed his difficulties in delivering his promises 
to grant the PLA an increasingly larger share in the national budget by indicating that 
an increase in military spending would be conditional. He advised the military that 
only on the basis of economic growth could more funds be available to develop the 
forces be appropriated.885 As a result of worsening corruption and increasing 
disciplinary problems, he had to place restrictions on the PLA business activities by 
enhancing its financial dependence on his leadership. Particularly, this caused 
further tension with the military. These three major issues, political privilege, 
military modernisation and defence budget, had become the continued disputes 
between Jiang and the military. As Jiang tried to rein in the military restraining its 
unmeasured demands, feelings on both sides became increasingly uncharitable. To 
be fair, Jiang's remarks and conduct curbing the military's excessive demands were 
nothing new. He only reiterated the guidelines of military strategy defined by Deng 
and continued to pursue Deng's policies of building the army and constructing the 
country, making greater concessions to the military. However, unlike Deng who had 
military experience and exploits as well as high prestige and authority, Jiang was not 
viewed as 'one of the military, due to his lack of a service record. Jiang's attempt to 
rein in the military resulted in straining relations between the sides. Contrary to 
Jiang's wish, the military had become more assertive. This potentially placed his 
successor position in jeopardy and consequently threatened to unhinge his 
management of the crisis in the Taiwan Strait. 
884. See Chapter 5.3. The Military's Interests in Taiwan Policy-Making. 
885. You Ji, "Missile Diplomacy and PRC Domestic Politics," in Greg Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy 
and Taiwan's Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power. Canberra: Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997, 
p.45. 
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The Yang family generals are an important element in assessing Jiang's relations 
with the military. The struggle between Yang and Jiang is a key issue in his quest for 
military command. The Yang family generals were a feared clique in the military 
and one of the most powerful factions in the political hierarchy. Yang Shangkun was 
once considered the most influential party and military elder after Deng, and until the 
early 1990s, he had hoped to succeed Deng as paramount leader. Further, he had the 
strong backing of his half brother, Yang Baibing, who held key military posts. Thus 
the Yang brothers posed an immediate threat to Jiang's successor position. The two 
sides, Yang and Jiang, became mortal enemies in the early 1990s. The two Yangs 
took advantage of Deng' s criticism of Jiang during his 1992 tour of southern China, 
putting him under strong pressure to resign. The brothers pledged the military's 
loyalty to support and defend Deng's reform and opening policies amid the worst 
political crisis since Jiang took charge of the leading body. Furthermore, Yang 
Shangkun launched a concerted effort to unseat Jiang proposing that Deng dismiss 
him at the corning party's 14th National Congress of 1992 by reason of Jiang's lack of 
enthusiasm for reform. Meanwhile, an embattled Jiang secretly reported to Deng that 
Yang Shangkun had matched himself against Deng. In a letter sent by Jiang to Deng, 
he alleged that Yang would seek to reappraise the Tiananrnen events of 1989 to pin 
the bloodshed on Deng and establish a Zhao Ziyang administration without direct 
participation by Zhao Ziyang. 886 Jiang requested Deng's approval to remove the 
Yang family generals. 887 A crucial contest to succeed Deng between Jiang and the 
two Yangs presaged that Jiang's leadership in the post-Deng era would be in 
jeopardy. The Yang family generals, were an extremely powerful political and 
military force. Regardless of whether or not they had any ambition to exploit their 
military command to take supreme power, they were perceived as the largest threat to 
886 • According to Xu Jiatun, there was a fierce power struggle between the Yang family generals and 
Jiang. Xu was a former member of the party's Central Committee and director of the Hong Kong 
branch of the official Xinhua news agency, which was the PRC Government's official representative 
in the then British colony. Xu knew many inside stories on the PRC leadership and had a good 
personal relationship with Yang. When Yang served as the head of the Central Taiwan Work Leading 
Group, Xu also worked on cross-strait relations under Yang's leadership as an important part of his 
duties because of the convenience of dealing with Taiwan in Hong Kong. See "Before Yang Family 
Generals Were Removed from Office, Yang Shangkun Had Intended to Oust Jiang Zemin and Li 
Peng from Office," (" tt& * ~~ ~U tR §fJ tm [r!.j EB ~ ~ll. :til U 7"f: ~ . * ~ r is' ' ") TTNN ( :$ 
if{, #j E lfli I'il! ), September 20, 1998. 
887 • Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, p.l95. 
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Deng's arrangement for Jiang's succession.888 Jiang successfully convinced Deng to 
strip the brothers of their military command in order to safeguard his heir. In the 
power struggle between the Yang brothers and Jiang, Deng finally stood by Jiang's 
side. Between 1992 and 1993 , Yang Shangkun was forced into retirement from all 
his official posts including his position as the head of the Central Taiwan Work 
Leading Group. Yang Baibing was removed from all his military posts and 
Secretariat membership of the party's Central Committee in 1992 despite becoming a 
member of the Politburo, which was an outward promotion but an actual demotion.889 
Thus, Jiang won a decisive battle in purging his strongest political enemy from the 
military hierarchy. The fall of the Yang family generals saved Jiang from a threat to 
his successor position, helping foster his power before Deng's demise. Jiang made 
three major gains from his triumph over the Yang family generals-the recaptured 
military command, the state presidency and the control of the decision-making in 
relation to Taiwan policy. 
Jiang had consolidated his successor position and had improved his conditions for 
commanding the army, but there was still much to be done in order to grasp the 
military's leadership. He had taken major measures in the key military leadership 
reshuffle, which can be divided into two phases. In the first phase, from late 1992 to 
mid-1994, Jiang purged the two Yangs' supporters and installed his proteges in key 
positions. The Yang family generals had controlled almost all high-level military 
appointments since the late 1980s, which posed a serious threat to Jiang. After the 
Yangs were removed from the CMC, Jiang was able to secure the promotion of many 
of his military allies. A major reshuffle of the army leadership had taken place in 
which there were wide-ranging personnel changes. In curbing the Yangs' influence 
888 • So far, there has been no conclusive evidence or information on whether the Yang brothers had 
conspired to replace Jiang with themselves through a military coup d'etat or other forcible means 
after Deng's death. However, it seems that Yang Baibing showed his political ambitions in 1992 
when, under unauthorised conditions, he prepared for 'security protocols' to keep order in the event 
of the Deng's demise. This became the most damaging charge against Yang Baibing, being 
considered by Deng as indicating the possibility of a coup by Yang Baibing. See David Shambaugh, 
"China's Commander-in-Chief: Jiang Zemin and the PLA," in C. Dennison Lane, Mark Weisenbloom 
and Dimon Liu (eds), Chinese Military Modernization. New York: Kegan Paul International, 1996, 
pp.223-225. 
889 • Yang Baibing had been a Politburo member without a portfolio from 1992 to 1997, and was 
edged to the sidelines. See Pan Yongchang and Zhong Shi, "Zeng Qinghong on the Quite Organises 
the Team of Jiang Core," ( l1hk I§ . # ~ , " ~ J3C n IIll '§ U ~ J~\ tII M , " ) Cheng Ming 
Monthly 
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within the military, Jiang had removed or transferred some three hundred high-level 
officers, replacing Yang loyalists with his own trusted officers.89o Jiang tended 
increasingly to favour military officers who could be relied upon to support him in 
the power struggle for the leadership succession. At the end of 1992, he appointed 
three supporters of his as CMC members and directors of the PLA three general 
departments. Respectively, Zhang Wannian, Yu Yongbo and Fu Quanyou took over 
as the chief of the general staff, the director of the general political department and 
the director of the general logistics department. On June 7, 1993, Jiang promoted 
them and three other senior officers to the rank of genera1.891 From mid-1993 to mid-
1994, he conferred the rank of general on another 13 senior officers.892 By 
reshuffling, he largely had the upper hand in the PLA's three general departments, 
while also having an influence over army generals. However, Jiang had aroused 
controversy among the military officer corps and his promotions produced a series of 
problems, causing a new unbalance in all services and arms and stimulating more 
demands by the generals. For example, as we have seen, the Second Artillery Corps 
formally demanded to change its name to the PLA Strategic Rocket Force in order to 
promote its position from an arm to a service, while both the Navy and Air Force 
demanded their own memberships in the CMC. Jiang found it hard to meet the 
unmeasured demands for higher posts and ranks which the greedy army generals 
required in exchange for the military's backing of his leadership. He was in political 
difficulties which increasingly put greater pressure on him.893 The support of the 
generals for Jiang was conditional and unstable. He was worried and angered that 
($Il$), No.221, March 1996, pA2. 
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New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp.507-508. 
891 • Three other senior officers were Zhu Dunfa, President of the National Defence University, Zhang 
Lianzhong, Commander of the PLA Navy and Cao Shuangming, Commander of the PLA Air Force. 
See Wu Jiang, "It Is Reported that Yu Yongbo Will Assume the Post of Defence Minister," (~ U ' 
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military organs such as The Liberation Army Daily still looked down upon him when 
in published reports. Jiang's authority over the army remained insecure.894 
In the second phase from mid-1994 to late 1995, Jiang attempted to deal with the 
problems caused by two incumbent PLA veterans. When the Yang family generals 
were removed from the CMC, Admiral Liu Huaqing and General Zhang Zhen were 
brought in as vice-chairmen, despite having retired.895 Liu played a bigger role than 
Zhang in the CMC. Seen as close to Deng, Liu was deputed by Deng to help Jiang 
assert control over the army and solidify his leadership.896 Liu did, so guiding the 
PLA into acceptance of Jiang as Deng's successor. Liu was not ambitious for 
supreme power. However, he was put on the Politburo Standing Committee and had 
the seniority, the prestige and the military exploits, to overshadow Jiang. Jiang stood 
in awe of him and had to take his advice into account on major issues. Under such 
circumstances, these two PLA veteran generals, especially Liu, had real power over 
the army. Jiang was unable to decide reshuffles and appointments of senior officers 
and had to consult with Liu and Zhang and make compromise deals. 897 On major 
issues, all services, arms, various military major regions and group-armies asked for 
instructions from, and reported to, Liu and Zhang rather than Jiang. Jiang had been 
relieved of the bulk of his duties regarding military command and the handling of 
PLA affairs. This problem was so serious that in March 1995 Deng met the PLA 
chiefs, calling for them to unconditionally obey the orders of Jiang.898 
Liu was close to two of Jiang's main rivals for the leadership succession, the 
Chairman of the National People's Congress' Standing Committee, Qiao Shi and 
Premier Li Pengo An alliance would pose a threat to Jiang's position as the heir of 
894. Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998, pp.225-226. 
895. Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.), The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng (Second 
Edition). New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.508. 
896. You Ji, "Jiang Zemin: In Quest ofPost-Deng Supremacy," in Maurice Brosseau, Suzanne Pepper 
and Tsang Shu-ki (eds), China Review 1996. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1996, p.8; 
Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1994, pp.365-366. 
897. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, p.184. 
898 . Luo Bing, "The Military Reduces Jiang to a Mere Figurehead-Deng Meets the Top Military 
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Deng. 899 After Liu assisted in a smooth succession for Jiang, Jiang did not need him 
any more and intended to curb his influence and that of his potential allies. Jiang 
hoped that Liu would retire again, thereby shoring up his own control of the military. 
As tensions in the Taiwan Strait increased in late 1995, however, Admiral Liu and 
General Zhang allied with Chairman Qiao and Premier Li in criticising Jiang's 
moderate Taiwan policy.900 In the face of these two formidable military opponents 
and their coalition with Qiao and Li, Jiang felt the urgent need to reshuffle the CMC 
and promote his own people. Because Jiang was unable to remove Liu and Zhang 
any sooner, he adopted outflanking tactics. Two younger generals were added to the 
vice-chairmanships of the CMC in an attempt to weaken the functions and powers of 
Liu and Zhang. Therefore, in September 1995, General Zhang Wannian, the chief of 
the general staff, and General Chi Haotian, the minister of defence, were appointed as 
CMC vice-chairmen.901 Both new vice-chairmen were viewed as Jiang's supporters 
but their degree of support differed. Zhang Wannian was widely seen as a strong 
supporter of Jiang. Because he was the biggest benefactor of Jiang's reshuffle, he 
wanted to reciprocate Jiang's confidence. During the Taiwan crisis, he almost never 
criticised Jiang's Taiwan policy. This notwithstanding, he assumed a strong stance 
toward Taiwan and the US for the sake of the military's unity and in the interests of 
seeking to win his own reputation in the army.902 Chi's support for Jiang was less 
apparent. Chi sought to preserve the PLA interests more than he supported Jiang. 
His opinions on the Taiwan crisis were more aggressive than Zhang Wannian's and 
were largely out of accord with Jiang's Taiwan policy.903 The behaviour of these two 
899. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, p.l84; 
Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for 
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supporters of Jiang showed that support could not always be translated into loyalty 
and control. Meanwhile, Liu and Zhang Zhen retained their first and second ranlcing 
vice-chairmanships despite expecting to be eased out in two years. Although their 
power was shared with two new CMC vice-chairmen, both veterans retained their 
decisive roles in discharging CMC responsibilities along with their powerful political 
influence. 
After augmenting the vice-chairmanships of the CMC, the unfavourable situation 
for Jiang in the military's hierarchy had been partially remedied but had not been 
fundamentally changed. The military continued to firmly preserve its own vital 
interests, generally speaking with one voice. Even Xiong Guangkai, the then director 
of the PLA intelligence department who was close to Jiang, was reluctant to suppOli 
his moderate Taiwan policy during the crisis.904 In late 1995, Xiong aired the 
strongest of anti-American views, threatening to incinerate Los Angeles with nuclear 
destruction if America should come to the aid of Taiwan.90s Retired PLA generals 
also remained important. They took the opportunity presented by strained PRC-US 
relations and cross-strait tensions to regain military commands.906 They had been 
very active during the Taiwan crisis and frequently interfered in interlinlced policies 
toward Taiwan and the US. 907 This strengthened the military's influence over Jiang 
on decisions concerning Taiwan and put heavier pressure on him. Although Jiang 
had deliberately sought to whip the military into line, he was still not in a position of 
control. After the appointments of Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian, the military, as 
a whole, remained strongly-positioned to articulate itself and press its views upon 
Jiang. Until the question of the leadership succession was decisively resolved, the 
challenges by the contenders for Deng' s heirship forced Jiang to rely increasingly on 
('¥ JJ 1~ Jit x~ IJ\.3f ~ iR mJ 1l1J) Beijing Spring (it Jif.2 1F), No.29, October 1995, p.21; Yi 
Fan, "The Top Military Leaders Brag that the PLA Will Need Less Than Two Days to Mount a 
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904. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, pp.14-
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the military. As such, the military's crucial role in the post-Deng succession and 
Jiang's inability to control it determined that he had to accept its adventurist plans of 
conducting war games during the Taiwan crisis. 
8.2-2. The Military's Role in Pressing upon Jiang Zemin the 
Adoption of Strong Measures against Taiwan908 
From the outset, the military looked unfavourably upon Jiang's eight point 
proposal on the Taiwan issue, and became increasingly opposed.909 Jiang had sought 
to embark on his moderate Taiwan policy with the backing ofthe military but had 
failed. The military had consistently advocated a tough line with Taiwan. His 
moderate policy with eight points was perceived as a sign of weakness. Bearing in 
mind the range of strategic, political and economic interests involved, the military 
had managed to prevent Jiang from going too far along with his mild line. 
Shortly before the publication of Jiang's Eight-Points, on December 12-25, 1994, 
the Ministry of National Defence and the General Staff Department held a 
symposium entitled "The Strategic Principle toward Taiwan". Most top military 
leaders attended the symposium and General Chi Haotian, Minister of Defence, 
delivered a bellicose speech. He believed that cross-strait relations were in tension 
and wished to step up combat readiness while preparing to deal with armed 
intervention by the United States and its allies over the Taiwan issue. The 
symposium discussed the issues of Taiwan policy and determined Lee Teng-hui to be 
a separatist and a threat, in light of his political behaviour and policy direction. The 
military's mainstream viewpoints were summarised and eight points for dealing with 
Taiwan were brought forward, advocating a firmer approach. The military's eight 
points deemed that the Lee Teng-hui's administration was pursuing Taiwan 
907 • Luo Bing, "More Than Fifty Generals Mount Pressure on Jiang Zemin," ( ?J1 (,7j( , " # S ~~ ~ rPJ 
U ~~ ~ JJffi ffi ' ") Cheng Ming Monthly (1fr P.!ij), No.214, August 1995, pp.8-9. 
908. For an examination of the PRe military's involvement in the Taiwan policy process, mainly the 
handling of the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96, see Ellis Joffe, "How Much Does the PLA Make 
Foreign Policy?" in David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds), China Rising. London and New 
York: Routledge, 1997, pp.53-70. 
909. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, pp.l72-
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independence and asserted that Lee's cross-strait policy was hostile to mainland 
China. While Taipei promoted the intention to "create two Chinas, or one China, one 
Taiwan, or Taiwan independence", the PRC would impose a blockade of Taiwan or 
take resolute military actions to thoroughly settle the reunification issue. 91o In terms 
of Taiwan policy, the military's eight points were diametrically opposite to Jiang's 
eight points. The military's eight points did not mention peaceful reunification at all, 
and denied that there would be the possibility of reaching a consensus on the 
reunification issue through negotiations and consultations between Beijing and 
Taipei. They proposed that only after reunification by military means could the "one 
country, two systems" be exercised in Taiwan. This demonstrated that the military 
was still preparing for the use of force in settling the Taiwan issue, despite Jiang 
planning to make peaceful overtures toward Taipei. 
Worse still, soon afterwards, the military implemented its tough policy. On 
January 30, 1995, the same day that Jiang offered his overtures with eight 
propositions toward Taiwan, the PRC military high command deployed new missile 
forces in areas opposite Taiwan. The PLA missile unit moved its M-c1ass missile 
bases from the inland province of Jiangxi to the coastal province of Fujian, opposite 
Taiwan. This constituted a new military threat to the island, although Jiang took the 
initiative, launching his 'smile' offensives. The military's fresh heavy arms build-up 
directed at Taiwan indicated its disapprobation of Jiang's approach to Taiwan placing 
him at a disadvantage in accommodating Taipei. This undercut the significance of 
his eight-point proposal, arousing Taipei's suspicion about his sincerity in 
developing cross-strait relations and promoting peaceful reunification.9I1 More 
crucially, the military's demonstrations exposed Jiang's inability to rein in the PLA, 
emphasising the weak and unstable nature of his leadership. 
The military viewed the publication of Jiang's eight point proposal on Taiwan as a 
weak policy.912 In response to Lee Teng-hui's US visit, the military was extremely 
910. Yi Fan, "Communist China Prepares Public Opinion for Forcible Invasion of Taiwan," (JlJ fL, " 
* ;l:t j; ~ jJ :§c is' 11: ~ it it *' " ) Cheng Ming Monthly ( $- p}$), No.208, February 1995, 
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critical, in sharp contrast with Jiang's restrained attitude, again demonstrating its 
disapproval of Jiang's moderate Taiwan policy. Shortly after the Clinton 
administration decided to issue a visa to Lee on May 22, 1995, the military 
responded harshly. On May 23, the Commander of the PLA Air Force, Yu Zhenwu, 
cut short his US tour and returned home.913 On May 26, Minister of Defence Chi 
Haotian postponed a planned visit to the US.914 In the meantime, the military had 
taken an aggressive, hard-line position while exerting powerful pressure on Jiang. 
On May 24, the Ministry of National Defence, the General Staff Department, the 
Navy, the Air Force and the Second Artillery Corps wrote a letter jointly to the State 
Council and the Central Military Commission. It demanded that the PRC 
government take firm and substantive steps to counter the provocation of the 
American authorities and adopt essential measures against the Taiwan authorities. 
The Ministry of National Defence and the Second Artillery Corps even proposed that 
the PRC should cut off political relations and military contacts with the US as the 
first of a series of strong measures.915 On June 2 the General Political Department, 
the General Logistics Department, the General Staff Department and the Commission 
of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence submitted a proposal 
jointly to the State Council and the Central Military Commission. It proposed that 
the party's central leadership should revise the PRC guiding principle and policy 
toward the US, while remaking Taiwan policy. It also demanded the party's central 
leadership take countermeasures to deal with a deterioration in PRC-US relations and 
Against Japan, Liu Huaqing and Chi Haotian respectively took the occasion of publishing their signed 
articles advocating nationalism and implicitly criticising Jiang's weak stand on Taiwan. In their 
articles packed with hard-line and threatening rhetoric, they disapproved of Jiang's flexible eight 
point policy proposal on Taiwan and insisted on the military's hawkish standpoints. Against Jiang's 
assurances to the Taiwanese people that Chinese should not fight fellow Chinese, Liu and Chi 
renewed their threat that the PLA would use force to stop Taiwanese splitting with the mainland. See 
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a radical change in cross-strait relations. 916 Member of the party's Politburo Standing 
Committee and First CMC Vice-Chairman Liu Huaqing had played a leading role in 
pressing the military's opinion upon Jiang. In the symposium attended by the 
commanders of all services and arms as well as military colleges on June 19, and the 
Party Congress of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National 
Defence on June 22, Liu declared that the PRC would adopt military means to settle 
the Taiwan issue and smash the scheme of Taiwan independence.917 This whipped up 
belligerent sentiments and cut down Jiang's room for diplomatic and political 
solutions to the disputes in PRC-US and cross-strait relations. In cooperation with 
Liu, Second CMC Vice-Chairman Zhang Zhen focused on criticising Jiang's guiding 
principle on the US, stirring up indignation against the US and reducing Jiang to a 
passive position. On May 24, Zhang pointed out emphatically that Jiang's policy had 
taken overmuch account of the relationship with the US, and actually there were four 
aspects which were more important. Zhang called for preparation for a showdown 
between the PRC and the US while demanding a change in the US policy.918 Further, 
the PLA chiefs claimed that Jiang's moderate eight point policy toward Taiwan had 
failed because it stirred Lee to embark on his US visit. They demanded a re-
explanation of Jiang's Eight-Points to deter Taiwan from taking the road of 
independence. The military maintained that Beijing should take an intransigent 
attitude toward the US over Taiwan. Jiang was under tremendous PLA pressure to 
escalate responses by utilising military means to respond to Lee's US visit.919 
Both senior military officers and retired generals severely criticised Jiang's soft 
stance on Taiwan and the US, even going as far as to challenge his successor 
916. Luo Bing, "Each Sticks to His Own View on Policies toward the US and Taiwan-The Disputes 
among the Party, Government and Military," ( ~ 111< ' " xt ~:xt €I JFk ~ %!Jt - ilU - 3t JFk ~ *-
%} 4Jr ' " ) Cheng Ming Monthly ( 11- PJ$), No.213, July 1995, p.8. 
917. Guan Jie, "Communist China's New Interlinked Policies toward America and Taiwan," ( *- jJt , 
"r:p;t\: :xt~ €I ¥,IT il& ~,") The Trend Magazine (#0 /iU), No.119, July 1995, p.21. 
918. Luo Bing, "The Military Hawk Grows More Powerful and Jiang Zemin Is Forced to Make Self-
Criticism-Communist China Reviews Its Interlinked Strategies toward America and Taiwan," ( ~ 
il1< ' " ~ 1J Jl ~ * *- U 1~ R; ~ m f§Z it- r:p ;t\: -lftiJ ~ ~ is' ~~ ~ , " ) The Trend Magazine 
(#0 /iU), No.118, June 1995, p.8. 
919. David Shambaugh, "China's Commander-in-Chief: Jiang Zemin and the PLA," in C. Dennison 
Lane, Mark Weisenbloom and Dimon Liu (eds), Chinese Military Modernization. New York: Kegan 
Paul International, 1996, pp.210-211 ; John W. Garver, Face Off China, the United States, and 
Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997, pp.61-62, 
172n.38; John W. Garver, "The PLA as an Interest Group in Chinese Foreign Policy," in C. Dennison 
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position. In the symposium marking the 50th anniversary of the War of Resistance 
Against Japan on June 20, retired PLA generals accused Jiang of being weak in his 
policies toward Taiwan and the US. They started a revolt, angrily reproaching him 
for behaviour injurious to national security and party-state interests. Jiang was 
rebuked for his weakness and incompetence as well as a neglect of duty, and his 
resignation was demanded. Some of the veterans proposed that Jiang should be 
substituted by other candidates for Deng' s successor position as early as possible. 
With unanimous resolution, these retired PLA generals backed incumbent generals 
and military departments in pressing their opinions upon Jiang. In addition, more 
than fifty retired generals wrote a letter in joint names to the party's Central 
Committee, the State Council and the Central Military Commission. It put forward 
an eleven-point proposal demanding the adoption of tough policies toward Taiwan 
and the US and the settlement of the Taiwan issue by force. It proposed stepping up 
combat readiness for a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait while making 
preparations for American armed .intervention. Worried about the threat of retired 
PLA generals to his right of succession, Jiang took their strong demands seriously. 
On July 4, he met seven leading retired generals responding to their proposals with 
two guarantees. He assured them that the party's central leadership would 
substantively respond to American hegemonist provocations with resolute measures 
while deploying military forces to meet any attack of the US Army. He also pledged 
himself to not permit the Taiwan independence force headed by Lee Teng-hui to 
separate the country, promising to take resolute military measures to resolve the 
reunification issue.92o The interference by retired PLA generals in interlinked 
policies toward Taiwan and the US in effect became part of the official military's 
positions on tensions over Taiwan, fuelling the military to flex its political muscle in 
pressing Jiang to accept its views. 
An assault by the military on the soft stands of the civilian departments concerned 
was an important part of pressing Jiang to take a tougher posture against Taipei and 
Washington. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ( MFA) did not advocate aggravating 
Lane, Mark Weisenbloom and Dimon Liu (eds), Chinese Military Modernization. New York: Kegan 
Paul International, 1996, p.272. 
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tension over Lee Teng-hui's US visit, while the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) 
objected to any retaliatory measures beyond those deemed strictly necessary. 
However, their moderate voices were overridden by the powerful military.921 While 
criticising the TAO, the military focused on accusing the MFA of adopting weak 
positions and making false moves. A lot of military officers satirised the MFA as the 
"ministry of traitors". Jiang himself was politically vulnerable and struggled to 
defend his successor position. As such, he was unable to protect the civilian 
departments concerned from these attacks. His moderate, interlinked policies toward 
Taiwan and the US were therefore compromised. The military concentrated on 
bringing an accusation against the Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, 
who was concurrently the CTWLG (the Central Taiwan Work Leading Group) 
deputy-head. In mid-July, the hawks within the Ministry of National Defence and 
the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence raised 
doubts about the diplomatic line and strategic principles regarding the US of the 
MF A, as led by Qian. In mid-September, they raised "Several Views on Comrade 
Qian Qichen's Leadership of the MFA". On September 25, the hawks within the 
Defence University and the Academy of Military Science wrote ajoint letter to the 
party's Fifth Session ofthe 14th Central Committee demanding a review of US policy 
and the dismissal of Qian. Their attacks on Qian and demands for his dismissal were 
in fact aimed at Jiang, in an attempt to force him to change his soft-line and toughen 
his stance toward Taiwan and the US.922 In mid-1995, the CTWLG secretary-general 
Wang Zhaoguo, Politburo Member and Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, was 
replaced by Xiong Guangkai, the military's representative on the CTWLG, although 
Wang did retain CTWLG membership.923 This indicated that the military was 
playing a larger role in the formulation of US and Taiwan policy, promoting 
approaches of its own preference. In rifts between the military and the civilian 
leadership, Jiang yielded to the military, reducing the functions and powers of the 
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civilian departments concerned with handling of US and Taiwan affairs. The 
aggressive positions taken by the military forced both Jiang and the civilian leaders 
and departments concerned to toughen their stands. 
Succession politics and the Taiwan crisis provided the military with the 
opportunity to greatly influence interlinked policies toward Taiwan and the US in the 
quest for its vital interests. The military's severe criticism sent warning messages to 
Jiang. He was fearful of losing his successor position, which had been threatened by 
the anti-Jiang coalition of the military and contenders for the leadership succession. 
In order to retain his succession to supreme power, he bowed to the pressures, issuing 
his self-criticism for failing to prevent Lee Teng-hui's from visiting the US to an 
enlarged emergency meeting of the Political Bureau on May 28. By and large, the 
military expressed satisfaction with this self-criticism, but the hawks within the 
General Staff Department and the Ministry of National Defence still assailed Jiang 
for his Right-deviationist mistakes in the CMC enlarged meeting on June 2.924 
Worried that the military would strengthen ties with his principal political opponents, 
Jiang was impelled by necessity to accept the military's aggressive demands and 
launch military exercises to intimidate Taiwan. Being aware that his successor 
position remained dependant on the military's support, he had to continue toughening 
his stance on Taiwan and the US to cater to the aggressive needs of the military. On 
September 7 when Jiang met and gave a banquet to more than eighty retired PLA 
generals, he set nine circumstances under which force against Taiwan would be used, 
including American interference in the Taiwan issue and support for Taiwan 
independence. It was called Jiang's Nine-Points. These Nine-Points were 
completely different from his Eight-Points of January, indicating a drastic change in 
his Taiwan policy and only briefly mentioning the possibility of peacefully 
reunifying with Taiwan. In the meeting and banquet, two CMC Vice-Chairmen, Liu 
Huaqing and Zhang Zhen made more bellicose speeches to impel Jiang to move on to 
intensify military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. Liu said that military means 
924. Luo Bing, "The Military Hawk Grows More Powerful and Jiang Zemin Is Forced to Make Self-
Criticism-Communist China Reviews Its Interlinked Strategies toward America and Taiwan," ( ~ 
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were the only and final option in settling the Taiwan issue while Zhang kept calling 
for the liberation of Taiwan. 925 
Although Jiang had been receptive to the military's sentiments, showing that he 
would respond to Lee Teng-hui's US visit with a high hand, so long as there was an 
opportunity he would try to move back to his original moderate Taiwan policy. 
When he was interviewed by the Us. News & World Report in October 1995, he 
reaffirmed his overtures by offering a cross-strait summit in his eight-point proposal. 
He made it known that he welcomed Lee Teng-hui to visit mainland China while 
saying that he would like to visit Taiwan if Lee invited him. By sending a signal 
differing from the military's belligerence, he wanted to temper tensions and sustain 
cross-strait engagement through dialogue. 926 The military was displeased with 
Jiang's contradictory approach. The interview had been arranged by the military 
with the aim of intensifying the PRC tough stance toward Taipei and Washington, 
but Jiang's reaffirmation of his eight-point proposal, especially the cross-strait 
summit, had produced effects to the contrary. The military sought to reverse the 
negative effects with a revised edition of Jiang's interview to be published by the 
PRC state-run media. Shortly thereafter, Xinhua, the state news agency, published a 
version of Jiang's interview differing from Us. News & World Report, weakening 
the effects of the invitation to Lee for his visit to the mainland.927 The revision was 
extremely rare for a leader's speech, indicating the strained relations between Jiang 
and the military. This impaired Jiang's prestige while causing the military to compel 
him to correct his ambivalent behaviour. 
Dissatisfied with Jiang's vacillation, the military had kept its pressure upon him 
while intensifying its war games in the Taiwan Strait. In assessing the effects of the 
first round of missile launches into the East China Sea near Taiwan, the General Staff 
Department ( GDP ) believed that the exercises had failed to stop Lee Teng-hui's 
tendency toward Taiwan independence. The GDP maintained that for a longer term 
effect it would be necessary to conduct additional military manoeuvres. It prepared 
925. Yue Shan, "Jiang's Nine-Points-the Chinese Fight Against the Chinese," ( ffi ill , " '¥I fL j};-
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an array of plans which included an orchestrated simulation of amphibious landing 
exercises, even a local attack on Taiwan's army and military facilities, in particular 
destruction of Taiwan's nuclear programme and a naval blockade of Taiwan. In a 
CTWLG meeting, the military's hard-line once again held a dominant position 
despite some debate. The CTWLG, headed by Jiang, therefore decided to continue 
to deter the elements of Taiwan independence with military intimidation.928 As the 
March 1996 presidential election in Taiwan drew closer, the military reinforced 
deployments and planned larger-scale exercises to attempt to influence the result. In 
the meantime, it stepped up combat readiness to fight back American armed 
intervention, and PLA chiefs even clamoured for a PRC-US war on Taiwan .929 
Having been pressured by the military, Jiang had no room for manoeuvre for his 
moderate Taiwan policy. In order to gain the military's backing for his successor 
position, he had had to take a harder line on Taiwan even making bellicose remarks 
to the military. In a speech delivered to the departments under the party's Central 
Committee and the ministries under the State Council in early 1996, he said that the 
PRC would make use of military means to resolve the Taiwan issue if necessary. 
The PRC should enhance the consciousness of combat readiness and further heighten 
overall preparedness for military measures against Taiwan independence and foreign 
intervention.930 With endorsement by Jiang, the PLA staged new war games directed 
at Taiwan after March 8, including a new round of missile tests near Taiwan, ajoint 
live bombing exercise by the PLA Navy and Air Force near the marine areas of 
Fujiang Province and large-scale combined manoeuvres by the three armed services 
around Pingtan Island. As provoked tensions in an attempt to dissuade Taiwanese 
voters from supporting Lee Teng-hui in the presidential elections, scheduled for 
March 23, the Taiwan crisis escalated. 
The PLA's new show of force in the Taiwan Strait led to a strong military 
response from the US, which sent two aircraft-carrier battle groups into the region to 
demonstrate American determination to stop any PRC military adventure aimed at 
928 . Yan Hua, "The Military of Communist China Plans to Blockade Taiwan in Another Form," ( ;g. 
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Taiwan. 93 1 The Taiwan crisis reached its height and Beijing was embarrassed by the 
largest US show of naval and air forces off China since the 1950s. In the aftermath 
of US intervention, the military put the blame on Jiang's weak leadership and poor 
interlinked policies toward Taiwan and the US. In a letter of unparalleled harshness 
to the party's Central Committee and the CMC, the Academy of Military Science 
accused Jiang of mistaken US policy decision-making. The Commander of the 
Defence University demanded Jiang's resignation for bringing damage and dishonour 
on the party-state. More than five hundred generals ( making up about one third of 
the total), including two CMC chairmen, Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian, wrote a 
letter to the party's Central Committee and the CMC strongly demanding a strike 
back against American armed intervention in the cross-strait conflict. Jiang was once 
again under heavy military pressure. 932 However, in terms of the possibility of a war, 
the military provoked crisis had subsided. 
Despite the military's pressure for further adventures, Jiang strove to take the 
initiative in curbing escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait. The situation had to 
be controlled. Under the circumstances, he resumed the exercise of a moderating 
influence. While believing military confrontation with the US was not in the 
interests of the PRC, he stressed that the cross-strait impasse was not in line with the 
party's central leadership's strategy toward Taiwan. He concluded that the PRC 
military exercises had achieved two goals. They had demonstrated the PRC's 
position on Taiwan independence and foreign interference, showing a readiness to 
use force ifnecessary.933 Also, the military considered that its exercises had 
produced the desired effect, being of great significance in military, political and 
diplomatic and other dimensions.934 The view of military exercises having achieved 
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good results was mutually acceptable to Jiang and the military, giving both of them 
an out. More importantly, in a bid to prevent escalation of the Taiwan crisis to an 
uncontrollable stage, Jiang had the backing ofDeng. Since tensions erupted over 
Taiwan, Jiang had been seeking to gain support from Deng for his crisis 
management. In particular, when he was in a stalemate with his political rivals and 
the military, he always asked Deng to step in and help resolve the dispute. Such 
backing was still a tremendous asset to him, and could strengthen his hand against 
those trying to take advantage of his alleged weakness toward Taiwan and the US to 
challenge his successor position, as well as helping overrule the military's wish for 
greater adventurism. Although Deng was advanced in years and seriously ill, he 
remained powerful, ultimately deciding the most important issues. On one hand, he 
approved the taking of effective measures to respond relatively strongly to Lee Teng-
hui's US visit. On the other hand, he was not in favour of military conflict in the 
Taiwan Strait, instructing that it was not to be carried too far so as to prevent further 
deterioration of cross-strait relations and PRe-US relations. In order to strike back at 
his critics in the party leadership and the military, Jiang time and again related 
Deng's instructions to avoid military confrontation with the US and the 
uncontrollable escalation of tension over Taiwan.935 As a result ofDeng's personal 
intervention, militant passions were calmed and the Taiwan crisis did not escalate out 
of control. With Deng's support, Jiang took steps to ease tensions. The PLA ended 
its military manoeuvres five days ahead of schedule, failing to achieve Beijing's goal 
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of costing Lee Teng-hui Taiwan's presidential election.936 The Taiwan crisis had 
finally ended. 
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9.1. External Factors and the Sources of the Taiwan Crisis 
9.1-1. The Significance of the International Factors 
This study has raised the question as to the causes and sources of the 1995-96 
Taiwan Strait crisis, in which there were a wide range of variables. These variables 
can be divided into three main areas: the international factors, the Taiwan factor and 
the PRC factor. 
Of the international factors relating to the Taiwan crisis, there were the Russian 
and Japanese factors and, most importantly, the US factor. The Russian factor was 
the least important. Russia had economic interests, but these were not vital. 
Militarily and politically, Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait were important in Moscow's 
view of the geo-political geometry of the Asia-Pacific region but not fundamental or 
critical to Russian interests. Russia's policy toward the Taiwan issue was based on 
both PRC-Russian relations and the global strategic pattern. It had basically been 
reflected in the pursuit of Russia's own national interests and its possible resurgence 
as a world great power. Support for the PRC policy towards Taiwan was principally 
out of concern for Russia's own domestic issues and strategic cooperation with the 
PRC in the international arena. However, although the PRC and Russia had a close 
strategic partnership, Moscow would not support Beijing in forcefully seeking to 
reunify Taiwan with mainland China. Its consistent position was that the Taiwan 
issue ought to be peacefully resolved. It was also logical that there was no 
willingness by Russia to intervene in a conflict between the PRC and the US over 
Taiwan despite explicitly supporting Beijing's sovereignty claim over the island 
during the crisis. Without the framework of a military alliance, the PRC-Russian 
strategic partnership took the form of political and diplomatic cooperation. Beijing, 
for its part, made attempts to exploit Russia's influence on the region to balance the 
respective geo-political forces, especially those relating to the US. In particular, 
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Beijing sought to use the PRC-Russian strategic partnership as leverage against US 
intervention. From Moscow's perspective, its support for Beijing's position on 
Taiwan would help maintain friendly relations with the PRC. This served Russia's 
strategic objectives in opposing America's world hegemony and balancing the Japan-
US alliance. During the Taiwan crisis, Moscow diplomatically supported Beijing's 
stand on Taiwan but did not back the PRC military exercises to intimidate Taiwan. 
Thus the Russian factor was not of major influence. 
The role of Japan, the potential intervening variable, was larger than that of 
Russia. Of all the foreign influences involved in the Taiwan issue, the Japanese 
factor was second only to that of the American. Japan had both immediate security 
interests and vital economic interests in Taiwan. It was concerned about Beijing's 
strategic intentions regarding the Taiwan Strait and the region. Tokyo preferred to 
see a divided China, with Taiwan acting as a shield against the PRC. Japan also 
wanted to avoid militarily confrontation with the PRC. In handling the issue of Lee 
Teng-hui's attempt to visit Japan, Tokyo made an effort to prevent deterioration in 
the relations between the PRC and Japan and avoid worsening the situation in the 
Taiwan Strait. When tensions arose from cross-strait relations and the PRC 
conducted the military exercises, Tokyo urged Beijing to exercise restraint. In 
addition, the Japanese government prepared to take measures to deal with the Taiwan 
crisis. In particular, the Defence Agency secretly mapped out a plan to meet any 
possible contingency. In the event of an armed conflict over Taiwan between the 
PRC and the US, the Japanese Self Defence Forces would provide logistical support 
for US military operations. However, Japan strongly avoided the possibility of being 
dragged into an armed conflict over Taiwan, lest Japanese commercial relations with 
the two sides of the Taiwan Strait be affected and its fundamental national security 
interests endangered. Tokyo tried to keep a balance in tackling the problem of cross-
strait military confrontation. The PRC war games had an impact upon Japan's 
economic security in the dimensions of civil aviation, sea transport and the fishing 
industry, but they did not pose a direct military threat to Japan. So long as the PRC 
did not undertake substantial military actions, Tokyo would not respond strongly. 
More importantly, Japan was unable to play its part independently in determining the 
status of Taiwan, for its foreign policy was conduct~d within the framework of the 
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Japan-US alliance. In responding to the Taiwan crisis, therefore, Tokyo adopted a 
low profile. By and large, it followed Washington in a subordinate role. Therefore, 
Japan did not playa major role in the Taiwan crisis. At the most, it was part of the 
support cast for the US. 
Of all the foreign influences involved in the crisis, the American factor was the 
principal variable. Having played an important role in the triangular relationship 
between Beijing, Taipei and Washington, the US had a great influence on the 
situation in the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan crisis underlined the distinctive US 
position in cross-strait conflict and the status of Taiwan. 
US policy toward Taiwan was based on 'one China' policy over Taiwan, the three 
adherences that they guaranteed the Taiwan issue from a resolution by other than 
peaceful means and the three noes that they indicated no US support for Taiwan's 
separation from the sovereignty of the Chinese nation. 
Although Beijing blamed the US government for creating the Taiwan problem 
and deliberately obstructing the reunion between the Taiwan Strait, American 
administrations had no objection to China ultimately being reunified. Presidents 
Bush and Clinton in the early 1990s even expressed their favourable attitudes toward 
a final resolution of the issue of China's reunification. However, so long as the PRC 
remained a potentially hostile authoritarian state, the US would not support the 
Chinese mainland's reunification with the island. 
The US had vital interests in Taiwan, but differentiated the immediate from the 
long-term. Until China could realise peaceful and democratic reunification, Taiwan 
was a US political and strategic ally helping to balance PRC power and potential 
threat. Also, Taiwan was an important American economic partner. However, the 
Taiwan issue was one of the most dangerous flash-points in the Cold War. Since the 
early 1990s, it had become one of the biggest security problems in the Asia-Pacific 
and an important potential threat to US national security interests. The US spared no 
effort to avoid becoming involved in a war with the PRC over Taiwan. However, the 
US was committed to help to defend Taiwan, but did not make it clear and definite 
that the US would directly defend the island. For its own fundamental national 
security interests, Washington had maintained a strategic ambiguity in terms of the 
question of defending Taiwan. The US had been closely linked with the long-
standing serious Taiwan problem, and it was not in the American interest that it 
would never be resolved. 
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The US insisted that, until the Taiwan question could be peacefully settled, the 
status quo of Taiwan must maintain. It was opposed to the PRC forcing reunification 
while checking any unilateral declaration of independence by Taipei. It did its best 
to avert military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Any such conflict might put the US at 
risk of war with the PRC. The most important interest of the US was to ensure peace 
and stability in the Taiwan Strait. 
The US was unwilling to meddle in the Taiwan issue despite being involved in it. 
Both Beijing and Taipei intended to draw Washington to their side. However, 
Washington considered that because the PRC-Taiwan dispute was very complex, 
emotional and dangerous, some mediatory efforts might be unhelpful even possibly 
undermining stability in the Taiwan Strait and risking American involvement in any 
conflict. Thereby, Washington maintained that cross-strait disputes and the issue of 
China's reunification should be resolved by the Chinese people themselves as the US 
would not act as a go-between. 
This long-standing strategy of preserving the status quo of Taiwan and not 
mediating cross-strait relations proved to be the consistent American goal in 
preventing the Taiwan issue from developing into greater tensions. It clearly showed 
that Washington had no reason to incite conflict or make trouble in the Taiwan Strait. 
The American global strategy was to maintain its military dominance and world 
leadership, but not to come into military antagonism with the PRC. Since the end of 
the Cold War, the US had adopted the "two major wars" approach. North Korea and 
Iraq were targets in US military strategy. Therefore, Washington did not make the 
PRC a higher priority in security considerations, despite its accelerating defence 
modernisation and increasing military power. Although the PRC was perceived as a 
potential future adversary of the US, the fundamental point of the Clinton 
administration's China policy was engagement rather than containment. It was 
formulated to view the PRC as becoming democratic and more free-market oriented 
through promoting peaceful evolution and the PRC-US relationship as mainly 
cooperative and able to manage possible friction between the two countries. 
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More explainable, the Clinton administration's initial stance against Lee Teng-
hui's US visit manifested that it had no intention to provoke Beijing on the Taiwan 
issue. Indeed, Beijing had promises from the Clinton administration that it would not 
grant Lee a visa. Nevertheless, the US Congress passed a resolution demanding 
approval be given to Lee's visit. Under powerful political pressure, the American 
government was forced to reverse its stance. The Clinton administration's 
inconsistent actions on Lee's US visit resulted from Taipei's successful public 
relations lobbying of the US Congress rather than a substantial change in US China 
policy. However, this sparked an angry reaction from Beijing, which maintained that 
a promise is a debt. Although the Clinton administration imposed restrictions on the 
Lee visit, which was undertaken in a strictly private capacity with no political 
activities allowed, Beijing reacted with a series of war games off Taiwan. The 
instability of US China policy, vacillating as it did between Taiwan and the PRC, 
gave Taipei unrealistic fancies and provoked Beijing to anger, further complicating 
American-Chinese-Taiwanese relations. However, this was not so serious that it 
could not be resolved through diplomatic channels. Washington's ambivalent 
behaviour in itself was hardly a sufficient cause of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. 
In any case, adopting a cautious approach in tackling the crisis, Washington tried 
its best to avoid military confrontation despite mounting tension over Taiwan. The 
PRC conducted war games from late July 1995, including the two rounds of missile 
tests off Taiwan, and the Clinton administration exercised restraint. While publicly 
calling upon Beijing to refrain from menacing military exercises against Taiwan and 
diplomatically urging Beijing to ease cross-strait tension, the US did not respond 
militarily. Indeed, the early reaction of the Clinton administration to the PRC war-
games was surprisingly mild. Some scholars, such as John W. Garver, believe that 
this mild reaction resulted from its infirm stance and encouraged Beijing's military 
adventure. 937 
} 
The Clinton administration spared no diplomatic efforts to prevent the Taiwan 
crisis from escalating. While striving to ease tensions between the PRC and the US, 
it did its best in urging Beijing and Taipei to show restraint and accept the necessity 
937 • See John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle 
and London: University of Washington Press, 1997, pp.74-75, 84-85, 95, and its book review by 
Gregory W. Noble, The China Journal, No.41, Janumy 1999, pp.228-229. 
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of mutual accommodation, and to resume dialogue to lessen the danger. Only when 
the PRC expanded its military coercion of Taiwan, carrying out larger war games and 
firing its third round of missile into waters off the island in March 1996, did the 
Clinton administration react by dispatching two aircraft-carrier battle groups to the 
region. In the wake of this dispatch, the Clinton administration still maintained 
efforts to calm tensions in the Taiwan Strait. 
Although Beijing interpreted this dispatch of the two carrier battle groups as a 
willingness by the US to use its armed forces in a conflict over Taiwan,938 it was 
intended more as a warning to Beijing to act cautiously than as a real precursor to 
war.939 Few signs were evident that Washington deliberately provoked the crisis, 
despite demonstrating a determination to deter PRC military adventures against 
Taiwan. 
Regardless of Beijing's deep suspicion of US intentions toward Taiwan, in 
particular American encouragement of Taiwan's independence, the US had neither 
territorial ambitions for the island nor involvement with those Taiwanese attempting 
secession from China. To be certain, having important interests involved in Taiwan 
and having influence upon the status of Taiwan, Washington played a major role in 
the crisis. However, the American actions were a passive response, not armed 
provocation. Thus the US was not where the Taiwan crisis originated. 
9.1-2. Taiwan and the Origins of the Crisis 
First and foremost, Taipei did not militarily threaten the Chinese mainland. It had 
reassessed the decades-old cold war view of cross-strait relations and no longer 
regarded Beijing as a mortal enemy. It renounced its earlier stance regarding the use 
of force to recover mainland China in 1991. It rejected immediate reunification 
938 . Li Zijing, "Zhang Wannian Threatened That the PLA Could Hit and Sink US Aircraft-Carriers," 
(~ § * ' " 5*]J 1:p 1m ~ fJ~ * iJL ~ -HJ: JW., ") Cheng Ming Monthly (.{fr Il$), No.222, April 
1996, pp.l4-15; Luo Bing, "The Inside Information on the Southeast War Zone of Communist 
China," ('?9 i7j(, " 9=' ~* 1¥J ~:J(; fXi*J 'If,") Cheng Ming Monthly (.{fr Il$), No.222, April 1996, 
pp.lO-ll. 
939. According to David S. Chou, "U.S. intervention has defused the crisis; however, it is unlikely that 
Washington would send combat troops to defend Taiwan." See David S. Chou, "Cross-Strait 
Relations and U.S. Roles in the Taiwan Strait Crisis," Issues & Studies, Vo1.32, No.lO, October 1996, 
pp.l,24. 
under the Communist regime, but advocated that national unification should be 
achieved gradually and peacefully through a process of democratic evolution. 
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In exploring whether the island was the source of the Taiwan crisis, it is necessary 
to summarily analyse the question of Taiwan independence. It is most important 
because this involves the issue of Beijing's claim that its military exercises were 
aimed at stopping Taipei's pursuit of independence. In the mid-1990s, although it 
seemed that the momentum for Taiwan independence was gaining, there was no 
genuine possibility of the Taiwanese founding an independent sovereign state. It was 
unlikely, firstly, because of external restraints. Most importantly, the United States 
has never supported independence for the island, despite being blamed for the 
separation of Taiwan from the mainland. Under America's policy of objecting to the 
island's independence, Taiwan could not count on US military help if it provoked 
mainland China by declaring independence. Although Taiwan independence 
fundamentalists cherished hopes of realising their dream with American backing, 
Washington dampened any enthusiasm for independence. In the existing domestic 
political situation, Taiwan independence lacked legitimacy because most Taiwanese 
stood by the maintenance of the status quo. While there was the pro-independence 
party, the Democratic Progressive Party, pro-reunification political forces such as the 
Chinese New Party were still strong, and the governing party, the Kuomintang 
followed the national unification guidelines. Being KMT party chairman, President 
Lee Teng-hui was bound to carry out the party's political programme to pursue 
Chinese reunification. Generally speaking, the pro-independence opinion still came 
up against great resistance at home. Restricted by various kinds of deterrent 
conditions externally and domestically, the island's de jure independence did not, 
and could not get under way. There was no serious and imminent threat of a 
declaration of independence by Taiwan, and therefore Beijing's argument that its 
massive military manoeuvres were for the purpose of repressing Taiwan 
independence was unconvincing.940 
940. Wang Daohan, a principal advisor to Jiang on the Taiwan policY, acknowledged that Taiwan 
independence had not taken shape in the administration of Lee Teng-hui despite his intentions. See 
Luo Bing, "Communist China's Policy toward Taiwan Will Loosen," ( J5J il.1< ' " r:p ~ xrri3' JE{ * 11), 
, ;f1.t '0J ' , ") Cheng Ming Monthly (#f mg), No.223, May 1996, p.9. 
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As regards Lee's role in the Taiwan crisis and his stance on reunification or 
independence, there are two fundamental differences of opinion. Lee denied seeking 
to promote Taiwan independence while reaffirming his commitment to reuniting 
China through pursuing democratic national reunification. Although he appeared to 
be inclined to the island's de/acto sovereignty, he in fact had no plan for founding an 
independent sovereign state. He repudiated his responsibility for the provocation of 
tension in the Straits, though mainland-island relations became much more tense 
after his visit to the US. Lee was alleged by Beijing to be responsible for a 
deterioration in cross-strait relations on the grounds that his visit to America was in 
order to pursue international recognition for Taiwan independence. 
Regardless of these accusations, Lee did not publicly advocate independence nor 
militarily provoke Beijing. After his US visit incurred an unexpectedly intense 
reaction from Beijing, he largely took care to be less provocative. He sought to react 
calmly and cautiously to Beijing's verbal assaults and military threats, in particular a 
series of sabre-rattling moves that Beijing took to intimidate Taiwan. Although he 
gave orders for an increase in military readiness, these were countermeasures to 
respond to Beijing's threats and contingency arrangements. His restraint helped 
prevent the two sides of the Taiwan Strait from going further into military 
confrontation, reducing the risk of crisis escalation. 
In summary, Lee's US visit triggered off the crisis, but it was not its major cause. 
Beijing's over-reaction to the visit indicated that there were other fundamental 
factors involved. 
9.2. The PRC As the Source and the Succession Struggle As 
the Cause of the Taiwan Crisis 
9.2-1. The Predominance of Domestic Issues in the Making ofPRC 
Policy toward Taiwan 
This study attributes the source of the Taiwan crisis to the PRC and its domestic 
problems. Having analysed various possible major factors likely to influence Taiwan 
policy-making, it confirms that the five variables: national security interests, 
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ideology, nationalism, economic issues and domestic political stability, were not the 
prime determinants. 
Perspectives on national security interests are not convincing in explaining PRC 
Taiwan policy setting and decisions on the Taiwan crisis. Indeed, no external 
military threat to national security occurred. Washington neither initiated military 
activity nor sought to encourage Taiwan to do so. Indeed, Taipei abandoned its long-
term strategy to recover the Chinese mainland by armed force. For the PRC, the 
security was not at stake.94 ! The Beijing leadership acknowledged that the 
international and cross-strait situation had tended to detente, although having 
concerns that the growing political force of pro-independence might impinge on 
cross-strait relations and potentially threaten peace, stability and development in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Thus timing is important. In light of its realistic estimation, 
Beijing had not made any moves likely to worsen cross-strait relations despite being 
displeased at the negative responses of Lee Teng-hui's Six-Points to Jiang's Eight-
Points and Taipei's more active pragmatic diplomacy. When Lee prepared and 
conducted his US visit, and even shortly after the visit, Beijing did not erupt in 
bellicose fury. It was only after internal strife, caused by the intensifying leadership 
succession struggle, that Beijing became belligerent towards Taiwan. In terms of 
national reunification, although Beijing declared that this was its sacred duty, it was 
not an urgent duty. Taiwan had been separated from the Chinese mainland for more 
than four decades. The continuation of the island's separation did not threaten the 
PRC's vital national interests. Although Taiwan independence was perceived by 
Beijing as a threat to national security, Taipei had neither the plan nor the 
opportunity to declare independence. In fact, Lee's US visit did not constitute a 
menace to the PRC territorial sovereignty and national security, despite arousing 
some suspicions and a strong military response from Beijing afterwards. 
Ideology became insignificant in the making of Taiwan policy. It was also 
inconsequential in impelling Beijing to make the move towards war games in the 
Taiwan Strait. Similarly, a careful examination of the relationship between Chinese 
941 • Peter Van Ness points out: "Nathan's explanation posits that China's leaders are responding to 
events in Taiwan that they perceive to be threatening to PRC state security. I disagree." There is no 
change in US-Taiwan security relations. Thereby "Taiwan is not a significant security threat to China 
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nationalism and Beijing's policy toward Taiwan has demonstrated that nationalism 
was not particularly important in Taiwan policy-making. Beijing did not reinforce 
nationalistic rhetoric during the Taiwan crisis. Scholarly work about the origins of 
the 1995-96 Taiwan crisis has demonstrated that the rise of a new Chinese 
nationalism did not provide volatile new fuel for a more belligerent policy on Taiwan 
issues. 942 
Nevertheless, this study has also found that whilst Chinese nationalism was not 
the main driving force in Taiwan policy-making, it was instrumental in two aspects. 
It was made use of as a tool in both the propaganda and the leadership succession 
struggles. Beijing regarded Chinese nationalism as a means to mobilise the people's 
support for its tough Taiwan policy, while conducting external propaganda to make 
excuses for its belligerent stance on Taiwan. However, the resurrection of Chinese 
nationalism occurred shortly after the Taiwan crisis rather than before. The crisis 
was over in the last ten-day period of March 1996. In May 1996 a book entitled The 
China That Can Say No, pushed resurgent Chinese nationalism to a high point.943 
During the crisis the US had despatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to the area 
near Taiwan bringing humiliation upon the PRC in its withdrawal from the military 
intimidation of Taiwan. This book coupled nationalistic appeals with strong 
emotions of Anti-Americanism. Following the book, a number of imitators such as 
How China Can Say No, Why Does China Say No and China That Does Not Only 
Say No were also published.944 Resultantly, nationalistic resentment reached a new 
peak in the second half of 1996 and thereafter. 945 
nor is it likely to become one in the foreseeable future." See Peter Van Ness, "Competing 
Hegemons," The China Journal, No.36, July 1996, p.126. 
942. For example, in a case study of Beijing's Taiwan policy in the mid and late 1990s, Suisheng Zhao 
concludes that "nationalism has not driven China into taking irrational action against Taiwan". See 
Suisheng Zhao, "Chinese Nationalism and Beijing's Taiwan Policy: A China Threat?," Issues & 
Studies, Vol.36, No.1, January/February 2000, pp.76-99. 
943. See Song Qiang, Zhang Zangzang and Qiao Bian, The China That Can Say No (* 5li\ . 5* ~ ~ . 
ff: Jll , rp !Jll Jif /!J. iJt /j\). Beijing: China Industrial and Commercial United Publishing House ( rp 
$: I It1 J}x -frill Jl!Z t± ), May 1996. 
944. See Zhang Xueli, How Can China Say No ( 3* '¥: ~L, rp !Jll Iii] /!J. iJt /j\). Beijing: Hualing 
Publishing House ( $: -&fill Jl!Z t±), September 1996; Peng Qian, Yang Mingjie and Xu Deren, Why 
Does China Say No ( W if . 1m J!ij ~ . q~ ~fJ if , rp !Jll h' If ~ iJt /j\). Beijing: New Century 
Publishing House ( ffVf tit ~e. ill Jl1Z t± ), October 1996; Jia Qingguo, China That Does Not Only Say 
No ( YJf. }j( 00, rp IJf/ /j\ fJZ fJZ iJt /j\). Beijing: China Industrial and Commercial United Publishing 
House ( rp $: I 1t1lf* -frill Jl1Z t±), November 1996. 
945 • The official media encouraged nationalistic rhetoric after the Taiwan crisis. Reports and 
comments on these books had shown this. Publications in English such as the state-run Beijing 
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Meanwhile, the findings of this study have indicated that nationalism was more a 
tool of succession politics than a substantive element in decision-making on Taiwan. 
Various factions exploited nationalistic sensitivities to coalesce support and weaken 
rivals. The Taiwan issue is one of the most sensitive matters of Chinese sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. They utilised Chinese nationalism to advertise their own 
stands and attack political opponents on issues of nationalistic supremacy. In 
particular, Jiang Zemin's new Taiwan policy was alleged to be too soft toward Taipei 
and Washington, giving political ammunition to contenders for the succession. 
Wrapped in the banner of nationalism, they took extreme positions on the ground of 
defending national prestige and destiny. However, nationalism was not the basis for 
the general making of Taiwan policy or decision-making on the crisis, just an 
effective instrument in the service of the leadership succession struggle. 
Economic issues were not an important part of Taiwan policy-making and 
decisions on the Taiwan crisis, and are accorded little weight by scholars discussing 
the motivations behind Beijing's war-games in the Straits. 946 Taiwanese investment 
did not have much influence on the PRC Taiwan policy establishment. When 
Beijing decided to launch the war games, it did not care that it would risk scaring off 
Taiwanese investors and hurt the Chinese economy. Economic problems were not a 
central issue. 
Similarly, the issue of national political stability did not affect the PRC policy 
toward Taiwan. Few scholars have seriously considered that the factor of diverting 
attention from a domestic political crisis was influential in reaching a decision to 
provoke the Taiwan crisis.947 For the leaders of Beijing, the handling of domestic 
social and political problems was less important than the problem of the leadership 
succession. 
Review had demonstrated this kind of encouragement. See Si Cheng, "Chinese Say 'No' to the 
United States," Beijing Review, October 21-27, 1996, p.l3; Li Haibo, "Books on Sino-US Relations," 
Beijing Review, May 19-25, 1997, pA. 
946. For example, John W. Garver believes that economic issues were irrelevant because "by 1995" 
"the economy was growing rapidly". See John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and 
Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997, and its book 
review by Gregory W. Noble, The China Journal, Issue 41, January 1999, p.228. 
947 • However, Ralph N. Clough assumes that Beijing might make an attempt to deflect public 
attention from many domestic problems. See Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the 
Taiwan Strait? Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999, p.89. 
384 
The democratisation of Taiwan was not a reason for Beijing's provocation of the 
Taiwan crisis. Beijing did not worry about the threat of Taiwanese democratisation 
because the administration of Lee Teng-hui had done little to promote political 
change in mainland China. Although the March 1996 presidential election in 
Taiwan, the first-ever direct election of state leaders in Chinese history, had an 
impact upon the Communist one-party dictatorship, Beijing had managed to restrict 
it. Indeed, Beijing lobbed missiles and conducted live-fire war games on Taiwan's 
doorstep to dissuade Taiwanese voters from supporting Lee. This was aimed at 
deterring his alleged conspiracy to realise Taiwanese independence, which had 
become the focus ofthe leadership succession struggle. It was not directed at 
stopping him from installing democracy in Taiwan and preventing this impacting 
upon the Communist regime. 
To sum up the main points of this section, these five factors: national security 
interests, ideology, nationalism, economic issues and national political stability, 
although considerations to varying degrees, were not the major influences in the 
general construction of Taiwan policy and decision-making on the crisis. 1995 and 
1996 were the crucial years of succession politics due to the unsteady leadership 
situation. 948 The approaching death of Deng had focused the attention of the 
governing clique on the struggle for predominance in the succession to supreme 
power. While the leaders of Beijing were animated by the contention for Deng's 
successor position, a lack of definite leadership led to political stagnation causing 
considerable problems in the polity and the formulation of guiding principles and 
policy, especially as regards Taiwan policy. 
9.2-2. The PRC Leadership Succession Crisis and the Taiwan Crisis 
948 . For an analysis of the 1995-96 domestic political circumstances under the dominance of 
succession politics, see David Goodman, "The Domestic Political Environment," in Stuart Harris and 
Gary Klintworth (eds), China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and Challenges in the ASia-Pacific 
Region. Melbourne: Longman Australia, 1995, pp.342-356; John Bryan Starr, "China in 1995: 
Mounting Problems, Waning Capacity," Asian Survey, Vol.XXXVI, No.1, January 1996, pp.l3-24; 
Avery Goldstein, "China in 1996: Achievement, Assertiveness, Anxiety," Asian Survey, 
Vol.XXXVII, No.1, January 1997, pp.29-42. 
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The most important domestic determinant acting on the formation of PRC policy 
toward Taiwan and decision-making on the Taiwan crisis was the leadership/ 
individual factor. 949 
An uncertain political transition caused a fierce power struggle for the succession 
to Deng Xiaoping. In the mid-1990s, the Taiwan issue was not emergent. However, 
it became the focus of struggle evoking intense emotions and high stakes among the 
contenders as succession contention arose. This in particular affected Taiwan policy 
outcome and its consistency. Under succession politics, the fate of the leaders of 
Beijing was at stake. Their insecurity in the ongoing succession struggle produced 
irrational behaviour, presenting a serious threat to security in the Taiwan Strait. In 
particular, this study has demonstrated Jiang Zemin's insecurity and the manner in 
which outward leadership stability appeared fragile. This became the most urgent 
factor impelling him to make the final decision to provoke the Taiwan crisis in order 
to defend his own successor position, despite being personally against such 
belligerent decision. 
The legitimacy of Jiang's right of succession was under fire from the beginning 
because of the unusual features of his appointment and his poor political 
achievements, lack of seniority and unpopularity. Also, at first Deng did not favour 
him, leaving a hidden danger for his successor position. Thereby, he was initially 
viewed as a transitional figure. Two years after Jiang became Deng's successor, 
Deng had become displeased with him and, in particular, his incorrect political line 
and misadministration of the economy. Deng believed that Jiang failed to implement 
the required program of reform and his efforts to restore traditional Marxist ideology 
threatened the survival of the Communist regime. Deng's landmark tour of southern 
China in early 1992, especially his warning remarks over Jiang during the tour, 
caused a crisis that threatened Jiang's successor position. Although Jiang got over 
this political crisis, his status as Deng's successor remained weak and unstable. 
Faced with contenders for succession, the consolidation of his right of succession 
was still Jiang's top priority. With a careful approach to the defence of his position, 
his strategic calculations for purging political opponents were successfully brought 
949. Two opposite schools have debated Beijing's motivations for war-games in the Straits. Their . 
contrary opinions suggest that the underlying cause is either the succession struggle consequence or 
the institutional outcome, see Chapter 1.2-1. The Existing Views and Perspectives on the Topic. 
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about over several years. He dealt with the Yang family generals in 1992 as well as 
the Beijing faction led by Chen Xitong in 1995, thwarting their intentions to usurp 
his position as 'crown prince' while establishing the Shanghai faction as his power 
base in the central authority. By holding the state presidency in addition to the two 
other top posts of party chief and head of the military, Jiang concentrated all the 
power of party, military and state on himself, boosting his authority. It seemed that 
he had consolidated his succession. However, purging his rivals gave rise to 
resentment among other factions. The Opposition was still strong and active. There 
was a danger that Jiang's leadership could be challenged again. Therefore, Jiang's 
status as Deng's successor remained potentially unstable. In particular, he was 
suspected of being incapable of performing as paramount leader. 
For Jiang, the next important move in consolidating his power was therefore to 
establish the image of an able leader in order to resolve the legitimate problems. 
Jiang had neither outstanding political achievements nor popularity. Unlike Mao 
Zedong and Deng, Jiang did not enjoy insurmountable authority over other 
politicians. Most unfavourably, Jiang's contribution to the party and country was the 
least among leaders in PRC history. Without great achievements, Jiang found it hard 
to convince elites and the people that he would be a legitimate and suitable supreme 
leader. In making efforts to gain credibility and authority to consolidate his 
leadership, the limited areas remaining for policy innovation left Jiang with few 
choices but Taiwan. The combination of desire to become an authoritative personage 
and aspiration to make his mark on Chinese history impelled him to pursue a major 
breakthrough over Taiwan. 
Jiang's own wishful thinking regarding an early resolution of the Taiwan issue on 
his terms resulted in unexpected problems in cross-strait relations already fraught 
with uncertainty. Obviously, he underestimated the complexities of Taiwan issues 
and the arduousness of realising national reunification. He set unrealistic 
expectations of what he could do to resolve the reunion issue. Such an intention of 
making great strides toward a single reunified nation had little chance of success. A 
cross-strait breakthrough was unlikely to come quickly because the basis for 
rapprochement remained fragile. He had not precisely assessed the situation in the 
Taiwan Strait. Although it was at detente, unseen hurdles and variables still lurked 
387 
beneath the ostensibly quiet and steady surface of cross-strait relations. He was 
overconfident that the improvement in cross-strait relations from the late 1980s to the 
mid-1990s could be expected to offer an historic opportunity for himself. However, 
there were no conditions to reunite the island under the communist leadership at that 
time. His new Taiwan policy was based on the perception of accomplishing his own 
political achievements rather than cross-strait political reality. He placed overmuch 
hope on his new Taiwan policy. Although he believed his Eight-Point proposals on 
Taiwan were appropriate for the cross-strait situation and were flexible, they were 
not acceptable immediately or totally for Taipei. He was blinded by his eagerness to 
settle the question. More unfortunately, he was overcredulous in believing Lee 
Teng-hui's discourses of reuniting the island with the Chinese mainland and 
unrealistically deemed Lee a partner who would be able to cooperate with him in 
negotiating the reunification issue.95o Consequently he would have to pay a political 
price for his over-optimistic estimation of the cross-strait situation and over-
confidence in his new Taiwan policy. 
Shortly after Jiang's optimistic reunification programme was published, Lee 
began planning his US visit. This apparently eliminated the possibility of a quick 
breakthrough with the island. Because the new Taiwan policy was primarily 
politically motivated by a desire to reinforce his legitimacy of leadership and carve 
his own name in Chinese history as the Great Unifier, arising cross-strait tensions 
were rapidly getting personal. Jiang saw Lee's US visit as suddenly threatening his 
ambitions and was upset about being landed in an awkward situation. Internal 
pressures upon him quickly arose due to his new Taiwan policy, which was 
perceived as soft. In order to free himself from such a predicament, he was forced to 
shift his policy from moderate to tough. This raised tensions in the mainland-island 
and PRC-US relations, escalating into military confrontation. 
An acknowledgement by Jiang threw additional light on the impossibility of 
fulfilling his goal of early reunification and the lessons learned at the cost of the 
950 • Even You Ji, a representative of the school of institutional outcome, gives his opinion that 
probably Jiang oversimplified the cross-strait problems and did not precisely assess Lee. You points 
out: "Jiang may have been thought too innocent, unable to understand Lee thoroughly". "He may 
have been blamed for being an overt optimist about the deepening ties across the strait in recent years, 
failing to anticipate a possible U-turn." See You Ji, "Changing Leadership Consensus: The Domestic 
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Taiwan crisis helped to sober him. Half a year after the crisis, he admitted that he 
had found it hard to resolve the cross-strait problems. He had to remake a timetable 
to achieve Beijing's goal of reabsorbing Taiwan by 2010 to gloss over his mistakes 
and failure. 951 Three terms as party chief and nearly two terms as state president 
passed without a major accomplishment on Taiwan. This again convincingly 
demonstrated that his ambitious reunification programme was impractical. Although 
it seemed that he had not slackened in his efforts to make a remarkable contribution 
to China's reunification, this had become increasingly unlikely. 
Jiang's Taiwan policies are therefore characterised by prevarication and change. 
Earlier, he had offered overtures of peaceful reunification to Taipei and made a new 
policy statement that Beijing would not militarily threaten the island appealing to 
Chinese on both sides ofthe Taiwan Strait not to fight with each other in his new 
year's message of 1995. Nevertheless, only half a year later, he had recanted. He 
was forced to make the decision that the PRC unilaterally suspend all negotiations 
with Taipei and he intimidated Taiwan with the cross-strait missile tests and military 
exercises following the visit by Lee Teng-hui to the US. His individual need for 
political achievements motivated Jiang's exploitation of the Taiwan issue and led to 
fluctuating Taiwan policies and grave consequences for cross-strait and PRC-US 
relations. 
The fragmented political system with informal politics and the partially 
informally politicised architecture of Taiwan policy all contributed to the crisis. 
Informal politics, mainly succession politics, significantly affected the Taiwan policy 
consistency and its outcome. The domestic dynamics of Taiwan policy decision-
making were mainly generated by informal politics. The leadership succession was 
entangled in Taiwan policy, giving rise to more problems in domestic politics and 
foreign relations and accumulating tinder for the Taiwan crisis. Under such 
abnormal political conditions, the Taiwan policy-making mechanism and function 
inevitably became defective and difficult to operate. Because of such internal 
constraints, it was extremely difficult to formulate rational and moderate policies to 
Context of War Games," in Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, 
and the 1995-1996 Crisis. New York and London: Routledge, 1999, p.86. 
respond to the events in the Taiwan Strait. Succession politics affected the top 
leaders in seeking to consider appropriate policies. Under such circumstances, 
Taiwan policy was particularly vulnerable to extremes of decision-making and 
associated crisis. 
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You Ji and Lowell Dittmer suggest that policy innovation by the successor is a 
risk in the succession process. However, this perspective is more focussed on the 
relationship between the heir apparent and the incumbent than the rivalry between 
the successor and the contenders for the leadership.952 Dittmer considers that "Jiang 
simply avoided policy innovation during his regency, thereby avoiding the fate of 
Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao". It is true, generally speaking, that "Jiang fathered no 
significant new policy initiatives during his eight-year regency".953 Yet, it seems that 
Dittmer neglects the fact that Jiang sought to advance Taiwan policy, giving political 
ammunition to his rivals and causing a new round of fierce succession struggle. This 
endangered Jiang's successor position. 
Jiang's policy initiatives on Taiwan complicated the political situation of the 
succession. He appeared to have never considered the risk of initiating a major 
policy, despite the fact that such initiatives can be dangerous when amidst political 
transition. Succession politics in Communist countries is tricky and fickle as the 
contenders for the leadership succession always find fault with the successors' work 
and policy. An initiation of major policy by a successor can provide an opportunity 
to provoke a policy dispute. In particular, new foreign policy propositions can easily 
and promptly turn into a primary domestic debating issue and serve as ammunition 
for rivals. Thereby the successors' major move in initiating or revising policies can 
invite an attack and result in fierce power struggles. When successors try to take 
policy initiatives for the purpose of leadership consolidation, there is limited room 
for political manoeuvre. More dangerously, any policy initiatives can re-ignite the 
951. Yue Shan, "Jiang Admits That He Has Found It Hard to Deal With Taiwan Despite Vowing to 
Resolve the Reunification Issue in 2010," (ffi LlJ , "~I *' iA Xl X;J 11 i5' t~- Y.. if ~ 2010 i:f fff~ 
tR: ME - II:iJ IDi, ") Cheng Ming Monthly (~Plt), No.230, December 1996, pp.19-20. 
952. You Ji, "Jiang Zemin: In Quest ofPost-Deng Supremacy," in Maurice Brosseau, Suzanne Pepper 
and Tsang Shu-ki (eds), China Review 1996. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1996, p.3; 
Lowell Dittmer, "The Changing Shape of Elite Power Politics," The China Journal, No,45, January 
2001, pp.63-66. 
953 . See Lowell Dittmer, "The Changing Shape of Elite Power Politics," The China Journal, No,45, 
January 2001, p.64. 
question of who is the more suitable successor. This will make the succession 
struggle all the more intense. 
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Jiang broke such a taboo, making a strategic mistake. His initiation of a new 
Taiwan policy stemmed from his attempts to claim credit for himself and imperilled 
his successor position. One of his worst miscalculations was that he appeared not to 
realise that his ability to launch policy initiatives was significantly constrained. In 
particular, it was impossible to expect that an unstable successor would be able to 
utilise the complicated and thorny Taiwan issue in order to gain political resources 
and consolidate power. The potentially explosive nature of the Taiwan Strait 
problem meant that it was unlikely to be manipulated for political benefit, let alone 
when under the considerable restrictions of succession politics. However, in questing 
for legitimacy, accountability and credibility for his own leadership, Jiang sparked 
such a powder key. He failed to carefully and seriously consider the political 
consequences oflosing control of the cross~strait situation in such circumstances. 
Indeed, frustrated in his new Taiwan policy, he had lost more than he gained. His 
failure in his quest for political accomplishment by way of reunification with 
Taiwan, left him struggling to defend his right of succession. This failure invited 
political infighting, leading to a more intense succession struggle. When his new 
Taiwan policy initiatives led to the accusation of capitulation, he had to give them up 
and accept tough policy proposals in order to preserve his own successor position 
from attack. Succession politics and its pressures distorted the Taiwan policy course, 
leading it in a more aggressive and disruptive direction. As a result, he was forced to 
make bellicose decisions, finally leading to the outbreak of the Taiwan crisis. 
Battles between contending factions in the hierarchy blocked a rational Taiwan 
policy. Amid the leadership succession struggle, neither successor nor contenders 
could afford to look weak and needed to demonstrate their own political correctness. 
A confrontation between different factions headed by the contenders for the 
leadership succession obstructed the Taiwan policy process, driving the top policy-
maker, Jiang into a corner. Factional rivalry impelled the succession struggle, 
skewing Taiwan policy-making toward more hawkish elements. Most factions 
exerted pressure upon Jiang with their strong demand for radical measures to deal 
with Taipei and Washington. They alleged Jiang had undertaken behaviour injurious 
391 
to national interests. In the charged atmosphere of succession politics, Jiang had to 
let various factions have a voice, as a result, tough opinions pervaded the governing 
clique. Facing such fragility and uncertainty, he had little recourse but to accept a 
more aggressive standpoint on Taiwan. This drove Taiwan policy to trend 
dangerously toward belligerence and resulted in an escalation of cross-strait conflict. 
The activities of internal political forces and the motives of politicians within the 
informal structure drove Taiwan policy towards the creation of cross-strait tensions. 
Taiwan policy was informally politicised and succession politics had a harmful effect 
on its formation and objectives. 
In summary, the greatest problem facing the PRe in 1995-96 was the leadership 
succession dominating the political situation. As a result of the succession struggle 
over the Taiwan policy issues, tension in the Strait was created. 
9.2-3. Problems of Structure and Process and Their Impact upon 
PRe Policy toward Taiwan 
This study has provided an overview ofthe structure and process of Taiwan 
policy-making surrounding the Taiwan crisis. The adoption of coercive means to 
deal with disputes in diplomacy over Lee Teng-hui's US visit, stemmed from a lack 
of formal institutions. Because PRe politics and policy-making were not 
institutionalised, the systemic defects in the architectural design of Taiwan policy-
making were congenital. Thus it can be seen that the mechanism of Beijing's policy 
toward Taiwan partially operated under informal politics, leading to indistinct policy 
goals and capricious policy behaviour. 
The imperfect nature of Taiwan policy-making obstructed any thoughtful, 
farsighted and effective cross-strait strategy. Investigations and studies have shown 
that the changing policies toward Taiwan basically resulted from an unstable internal 
system. The characteristics of the PRe political system were fragmented and 
authoritarian in nature. These features were also reflected in the structure of Taiwan 
policy-making. The various departments, mainly the Taiwan affairs offices and the 
military, security and foreign policy units operated in an uncoordinated fashion, even 
struggling for authority. They failed to work together to formulate a co-ordinated 
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strategy concerning Taiwan. Highly complex inter-personal relations widened the 
rift between the various competing departments and further hindered the Taiwan 
policy-making mechanism. Succession politics aggravated these structural problems. 
As a result, the perplexed and encumbered structure of Taiwan policy-making made 
confusing policy outcomes unavoidable. 
The formulation ofPRC policy toward Taiwan did not operate in a completely 
institutionalised fashion because it had both institutional and noninstitutional 
elements.954 The formal organisations and institutions did not function properly. On 
occasion, the noninstitutional elements even bypassed the institutional organs. The 
expression of different opinions toward, and the influence of internal political forces 
on, the top Taiwan policy-makers were partly due to abnormal procedures, use of 
informal channels and even personal relations. Some major Taiwan policy initiatives 
were even taken outside the institutional framework. The functions of official 
institutions were weakened and could not operate normally or well. 
The abnormal architecture and defective mechanism of Taiwan policy provided 
abundant opportunities for informal political manoeuvring. In Taiwan policy-
making, interpersonal relationships at the top level had an important influence and 
leaders' personal interests played a larger role than institutional factors. This 
facilitated individual leaders exploiting Taiwan policy to serve their political 
purposes. Also, factional contentions occupied an important place in Taiwan policy-
making. Elite factionalism fuelled the succession struggle, producing a negative 
effect and compelling Beijing to move to a tougher stance in its standoff with Taipei 
and Washington in order to smooth over internal strife. 
Noninstitutionalism was incarnated in the two Taiwan policy-making centres. 
The underlying cause for such an abnormal political state lay in Jiang's vulnerable 
successor position and his personal political dynamics. He had to seek support from 
his power base of Shanghai and set up the "Shanghai faction" in consolidating his 
leading position. He relied upon his trusted followers outside the official organs 
more than the official Taiwan policy-making bodies of Beijing. 
954. George W. Tsai, "The Making of Taiwan Policy in Mainland China: Structure and Process," 
Issues & Studies, Vol.33, No.9, September 1997, p.l. 
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The two Taiwan policy-making centres were the origin of Jiang's fluctuating 
Taiwan policies. Retired Wang Daohan played a larger role than Qian Qichen in 
mapping out Jiang's eight point policy toward Taiwan.955 This threw the structure 
into confusion and disrupted the policy procedure. The two centres competed for 
influence. The unofficial Shanghai centre, instigated and supported by the 
paramount leader, challenged the official Beijing centre. The Beijing centre was 
overshadowed but strove to preserve its own legitimacy and pre-eminence. Thus, 
each policy-making centre made its own Taiwan policy. Wang and Qian often 
delivered different speeches on Taiwan policy, which showed that there was a wide 
divergence of views prevalent among the Taiwan policy-makers and they were 
unable to coordinate because of structural problems. As the two centres tussled over 
the Taiwan issue, divisions and debate escalated into outright dispute. 
The two Taiwan policy-making centres further intensified the succession struggle 
and had a structural impact on the architecture of Taiwan policy. Its aftermath had 
been seen in the 1995-96 Taiwan crisis because of the confusion in the Taiwan policy 
structure and the manner in which policy goals were divorced from reality. Jiang 
was tempted to remake Taiwan policy without a proper strategy devised by the 
formal organisational system and its professional officials. 
The imperfect structure and partially irregular process of Taiwan policy-making 
provided the basis for fluctuating policies, even showing a U-turn and sudden 
escalation from diplomatic means to use of military force. Instability in the Taiwan 
policy-making framework and course was liable to transformation into an adventurist 
policy. The problematic structure and process of Taiwan policy-making under 
informal politics means that the top Taiwan policy-makers were not able to 
effectively address Taiwan policy questions or handle events appropriately in the 
Straits. 
The systemic problems in managing the crisis, together with the contention for the 
leadership succession, served to cause and escalate the Taiwan crisis. Beijing never 
developed a crisis-management mechanism, despite declaring that the Taiwan issue 
955 • Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, pp.174-
172. 
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involved serious matters of national security.956 The capricious countermeasures 
dealing with Lee Teng-hui' US visit revealed that institutional responses were 
subordinated. The failure to take appropriate moves to handle cross-strait problems 
that arose from the visit, despite 10 months of crisis, showed that Beijing was 
proving incapable of corning up with crisis-management measures. The Taiwan 
issue was a flash-point and many incidents in the relations across the Straits needed 
to be handled promptly. Yet the mechanism ofPRC Taiwan policy decision-making 
and implementation could not acclimatise itself to such circumstances. Its system of 
information and feedback was very slow and ineffective, incapable of simultaneously 
coordinating inside, and rapidly responding outside. This meant Taiwan policy could 
not readjust swiftly towards the changing situation. Political considerations made the 
systemic problems in crisis management protrusive. In adopting appropriate 
measures in response to Lee's US visit, Jiang Zemin trusted intelligence and the 
advice of his own henchmen more than the government's information-gathering 
system and decision-making apparatus. Failure to hammer out a mechanism for 
crisis-management in line with the potentially explosive nature of the Taiwan Strait 
problem enhanced informal political factors, with considerable consequences. 
Because of the lack of institutionalism in politics and policy-making, institutional 
and noninstitutional elements were simultaneously at work in the PRC policy toward 
Taiwan and the US during 1995-96. Under the circumstances, the viewpoint that the 
Beijing leadership reached a decision on a strategic shift in the Taiwan issue within 
the context of institutionalism, is not sufficient in explaining the PRe's sudden and 
violent actions in the Taiwan Strait. Institutional politics had not been completely 
established in the mid-1990s, mainly because the question of the leadership 
succession remained umesolved. 
9.2-4. Evaluation of the Role of the Military in Taiwan Policy 
Decision-Making 
956. The institutions for managing crisis were not established by the end of the last century. "In 
December 2000 a new National Security Leading Group was established, also chaired by Jiang, to 
formulate and coordinate responses related to international and regional military and strategic crises." 
see David Shambaugh, "The Dynamics of Elite Politics During the Jiang Era," The China Journal, 
No.45, January 2001, p.l04. 
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This study has examined the military's role in the structure and process of Taiwan 
policy-making and its involvement in, and influence on, Beijing's decision-making 
on the Taiwan crisis. It concludes that the leadership succession problem together 
with the military's leverage were leading factors in the outbreak of the crisis. 
The military's role in the policy-making system dealing with Taiwan was based 
on its political status in the PRC power structure and general framework of decision-
making. The military had traditionally wielded political influence and monopolised 
coercive power in the state. Most importantly, the military played a decisive role in 
succession politics. It became a determinant force in the post-Deng succession 
struggle. The military's influence upon politics was also important in shaping the 
country's course as one of the most important and powerful decision-makers within 
the PRC system. Therefore the politically influential military had leverage over 
Taiwan policy. 
Its structural advantages favoured the military having input into the Taiwan policy 
process. It had its own representatives in the inner sanctum of the party's hierarchy 
and governmental cabinet, thus having a considerable say over such issues. Thereby, 
the military's stance on Taiwan had an important influence on the paramount leaders' 
views. On occasion, however, the military trampled on the basic procedural 
regulations for policymaking in imposing its bellicose policy. 
Under such circumstances, although Jiang was planning to offer his peaceful 
offensives to Taipei at the end of 1994, the military was still preparing for the use of 
force in settling the issue. Worse still, on January 30, 1995, the same day that Jiang 
offered his eight-point overture to Taiwan, the military deployed new missile forces 
in areas facing the island. After the publication of Jiang's proposals, the military 
stood in opposition to him, especially outside the official system, trying hard to 
revise this new Taiwan policy. These illegal moves impaired Jiang's capacity as the 
supreme commander and disrupted his moderate Taiwan policy. During the Taiwan 
crisis, important military decisions were made without being formally and fully 
authorised specifically by the civilian leaders. The military leaders took 
presumptuous actions in preparing to intimidate Taiwan, even making battle plans to 
attack Taiwan and its offshore islands. These actions, which risked in full-scale war, 
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theoretically should have been taken after decisions were made by the Politburo and 
its standing committee, but instead came about through a constitutionally irregular 
procedure.957 The military then rammed through the decisions, damaging the Taiwan 
policy institutions. Abnormal military involvement and crude intervention increased 
the noninstitutional elements of the Taiwan policy-making, leaving process even 
more complicated and irregular. 
A struggle between the civilian administration and the military authorities for a 
larger say made the structure and process of Taiwan policy-making still more 
perplexing and disruptive. The military strongly demanded the civilian departments 
readjust Taiwan policy in responding to the course of events in the Straits. Although 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) 
maintained that disputes over Lee Teng-hui's US visit should be settled by means of 
diplomacy and politics, their voices were overridden by the powerful military. When 
the Taiwan crisis, together with the succession crisis, reached a critical point, Jiang 
himself was more politically vulnerable and was unable to protect the civilian 
departments from the military'S attacks. This study has demonstrated that, during the 
Taiwan crisis, the military played a larger role than the civilian departments in 
making decisions. Due to the leadership succession struggle, Jiang adopted more 
viewpoints imposed by the military than stands advocated by the MFA and the TAO. 
The military had a stake in Taiwan affairs and made exceptional efforts to 
influence Taiwan policy. With concerns over national reunification and the external 
environment, its anxiety about Taiwan's status made it assertive and aggressive in 
the pursuit of its strategic goals. To be sure, there were good reasons for its active 
involvement in Taiwan policy-making such as patriotism and preservation of national 
security and territorial integration. More importantly, however, the military was 
prompted by its own vital interests. These were embodied in three concerns: 
preservation of political privilege, the drive for modernisation and the need for 
greater budgetary resources for defence. The formation of a policy to maintain 
tensions with Taiwan could help the military reach its three goals. 
957. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore; New York: Prentice Hall, 1999, pp.174-
176. 
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The military powerfully and effectively influenced Taiwan policy-making. This 
influence stemmed from Jiang's weak and unstable leadership and his inability to 
rein in the PLA. Although he chaired the CMC, won a victory over the Yang family 
generals in the struggle for military command and made major replacements of 
senior officers in favour of himself, he experienced trouble in controlling the military 
and could not afford to risk losing its support. In this particularly fragile political 
transition, he went through a difficult time courting them. He had sought to embark 
on his moderate Taiwan policy with the backing of the military but had failed. This 
policy was perceived as weakness and was disapproved of by the military. In 
particular, the military considered that Jiang's new Taiwan policy militated against 
its strategic, political and economic interests. As the problem of Lee Teng-hui's US 
visit arose in cross-strait relations, the military exerted increasing pressure on Jiang 
to adopt a strong stance toward Taipei and Washington. The military's resentment 
made the responses to the visit especially critical for Jiang. He was forced to make a 
self-criticism over his handling of Taiwan matters and follow a hard-line course in 
future dealings. Furthermore, the military compelled Jiang to launch military 
operations. When Jiang took no action, the contenders for succession and the 
military joined forces to press him to make a decision to militarily confront Taipei 
and Washington. This demonstrated the faCt that there was a strong anti-Jiang 
coalition. The military's alliance with Jiang's principal rivals threatened his 
successor position. He was fearful that the military might shift its support to his 
contenders. Under pressure, he had to accept the plan of physically intimidating 
Taiwan in order to gain the military's support in consolidating his successor position. 
When there was strong political leadership, the military's aspirations could be 
contained. However, unlike Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin wielded 
neither real military command nor absolute political power. In theory, the chair of 
the Central Military Commission could allow him to have control of the army. But 
in practice, Jiang did not wield power as supreme commander in the army. As the 
highest military body ofthe party and country, the CMC is necessary to the power 
base of any top PRC leader. However, whether a leader can have ultimate control of 
the military depends on many circumstances. Although Jiang chaired the CMC, he 
had no real power. This became the root of the military chiefs' pressure on him on 
398 
Taiwan issues. The case of the 1995-96 Taiwan crisis demonstrated that 
noninstitutional elements became predominant over institutional elements in the 
system of military command. In particular, with Jiang unable to contain the 
military's pressure due to his weak successor position, he was in incomplete control 
of Taiwan policy. Thus the military's role was very significant thereby increasing its 
leverage. Jiang's eight-point Taiwan policy and the ramifications of Lee Teng-hui's 
US visit were important elements in events across the Taiwan Strait during 1995-96. 
However, the key point was Jiang's lack of real military command and the weakness 
of his successor position. The case of the Taiwan crisis highlights the factor of 
timing. Although there is always a predisposition on the part of the military to utilise 
the possibility of a crisis with Taiwan, the timing is determined by events external to 
the PRC and the lack of ability of the internal political authorities to restrain the 
military. 
Therefore, the PRC provocation of the Taiwan crisis can be largely attributed to 
the military's leverage over the leadership succession struggle. Succession politics 
together with military-driven politics made the Taiwan crisis inevitable. 
9.3. Summary of Conclusions 
To sum up, the examination of the relationship between domestic politics and 
Taiwan policy conditions and findings in this study shed light on the underlying 
causes of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis. The PRC leadership's consideration in 
making decisions to deal with problems in the cross-strait and PRC-US relations is 
more clearly internally politically motivated than strategic and diplomatic. It is quite 
evident that informal political factors played a large role in shaping Beijing's Taiwan 
policy and decision-making on events in the Taiwan Strait during 1995 and 1996 and 
that the PRC military exercises against Taiwan were more the consequence of the 
succession struggle than an institutional outcome. 
The close connections and interactions between the Taiwan crisis and succession 
politics, and Taiwan policy and informal politics, demonstrated that the PRC politics 
were not fully institutionalised. Military-driven politics played a major role, but 
succession politics constituted the centre of Chinese informal politics. This 
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leadership succession problem provided the military with the opportunities to greatly 
influence Beijing's decision-making on events in the Taiwan Strait. The military's 
influence was significant largely because political control was weakened by the 
struggle for succession. This process was facilitated by the importance of informal 
politics in the PRC. In this sense, the PRC provocation of the Taiwan crisis can be 
largely attributed to the military's leverage in the leadership succession struggle. 
Although other informal political factors contributed to Beijing's Taiwan policy and 
decisions to launch war-games, the struggle for succession was the most important 
factor acting on Taiwan policy and influencing the lead-up to the Taiwan crisis. 
Thus, the Taiwan crisis was due to a series of internal domestic elements of which 
the succession crisis was the key. 
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The Role of the Military ,in the PRe 
Taiwan Policymaking: a case study of 
the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996 
BI JIANHAI* 
This article examines the role of the military in the structure and process of PRe policy 
formulation on Taiwan through a case study of the military's involvement in, and influence 
on, Beijing's policymaking in the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996. The military has its 
own vital interests in Taiwan policy, which are embodied in three aspects: preservation of 
the military" s political privilege, military build-up for modernisation drives, and more 
budgetary resources for defence. This article proposes that the PRe leadership succession 
problem together with the military's leverage accounted for the outbreak of the crisis. 
Under pressure, Jiang Zemin had to accept the plan of physically intimidating Taiwan to 
gain the military's support in consolidating his position as Deng Xiaoping's successor. 
The military's position in the PRC political system and decision-making1 
Before discussing the military's influence upon Taiwan policy-making, it is 
necessary to clarify its position in the PRC power structure and general framework 
of decision-making. The military has played a pivotal political role since 1949. 
Although it has lost some of its importance since 1978 with the country's strategic 
shift from war preparations externally to domestic economic priorities, it is still the 
most powerful political force in the country. The military views its main role as 
safeguarding the country's security, unity and stability, including coping with 
internal unrest that could threaten the Communist regime and its privileged 
position. Domestically, the chief characteristic of the PRC armed forces is the need 
to suppress opposition political forces within the country. Therefore, the military is 
much more than just an organisation of the armed forces, it is the source of power 
for the regime. 
The military's position in the political system of the PRC is based on the 
complex power relationship between the Communist party and the military. 
Politically both party and army need each other. The army supports and safeguards 
* lianhai Bi is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand. He received his M.A. 
from the Foreign Affairs College of Beijing. As a former lecturer at the Institute of International Relations of Beijing 
and a former associate professor at the Institute of Naval Politics of the PLA, he has researched China's politics, foreign 
policy and military strategy. The author is indebted to Emeritus Professor Keith lackson for offering critiques on a 
previous draft of this article, 
I. For different points of view on the underlying cause of the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis and the PRC leadership 
succession problem, see Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-96 
Crisis (New York and London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 4-8. 
1067-0564 print; 1469-9400 online/02/320000-00 © 2002 Taylor & Francis Ltd 
DOl: 10,1080110670560220152328 
BI JIANHAI 
the one-party rule of the CPC whilst the party provides the army with privilege and 
regards it as.a guardian. Without the army the party would lose control of the 
polity. Nominally, the CPC and its paramount leaders have control over the army 
through appointing and reshuffling all military officers, but to a great extent, 
especially at the critical moment of a power struggle inside the CPC, the top leaders 
of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) decide on personnel by themselves and act 
in their own self-interest. Therefore, whether CPC paramount leaders have control 
over the PLA is questionable. By far the biggest issue for the CPC paramount 
leaders is always the loyalty of the military to the civilian leadership.2 
The military has a great influence upon PRC politics. It has the dual function of 
social and political service; especially it is positioned to act as a kingmaker and a 
key decision-maker. Whenever either internal conflict or external crises break out, 
the PLA comes to the fore to stabilise the political situation and, where appropriate, 
decide who should become the new ruler. The political survival of leaders depends 
on the military's support because it is always involved in any power struggle inside 
the party and can play a leading role in deposing a leader. 
In recent years, some scholars have argued that 'the PLA officer corps since 
1978 has become more "professionalized",.3 They believe that the PLA is 
developing more professional-type networks and that professionalising trends are 
prevailing throughout the army. Nevertheless, this study argues that although 
military professionalism has made rapid progress in recent years, the PLA is still 
a highly politicised army. At least in the mid-1990s, the political role of PRC 
armed forces remained unchanged. The National Defence Law, legislated by the 
PRC parliament in the mid-1990s, formalised the army's 'dual function' of 
defending the nation from invaders and ensuring social and political domestic 
stability." Although the professionalisation of the army is now the general trend, it 
is acknowledged that 'there is little evidence to suggest that the PLA is withdraw-
ing from politics'. 5 
The military continues to play an important role in the party and governmental 
policy-making process. In the CPC Central Committee of 1995-1996, elected by 
the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992, 24.3% of the membership represented the 
military establishment.6 The military had its own two representatives in the ruling 
2. According to Michael D. Swaine, the PLA status in the polity may be described as a 'state within a state'. See 
Michael D. Swaine, The Role of Ihe Chinese MililalY in National Security Policymaking (Santa Monica. CA: Rand 
Corporation, 1996), pp. 12, 5~55. In addition, Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross believe that 'the PLA was in 
fact a self-contained organisation'. 'There is even some question whether Jiang, despite his formal authority, has been 
able to exercise full authority over senior military officers.' See Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great 
Wall and Ihe Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), 
p.141. 
3. lames e. Mulvenon, Professionalization of the Senior Chinese Officer Corps: Trends and Implications (Santa 
Monica: Rand, 1997), p. l. 
4. A bill 'Law on National Defence of the PRC' was submitted to the NPC in 1996 and was adopted by the NPC 
in 1997. This law also stipulates the relationship between the PLA and the Cpe. See Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo 
Hwang, China's Security: The New Roles of the Military (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1998), p. 34; James 
Mulvenon, ed., China Facts & Figures: Anllual Handbook, Vol. 23, 1998 (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International 
Press. 1998), pp. 90-93. 
5. See Mulvenon, Pro/essionalizatioll a/the Senior Chinese Officer CO/ps, p. 76, and its book review by lianhai 
Bi. The China Journal, 41, 1999, pp. 222-223. 
6. Li Cheng and Lynn White, 'The army in the succession to Deng Xiaoping: familiar fealties and technocratic 
trends', Asian Sun1ey XXXIII(8), (August 1993), p. 758. 
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CPC Politburo which totalled a full membership of 20.7 More important, in the 
mid-1990s, the Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, General Liu 
Huaqing was a member of the permanent committee of the party's Political Bureau, 
which groups the CPC regime's most powerful leaders, and makes all important 
political decisions as well as formulating principles and policies. He was the only 
military official among the seven members of the CPC Politburo Standing Com-
mittee but had a strong voice.8 Traditionally, the military has taken a positive role 
in the formulation of domestic -and foreign policies. 
The military sees itself as the defender of national unity, trying to hold together 
China's separate islands and remote ethnic frontiers. Taiwan affairs constitute an 
important element in the national reunification and foreign policy areas. More 
important, the PRC policy towards Taiwan has a direct bearing on national defence, 
especially military strategy, even war and peace. The military insists that it will 
firmly protect the country's sovereignty and terrItorial integrity. The military has 
time and again threatened the use of force if Taiwan declared independence or in 
the event of a foreign invasion of the island. More seriously, an independent 
Taiwan or long-term division from mainland China will encourage ethnic splitting 
movements in the country's border regions such as the Muslims in western China. 
The military wants to play its role as China's central unifying structure and thus it 
is extremely important in seeking to understand how the PRC Taiwan policy is 
made. 
The military leadership and institutions involved in Taiwan policy making 
Before analysing the PLA major units involved in Taiwan policy making, it is 
necessary briefly to view the military's general organisational structure and de-
cision-making system.9 At the top level, the Central Military Commission(CMC) of 
the Communist Party of China(CPC) is the country's supreme body in charge of the 
armed forces, and the highest military policy-making body. The state CMC is 
bracketed with the party CMC as both organisations consist of the same people. 
The PRC leadership has maintained dual, identical party and state military commis-
sions since the 1980s in order to enhance the legitimacy of the CPC regime with 
a nominal government role in governing the army.lO Between 1995 and 1996, the 
then chairman of the CMC of both party and state was Jiang Zemin who was also 
both Communist Party chief and head of state. The CMC has overall responsibility 
for military affairs, thereby centralising power on major issues. Its main duty is to 
take decisions on defence strategy and national security. For example, it has the 
7. Robert F. Ash. 'Quarterly chronicle and documentation', The China Quarterly No. 133, (March 1993), p. 194. 
8. Compared with that there was no professional serviceman in the CPC Politburo Standing Committee of the 
Thirteenth Central Committee in the latc-1980s, the military's representation in the ruling circle has significantly 
increased in the earIy- and mid-I 990s. See You Ji, 'Missile diplomacy and PRC domestic politics', in Greg Austin, 
ed., Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan's Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power (Canberra: Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997), p. 43. 
9. For a chart of the basic organisational structure of the PRC military, see Michael D. Swaine, The Military & 
Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, Beliej~' (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1992), p. 245. 
For an overview of the military's decision-making structure, see Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military. 
10. Gurtov and Hwang, China's Security, p. 14. 
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power to initiate the use of force despite the power of deciding on questions of war 
and peace nominally being exercised by the National People's Congress and its 
Standing Committee. Thus it has the real power to take a final decision on whether 
to use military means against Taiwan. However, the CMC does not supervise all 
military affairs. Matters such as defence planning and the army's training are 
assigned to the PLA three general departments to oversee. 
There is a close linkage between the CMC and the Central Taiwan Work 
Leading Group (CTWLG). Tai-wan policy is largely military in nature. Jiang 
Zemin's assumption of a leading position in the CTWLG originated in part from 
his chairmanship of the CMe. Such circumstances established a connection 
between defence policy and Taiwan policy, more generally providing the military 
plenty of room to become involved in a range of critical Taiwan policy decisions. 
The PLA had a representative, Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief 
of the general staff of the army, on the CTWLG, strengthening the military's ties 
with the top Taiwan policy makers. At the time when Jiang was in incomplete 
control of Taiwan policy, the military's role in shaping the country's strategic 
objectives was particularly significant thereby increasing its leverage. II 
Four CMC vice-chairmen were professional servicemen: Admiral Liu Huaqing, 
General Zhang Zhen, General Zhang Wannian and General Chi Haotian. 12 Admiral 
Liu and General Zhang Wannian were viewed as the key defence strategy makers 
and known to be involved in, and influence Taiwan policy.13 First Vice-Chairman 
Liu Huaqing was also concurrently a member of the CPC Politburo Standing 
Committee in charge of day-to-day military affairs. He had a decisive role in 
discharging the CMe responsibilities. Second Vice-Chairman General Zhang Zhen 
had a low public profile. His military career after 1949 was served mainly as a 
senior official leading the defence science, technology and education organisations 
rather than as a commander directing operations. He was not regarded as an active 
participant in Taiwan policy making. 14 General Zhang Wannian who had real 
power despite being fourth in the top military hierarchy, had served previously as 
chief of the PLA general staff. He was good at mapping out strategy and tactics 
while also being experienced as a field commander. He planned and executed the 
military exercises held during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996. 
General Chi Haotian served concurrently as Minister of Defence. Although 
visible internationally as the PRC top military leader, Chi was less powerful than 
General Zhang Wannian, or the two veterans, Admiral Liu Huaqing and General 
Zhang Zhen. 15 This suggests that the Ministry of National Defence (MND) is not 
II. You li. 'Missile diplomacy and PRC domestic politics', pp. 40-43; John W. Garver.Face Off: China, the United 
States, and Taiwan '.I' Demorcrati::.ation (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997), p. 61; Swaine, 
The Role of the Chinese Military, p. 27, n. 19; p. 28, n. 20. 
12. Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
j 3. Harlan W. Jencks, 'Wild speculations on the military balance in the Taiwan Straits', in James R. Lilley and 
Chuck Downs, cds, Crisis in the Taiwan Strait (FT. McNair, Washington. DC: National Defence University Press, 
1997), p. 146; Tai Ming Cheung, 'Chinese military preparations against Taiwan over the next 10 years', in Lilley 
and Downs, eds. Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, pp. 61-62. 
14. Swaine. The Role of the Chinese Military, p. 18. However. according to Tai Ming Cheung, 'Zhang Zhen is 
believed to oversee the formulation of strategic doctrines toward Taiwan', yet Cheung does not provide a reference 
to support his opinion. See Tai Ming Cheung, 'Chinese military preparations against Taiwan', p.62. 
15. On the inter-personal and working relationship between the four CMC vice-chairmen, see Swaine, The Role 
of the Chinese Military, p. 43. 
542 
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE PRC 
an organ with real power. The MND exists in name, rather than in reality. It is set 
up in light of international custom performing mostly protocol and ceremonial 
functions such as liasing with foreign military units. The important defence 
decisions are made at the CMC while routine military administrative affairs are 
handled by three general departments of the PLA. 16 Chi did not playa leading role 
in national security affairs or military strategy. His career was mainly served as a 
political commissar specialising in military political work. As a state councillor and 
Minister of National Defence, -Chi oversaw military research and development 
while coordinating relations with the administrative departments. Chi was not as 
influential as the other three CMC vice-chairmen in the Taiwan policy process 
despite participating in making the major decisions to launch the military exercises 
intimidating Taiwan in 1995-1996. 
The PLA three general departments, the General Political Department (GPD), the 
General Logistics Department (GLD) and the General Staff Department (GSD), 
represent a second tier of the military leadership.17 The GPD is a general branch 
of the CPC in the PLA. It is responsible for overseeing political education, 
discipline and the supervision of officers and soldiers. The GLD is in charge of 
defence finance, military supplies and PLA-related construction and properties. The 
GSD is the highest organ in charge of PLA military matters including the direction 
of troop movements and operations. It plays a key role in the policy-making 
process,particularly war readiness and mobilisation. Among the three general 
departments, the GSD plays a larger role than the GPD or the GLD in influencing 
the formulation of defence strategy and Taiwan policy.18 The heads of the GPD, the 
GLD and the GSD are all members of the CMC. Although the directors of the three 
general departments do not participate in all critical decision-making, their advice 
would be taken into account. Usually they had a strong voice. Of the directors and 
deputy-directors of the three general departments, the chief of the general staff and 
deputy chiefs have a predominant role in national security affairs and Taiwan 
policy making. 
This study proposes that the GSD and its chief and deputy chiefs are more 
influential than the GPD and the GLD and their directors and deputy-directors in 
the military's standpoint on national security affairs and Taiwan policy.19 This 
16. Ibid., pp. 34-36: p. 44, n. 16. 
17. The PLA had three general departments between 1995 and 1996, but it has four general departments now. In 
1998 the PRC government announced that it had added a fourth department to the army. The General Equipment 
Department (GED) is a new department to oversee the PLA weaponry, equipment, and armaments acquisition in 
particular. See Edward Chen, 'Mainland China deploying over 400 missiles opposite Taiwan: report', CNA, (8 August 
2000). 
18. Michael D. Swaine believes that 'of the three general departmenl~ and other executive agencies of the military 
affairs system, the GSD has by far the greatest input into the national security and defense policy process'. See Swaine, 
The Role of the Chinese Military, pp. 46-47. 
19. According to Michael D. Swaine, the GPD and GLD 'reportedly do not playa major formative role in the 
defense policy process'. Chief of the General Staff, Fu Quanyou played a role in advising on the national security 
policy. See Ibid .. pp. 50-52, p. 16. On policy toward Taiwan, it is basically the same situation but slightly different. 
George W. Tsai believes that the GLD does not playa major role in the Taiwan policy process. He puts the roles 
of both the GSD and the GPD in influencing Taiwan policy on an equal footing, but recognises that Xiong 'is an 
important transmitter of the military's stands on Taiwan affairs' and is in a position that can have an effect on Jiang 
Zemin's view on Taiwan policy. See George W. Tsai, 'The making of Taiwan policy in mainland China: structure 
and process', Issues & Studies 33(9), (September 1997), pp. 16,24. 
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argument is based on the following three points. Firstly, the GSD is a key unit 
concerning Tiiiwan, which is in charge of military strategy on Taiwan including 
collection of Taiwan information and mapping-out of the battle plan against 
Taiwan. Secondly, Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of the general 
staff, was the PLA representative on the Central Taiwan Work Leading Group. 
Thirdly, Xiong was in charge of foreign affairs and information for the whole army, 
and was responsible for coordinating all strategic intelligence materials in the field 
of military intelligence, in particular, Taiwan-related military affairs. 
Below the level of the three general departments, there are seven major military 
regions, mainly made up of ground forces. Other services and arms are the Air 
Force, Navy and the strategic nuclear force, the Second Artillery Corps. In addition, 
there are non-combatant units such as: the Commission of Science, Technology and 
Industry for National Defence, the Academy of Military Science and the Defence 
University. Among them, the Defence University is more active in Taiwan policy 
but does not have a substantive influence. Of the seven major military regions, the 
Nanjing Military Region, which oversees the Taiwan area, is responsible for 
preparing possible military action against Taiwan. The Second Artillery Corps is 
involved in the Taiwan policy process but is less influential. This notwithstanding, 
motivated by its own vital interests, it has tried to influence Taiwan policy. It 
demanded formally a change of name into the PLA Strategic Rocket Force in order 
to promote its position from an arm to a service. It believed that cross-Strait 
tensions could demonstrate its important position. It prepared a lightning war to 
attack Taiwan and proposed this battle plan to Jiang Zemin during the Taiwan 
Strait crisis of 1995-1996.20 The Air Force lobbied for sophisticated aircraft to deal 
with the Taiwan contingency. However, among all the services and arms, the navy 
has seen the most active involvement in Taiwan policy making because it relates 
closely to its strategic ambitions?] 
The PLA Navy (PLAN) had played an increasing role in Taiwan policy making 
following the early 1990s when conditions were favourable for its lobbying on 
Taiwan policy. The PLAN's commanders, who had been far away from the 
decision-making centre in the previous 40 years, now had powerful representatives 
in the party-state and military. The former Commander of the Navy, Liu Huaqing 
became a member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Politburo and first CMC 
vice-chairman in 1992.22 Liu was credited with expanding the PRC naval ambi-
tions, and made important .contributions to the PLAN's reconstruction and 
modernisation while stressing its important role in resolving the Taiwan issue.23 
20. Luo Bing, 'The military hawk grows more powerful and Jiang Zemin is forced to make self-criticism-
Communist China reviews its interlinked strategies toward America and Taiwan'. The Trend Magadne (Dollgxiang) 
No. 118. (June 1995), p. 8; Qu Tao, 'Can an attack with missiles on Taiwan become effective within three minutes?', 
Cheng Ming Monthly No. 219, (January 1996), pp. 21-22. 
21. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military. pp. 47-48; Bates Gill and Kim Taeho, China's Anns Acquisitions 
Jrom Abroad: A Quest Jor 'Superb and Secret Weapons' (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
pp.60-61. 
22. 'New party leadership line-up', Beijing Review, (2-8 November 1992), p. 12. 
23. You Ji and You Xu, 'In search of blue water power: the PLA navy's maritime strategy in the 1990s', Pacific 
Reviell' 4(2), (1991), pp. 139-140; Gill and Taeho. China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad, pp. 60--61, 108. In 
addition, with Liu Huaqing's influence and efforts, the navy was one of the best funded of PLA services in the early 
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The former PLAN Vice-Commander and Naval Airforce Commander, Vice-Admi-
ral Li Jing, promoted to Vice-Chief of the General Staff in the early 1990s, was 
regarded as the navy's chief representative at the level of the PLA three general 
departments.24 Li played a key role in lobbying the civilian and military leadership 
to decide to import warships and submarines from Russia, and at a time to plan to 
purchase a Russian-made aircraft carrier to cope with the Taiwanese and the 
American Navies. 25 The promotion of PLAN's elite into the paramount political 
strata and the top military leadership set up the navy's input into Taiwan 
policymaking. 
Apart from accelerating naval modernisation, the PLAN lobbied on Taiwan 
policy for two main objectives. Strategically, a strong Beijing stance would help 
promote the PRC national security priority shift from land-dominated military 
strategy to maritime defence. Politically, an important role in resolving the Taiwan 
issue would mean the PLAN's higher status in the armed forces and higher prestige 
in the country. Specifically, the PLAN hoped to gain a greater share of the military 
budget and more advanced warships, including the aircraft carrier through its 
vigorous lobbying activities. The PLAN viewed resolution of the Taiwan issue in 
its form of reunification of the country as its primary combat mission followed by 
defence of the sea territory and protection of China's maritime interests. 26 The 
prominence of the Taiwan issue pushed the PLAN forward a stage and provided a 
golden opportunity for it to lobby the PRC paramount strata. The PLAN was a 
particular actor in provoking the crisis of 1995-1996 when Beijing made the 
decision to militarily intimidate Taiwan. For example, as principal commanders, 
Vice-Admiral Li Jing, deputy chief of the general staff of the PLA, and Rear 
Admiral He Pengfei, PLAN vice-commander, conducted a manoeuvre called 
'95-Independent No.8', one of the most important military exercises in intimidating 
Taiwan. The manoeuvre with live ammunition involved the three armed services, 
mainly the naval air force, naval coastal artillery, naval missile unit and the East 
Sea Fleet.27 The PLAN's lobbying resulted in attracting more attention from the 
highest leadership. During the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996, Jiang Zemin 
made an inspection tour of the PLAN's units and viewed a naval exercise directed 
at Taiwan.28 The PLAN's profile had risen. It canvassed for its own aggressive 
views on Taiwan policy and strove to get them adopted. Basically, the policy was 
a naval blockade of Taiwan. A blockade of Taiwan would display the PLAN's 
FoOflJmf' 23 cmlliflut'd 
1990s. See Willy Wo-Lap Lam. China after Deng Xiaoping: The Power Structure in Beijing since Tiananmen 
(Singapore: John Wiley & Sons. 1995). pp. 196-197,200. 
24. The Editorial Board of Who's Who in China. Who's Who in China Current Leaders (Beijing: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1994). p. 300. 
25. As the former navy commander and naval air force commander, both Liu and Li took a personal interest in 
aC<.juiring an aircraft carrier. See Gill and Taeho. China's Anm Acquisitions ji'om Abroad, p. 108. 
26. Ibid., pp. 60-61. 
27. Li Zijing, 'An actual account on the exercises of blockading Taiwan', Cheng Ming MOl1lhly No. 21S, 
(September 1995). pp. 12-13. 
28. During his inspection, Jiang emphasised that it was very important to improve the naval force and quicken 
the pace to realise its modernisation to ensure coastal defence and resolve the Taiwan issue. Jiang praised the PLAN's 
military build-up achievements. Encouraged by his remarks, the PLAN vowed to strive for better performance of its 
military role in the country and contribute to the national reunification. See Huang Caihong, 'Witnessing the PLAN's 
naval exercise on the sea'. Outlook Weekly, (6 November 1995), pp. 6-7. 
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naval power and increase its leverage while avoiding its weak point that it was 
incapable of launching and sustaining an amphibious assault. Both the air force and 
the ground force would only playa supporting role. The military held a number of 
exercises blockading Taiwan in the PLA war games during the crisis of 1995-1996. 
This demonstrated, by and large, that the PLAN's strategy of blockading Taiwan 
had been approved by the military high command.29 In the meantime, the PLAN's 
plan of blockading Taiwan was taken into account by the PRC leaders in search of 
a coercive solution of the Taiwan issue.3D 
The military has its own information units and research institutes dealing with 
TaiwanY The military intelligence apparatuses playa leading role. The two most 
important are the Military Intelligence Branch of the GSD and the Liaison 
Department of the GPD. The Military Intelligence Branch, which is also called the 
Second Department (the Er Bu) is in charge of foreign military intelligence. The 
collection of Taiwan military intelligence is one of its major missions including 
clandestine special agents sent to Taiwan. The First Bureau under the Second 
Department is responsible for gathering information on Taiwan. It focuses on 
spying on intelligence about the Taiwan army such as armaments, operational 
preparations and battle plans while collecting information about politics and society 
relating to the military. When the Second Department engages in public activities 
and exchanges with foreign military and academic institutions, as well as Tai-
wanese research bodies and visiting scholars, it is in its capacity as the China 
Institute for International Strategic Studies.32 
The Liaison Department (Lianluo Bu) of the GPD was formerly called the enemy 
affairs unit. Now publicly known as the China Association for International 
Friendly Contacts, its main duty is to stir up insurrection within enemy armies or 
an imaginary enemy army with psychological warfare. It is also responsible for 
gathering political, economic, social and relevant military intelligence regarding 
Taiwan. However, it is principally tasked with instigating attempts at rebellions 
within the Taiwanese military. It conducts ideological and political work, political 
29. See Li Zijing. 'An actual account on the exercises of blockading Taiwan', pp. 12-13: Luo Bing, 'The ground 
force and airforce under the command of three major military region~ moved into Fujian and Jiungxi', Cheng Ming 
Monthly No. 221, (March 1996). pp. 6-7. At a meeting entitled 'the Report on Strategic Principle regarding Taiwan' 
convened by the Ministry of National Defence and the General Staff Department attended by most top military leaders, 
one of the mains views was that advocating a blockade of Taiwan. See Yi Fan. 'Communist China prepares public 
opinion for forcible invasion of Taiwan ',Cheng Ming Monthly No. 208, (February 1995), pp. 25-26. In addition, CMC 
Vice-Chairman Zhang Wannian bragged that the PLA was capable of blockading the Taiwan Strait within 24 hours. 
See Yi Fan. 'The top military leaders brag that the PLA will need less than two days to mount a successful invasion 
of Taiwan', Cheng Ming Monthly No. 218, (December 1995), pp. 29-30. 
30. The PRe leaders have delivered many speeches about a naval blockade of Taiwan while threatening the use 
of force. See Martin Lasater, Beijing's Blockade Threat to Taiwan (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 1985), 
p. I; John K.T. Chao, 'Legal aspects of a Pacific blockade of Taiwan' , in Jayant Lele and Kwast Of or i-Yeba~h, cds, 
Unravelling the Asian Miracle: Explorations in Development Strategies, Geopolitics and Regionalism (Alders hot and 
Brookfield, USA: Dartmouth, 1996), pp. 153-154; David Shambaugh, 'The insecurity of security; the PLA' s evolving 
doctrine and threat perceptions toward 2000', Journal oJNortheast Asian Studies XlII(I), (Spring 1994), pp. 13-14. 
31. For an examination of the PRe military's strategic research, analysis, and intelligence institutions in the national 
security affairs including Taiwan affairs, see Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military, pp. 57-71. 
32. Dan Bo, 'Communist China's intelligence, external affairs research organs', Cheng Ming Monthly No. 227, 
(September 1996), p. 30; Tsai, 'The making of Taiwan policy in mainland China', p. 24. 
546 
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE PRe 
offensives and wars of nerves against the Taiwan army, attempting to disintegrate 
it by dampening servicemen's morale. 33 
The duties of the Second Department and the Liaison Department are to research 
the military strategy regarding Taiwan and prepare studies on questions that the top 
military leaders want addressed. In addition, the two departments provide another 
channel of information for the paramount leaders which is different from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Foreign Affairs Office, the Taiwan Affairs Office 
and the Ministry of National Security. Sometimes these two military departments 
prepare infonnation for reference to the Politburo of the CPC. They report new 
developments in Taiwan affairs to the central decision-makers and advise on moves 
to get the military opinion input into the inner Taiwan policy process.34 
In the mid-1990s, both the Second Department and the Liaison Department were 
directed by Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai. Although the Liaison Department 
belonged to the GPD system, it was put under Xiong's command. Xiong was in 
charge of foreign affairs and infonnation for the whole army and was responsible 
for coordinating all strategic intelligence materials in the field of military intelli-
gence. Of all military officers below the CMC level who are involved in the 
formulation of Taiwan policy, Xiong was one of the most politically influential 
generals.35 Xiong sat as a military representative on the powerful CTWLG that sets 
policy toward Taiwan. Apart from the military strategy, he was seen as rather 
actively· involved in a number of other aspects of Taiwan concerns. While 
frequently travelling abroad, he had substantial contact with important visitors from 
major powers as well as Taiwan. He had firsthand material on Taiwan and reported 
directly to Jiang Zerning, boasting considerable political influence with his mili-
tarily aggressive views. From time to time he also published tough opinions on 
Taiwan policy as the military's representative. He showed himself to be a strident 
critic of US policy toward Taiwan while advocating a strong PRC stance toward 
the United States. For example, he was best known for his threat that the PLA 
could strike Los Angeles with nuclear weapons if the United States intervened in 
the conflict during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996.36 Xiong representing the 
PLA had a key voice in setting Taiwan policy. 
PLA veterans are an important force in influencing the Taiwan policy process. 
Although retired, veterans who held senior posts in the PLA remain privileged and 
influential with a strong conservative and negative voice. They continue to be 
involved in the party-state politics and policy decision making including foreign 
policy:'? They express their views on national security affairs and defence policy 
33. Dan Bo, 'Communist China's intelligence'. p. 30; Tsai, 'The making of Taiwan policy in mainland China'. 
p.16, 
34. Dan Bo. 'Communist China's intelligence'. p, 30; Tsai, 'The making of Taiwan policy in mainland China', 
p. 16. p. 24, 
35. For Xiong's position in the party-state leading circles and the military authorities and his role in Taiwan policy 
making. see Swaine, The Role of the Chinese MiUta/y, p,32; Dan Bo, 'Reasons why replaced national security 
minister', The Trend J'vJagazine No, 152, (April 1998), pp, 40-42: Tsai, 'The making of Taiwan policy in mainland 
China', p, 24, 
36, lames Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relations with Chilla,jrom Nixo/l to Clinton (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1999). pp. 334. 342, 
37. lohn W. Garver, 'The PLA as an interest group in Chinese foreign policy', in C. Dennison Lane, Mark 
Weisenbloom and Dimon Liu, eds, Chinese Military I'vlodernizatioll (New York: Kegan Paul International. 1996), 
pp. 254-255. 
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through writing letters and sending petitions in joint names. Taiwan was one of the 
major issues that concerned them and they were influential with the top Taiwan 
policy makers. They questioned the civilian leadership's rapprochement with the 
United States while American support for Taiwan continued and demanded a tough 
PRC stance. In the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping could resolve their differences and 
dissatisfactions within the policy apparatus. However, by the mid-1990s when 
Deng's successors as party-state leaders took charge, in particular, Jiang Zemin, 
they found it hard to resist pressure from these retired PLA elders. As a result, the 
PLA veterans' interference in the Taiwan policy process strengthened the military's 
influence on the paramount makers on decisions concerning Taiwan. However, this 
put the civilian leaders in a dilemma and made it more difficult, especially for 
Jiang, to formulate a rational and practical Taiwan policy.38 
The military's interests in Taiwan policy making 
With its special capacity, the military plays an important role in Taiwan policy-
making. At times it may even play a decisive role. Apart from acting in defence 
of the nation's unity the military has its own vital interests in Taiwan policy 
embodied in three aspects: preservation of the military's political privilege; military 
build-up for modernisation drives; and more budgetary resources for defence. 39 
Only through an active involvement in the Taiwan policy-making process can the 
military reach these three major objectives. It is known to favour aggressive stands 
which derive from its particular interests and it benefits most from tension with 
Taiwan. 
Firstly, the military strives to regain power and through participation in Taiwan 
policy-making to resurrect its social stature and maintain its privileged position. 
The military achieved almost legendary status from the 1950s to the 1970s but has 
faced tough times since the 1980s. During the 1960s and 1970s, especially the 
period of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the military dominated the 
country through maintaining social order and political stability. After the return of 
civilian rule, it lost its power. The developing market-oriented economy and the 
opening to the outside world have had a strong impact on the military's privileged 
position. Economic reform from the planned economy to a market economy began 
in the 1980s and did not require a military social-control function. 
Faced with the country's dramatic transformation, the military reluctantly agreed 
to participate in economic reform but refused to join political reform. Its position 
in the country was diminished. In previous decades, servicemen enjoyed living 
standards superior to people in other occupations, but beginning in the 1980s, the 
stature of the servicemen's profession depreciated. The military's lower social 
station was demonstrated by the fact that officers and soldiers suffered from pitiful 
salary scales.40 The military socio-political status declined, it lost much of its 
importance in the state and no longer enjoyed pride of place in society. In order to 
38. Swaine. The Role of the Chinese Military. pp. 12,33-35. 
39. Tsai. 'The making of Taiwan policy in mainland China', p. 17. 
40. Arthur S. Ding. 'China's defence finance: content. process and administration', The China Quarterly No. 146, 
(June (996), p. 442. 
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reverse the unfavourable situation, the military had to find and prove an externally 
realistic danger to the country to underline the urgency of enhancing its power. 
Taiwan was a ready-made ideal policy area that demonstrated the essentiality of the 
military. Tension in the Taiwan Strait automatically helps to increase the military's 
importance and prestige. 
Large-scale military cuts were in line with a change of status in the army. In 
1985, the PRe government announced that the armed forces would be cut by one 
million.41 From 1985 to 1990, the PLA manpower was reduced from 4.4238 million 
to 3.199 million.42 The major military regions were pared from 11 to seven. The 
PLA officer corps was reduced and its future size curbed. Many military officers, 
especially generals, lost their promotion prospects. 
Although the military voiced concerns that it could not disarm any more and 
stressed the importance of stepping up defence modernisation on the grounds of 
dealing with external invasion, it found it hard to convince the civilian leaders that 
the security of the PRe was threatened. The PRe leadership judged that another 
world war was unlikely to break out in the next several decades and peace and 
development had become the main trend all over the world. The civilian leaders 
were planning a new round of troop cuts for the army in the face of stiff resistance 
from the military in the early 1990s. The total PLA staff establishment was 
expected to be cut from 3.2 million to 2.7 million. The proposed move was 
politically risky for the civilian leaders. The generals fought the reductions in a 
lobbying campaign bitterly opposing more layoffs. 
The military believed that underlining the Taiwan issue could be an excellent 
reason to stop further disarmament. What is more, this would provide an oppor-
tunity for the military's resurgence. Thus the military managed to stress that there 
was a possibility of armed conflict over the Taiwan issue, in particular, with 
Taiwan's guardian, the United States. The active diplomatic drive by Taipei to seek 
to become an independent state internationally, in particular, the Taiwan president's 
US visit and Washington's permission for his trip, gave the military an argument 
to alert the paramount leaders to the danger of permanent national division 
heightening tension in the Taiwan Strait. Although the civilian leaders believed that 
the international environment was still peaceful and favourable and this would help 
promote peaceful reunification with Taiwan, they had to yield to the army's 
powerful pressure because the military had an important leverage over its political 
destiny during the period of leadership succession. The disarmament plan of cutting 
a further half-million troops prepared in 1995 was postponed until the Taiwan Strait 
crisis of 1995-1996 ended a year and half later.43 
41. 'China decides to cut its army', Beijing Review, (17 June 1985), p. 6. 
42. Zhao Yining, 'China will cut 500.000 troops from its armed forces'. Outlook Weekly. (17 November 1997). 
p.8. 
43. You Ji. 'The PLA's military modernisation in the 1990s', in Stuart Harris and Gary Klintworth. eds. China 
as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region (Melbourne: Longman Australia. 1995), 
p. 238; Bear Lee, 'Defense ministry comment on reports of Beijing's mil. dismantling', CNA, (9 Decembcr 1997); 
Jiang Zemin announced that China would de mobilise 500,000 military personnel in the nex! three years at the 15th 
Party Congress in 1997. See Jiang Zemin, 'Hold high the great banner of Deng Xiaoping theory for an all-round 
advancement of the cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics into the 21 st century-report delivered 
atthe 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on September 12, 1997', Beijing Review. (6-12 October 
1997). p. 28. 
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One of the reasons that the military intended to spark Taiwan as a flashpoint was 
to restore the -Fuzhou military region. The big reduction of one million personnel 
between the mid-1980s and the early-1990s eliminated a large number of higher-
ranking positions at the regional-level.44 The generals faced increasingly tough 
competition with each other for positions as commanding officer at the regional-
level. A way out for more opportunities was to be found in the restoration of 
the abolished major military regions. The generals knew that it would be imposs-
ible to re-establish all of them, -but placed their hope on recovering the Fuzhou 
military region. Of the four major military regions abolished, only the former 
Fuzhou military region directed at Taiwan would stand a chance of restoration.45 
The generals sounded the alarm on Taiwan to provide impetus for the re-establish-
ment of the Fuzhou military region.46 When the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996 
broke out, a compromise was reached between the generals and the civilian leaders. 
The Nanjing War Region (NWR) was established instead of restoration of the 
Fuzhou military region. However, the NWR was a provisional unit outside the 
formal system of military organisation.4? Since the mid-1990s, the tense situation 
in the Taiwan Strait between 1995 and 1996 in particular, the civilian leadership 
has been under strong pressure from the generals to restore the Fuzhou military 
region.48 
Defence modernisation and the military's involvement in Taiwan policy 
A strong desire for defence modernisation impels the military to keenly involve 
itself in Taiwan policy. Taiwan is the main focus of the PLA modernisation efforts. 
A powerful modem army has been the military's dream for a long time.49 Although 
it claimed to be the largest standing army in the world, until the mid-1990s, the 
PRe combat forces were considered to be backward in both weapons and military 
doctrine. From the late-1940s to the mid-1990s, the PLA weaponry had evolved 
from old-fashioned equipment to relatively sophisticated warships, fighter planes, 
nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles including a few Russian-made advanced conven-
tional weapons. This notwithstanding, generally speaking, the PLA was still 
equipped like a fighting force from the 1950s. A lot of elements of the military 
were outdated, even equipped with US and Japanese equipment captured during 
44. Since the disarmament of CUlling one million personnel and the PLA professionalising trends, a series of 
measures of regularising the army, such as a strictly formal organisational system. mandatory retirement and 
gradualised promotion. have been introduced. Thereby the commander posts of major military regions were 
mandatorily limited. See Mulvenon. Professionali::ation of the Senior Chinese Officer Corps. 
45. When the major military regions were reorganised into seven. the Fuzhou military region was cut off and its 
defence area was merged into two neighbouring military regions. mainly the Nanjing military region. After merging, 
the Nanjing Military Region oversees the Taiwan area. 
46. Garver. 'The PLA as an interest group in Chinese foreign policy'. p.261. 
47. Jencks, 'Wild speCUlations on the military balance in the Taiwan Straits'. pp. 145-146. 
48. 'Communist China plans to re-establish the Fuzhou Military Region', Cheng Ming Mon/hly No. 264. (October 
1999), p. 23; Guan Qingning and Wang Jianmin. 'To outward seeming the tension eases but a crisis is latent in the 
Taiwan Strait'. The International Chinese Weekly, (29 August 1999). 
49. For an overview of the PRC military modernisation, see Larry M. Wortzel. cd., China '.I' Militw}' Moderni~atioll: 
International Implications (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988); Dennison Lane e/ ai., eds. Chinese Military 
Model'lli~atiol1. 
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World War II. Thus the combat forces remained backward in weaponry and 
equipment, in particular, the PLA had not acquired and assimilated advanced 
technology. It was in need of new types of weapons and sophisticated technology, 
smart weapons and new high technology military armaments in particular. 
Nevertheless, the top priority had been given to national economic development 
since 1978 despite defence modernisation being one of the Four Modernisations' 
programme (the other three objectives are modernisation of industry, agriculture, 
and science and technology). If-military modernisation was to be taken as a focal 
point of the country's work, it would undertake a huge spending programme over 
many years and require a major diversion of resources from the civilian economy, 
but many Chinese would oppose such a shift. In order to consolidate the Commu-
nist regime's legitimacy the PRC leadership had to scale down its agenda for 
military modernisation to focus on the pressing economic issues. 
The 1991 Persian Gulf War, which became a favoured theme of the elite officers, 
provided the PRC military with an argument to speed up defence modernisation.so 
Comparatively, the Gulf War demonstrated Western modernised military power 
and revealed the PRe military backwardness. This promoted the PRe military aim 
for a leaner but technologically more advanced establishment of national defence. 
However, there was no danger of war for the PRe. Although it fought with India 
in the early 1960s and with Vietnam in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, Beijing 
was negotiating with New Delhi and Hanoi on border issues. Indeed, there were 
disputes for territorial claims between the PRe and Southeast Asian countries over 
the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and between the PRe and Japan over 
the Diaoyutai (Senkakus in Japanese) Islands. However, Beijing has displayed its 
consistent stance to shelve disputes or settle them in a peaceful and rational manner 
despite enforcing its claims. The PRe basic foreign policy since 1978 has been to 
seek a stable world order to pursue its primary goal of economic development. The 
military therefore needed more convincing grounds to place military modernisation 
on the agenda of the PRC leadership. 
The most reasonable grounds for renewing military modernisation are to prove 
the primary importance of safeguarding national security and unification. The 
Taiwan issue could be premised upon developing the capability to win local wars 
under high-tech conditions. The military modernisation drive would advance the 
PLA ability to achieve objectives of national security and unification, in partiCUlar, 
the forceful integration of Taiwan into the mainland while deterring supposed 
interference by the American army on Taiwan.51 The military could take advantage 
of the Taiwan issue to justify a powerful national defence and military strength as 
solid backing for national security and reunification. A war game in the Taiwan 
Strait would have a strong sense of crisis and help prepare the PLA for hi-tech 
conflict. An improvement of the PRC military capabilities would enable Beijing to 
improve its ability to fight wars on Taiwan while bargaining with Washington on 
the Taiwan issue and force Taiwan to reunify with the mainland. For this purpose, 
the PRC needed credible means of threatening the use of force against Taiwan. The 
50. You Ji, 'The PLA's military modernisation in the 1990s', pp.234. 237. 
51. Ibid .• pp. 235-236. 
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civilian leaders had continuously been urged by the military to push the modernis-
ation of the armed forces to a new stage and enhance their combat readiness and 
defence capability using high technology. 
The priorities of PLA modernisation had been given to the navy, the air force 
and the strategic rocket force aimed at invading Taiwan.52 The PLA naval 
modernisation would be raised to a new level.53 The naval force was one of the 
weakest areas of the PRC armed forces. In the mid-1990s, the PLA Navy(PLAN) 
was the third largest navy in the world, with 260,000 men, equipped with 50 
principal surface combatants and 52 submarines. It had reached a considerable level 
of expertise in naval operations with a growing fleet of missile-equipped destroyers 
and nuclear-powered submarines. However, the PLAN was still a shrinking and 
outdated navy because many warships were obsolete. Because it had no battleships 
and cruisers, its main fighting platform was 15 older Luda class destroyers and two 
modified Luda. Although they had been re-equipped and upgraded, most of them 
were constructed in the 1970s and the early 1980s, and were largely considered 
obsolete by Western standards. Thirty-two frigates constituted another part of its 
naval main force but 26 were older generation Jianghu class frigates. The PLAN 
had a large fleet of submarines including nuclear-powered submarines and a 
nuclear-fuelled ballistic-missile submarine.54 However, by and large, the older 
conventional submarines were powered by diesel engines. The PLAN's marine 
corps was small and weak. It only had a brigade with 5,000 men, equipped with 
light landing craft and weapons. 55 The PLA. Naval Air Force was considered 
outdated. 56 Its 855 fighter planes and 68 armed helicopters were mainly shore-
based.57 Although new type guided-missile destroyers were equipped with 
antisubmarine helicopters, most of its combat aircraft were based on land. In a strict 
sense, it was a part of the air force rather than a naval air force. 
The PLAN was able to take advantage of the Taiwan issue to accelerate its 
modernisation while improving its fighting capability. 58 The PRC leadership has 
quickened the pace of resolving the Taiwan issue since the 1980s. Beijing has 
repeatedly warned Taiwan that it could use force against the island if Taipei 
attempted to declare independence. The naval command took the opportunity to 
speed modernisation, in particular, acquisition of an aircraft carrier. In 1995, the 
PLA was the world's biggest army with 2.93 million soldiers while Taiwan had 
52. Ibid .. p. 237: Avery Goldstein, 'Great expectations: interpreting China's arrival', Il1Iernatiollal SecLiriry 22(3), 
(Winter 1997/98). p.52. 
53. For an extended analysis of the PLAN's modernisation. see You Ji. 'A blue water navy: does it matterT, in 
David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal. eds. China Risillg (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 71-89; 
You Ji, 'The PLA's military modernisation in the 1990s', pp. 247-249. Also see Greg Austin, China's Ocean Frol1lier: 
Illternational Law, Milirary and National Developmel1l (St. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin in association 
with the Department of International Relations and the Northeast Asia Program, Research School of Pacific and Asian 
Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT. 1998), pp. 282-289. 
54. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1995196 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995 J. p. 177. 
55. Ibid .. p. 178. 
56. You Ji, 'A blue water navy', p. 82. 
57. International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance: 1995196, p. J78. 
58. For thc factor of Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait of 1995-1996 in particular. in promoting the PLAN's modernisation, 
see You Ji, 'A blue watcr navy', pp. 71,76,78.83; Austin, China's Ocean Frolltier, pp. 288-289. 
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about 376,000 troops,59 but the PLA would have been incapable of occupying 
Taiwan becal,lse it was not able to wage amphibious warfare.60 The key to the PRC 
recovering the island would be to make a forced crossing of the l60-mile-wide 
Taiwan Strait while preventing the United States from supporting Taiwan. The 
PLAN is the main force for invading Taiwan but the Taiwanese navy had the 
balance of power in its favour, particularly after its acquisitions of French and 
American-made missile frigates in a major naval upgrade in the mid-1990s.61 The 
naval command stressed that -it would need urgently to deploy sophisticated 
warships to destroy the Taiwanese Navy while deterring the US Navy's interven-
tion. It was essential to strengthen and improve the naval force for a successful 
invasion of Taiwan.62 
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) was a weak service.63 It was large, numbering 
about 470,000 and was equipped with 4,970 combat aircraft in the mid-1990s.64 
However, the vast majority of its warplanes were more than 30 years old and ought 
to have been decommissioned. In light of the new features of air wars and new 
trends in air power development in the twenty-first century, the PLAAF was 
backward in most fields such as reconnaissance, communications and electronic 
warfare capabilities, in particular, in-flight refuelling systems to extend its range 
and sustainability.65 The PLAAF was in need of new types of electronic-war 
aeroplane, high-speed fighters, airborne warning and control systems, as well as 
more advanced and accurate missiles to fill a gap in the air defences. Externally, 
because Communist China is a rival to the United States and other Western powers, 
Western countries especially had observed an embargo on sales of arms to the PRC 
since the Tiananmen Square military suppression in 1989, the PRC had to rely on 
itself to develop weaponry and equipment for the air force. Although the PRC 
basically had the capability to produce combat aircraft, it had had difficulty 
developing a fighter to match international standards. Generally speaking, from the 
1980s to the mid-l990s, the military had tried very hard to enhance the air force 
by relying on itself. The PRC air defence had improved and strengthened somewhat 
in weaponry and equipment, but most were still in a developing stage. Overall 
modernisation still had a long way to go. 
The PLAAF had long cherished the hope of changing from a defensive force to 
one that would be capable of both defence and offence,66 but it lacked such a 
59. International Institute for Strategic Studies. The i."filitary Balance: 1995/96. p. 192. 
60. For the PLA Navy's combat effectiveness to attack Taiwan. see Chong-Pin Lin, 'The military balance in the 
Taiwan Strait'. The China Quarterly No. 146, (June 1996). pp. 588-589,591. 
61. Taiwan ordered six LaFayette-class missile frigates from France in 1992 and most of them were delivered in 
1996. Also, it acquired six Knox-class missile frigates from the United States between 1992 and 1996. In addition. 
Taiwan ordered seven American-made Perry-class frigates, which were delivered between 1993 and 1998. See 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 199912000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
1999). pp. 178-179. 
62. You Ji. 'A blue water navy', pp. 71. 76, 78, 82-83. 
63. For the modernisation of the PLAAF, see You Ji, 'The PLA's military modernisation in the 19905', 
pp.244-247. 
64. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1995/96, pp. 178-179. 
65. International Institute for Strategic Studies. 711e Military Balance: 1996/97 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996). p. 171. 
66. You Ji, 'A blue water navy'. p. 72. 
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capability up to the mid-1990s. A war game in the Taiwan Strait could provide an 
opportunity for such a strategic transformation. Tension across the Taiwan Strait 
would confirm that the PRC needed to beef up its air defence capabilities. Taiwan's 
air force was small but higher-quality with modem fighters like the French Mirage 
and the American F-16Y Although the PLAAF had the numerical advantage, most 
combat aircraft were out of date. Thus it would be difficult to gain air superiority 
to cover the navy and to support the army to launch an attack on Taiwan. 68 
Moreover, the American forces would probably help in Taiwan's defence and the 
powerful American air force would pose a big threat. The PLAAF considered that 
it should have more advanced fighting aircraft to attack Taiwan's well-defended 
airspace. It had imported 26 Sukhoi-27 supersonic warplanes from Russia in the 
early 1990s but these were insufficient.69 
The PLA missile unit needed to be improved and strengthened.70 Between 1995 
and 1996, the PRC had 17 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 70 intermediate range 
ballistic missiles and a large number of short range missiles.71 The PRC had 
detonated its first atomic bomb in 1964. Besides strategic nuclear striking strength, 
most of its short range missiles could carry a conventional, biological, chemical, or 
nuclear warhead. However, the Second Artillery Corps-that is, the PLA strategic 
rocket force-was still a small nuclear force, about the size of that of France. It 
remained far behind America and was backward in technique. The missiles it had 
at that time were still below world standards in terms of speed and accuracy, while 
being antiquated and impossible to launch quickly. While badly needing new-type 
conventional missiles, the Second Artillery Corps expected to modernise its nuclear 
arms. If Beijing were to seek to determine the future of Taiwan by force, it would 
increase the risk of military confrontation between the PRC and the US. In terms 
of missile force confrontation, if the PRC used missiles to attack Taiwan, the 
United States would help Taiwan defend itself covering it with an anti-missile 
umbrella or it could fire ballistic missiles into mainland China in a conflict between 
two nuclear powers. In this case, the PRC would be threatened or deterred by the 
US. The PRC would have to thwart any American intention to protect Taiwan with 
conventional missiles and strategic nuclear weapons. Although the PRC missiles 
could strike almost anywhere in Asia and reach Los Angeles, the PLA missile unit 
had to continue efforts to modernise and diversify its nuclear arsenal especially 
developing newer, mobile ballistic missiles and improving warheads. A crisis in the 
Taiwan Strait would stress the strategic necessity of modernisation for the Second 
Artillery Corps which would provide imperatives for a major expansion of forces 
to upgrade its capability to cope with the US strategic nuclear force while striking 
Taiwan. The PLA missile inventory, production, installations and maintenance such 
67. Taiwan ordered ISO F-16~ and 60 Mirage 2000s in 1992. They were delivered in succession until 1999. See 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 199912000, pp. 178, 175. 
68. For the PLA Air Force's battle-worthiness to attack on Taiwan, see Chong-Pin Lin, 'The military balance in 
the Taiwan Strait', pp. 585-588, 59!. 
69. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1995/96, p. 178. 
70. For the modernisation of the PLA Strategic Missile Forces. see You Ji, 'The PLA's military modernisation 
in the 1990s', pp. 237-244. 
71. For information about the PRe Strategic Missile Forces from 1995 to 1996, see International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1995/96. p. 176. . 
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as tactical ballistic missiles and long-range cruise missiles would be highly valued. 
Meanwhile, because medium and short-range missiles play an important role in 
enhancing the PLA capability of attack against Taiwanese or US forces, they 
needed urgently to be expanded and upgraded while improving their accuracy. The 
Second Artillery Corps could avail itself of tension with Taiwan to flex its missile 
muscle and obtain preferment in the modernisation. 
The defence budget and the military's involvement in Taiwan policy 
More defence budgetary resources are another major objective of the military's 
involvement in Taiwan policy on its own initiative.72 From 1949 to 1978, the 
national finances had been giving priority to military expenditure. However, the 
military had been faced with a difficult situation in defence spending since it had 
been told that economic development was a higher priority than a military build-up. 
The government could not but give a lot less to the military and a lot more to other 
pressing domestic needs.73 
The defence budget had been virtually unlimited from the 1950s until the late 
1970s but available budgetary resources for the military had decreased from then 
to the mid-1990s. The defence budget was reduced, from 5.6% of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 1979 to only 1.3% in 1994. Military expenditure had 
declined successively, from 18.5% of the total national expenditure in 1979 to 9.5% 
in 1994.74 Budgetary restraints made it difficult to purchase and develop PLA 
weapons systems. The military believed that it had been weakened by declining 
budgets.7s 
There were two main reasons for the military calling for a larger increase in the 
defence budget. One was the modernisation programme and another was the 
inflationary factor. The military has been pursuing its ambitious and expensive 
modernisation drive focusing on high-technology warfare. It needed large amounts 
of money to upgrade its arsenal, but it had been constrained by direct budget 
limitations. 
The request for an expensive new weapons programme was treated with 
indifference by the civilian leaders. As for the inflationary factor, it seemed that it 
72. Western military analyst~ believe that the PRC actual defence spending is substantially higher than the 
published figures. This study still cites Beijing's official figures on defence budgets in illustration of its viewpoints 
because they can shed light on military expenditure in the PRe. For an analysis of the PRC defence finance in detail. 
see Ding. 'China's defence finance', pp. 428-442: 'China's military expenditure' . International Institute for Strategic 
Studies. The Military Balance: 1995196. pp. 270-275. 
73. Deng Xiaoping, 'The army must subordinate itself to serve the overall situation of the nation's economic 
construction', in Selected Works of Dellg Xiaoping, Vol. 3 (People's Press. 1993), pp. 98-100; Lu Weimin, 'The 
military criticises Deng Xiaoping of delaying national defence', Beijing Spring No. 29. (October 1995), pp. 21-23. 
74. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. 'China: arms control and 
disarmament (November 1995, Beijing)', Beijing Review. (27 November-3 December 1995), p. 15. For a further 
analysis of the PRC defence expenditures. see Richard A. Bitzinger, 'Military spending and foreign military 
acquisitions by the PRe and Taiwan', in Lilley and Downs, eds. Crisis ill the Taiwan Strait, pp. 75-77. 
75. Fang Zhi. 'Who on Earth threatens who?-Xu Xin. Chairman of the China Institute for International Strategic 
Studies. Former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, talks about the so-called threat', Outlook Weekly, (19 
February 1996), pp. 48-49; Lu Weimin, 'The military criticises Deng Xiaoping', pp. 21-23; Gary Klintworth and 
Des Ball, 'China's arms buildingup and regional security', in Harris and Klintworth, eds, China as a Great POI1.'er, 
pp. 263-264. 
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had an adverse effect on the increase in defence expenditures. Prices had been 
increasing rapidly and the paper currency had been inflated since the late 1980s.76 
Inflation even led to decreasing servicemen's real salaries.77 The military had 
already taken the inflation factor into account when it made the request for more 
defence spending.78 It contended that the annual increase was largely in line with 
inflation, with added costs for maintaining the standard of living of army personnel 
and pensions rather than purchasing and maintaining weapons and equipment.79 
However, the military's claim on the national budget for a larger share by reason 
of inflation was declined. The reason for this was that not only the armed forces, 
but all trades and professions had been affected. The civilian administration was 
already facing mounting unemployment and budget deficits together with a huge 
public spending programme to try to deal with the situation. The government 
therefore did not satisfy the military's wish to make compensation. Only 71.65% 
of the military's demand for spending because of inflation was met. so 
The budget shortfalls pressured the military to find alternative financial sources, 
and it was forced to engage more heavily in business to provide funding for itself. 
The PLA established a colossal empire of about 20,000 companies employing a 
large number of soldiers and civilians, which raised a substantial revenue for 
additional army spending. At one time when the government was years away from 
instituting a fully functioning national budget to provide for all the needs of the 
PLA, the Civilian and military leaders had tacitly consented or implicitly encour-
aged the PLA commercial business operations. However, although it engaged in 
widespread commercial activities, as extra-budgetary earnings substituted for lost 
defence expenditures and helped to finance the long-desired military modernisation, 
corruption greatly increased and military discipline seriously worsened, involving 
rampant smuggling and other illegal activities. As a result, business impaired the 
PLA military capabilities.S! In view of such a serious situation, attempts had been 
made by the civilian and military leaders to break the myriad links between the 
army and business. The civilian leaders declared that, in principle, the allocation of 
necessary funds for the PLA to carry out its duties should be regularised, more 
reliant on state finances while the army should be more obedient to state directives. 
The civilian and military leaders ordered the PLA to narrow gradually its business 
fields, leading over a period of time to a final withdraw from commercial activities. 
But nothing happened because the military officers were unwilling to give up 
money-making assets and the civilian leadership did not ensure the PLA had the 
76. Between 1989 and 1990. inflation had taken a turn for the worse. reaching about 30%. Although the inflation 
rate feIl from over 20% in 1994 to 17. I % in 1995. it remained relatively high. See William A. Joseph. cd .. China 
Briefing: The Contradictions of Change (Armonk. NY: M. E. Sharpe. 1997), pp. 67-68. 
77. Ding, 'China's defence finance'. p.442. 
78. Dennis Van Vrankcn Hickey, Taiwan's Security in the Changing International S~\'stem (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Ricnner Publishers. 1997). p. 154. 
79. Klintworth and BaIl, 'China's arms buildingup and regional security'. pp. 263-264: Information Office of the 
State Council of the People's Republic of China. 'China: arms control and disarmament'. p. 15. 
80. Klintworth and Ball, 'China's arms buildingup and regional security', pp. 263-264; Information Office of the 
State Council of the People's Republic of China. 'China: arms control and disarmament', p. 15. 
81. For an overview of the PLA commercial activities, see Tai Ming Cheng, 'China's entrepreneurial army: the 
structure, activities and economic returns of the military business complex', in Dennison Lane et al.. eds, Chinese 
Military Modernization. pp. 168-197. 
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necessary budget despite the government promise that it would gradually increase 
the defence allocation.82 The PLA had to demonstrate to the government by other 
means that it needed a substantial boost to its budget. 
Taiwan issues again provided the necessary argument. 83 The military saw 
national reunification as an opportunity for a bigger slice of the budget. If there was 
no serious threat to the security and sovereignty of the country, defence expendi-
tures would not increase by a wide margin. Only if the military played up the 
urgency of the Taiwan issue tQ expedite reunification using the PLA as backup, 
could it obtain more defence budgetary resources. If the Taiwan Strait were to 
return to tense times, big boosts in the defence budget would be considered 
necessary. Thus, the PRe found itself in a period when supreme power was in a 
state of transition, the top leaders competing for the paramount succession were 
open to the argument that Taiwan should be put at the top of the PRe agenda and 
relevant defence spending should be given priority. No leaders could withstand a 
decrease in military expenditure affecting the use of force against Taiwan in the 
pursuit of national reunification.84 The PLA stressed that it would need to increase 
its military expenditure before a successful invasion of Taiwan was possible. The 
military pushed for bigger budgets for sophisticated weapons and training pro-
grammes focusing on naval power projection and amphibious lift-all vessels crucial 
to an invasion of the island. 
The PRe military had cited efforts by the Taiwan government to modernise the 
Taiwan army as a reason to spend more on sophisticated hardware. The military's 
argument was that Taiwan had made an enormous investment in the defence 
system from the 1970s to the 1990s. Taiwan's defence spending had taken 40.3% 
of the total budget, and the military accounted for 6.98% of the island's GNP in 
the 1980s.85 More dramatically, from the early 1990s onwards, Taipei had given the 
army a huge amount of money in an extra-budgetary allocation purely for the 
purchase of American and French advanced weapons systems.86 The military 
expressed concern that by procuring more hi-tech weapons in the coming years 
Taiwan's forces would constitute a threat to the PLA. If the PRe did not provide 
a continued investment in its armed forces, it would lose its margin of military 
superiority to Taiwan over the next decade. The military drew attention to Taiwan's 
fast-growing defence spending while the mainland's rate of military expenditure 
growth had slowed. The military called for the government to increase its defence 
budget to upgrade the PLA combat preparedness for reunification by force. 87 
82. Jianxiang Bi, 'The PRe's active defense strategy: new wars. old concepts', Issues & Studies 31 (11). (November 
1995). pp. 92-94; Ralph A. Cos sa. 'The PRC's national security objectives in the post-Cold War era and the role of 
the PLA'. Issues & Swdies 30(9), (September 1994), pp. 22-23. 
83. Ellis Joffe, 'How much does the PLA make foreign policy?'. in Goodman and Segal. eds, China Rising, p. 61; 
Swaine, The Role of the Chinese MilitaJ)" p. 75, n. 2. 
84. Goldstein. 'Great expectations'. pp. 67-68. 
85. Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, United States-Taiwan Security Ties: From Cold War to Beyond Containment 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), p. 64. 
86. International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance: 1998/99 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), pp. 169, 197. 
87. You Ji, 'Missile diplomacy and PRC domestic politics', pp.47-48; Cossa. 'The PRC's national security 
objectives', pp. 12-14. pp. 23-24; Swaine. The Role of the Chinese Military, p. 78, n. 5. 
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Therefore, the Taiwan issue became the most immediate and reasonable grounds on 
which to argue the military's requirements for more defence budgetary resources. 
Evaluation of the military's influence upon Taiwan policy making 
The military did not feel it was necessary to lobby on the Central Taiwan Work 
Leading Group (CTWLG) before 1992 but it considered it an imperative necessity 
to influence the top Taiwan policymakers after 1992. Before 1992, the military 
itself dominated the policy-making and handling of affairs regarding Taiwan. The 
then CTWLG was headed by President Yang Shangkun. Yang was authorised by 
Deng Xiaoping with whom he had a close personal relationship. Yang had control 
over Taiwan policy while keeping the handling of routine affairs of the military in 
his own hands as permanent vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission 
(CMC). When there were disputes between the civilian administration and the 
military authorities, Yang was able to resolve or mediate them playing a balanced 
role on the military's behalf. 88 Although Jiang Zemin was CPC General Secretary 
and CMC chairman, he had a small say in Taiwan policy. At that time the 
military's profile on the Taiwan issue was low, for it did not need to act as a 
lobbyist to inject its views into the Taiwan policy process. After Yang's failure in 
the power struggle with Jiang Zemin in the 14th National Party Congress in 1992, 
Jiang replaced Yang, becoming state president and CTWLG head. However, Jiang 
was not viewed by the military as one of them because of the absence of a military 
record as a serviceman. Such circumstances had caused him difficultly in winning 
respect and loyalty from the military. Although there still was a professional 
serviceman, Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai, in the CTWLG, the military 
believed that its influence was insufficient for it to gain the upper hand on Taiwan 
issues. Against such a background with its role in the Taiwan policy process 
impaired, the military had to conduct lobbying activities with the CTWLG. In the 
meantime, with Jiang Zemin not yet predominant in Taiwan policy-making, the 
military had room to exercise influence.89 
Unlike pre-1992, the military sought to significantly influence the Taiwan policy 
process in the mid-1990s, fuelled by its pivotal role in the succession politics of the 
post-Deng era. Jiang's political survival depended on the military's support but that 
support was conditional. Jiang had to give the military more for its defence budget 
and greater participation in policy decision making. Thus the military was able to 
bring pressure to bear. The change in the leading structure of Taiwan policy making 
was exposing rifts between the military and the civilian leadership. There were 
increasing voices of dissent in the PLA over Beijing's Taiwan policy. However, 
Jiang was unable to easily smooth away the divergence between the civilian 
officials and the military officers. If Jiang attempted to rein in the PLA his own 
position might be in jeopardy. Jiang had found it difficult to take controversial 
stands on military issues and Taiwan affairs. The military had become more 
88. Tai Ming Cheng, 'Chinese military preparations against Taiwan over the next 10 years', in Lilley and Downs, 
eds, Crisis in the Taiwan Strait. p. 46; Chen Te-sheng, 'Mainland China's Taiwan affairs organizations and personnel' , 
issues & Studies 30(7). (July 1994). p. 58; Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military. pp. 34-36; p. 41, n. 9. 
89. Garver, Face Off, p. 61. 
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assertive, threatening to unseat him while unhinging the civilian management of the 
Taiwan issue. This situation, finally, led to Jiang making the decision to intimidate 
Taiwan by force under the military's pressure. Succession politics and the Taiwan 
crisis in the mid-1990s provided the military with the opportunities to greatly 
influence the Taiwan policy process.90 
The military does its best to lobby on the NPC and NPCSC. Although the NPC 
and NPCSC are generally acknowledged to be rubber stamp organisations, they are 
the PRC top legislative body. Theoretically and legally, their responsibility is to 
approve or reject suggestions issued by the State Council, including the election of 
state leaders. It has that constitutionally mandated power to legislate, oversee law 
enforcement and supervise the government. The election and appointment of state 
leaders and the adoption of the law must have over half of the votes of all members 
of NPC and NPCSC to be passed. More imperatively, the national budget including 
the defence budget and final accounts must be examined and approved by the NPC. 
Before the mid-1980s, the top legislators followed the party's order to adopt by 
nearly unanimous votes. All bills and motions, and decisions made by the State 
Council were passed. Nevertheless, as democratisation took its course, the PRC 
parliament began to change its symbolic image.9! Lawmakers have nullified draft 
law tabled to them for approval. There were two cases in which bills proposed by 
the State Council were not approved by the NPCSC.92 Under such circumstances, 
especially when the NPC discusses and approves the defence budget, the military 
cannot slight the NPC and NPCSC despite inputs into the policy process of the 
central party's leadership and national government on major political and foreign 
decisions.93 Before the mid-1980s, the PLA delegation was organised to attend the 
annual NPC but was not active. However, since the early 1990s the military has 
exerted itself to lobby the national legislature.94 The PLA delegation proposed its 
own motions on the budget expansion emphasising the army's urgent needs in 
accomplishing reunification in the mid-1990s. 95 In the meantime, to make its 
requirements on Taiwan issues legitimate, the military regarded the NPC and 
NPCSC as an important policy forum. The PLA delegates to the NPC and the 
military's representatives on the NPCSC took advantage of the situation to 
propagandise the hard-line on Taiwan, preaching war-like rhetoric while attacking 
the civilian departments concerned for their soft stands.96 
90. David Shambaugh. 'China's Commander-in-Chief: Jiang Zemin and the PLA', in Dennison Lane et al .. eds, 
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n. 24; Also see You Ji, 'Jiang Zemin: in quest of post-Deng supremacy', in Maurice Brosseau, Suzanne Pepper and 
Tsang Shu-ki. eds, China Review 1996 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1996), pp. 1-27. 
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committees. The second time was in 1999. During the Ninth NPC, a Highway Bill was not adopted. These two cases 
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Zhu as fuel tax proposal rejected', The South China Morning Post, (30 April 1999). 
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95. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military. p. 78, n. 5. 
96. Garver, Face Off, pp. 57-58; Allen S. Whiting, 'Chinese nationalism and foreign policy after Deng', The China 
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The interactions between the military and the civilian departments demonstrated 
that the military did not intend to become a directorate. What it wanted was a 
larger say. However, at a crucial moment when it believed that its political and 
economic benefits would be affected, especially its strategic interests because of the 
soft-line by the civilian departments concerned, the military strove to take the 
initiative. It strongly demanded the civilian departments concerned readjust Taiwan 
policy responding to the course of events in the Taiwan Strait during 1995-1996 
in light of the military's views.- Yet this did not show that the military intended 
to dominate Taiwan policy formulation. It sometimes criticised the Taiwan 
Affairs Office (the TAO) but never targeted it for attack. The TAO is the PRC 
main working organ for Taiwan but, to a great extent, its main duty is to implement 
rather than make Taiwan policy. Instead, the military aimed its attack at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and focused its criticism on the MFA 
head, Qian Qichen, because much of the Taiwan issue involves the PRC-US-
Taiwan relationship, and the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian, 
was one of the key Taiwan policymakers who was concurrently the CTWLG 
deputy-head. The military resented his weakness toward Washington and Taipei 
and blamed the MFA for bartering away sovereignty and encroaching upon the 
military's interests. In terms of American arms sales to Taiwan and other issues of 
PRC-US relations over Taiwan, the military believed that the MFA had not 
responded strongly enough, and more unforgivably, had not taken countermeasures. 
The MFA was severely criticised for its wrong moves and Qian was attacked for 
his failure in his duties of supervision. His resignation as foreign minister was 
demanded. The military maintained that Beijing should take an intransigent attitude 
toward the United States over Taiwan and should handle the Taiwan issue with a 
high hand. Jiang Zemin had to defend the accused Qian but Jiang's authority was 
affected.97 
Further, while forcing Qian into making a self-criticism, the military criticised 
Jiang for following a soft-line and urged him to toughen the PRe stance on Taiwan. 
The PLA chiefs claimed that Jiang's moderate eight-point policy toward Taiwan 
, had failed. In order to seek the military's support to consolidate his position as 
Deng Xiaoping's successor, Jiang had to accept the plan of intimidating Taiwan 
even though he did not favour such an adventurist plan. Under the military's 
pressure, Jiang even undertook a self-criticism for his wrong decisions on inter-
linked policies toward America and Taiwan.98 The aggressive positions taken by 
the military forced the civilian leaders and departments concerned to take a stronger 
stance. Generally speaking, the civil-military disputes resulted in a resolution 
favourable to the military. Although the military did not attempt to playa central 
role in Taiwan policy decision making, undoubtedly, its influence increased in the 
mid-l990s. The absence of a political strong man after Deng Xiaoping resulted in 
97. Lo Bing. 'The C.P.C. military attacks the Ministry of Foreign Affairs', Cheng Ming Monthly No. 201, (July 
1994), pp. 6-8: David Shambaugh, 'China's military in transition: politics. professionalism, procurement and power 
projection', The China Quarterly No, 146, (June 1996), pp. 273-274; Garver, Face Off, pp. 57-59. 
98. Shambaugh. 'China's Commander-in-Chief', pp. 210-211; Garver, Face Off, pp. 61-62; Garver, 'The PLA 
as an interest group in Chinese foreign policy', p. 272. 
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no leader wielding sufficient power to be predominantly influential over Taiwan 
policy, and helped the military to push its views into the Taiwan policy-making 
process. Such circumstances made the already fragmented Taiwan policy-making 
structure more diffuse. Worse, the Taiwan policy process was politicised. 
In addition to the above-mentioned channels of influence over Taiwan policy, the 
military took public opinion seriously. It made use of the media as means while 
whipping up nationalist sentiments to press the civilian leadership to follow a 
hard-line on Taiwan. During the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996, the military 
intensified its activities in propaganda and public relations. On the one hand, it kept 
up a propaganda barrage in its own organs such as The Liberation Army Daily. 
Simultaneously, the top PLA generals published many strong statements trying 
to show that safeguarding national reunification and territorial integrity was 
becoming an emergency situation. The military claimed in its many hawkish 
comments that US intervention in a conflict between mainland China and Taiwan 
would result in a serious aftermath while intensifying a barrage of criticism aimed 
at the Taiwan independence force headed by Lee Teng-hui. The military also 
launched its propaganda offensive in the civilian media to exert a heavier pressure 
on the civilian leadership to meet the PLA demands. During the tensest time of 
the Taiwan crisis, the PRC state media was filled with pictures and reports of 
war games.99 The military's propaganda implicitly criticised Jiang Zemin's 
wrong decisions on Taiwan policy and urged Jiang to take resolute steps against 
Taiwan. At a time of mounting tension over Taiwan, the Beijing leadership was 
scheduled to gather at the seaside resort of Beidaihe for its annual mid-year policy 
review in summer 1995.100 The top item on the political agenda was the Taiwan 
question. The military flexed its political muscle to press Jiang to accept its views 
at the Beidaihe conference designed to chart new PRC policy toward Taiwan. The 
military stepped up its war of words over Taiwan before the Beidaihe meeting 
putting Jiang under heavier pressure. In an atmosphere of strong nationalism 
fostered by the military, Jiang, vulnerable in the midst of the succession struggle, 
could not allow himself to appear soft on Taiwan. He managed to stabilise his 
successor position through satisfying the armed forces. After the Beidaihe confer-
ence, Beijing declared that it would take stronger military measures against Taiwan. 
As more PLA military exercises took place, tensions across the Taiwan Strait 
grew. 101 Thus military adventurism along with public opinion reduced the civilian 
leaders' room for manoeuvre. They could not but make some compromises with the 
PLA hawkish appeals. As a result. it became more difficult for a pragmatic Taiwan 
policy establishment to succeed. 
99. Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro. The Coming Conflict with China (New York: A. A. Knopf. distributed 
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Jiang Zemin's relationship with the military 
The military 'played a major role in pressing Jiang Zemin to make decisions to 
test-fire missiles into the Taiwan Strait and stage military exercises along the 
mainland coast to intimidate Taiwan. For this reason, it is essential to make an 
examination of the relationship between Jiang and the military. 
The military was a decisive factor in succession politics. Whether Jiang would 
be able to gain support in the military was a key question to assure his succession 
from Deng Xiaoping. Jiang's weak link with the military was his greatest weakness 
in defending his position as the heir of Deng. The challenge of the contenders for 
the leadership succession increased the pressing need for strong military support. 
Jiang was eager to ensure the loyalty of the PLA as he intended to win the 
succession struggle. Yet, without a personal power base in the army, he was not in 
an advantageous position in commanding the armed forces although he held the 
highest military leading post in November 1989. In theory, the chair of the Central 
Military Commission (CMC) could allow him to have control of the army, but in 
practice, almost nobody believed that Jiang wielded power as supreme commander 
in the army at the beginning of his CMC chairmanship.lo2 For Jiang, the biggest 
disadvantage was his lack of a military background. He was never involved in 
actual military operations before he became CMC chairman. Although he had been 
the first political commissar of the Shanghai garrison in the late 1980s, that position 
was concurrently in his capacity of Shanghai Communist Party secretary, which 
was rather symbolic for the party's leadership over the army. Strictly speaking, he 
was the first civilian to hold the CMC chairmanship. Without military experience, 
officers and soldiers had reluctantly paid him allegiance, which had affected his 
credibility as commander-in-chief. Jiang himself admitted that he had no experi-
ence in military work and vowed to modestly learn military affairs. 103 Then he had 
to work hard to win the respect and loyalty of the army. A comparison between 
Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin shows an unlikeness, demonstrating 
that military experience is essential for those who want to reach the height of 
power. Both Mao and Deng had their military careers and exploits as professional 
revolutionaries. Unlike his predecessors, Jiang, an undistinguished technocrat, 
wielded neither real military command nor absolute political power. Apparently, he 
was not in a position to check the most influential force in contemporary PRC 
politics. He had a few political resources for reining in the military, mainly the 
doctrine of 'the party's absolute leadership over the gun'. He had conducted an 
ideological campaign in the PLA to promote loyalty to himself, urging all officers 
and soldiers to follow the command of CMC Chairman Jiang. Yet many service-
men remained reluctant to recognise his authority as the core of the third-generation 
leadership over the PLA. He had been handicapped in his relationship with the 
military since the day he became paramount party and military leader. 
Under such circumstances, Jiang had to court the military in exchange for its full 
102. Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemill and China's New Elite (Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 1998), pp. 164-169, 225-226. 
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backing for his right of leadership succession. 104 He had assiduously cultivated 
good relation.s with the military through championing its three major objectives. He 
strove to meet their demands for political privilege, army modernisation and 
defence budget. Politically, he allowed the military more participation in the party's 
and governmental policy decision making to raise its social stature and maintain its 
privileged position. In the Jiang Zemin era, the military had a larger say than in the 
eras of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, reinforcing its privileges in politics. In 
terms of defence modernisation, he tried to satisfy the military's wish. He talked 
about the importance of a strong army calling for the military's rapid modernisation 
while advocating technological improvements for the army to strengthen defence 
and the military's ability to cope with hi-tech regional wars. Basically, he 
consented to the PLA plans to modernise its weaponry. He approved many of the 
military's purchasing lists for sophisticated weapons and equipment induding 
import of Russian-made advanced warships, fighter planes and missiles. With 
respect to the demand for defence budget, he approved granting the PLA a bigger 
budget. The defence budget has been increased annually at a double-digit pace 
since Jiang assumed power.105 In addition, he has promised more budgetary 
resources in the future. 106 When the military engaged in business activities to make 
up its financial deficiency, he rode with a loose rein allowing the PLA to make 
money. 107 
Jiang's attempts to both court and control the military appear to have resulted in 
partly success but have produced side-effects because of contradictory elements. 
On the one hand, support was, to some extent, gained. The military accepted his 
leadership over the armed forces as supreme commander. However, as the price of 
his support, he was forced to make major concessions lowering him in the eyes of 
servicemen. On the other hand, he had not thrown the reins to the military because 
his goal was to have control of the military to make it loyal to himself. His 
intentions of controlling the military were in conflict with the military's aggressive 
demands for keeping a slack rein. Although Jiang had sought to court them, the 
military remained dissatisfied with him. In the circumstances, strained relations 
emerged despite Jiang seeking to cultivate his amicable ties. As Jiang had 
misgivings about his control over the military and the military worried about its 
own particular interests, the divergence was exposed between the armed forces and 
supreme commander. Politically, the military's deeper and broader involvement in 
policy decision making had begun to ring alarm bells about Jiang's leadership. For 
example, Jiang's plans of reducing the size of the PLA had to be suspended or 
slowed up when he met resistance by the generals. This damaged his prestige as 
commander-in-chief. He had to prevent the military from increasingly interfering in 
policy formulations on major issues while compromising. This had brought him 
104. Regarding Jiang's effort to court the military. see Shambaugh, 'China's Commander-in-Chief', pp. 209-245; 
Gilley, Tiger 011 the Brink. pp. 226-227, 
105. Suisheng Zhao, Power Competition ill East Asia; From the Old Chinese World Order to Post-Cold War 
Regional Mullipolarily )New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 218. 
106. You Ji. 'Missile diplomacy and PRe domestic politics'. p. 45. 
107. Willy Lam and Frankie Leung, 'Peking facing crucial tests after Deng', The Free China Journal XIl(39), 
(13 October 1995), p.7. 
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into contradiction with the nrilitary. In tenns of the military's expectations for a 
quickened defence modernisation drive, he had to balance concerns over the 
national economy and demands of modernising the PLA with expensive advanced 
annament. When he frequently required that the PLA should be subservient to the 
overall goal of econonric construction, the military became dissatisfied with him. 
Regarding the nrilitary's aggressive demand for a bigger budget, he expressed his 
difficulties in delivering his promises to grant the PLA an increasingly larger share 
in the national budget by indicating that an increase in military spending would be 
conditional. He advised the military that only on the basis of econonric growth 
could more funds to develop the forces be appropriated. lOS In view of corruption 
such as graft-related and worsening disciplinary problems even disobedience, he 
had to place restrictions on the PLA business activities, by enhancing its financial 
dependence on his leadership. The nrilitary were displeased with him for only 
slowly increasing defence spending as well as imposing restrictions on an enlarge-
ment of the PLA business empire. These three major issues, political privilege, 
nrilitary modernisation and defence budget, became the continued disputes between 
Jiang and the military. As Jiang tried to rein in the nrilitary restraining the 
military's unmeasured demands, feelings on both sides became increasingly un-
charitable. To be fair, Jiang's remarks and conduct curbing the military's excessive 
demands were nothing new. He only reiterated the guidelines of military strategy 
defined by Deng and continued to pursue Deng's policies of building the army and 
constructing the country, making greater concessions to the military. However, 
unlike Deng who had military experience and exploits as well as high prestige and 
authority, Jiang was not viewed by the military as one of them because of his 
absence of a military record as a serviceman. Jiang's attempt to rein in the nrilitary 
resulted in straining relations between both sides. Contrary to Jiang's wish, the 
military had become more assertive. This placed his successor position potentially 
in jeopardy and consequently threatened to unhinge his management of the crisis 
in the Taiwan Strait. 
The Yang family generals are an important element in assessing Jiang's relations 
with the military. The struggle between Yang and Jiang is a key issue in his quest 
for military command. Jiang won a decisive battle in purging his strongest political 
enemy out of the military hierarchy. I 09 The fall of the Yang family generals saved 
Jiang from the danger to his successor position helping to foster his power before 
Deng's denrise. Jiang had three major gains from his triumph over the Yang family 
generals-the recaptured military command, the state presidency and the decision-
making regarding Taiwan policy. 
Jiang had consolidated his successor position and had improved his conditions 
for commanding the army, but there would still be a lot of work to do in grasping 
the military's leadership. He had taken major measures in the key nrilitary 
leadership reshuffle, which can be divided into two phases. In the first phase from 
late-1992 to mid-1994, Jiang had purged the two Yangs' supporters while installing 
108. You Ji. 'Missile diplomacy and PRC domestic politics', p. 45. 
109. Regarding the power struggle between Jiang Zemin and the Yang family generals for military command. see 
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his proteges in key positions. The Yang family generals had controlled almost all 
high-level military appointments since the late 1980s, which posed a serious threat 
to Jiang. After the Yangs were removed from the CMC, Jiang was able to secure 
the promotion of many of his military allies. A major reshuffle of the army 
leadership had taken place in which there were wide-ranging changes of personnel. 
In order to seek to curb the Yangs' influence within the military, Jiang had removed 
or transferred some 300 high-level officers, replacing the Yangs' loyalists with his 
own trusted officers. llo Jiang tended increasingly to favour military officers who 
could be relied upon to support him in the power struggle for the leadership 
succession. At the end of 1992, he appointed three supporters of his as CMC 
members and directors of the PLA three general departments. Respectively, Zhang 
Wannian, Yu Yongbo and Fu Quanyou took over the chief of the general staff, the 
director of the general political department and the director of the general logistics 
department. On 7 June 1993, Jiang promoted them and three other senior officers 
to the rank of general. 111 From mid-1993 to mid-1994, he conferred the rank of 
general on another 13 senior officers. 1l2 Through reshuffling, he, by and large, had 
the upper hand in the PLA three general departments while having an influence on 
army generals. 
However, Jiang had aroused controversy among the military officer corps. More 
questionable, Jiang's promotions gave rise to a crop of problems, causing a new 
unbalance in all services and arms and stimulating more demands of the generals. 
For example, the Second Artillery Corps formally demanded a change in its name 
to the PLA Strategic Rocket Force in order to promote its position from an arm to 
a service while both the Navy and the Air Force demanded their own memberships 
in the CMC. Jiang found it hard to meet the unmeasured demands for higher posts 
and ranks which the greedy army generals required in exchange for the military's 
backing for his leadership. He was in political difficulties which increasingly put 
larger pressures on him. 113 The support of the generals for Jiang was conditional 
and unstable. He was worried and angered that the military's organs, such as The 
Liberation Army Daily still looked down upon him when they published reports on 
him. Jiang's authority over the army remained insecure. 114 
In the second phase from mid-1994 to late-l995, Jiang made an attempt to solve 
a problem that his military command was overridden by two incumbent PLA 
veterans. When the Yang family generals were removed from the CMC, Admiral 
Liu Huaqing and General Zhang Zhen were brought in as CMC vice-chairmen 
despite having retired. liS Liu played a bigger role than Zhang in the CMC. Seen as 
110. Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng (Second Edition) (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). pp. 507-508. 
III. Three other senior officers were Zhu Dunfa, president of the National Defence University, Zhang Lianzhong, 
commander of the PLA Navy and Cao Shuangming, commander of the PLA Air Force. See Wu Jiang, 'It is reported 
that Yu Yongbo will assume the post of Defence Minister', Taiwan Today News Network (TTNN), (9 February 2001). 
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113. Qu Tao, 'There is more behind Jiang Zemin promoted senior officers to the rank of full general', Cheng Ming 
Monthly No. 221, (March 1996), pp. 35-38; Qu Tao, 'Can an attack with missiles on Taiwan become effective within 
three minutes'?', pp. 21-22. 
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close to Deng, Liu was deputed by Deng to help Jiang assert control over the army 
in order to s.olidify Jiang's 1eadership.116 Liu did so by guiding the PLA into 
acceptance of Jiang as Deng's successor. Liu was not ambitious for supreme power. 
However, he was put on the Politburo Standing Committee having the seniority, the 
prestige and the military exploits, to overshadow Jiang. Jiang stood in awe of him 
and had to take his advice into account on major issues. Under such circumstances, 
these two PLA veteran generals, especially Liu, had real power over the army. 
Jiang was unable to decide reshuffles and appointments of senior officers and had 
to consult with Liu and Zhang and make a compromise deaL 117 On major issues, 
all services and arms and various military major regions and group-armies asked 
for instructions from and reported to Liu and Zhang rather than Jiang. Jiang had 
been relieved of the bulk of his duties regarding military command and the 
handling of PLA affairs. This problem was so serious that in March 1995 Deng met 
the PLA chiefs calling them to unconditionally obey the orders of Jiang. 118 
Liu was close to two of Jiang's main rivals for the leadership succession, the 
Chairman of the National People's Congress' Standing Committee, Qiao Shi and 
Premier Li Pengo An alliance would pose a threat to Jiang's position as the heir of 
Deng. 119 After Liu assisted a smooth succession for Jiang, Jiang did not need Liu 
any more and intended to curb his influence and those of his potential allies. Jiang 
hoped that Liu would retire early thereby shoring up his own control of the 
military. As tensions in the Taiwan Strait increased in late 199~, however, Admiral 
Liu and General Zhang allied with Chairman Qiao and Premier Li to disapprove of 
Jiang's moderate Taiwan policy.120 In the face of these two formidable military 
opponents and their coalition with Qiao and Li, Jiang felt that the need to reshuffle 
the CMC was more urgent especially promoting his own people into it. Because 
Jiang was unable to remove Liu and Zhang any sooner, he adopted outflanking 
tactics. Two younger generals were added to the vice-chairmanships of the CMC, 
in an attempt to weaken the functions and powers of Liu and Zhang. In September 
1995, General Zhang Wannian, the chief of the general staff, and General Chi 
Haotian, the minister of defence, were appointed as CMC vice-chairmen. 121 Both 
new vice-chairmen were viewed as Jiang's supporters but their degree of support 
differed. Zhang Wannian was widely seen as a strong supporter of Jiang. Because 
he was the biggest benefactor of Jiang's reshuffle in the military leading posts, he 
wanted to reciprocate Jiang's confidence. During the Taiwan crisis, he almost never 
criticised Jiang's Taiwan policy. This notwithstanding, he assumed a strong stand 
toward Taiwan and the US for the sake of the military's unity and stakes while 
seeking to win his own high reputation in the army.l2:?· Chi's support for Jiang was 
116. You Ji, 'Jiang Zemin: in guest of post-Deng supremacy', p. 8; Baum, Burying Mao, pp. 365-366. 
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very limited and not apparent. Chi sought to preserve the PLA interests rather more 
than he supported Jiang. His opinions on the Taiwan crisis were more aggressive 
than Zhang Wannian even being out of accord with Jiang's Taiwan policy.123 The 
behaviour of these two supporters of Jiang showed that support could not always 
be translated into loyalty and control. Meanwhile, Liu and Zhang Zhen retained 
their first and second ranking vice-chairmanships despite expecting to be eased out 
in two years. Although their power was shared with two new CMC vice-chairmen, 
both veterans retained their deGisive roles in discharging the CMC responsibilities 
and their powerful political influence. 
After augmenting the vice-chairmanships of the CMC, the unfavourable situation 
for Jiang in the military's hierarchy had been partially remedied but had not been 
fundamentally changed. The military continued firmly preserving its own vital 
interests, speaking with one voice in general. Even Jiang's protege, Xiong 
Guangkai, the then director of the PLA intelligence department, was belligerent 
beyond Jiang's moderate Taiwan policy during the Taiwan crisiS. 124 In late 1995, 
Xiong aired the strongest anti-American views threatening to incinerate Los 
Angeles with nuclear destruction if America should come to the aid of Taiwan. 125 
Retired PLA generals remained important. They took the opportunity of the 
strained PRC-US relations and cross-Strait tensions to regain military com-
mands. 126 They had been very active during the Taiwan crisis and frequently 
interfered in interlinked policies toward Taiwan and the US. 127 This strengthened 
the military's influence upon Jiang on decisions concerning Taiwan putting heavier 
pressure on him. Although Jiang deliberately whipped the military into line, he was 
still not in a position of control. After the appointments of Zhang Wannian and Chi 
Haotian, the military, as a whole, remained strongly positioned to articulate and 
press its views upon Jiang on the interlinked policies toward Taiwan and the US. 
Until the question of leadership succession was decisively resolved, the challenges 
by the contenders for Deng's heirship forced Jiang to rely increasingly on the 
military. The military's crucial role in the post-Deng succession and Jiang's 
inability to control it determined that Jiang had to accept its adventurist plans of 
conducting war games during the Taiwan crisis. 
The military's role in pressing upon Jiang Zemin the adoption of strong 
measures against Taiwan128 
From the outset, the military looked unfavourably on Jiang's eight-point proposal 
on the Taiwan issue, and became increasingly opposed. 129 Jiang had sought to 
123. Lu Wei min. 'The military criticises Deng Xiaoping', p. 21; YiFan, 'The top military leaders brag', pp. 29-30. 
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embark on his moderate Taiwan policy with the backing of the military hut failed. 
The military had consistently advocated a tough line with Taiwan. His moderate 
policy with eight points was perceived as weakness by the military. The idea of a 
more accommodating Taipei would pose awkward questions for the military to 
consider the immensity of the stake. Bearing in mind the range of strategic, 
political and economic interests involved, it had managed to prevent Jiang from 
going too far along with his mild line on Taiwan. 
Shortly before the publication ofJiang's Eight-Points, on 12-25 December 1994, 
the Ministry of National Defence and the General Staff Department held a 
symposium entitled 'the Strategic Principle toward Taiwan'. Most top military 
leaders attended the symposium and General Chi Haotian, Minister of Defence, 
delivered a bellicose speech. He believed that cross-Strait relations were in tension 
and wished to step up combat readiness while preparing to deal with anned 
intervention by the United States and its allies over the Taiwan issue. The 
symposium discussed the issues of Taiwan policy and determined the nature of Lee 
Teng-hui as separatist and hostile in light of his political behaviour and policy 
direction. The military's mainstream viewpoints were summarised and eight points 
for dealing with Taiwan were brought forward, advocating a firmer approach. The 
military's eight points deemed that Lee Teng-hui's administration was pursuing 
Taiwan independence, asserting that Lee's cross-Strait policy was hostile to 
mainland China. While Taipei kept on intending to create two Chinas, or one 
China, one Taiwan, or Taiwan independence, the PRe would impose a blockade of 
Taiwan or take resolute military actions to thoroughly settle the reunification 
issueYo Thereby, in terms of Taiwan policy, the military's eight points were 
diametrically opposite to Jiang's eight points. The military's eight points did not 
mention peaceful reunification at all, and denied that there would be the possibility 
of reaching a consensus on the reunification issue through negotiations and 
consultations between Beijing and Taipei. They were based on contemplating the 
use of force to achieve reunification while proposing that only after reunification by 
military means could the 'one country, two systems' be exercised in Taiwan. This 
demonstrated that the military was still preparing for the use of force in settling the 
Taiwan issue despite Jiang planning to offer his peaceful overtures toward Taipei. 
Worse still, soon afterwards, the military implemented its tough policy toward 
Taiwan. On 30 January 1995, the same day that Jiang offered his overtures with 
eight propositions toward Taiwan, the PRC military high command deployed new 
missile forces in areas opposite Taiwan. The PLA missile unit moved its M-class 
missile bases from the inland province of Jiangxi to the coastal province of Fujian, 
opposite Taiwan. This constituted a new military threat to the island, although Jiang 
took the initiative launching his smile offensives. The military's fresh heavy 
mms build-up directed at Taiwan indicated its disapprobation of Jiang's approach 
to Taiwan placing him at a disadvantage in accommodating Taipei. This under-
cut the significance of his eight-point proposal, arousing Taipei's suspicion about 
his sincerity in developing cross-Strait relations and promoting peaceful 
[30. Yi Fan. 'Communist China prepares public opinion for forcible invasion of Taiwan'. pp. 25-26. 
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reunificationY' More crucial, the militaIy's demonstrations exposed Jiang's inabil-
ity to rein in the PLA and his weak and unstable leadership. 
After the publication of Jiang's eight-point proposal on Taiwan, the military 
viewed it as a weak policy. The militmy had been critical of it and had tried hard 
to revise it. 132 In response to Lee Teng-hui's US visit, the military was extremely 
critical, in sharp contrast with Jiang's restrained attitude, demonstrating its disap-
proval of Jiang's moderate Taiwan policy. Shortly after the Clinton Administration 
decided to issue a visa to Lee on 22 May 1995, the militmy immediately made a 
harsh response. On 23 May, the Commander of the PLA Air Force Yu Zhenwu cut 
short his US tour and returned home. On 26 May, Minister of Defence Chi Haotian 
postponed a planned visit to the US.'33 In the meantime, the militmy had taken a 
hardline and aggressive position while exerting powerful pressure on Jiang. On 24 
May, the Ministry of National Defence, the General Staff Department, the Navy, 
the Air Force and the Second Artillery Corps wrote a letter jointly to the State 
Council and the CMe. It demanded that the PRC government take firm and 
substantive steps to counter the provocation of the American authorities and adopt 
essential measures against the Taiwan authorities. The Ministry of National 
Defence and the Second Artillery Corps even proposed that the PRC should cut off 
political relations and military contacts with the US as a first in a series of strong 
measures.'34 On 2 June, the General Political Department, the General Logistics 
Department, the General Staff Department and the Commission of Science, 
Technology and Industry for National Defence submitted a proposal jointly to the 
State Council and the CMe. It proposed that the party's central leadership should 
revise the PRC guiding principle and policy toward the US while remaking Taiwan 
policy. It also demanded the party's central leadership take countermeasures to deal 
with a deterioration in PRC-US relations and a radical change in cross-Strait 
relations.135 Member of the party's Politburo Standing Committee and First CMC 
Vice-Chairman Liu Huaqing had played a leading role in pressing the military's 
opinion upon Jiang. In the symposium attended by the commanders of all services 
and arms as well as military colleges on 19 June, and the Party Congress of the 
Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence on 22 June, 
Liu declared that the PRC would adopt military means to settle the Taiwan issue 
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and smash the scheme of Taiwan independence. 136 This whipped up belligerent 
sentiments and cut down Jiang's room for diplomatic and political solutions to the 
disputes in PRC-US relations and cross-Strait relations. In cooperation with Liu, 
Second CMC Vice-Chairman Zhang Zhen focused on criticising Jiang's guiding 
principle on the US, stirring up indignation against the US and reducing Jiang to 
a passive position. On 24 May, Zhang pointed out emphatically that Jiang's policy 
toward the US had taken overmuch account of the relationship with the US, and 
actually there were four aspects which were more important. Zhang called for 
preparation for a showdown between the PRC and the US while demanding a 
change in the US policy.137 Further, the PLA chiefs claimed that Jiang's moderate 
eight-point policy toward Taiwan had failed because it stirred Lee to embark on his 
US visit. They demanded a re-explanation of Jiang's eight points to deter Taiwan 
from taking the road of independence. The military maintained that Beijing should 
take an intransigent attitude toward the US over Taiwan and should handle the 
issue with a high hand. Jiang was under tremendous military pressure to escalate 
responses mainly in response to Lee's US visit. 138 
Both senior military officers and retired generals severely criticised Jiang's soft 
stance on Taiwan and the US, even challenging his successor position. In the 
symposium marking the 50th anniversary of the War of Resistance Against Japan 
on 20 June, retired PLA generals accused Jiang of being weak in policies toward 
Taiwan and the US. They started a revolt angrily reproaching him for behaviour 
injurious to national security and party-state interests. Jiang was rebuked for his 
weakness and incompetence as well as neglect of duty, and his resignation was 
demanded. Some veterans proposed that Jiang should be substituted by other 
candidates for Deng's successor as early as possible. With unanimous resolution, 
these retired PLA generals backed incumbent generals and main military depart-
ments to press their opinions upon Jiang. In addition, more than 50 retired generals 
wrote a letter in joint names to the party's Central Committee, the State Council 
and the CMC. It put forward an II-point proposal to demand the adoption of tough 
policies toward Taiwan and the US and settle the Taiwan issue by force. It 
emphatically proposed stepping up combat readiness for a military conflict in the 
Taiwan Strait while making preparations for American armed intervention. Worried 
about the threat of retired PLA generals to his right of succession, Jiang took their 
strong demands seriously. On 4 July, he met seven leading retired generals 
responding to their proposals with two guarantees. He assured them that the party's 
central leadership would substantively respond to American hegemonist provoca-
tions with resolute measures while deploying military forces to meet an attack of 
the US army. He also pledged himself not to permit the Taiwan independence force 
headed by Lee Teng-hui to separate the country promising to take resolute military 
measures to resolve the reunification issue. 139 The interference by retired PLA 
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generals in interlinked policies toward Taiwan and the US in effect became part of 
the official military's positions on tensions over Taiwan, fuelling the military to 
flex its political muscle to press Jiang to accept its views. 
An attack by the military on the civilian departments concerned was an important 
part of pressing Jiang to take a tougher posture against Taipei and Washington. The 
military launched fierce offensives against the civilian departments concerned for 
their soft stands. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) did not advocate 
aggravating tension over Lee Teng-hui's US visit while the Taiwan Affairs Office 
(the TAO) objected to any retaliatory measures more than strictly necessary. 
However, their reasonable voices were overridden by the powerful military.140 
While criticising the TAO, the military focused on accusing the MFA of adopting 
weak positions and wrong moves. A lot of military officers satirised the MFA as 
the ministry of traitors. Jiang himself was politically vulnerable and struggled to 
defend his successor position,. he was unable to protect the civilian departments 
concerned from these attacks. His moderate interlinked policies toward Taiwan and 
the US were compromised. The military concentrated on bringing an accusation 
against the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, who was 
concurrently the CTWLG (the Central Taiwan Work Leading Group) deputy-head. 
In mid-July, the hawks within the Ministry of National Defence and the Com-
mission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence raised doubts 
about the diplomatic line and strategic principle on the US of the MFA led by Qian. 
Their attacks on Qian and demands for his dismissal were in fact aimed at Jiang, 
in an attempt to force him to change his soft-line and toughen his stance toward 
Taiwan and the US. 141 In mid-l 995, the CTWLG (the Central Taiwan Work 
Leading Group) Secretary-General Wang Zhaoguo, Politburo Member and Director 
of the Taiwan Affairs Office, was replaced by Xiong Guangkai, the military's 
representative on the CTWLG despite Wang retaining CTWLG membership. 142 
This indicated that the military was playing a larger role in the formulation of US 
and Taiwan policy, helping to make policies preferred by itself. In rifts between the 
military and the civilian leadership, Jiang yielded to the military, reducing the 
functions and powers of the civilian departments concerned in handling of US and 
Taiwan affairs. The aggressive positions taken by the military forced both Jiang 
and the civilian leaders and departments concerned to toughen their stands. 
Succession politics and the Taiwan crisis provided the military with the opportu-
nities to greatly influence interlinked policies toward Taiwan and the US in the 
quest of its vital interests. The military's severe criticism sent warning messages to 
Jiang. He was fearful of losing his successor position, which had been threatened 
by the anti-Jiang coalition of the military with the contenders for the leadership 
succession. In order to retain his succession to supreme power, he bowed to the 
pressures, issuing his self-criticism to the emergency enlarged meeting of the 
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Political Bureau on 28 May for failing to prevent Lee Teng-hui from visiting 
the US. By and large, the military expressed satisfaction with this self-criticism, but 
the hawks within the General Staff Department and the Ministry of National 
Defence still assailed Jiang for his Right-deviationist mistakes in the CMC enlarged 
meeting on 2 June. 143 
Although Jiang had undertaken self-criticisms and had expressed his aspiration 
that he would adopt strong measures to deal with Taipei and Washington, he was 
hesitating to counterattack Lee -Teng-hui's political provocations and American 
diplomatic provocations with military action. Hardliners urged Jiang to take one 
further step to escalate responses, in particular, a military response to Lee's US 
visit. When Jiang took no action, the contenders for the leadership succession and 
the military joined forces to press Jiang to make a decision to strongly retaliate 
against Taipei and Washington. Premier Li Peng and two CMC Vice-Chairmen, 
Admiral Liu Huaqing as well as General Zhang Zhen, took the opportunity of 
Jiang's visit to Germany and Poland to make a plan to conduct war games and fire 
missiles into the sea near Taiwan. After he returned from abroad, Jiang was 
immediately confronted with the accomplished plan. Jiang had to accept a fait 
accompli perforce endorsing the plan even if he did not favour such military 
adventures. 144 In the meantime, the military supported Qiao Shi and Li Ruihuan 
attacking Jiang for his weak responses to Lee's US visit and pressing Jiang to 
change the line on Taiwan and the US. 145 The joint actions of the military with 
these three rivals for the leadership succession demonstrated, in fact, there was an 
anti-Jiang coalition. The formation of the coalition was according to their respect-
ive political needs. The military wanted its own strategic, political and economic 
interests, which would not oust Jiang from office so long as he could satisfy it with 
concessions. However, if Jiang failed to consent to a military response, it was likely 
that the military would withdraw its support for him. Meanwhile, Jiang's three 
rivals were committed to replacing Jiang as Deng's successor. They were ready to 
stand in with the military because they lacked the political strength to eject Jiang 
from power. Although their respective ends were different, coalitionists were ready 
to join hands. The military's joint forces with Jiang's principal rivals affected his 
successor position, making him vulnerable to criticism and pressure. Jiang was 
fearful that the military might shift its support from him to his contenders. 146 The 
infighting for the leadership succession within the highest echelons of power in 
Beijing appeared to have put Jiang on a collision course with the coalition. In order 
to prevent the coalition from undermining his position as the heir of Deng, Jiang 
had to accept the plan of physically intimidating Taiwan. 
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144. Sha Ming, 'The military exercises in East Sea', pp. 32-34. 
145. Shao Jiang, 'Jiang Zemin signed treaties in Shanghai in order to prevent from Qiao Shi's political influence', 
Cheng Ming Monthly No. 224, (June 1996), pp. 28-30. 
146. For a brief analysis of the military's joint forces with the contenders for the leadership succession to press 
military action against Taiwan upon Jiang, see Edward Friedman, 'The prospects of a larger war: Chinese nationalism 
and the Taiwan Strait conflict'. in Suisheng Zhao. ed" Across the Taiwan Strait, p. 262. 
572 
